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## APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY



# APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY

*Some Contemporary Conceptions  
Used in Psychology and Psychiatry*

BY  
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Accounts of psychiatry written by psychologists are almost like translations of Faust into French; much of their logic and idiom is lost. The interpreter, realizing that these products are unassimilated aliens, usually thins down the doctrines to make them digestible, or, in proselytizing zeal, selects passages which the reader is likely to approve. Equally serious difficulties arise when psychiatrists attempt to redefine psychological systems which have arisen in the laboratory or the study. That we have not "smoothed out" our differences of opinion will be obvious. Despite much lip-reading, each seems rather hard of hearing when in the other's presence. The reader who attends closely may discover whether this is an organic or a functional deafness, and may be able to grasp more clearly than we do the point at which our approaches seem likely to meet.

The confusion in the contemporary psychology of personality is considerable. Yet it is apt to appear greater than it really is, for emphasis is apt to be upon defining the ways in which one's own school differs from another. The impression seems to have gotten abroad that psychology is a collection of schools, viewpoints, approaches, attacks, or, in the language of the academy, "alternative modes of conceptual analysis," or "mutually exclusive sets of presuppositions." One reads that since behaviorism or psychoanalysis or *Gestalt* psychology denies the premises upon which other schools proceed, one must, perforce, abandon everything that has been found out and "consign to the waste-basket" not only the presuppositions of other schools, but even the most definite results of their research work. Books like the *Battle of Behaviorism* give one, as Woodworth remarks, the impression "that we are at each other's throats," and that until a good deal more tearing and clawing has been done, we shall not be able to proceed.

Actually all this is most strange when one considers the fact that fifty journals of psychology are being published, most of which are concerned primarily with research investigations. Annual meetings of the American Psychological Association,

biennial congresses of the German psychologists, and International Congresses of Psychology, too, present us solid compendia of new contributions, for the most part offered in the same spirit in which astronomers, physicists or biologists offer their new findings.

The interpretation of results involves, of course, more or less guessing and groping. But this groping is of the sort always used in science; it is the formulation of hypotheses or tentative explanations which are to be tested by the next set of experiments. No hypothesis cuts much of a figure in science unless it can be tested. And many of the hypotheses offered by psychologists can be tested by anyone who will acquire the necessary information and technical skill, quite aside from predilections for "schools," approaches, or points of view. Of course, some of our hypotheses are so stated that they cannot be tested. Consider, for example, problems like the following: the relation of body to mind; the relation of the thing known to the person who knows it; the relation between experience and consciousness; whether the conscious is more mighty than the unconscious; whether the unconscious exists; whether consciousness exists. Here are problems which cannot be discussed at all intelligibly until many complicated matters of terminology are cleared up, and until some degree of unanimity exists with regard to the present-day significance of the systematic philosophies out of which these problems arose.

Now the *value* of psychological schools lies precisely in the fact that their characteristic viewpoints result in all sorts of interesting investigations and *hypotheses to be tested*; and the danger of schools lies in their equally evident tendency to run to dogmatic generalizations of a sort permitting no testing. In the former sense, the schools are expressions of interest and energy; in the latter sense, they tend, to speak candidly, to generate a paranoid system of rigid dogmas. To overlook the distinction between these two aspects of psychological "schools" is to miss most of the point of modern psychological controversy. For it is of the very essence of science to test

hypotheses against the results of research, and to proceed to formulate new hypotheses which can in turn be tested. The actual structure of modern psychology consists chiefly of verified hypotheses, or of hypotheses which are being tested. As the ratio of testable to untestable hypotheses increases, the common ground between the schools will increase, until, in the course of time, the schools will exist only in the happy hunting ground of the historian.

In the meantime, various psychological approaches exist, and fruitful hypotheses continue to come from them. But whereas this book aims to seize upon several of the points of advantage which an eclectic or polyglot exposition can claim, it is no place for the reader to find a systematic, expansive, and elaborately constructed presentation of any single doctrine. One cannot perfectly understand *Gestalt* psychology or behaviorism or psychoanalysis or individual psychology by scrutinizing the sketches which are presented here. Their purpose is to whet the appetite, not to satisfy it. In the same connection it must be emphasized that a deliberate endeavor has been made to avoid the sort of technical exposition of psychological systems which is suitable for advanced students of psychology. *The Psychologies of 1930* (edited by Carl Murchison) and the recent volume by R. S. Woodworth entitled *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* will serve the purpose of such readers more adequately than will the present volume.

There is, however, a much more fundamental difference between the present volume and those which undertake chiefly to compare the basic principles of psychological *schools*. Some of the schools are concerned with problems which have but little to do with *personality*. They examine, for example, cross sections of consciousness, or the nature of the raw material which underlies all mental realities, or the physics and chemistry of particular actions. Systematic psychologists are, in fact, frequently hostile to the emphasis given to the psychology of personality, believing (probably with justice) that

there are crucial and fundamental psychological problems which have nothing to do with the nature of personality as ordinarily understood. This volume is definitely not a description of complete systems of psychology; it is concerned with psychological schools only as they bear upon the study of personality. A further difference lies in the fact that many of the most fruitful approaches to personality have appeared in recent years among students and research workers who are themselves members of no psychological school, and whose work must be classified not in terms of systematic presuppositions but in terms of concrete methods and results. Most of the quantitative studies of personality, for example, are only in small degree indebted to systematic scholarly psychology. They are not school psychologies at all, but direct techniques for the study of personality. They have about as much to do with psychological schools as the techniques of civil engineering have to do with the respective theoretical systems of physics associated with the names of Galileo and Einstein.

Approaches to personality change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. An approach which seems reasonably adequate today may tomorrow prove to be unsound. We are not even sure what are the main or crucial principles which must be applied in order to make our present approaches useful. In a sense the complexity, the every-which-way-ness of contemporary psychology makes any definition of what its central problems are profoundly misleading. A psychologist who tries to keep up with his field may trot about in a great library between the branches or departments assigned to education and to physiology, to anthropology and to statistics, to economics and to zoölogy, to sociology and to politics; he may spend hours among the educational journals and days in medical libraries; but he is never up-to-date, never master of his field, never secure in the sense that he has covered the available literature on the topic on which he will next lecture or write. He knows perfectly well that next month's *Psychological Abstracts* will

bring him an account of several hundred more pieces of research (for this is the rate at which the material is now appearing) and that at least a half dozen of the new articles will contain research which will worry, disorganize, or even upset the reasoned conclusions to which he had fought his way.

Though this is true of almost every aspect of psychology, it is peculiarly true with reference to the study of personality. Some aspects of psychology have been pursued long enough and by sufficiently exact methods to give a fairly solid foundation upon which new work may be built. Only when some genius appears on the scene is any very drastic reconstruction apt to seem necessary. The study of personality, on the other hand, has been pursued neither so long nor by such exact methods. There are quite literally many approaches to personality, tentative, suggestive, offering glimpses of what may ultimately be a solid and substantial science. For this reason each chapter has been written, so far as possible *from the point of view of the school represented*.\*

This book, then, is a comparison of a few of the efforts of psychologists and psychiatrists to analyze, to measure, to classify, and to understand human personalities. It is an attempt to show a little of what the psychological schools and an army of eclectic technicians have contributed to plumbing the depths and analyzing the structure of the functioning self. Much of the work, as is always the case in science, is the formulation of hypotheses—hypotheses invoked to impose order upon unruly and otherwise undisciplined facts. How far the hypotheses succeed in making the facts work together to the common purpose of giving us a deeper insight, and how far they do injury to the facts which they seek to interpret, the reader will have to judge for himself. For these are but approaches. We do not believe that anyone today can seriously undertake to say that he knows what personality is. The prob-

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\* Thus, for example, F. J. in Chapter IV tries to see things from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, and G. M. in Chapter III tries to see things behavioristically. Our purpose is to see *where these ideas lead*, not to plead or persuade.

## INTRODUCTION

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lem is not only baffling and intricate; the very intensity of our interest distorts our vision and blinds us to approaches which might be still more fruitful. After all, however, we have begun to learn something, and even in the midst of our uncertainty it may be well to point out some of the paths which may lead toward an understanding.

G.M.

*March 1932*

F.J.



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*PART ONE:*

THE APPROACH FROM EXPERIMENTAL  
PSYCHOLOGY



# APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY

## CHAPTER ONE

### GESTALT AND TYPE


THAT the whole is equal to the sum of its parts is not even admitted by the geometer when he speaks candidly. He knows, as every one of us knows who mends a broken plate, that the way in which the parts are put together is the essence of the totality. When you add up a column of figures, it makes no difference in which order you put the numbers. But in putting bits of stained glass together to make a window, or lines to make a drawing, the problem of creating something is only in small part a problem in summation; it is almost entirely a problem of organization. The stained-glass-window analogy will, in fact, serve us well for a consideration of the *Gestalt* psychology.

A clock has been taken apart and must be put together again. But suppose the parts of the clock, though properly classified in the inventory, are put together amateurishly; the parts are all there; the whole, the sum of its parts, is reconstituted; yet the clock is not a clock, for it will not go. Surely the whole is no mere sum of its parts; surely the way the parts are assembled is no mere detail, but rather the essence of the distinction between an organic unity and a meaningless junkpile of irrelevant wheels, bearings, and jewels. As Plato would have said, the idea of clockness is wanting.

Glance at the following figure. Does what you see consist of the sum of the parts? Curious, is it not, that whereas the parts remain constant, the whole is somewhat different from moment to moment? Is consciousness, or experience, at any

moment actually composed, then, of parts? If it were, would not the assemblage of parts always bring back the same whole?

No, not even in physics or chemistry, not even in the geometry of the block in which you live or the time relations of the melody to which you listen, can the form, the organization, the pattern by which wholes are constituted ever be treated as mere parts of a total.



"Thus, if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man."<sup>1</sup> With such words, John Locke sounded the clarion note of the "association" psychology, which for more than two centuries proclaimed that mental states are made up of simple elements added to one another.

And despite many disclaimers, the new experimental psychology of the late nineteenth century was a radically analytic science; it sought to burst asunder any complex mental state or process and catalogued the fragments. The fundamentally analytic trend of the psychology of 1900 is clearly shown in the events of 1900 to 1915. For when Bekhterev<sup>2</sup> in Russia and Watson<sup>3</sup> in the United States began to protest against introspective method, and to write an "objective psychology," they assumed, without as much as thinking about the matter,

that the important thing was simply to divide men up not into subjective fragments (ideas), but into objective fragments (reflexes). A revolution, despite all this, was brewing.

The study of the *perception of motion*<sup>4</sup> led in 1912 to Wertheimer's doctrine that the association of a number of psychical elements fails to explain the total experience. From this arose the doctrine that the description of parts and their connections never tells the nature of the whole; that, in fact, the whole is no mere sum of its parts, but a totality, an integer, a form, the nature of which must be directly grasped. There must be an end of elements. Just as chemical analysis of living tissues destroys life, rendering the mere chemical description inadequate as a description of the total reality, so the reduction of mental states to elements destroys that unity, that organization, which is mental life itself. It is of the very nature of a process of perception or thought to have organization, and this mode of organization is the reality beside which the supposed elements are but pitiful abstractions. Emphasis was placed upon the *Gestalt* or form of experience rather than upon elements of any sort. (Though we personally see no reason why *Gestalt* should not be translated *form*, as it is in most scientific and literary work, we must defer to the general opinion of the "Gestalters" that neither "form" nor "pattern" nor "configuration" accurately renders the German term.)

Koffka and Köhler were "laboratory animals" for Wertheimer; it was they in fact who from first-hand experience knew what these total forms or Gestalten were. With vigor and clarity they began a frontal attack upon the methods and conceptions of psychology, an attack which could scarcely be heard, of course, during the world chaos of the War, but which began shortly after the Armistice to command attention. The Gestalt school has been exceedingly prolific in experimental researches, especially upon visual perception,<sup>5</sup> and has enjoyed a popularity partly due to the enthusiasm and good temper of its advocates, partly to its bold endeavors to prove the novel proposition that elements and parts have no exist-


ence, and partly, of course, to fed-up-ness with other schools and the sheer love of a new idea for its own sake.

It is probable also that the mechanical character of both orthodox psychology and Watsonian behaviorism were felt by students of psychology to be in ill accord with the whole trend in contemporary biology, which, though it may be mechanistic, is scarcely mechanical. A psychologist may believe that the ultimate interpretation of organic laws lies in physics and chemistry, but he knows that the fitting of pieces together, considering each new piece as something to be *added* to what was there before, is not an effective method of dealing with the organic and dynamic unity of either animals or men. There had been frequent gestures by the behaviorists in the direction of an "organismic" psychology, but for better or for worse most of the behaviorists had not listened.


Now it seems to us that the Gestalters have made a much bigger contribution than they realize; that their claims have been too modest and in large part irrelevant; that an actual consideration of what they have done shows the movement to be of astounding significance, not only to psychology, but to other sciences and to philosophy. The progress of science has, of course, been in part the process of stating in exact form the things which everyone knew in a vague kind of way. The difference between "common sense" and the real science on which our modern engineering and medicine, for example, are based, depends upon the proper manipulation of *quantities*, that is, upon measurement and the mathematical study of the interrelations between measurements. Quantitative method in psychology had, despite the genius of Fechner<sup>6</sup> and Ebbinghaus,<sup>7</sup> thrown but feeble rays into the darkness of the vast unknown which the new science sought boldly to explore. But the Gestalt psychology is really a *quantitative* psychology, as few of its devotees have clearly pointed out or made articulate.<sup>8</sup>

Let us turn to experimental evidence. Every experiment in optics and acoustics shows a certain *discontinuity* or break be-

tween one form of experience and another. Take this simple optical effect, for example.



Here you can see the staircase as if you were about to climb it from A to B, or as if you stood beneath it. In case the alteration of the two modes of seeing it does not immediately appear, imagine yourself taking hold of C, pulling it sharply toward you, and you will probably get the effect. Now try hard to see the figure as if it were absolutely flat; try to destroy the three-dimensional effect. The reason why you do not succeed is the fact that there are two fundamental forms or patterns or Gestalten here, which are absolutely discontinuous. They are just as different as circles and squares, and unless we go to work and reorganize our entire mental furniture in relation to this problem, we shall not be able to break up these patterns. Now the two ways of seeing this staircase differ no whit from the three or more ways in which one may see the following group of dots.



You can see them in patterns of three or of four, or as an X with dots thrown north, south, east, and west. On the other hand, these different modes of organization are distinct and dis-

continuous. You cannot group the dots in groups of three and a half. You cannot split a given dot and arbitrarily combine it with the fraction of another dot. You cannot, in other words, fill in the space between two Gestalten. That these Gestalten are *quantitative* modes of organization is evident from the very material which has been used. The pattern is a spatial pattern within psychological space, that is, the space of the world which you experience.

The problem is the same in the world of hearing or touching. You may perhaps have tried the experiment of listening to a metronome, or listening to a simple melody, combining the notes in such a way that they make different patterns. You can even train yourself to "feel" the accent at different places. But there is a limit to the number of different patterns which you can make out of the metronome ticks or the melodies; and what is more important, these patterns have a psychological will of their own; there are particular patterns which are psychologically possible, and in between these there are simply no patterns which one can make. In other words, these psychological patterns, which are defined quantitatively, and which are just as much a matter of number as are the patterns used in physics or chemistry, present exactly the same kind of disjointedness, the same love of leaping from one form to another across a bottomless abyss, that we see in the case of the physical world.

Now let us look at this matter of "disjointedness" or discontinuity a little more closely; obviously since the same "elements" may be grouped in different patterns of relationship, the crux of the problem is to see why relationships should show discontinuity.

Shall we make a compromise with John Locke's psychology, agreeing that the relations between parts are new elements, a kind of element which he had neglected, but, after all, elements serving their rôle in the total experience as any other elements may do? No, we can scarcely compromise, and that for two reasons: First, if the relations are simply new elements, we

elements and the new relational elements; and we should find ourselves in an infinite regressus. But our second objection is more final, and makes even the beginning of a compromise quite hopeless. The fact is that wholes simply are not made up out of parts, not even in the physical world, and certainly not in psychology. The percept, for example, of a cross is not the sum of an agglomeration of sensations contributed by the separate arms of the cross. The cross is a cross first of all. The "arms" are only recognized after the cross has been perceived as a whole. If, for example, you keep your eye fixed upon a point before you and gradually swing an object from the side inwards toward the center of your field of vision, you will find that long before you see the parts out of which the total object is said to be composed, you will see the whole; the object is, so to speak, fractionated, chopped up more and more, as it comes under closer and closer inspection. Triangles, rectangles, circles, for example, are as elemental as anything which can be said to have existence in the world of experience. We do not first see the lines and then put them together. We see the square or triangle and then analyze out the lines.

Yes, says the lover of mental elements, so we do in some cases, but all this is the result of our first experiences. We have but associated, tied together, various sense elements; and these elements are so tightly bound together that we could not, even if we would, see the world again as it first appeared to our naïve childish observation.

Very well then, the appeal is to past experience, and to past experience we must go. Let us not, however, content ourselves with schoolroom or even kindergarten observations. Let us go back, with Volkelt,<sup>9</sup> to the very first acts of perception in the child's life. Let us consider the development of the perception, for example, of space and of color. The discrimination of forms has been investigated with truly German enthusiasm and thoroughness, and dozens of monographs have appeared in which the actual process of perceptual development has been delineated. The evidence seems to prove that the little child's first visual experiences are global totals, lumps from which, so

to speak, bits are broken off as experience and especially as language makes discrimination possible. French and Swiss studies as well, usually with special emphasis upon linguistic growth, have made clear how very meager and insignificant is the process of synthetic association, or the piling of parts upon one another, the mere accretion or agglutination of new particles.<sup>10</sup> The parts are, indeed, not recognized at all unless there is need for their recognition. The whole process of analysis is carried through by the child only when it is forced upon him.

The appeal, then, to child psychology, and to "association," certainly sustains the claim that in psychology we begin with wholes, not with parts; that experience is no mosaic of pieces but, in its pristine and original form, a unit from which the process of living gradually splits off one part after another. Such parts may in turn be split up farther, if the exigencies of life force such distinctions upon us. This is what the Gestalters mean when they insist that their psychology objects not to analysis but to synthesis, not to the recognition of the process of individuation within the total mass, but to the assumption that merely putting the pieces together would somehow explain or give reality to the original Gestalt.

But time has come to carry the war into the enemies' country. Some lingering phrases in the above paragraphs bespeak a willingness to lapse after all into the language of parts and wholes. It is, nevertheless, the contention of the Gestalter that the whole problem of parts and wholes has been misconceived. Our evidence forces us to abandon this misleading terminology, and to look at the facts afresh. The profile below is a sketch of an



acquaintance of mine — not very artistic, to be sure. If you will look at it a few seconds more, you will notice some curious things; details which no photograph could possibly have rendered in the way the drawing renders them. This face is, after all, not a face at all. Yet many a cartoonist uses fewer lines than these. Now, the instant you first looked at the face you were probably quite unaware of details which, when considered piecemeal, could not possibly make up a part of any face. The total mode of organization so dominated the process of perception that the marks upon the paper were literally forced to do duty as symbols for an appearance quite unlike themselves. In what sense, then, can these marks be said to be *parts* of the whole perceptual total?

The whole is not the sum of its parts, *even* if the mode of organization be freely conceded to be all-important. On the contrary, the whole *determines* its parts,<sup>11</sup> not only their relation, but their very nature. A red blotch is, as far as we know, never simply a part of any landscape. On the contrary, all landscapes have the character of imposing upon each particle, abstracted from the whole, peculiar characteristics which must occur in that particular Gestalt, and could not possibly occur in any other.

The problem that we have been raising here as to whether wholes are made up of parts is, of course, a problem as to the nature of reality, not merely a problem within the sphere of psychology. If we were willing to speak of Gestalten as *patterns* in the ordinary sense of "modes of arrangement of parts" in time or space, we should not be concerned to go beyond the rough and ready common-sense observations upon which the popular appeal of Gestalt psychology depends. We maintain, however, that the whole actually determines its parts; in fact, that parts have no existence except insofar as attention flags and allows an aspect of a unified whole to stand out in relief for a moment, making a new Gestalt of its own. This is no mere revolution in psychology; the Gestalter demands nothing less than a new metaphysics, in which the part-whole rela-


tionship shall be irrevocably banished and the concept of unique characters, entities, or integers elevated to a position of genuine explanatory value. Atomic theories, elementarisms, structuralisms of all sorts must go. Instead of assuming, as the naïve chemist of the early nineteenth century assumed, or as the almost equally naïve physicist of the early twentieth century thought he had proved, that the physical world is made up of parts which are ultimately exactly alike, we shall have to say, as relativity says, that the nature of any alleged part depends upon the place it holds, and that modes of relationship are the only absolute which we can hope to know.

These modes of relationship, as known to physical sciences, are, of course, quantitative; and it is in the quantitative analysis of such relationships that the real heart of the problem of Gestalt lies. When one speaks of quantities, the suggestion is almost perforce conveyed that one is dealing with a continuum, the sort of gradation which space or mass or any other physical concept is supposed to present in its variation from small to large quantities. Actually, however, the world is *full of discontinuities*, and these are the clue to our problem.

Now, if we were willing to admit that visual Gestalten are mere geometric shapes, or that auditory Gestalten are mere tonal patterns, it would be possible to show in every case gradations from one to the next. There would be between the Gestalt of one man's face and another's an infinite series of faces. A sculptor could with his clay demonstrate to you all the transitions you like between any face and any other. Mere change of position in Euclidean space presents no problem of discontinuity, and so fails to interest us as Gestalters. If the mere recognition of the fact of spatial or temporal transitions were at stake, it would be well to turn to something more interesting. The essential contribution of Gestalt is, however, more impressive, more profound than this. It is content with nothing less than an answer to the problem of continuity and discontinuity in the realities out of which the world is made up. Just as Aristotle maintained that forms had existed eter-

nally and never mingled one with another, so the modern student of Gestalt notes the fundamental discontinuities of experience, the fundamental discreteness of the patterns of which life is composed; and, resolutely rejecting all compromises, presses forward to the determination of those Gestalten which are the ultimate and indivisible contributors to the world of experience. It is largely because of its interest in discontinuity that Gestalt psychology is important. The dependence of parts upon wholes was already coming to be recognized before the Gestalters raised their voices; but the further point that wholes display the principle of discontinuity has probably been brought out more clearly by Gestalters than by any one else (excepting possibly the students of "quantum theory" in physics).

The fundamental pattern which you must follow to draw an ellipse depends absolutely upon a mathematical equation. There are three kinds of equations for conic sections; from these you may draw ellipses, parabolas, and hyperbolas.



In Euclidean space there are three distinct ways in which a few simple quantities may combine. One may feel that it is arbitrary that they cannot combine in other ways. One may see no reason why there cannot be other forms or patterns besides these — patterns, for example, lying between the ellipse and the parabola. Now if the ellipse and the parabola were simply different lines in a continuous, orderly series, it would be possible to do so; but the perversity of Euclidean space<sup>12</sup> is such that there simply do not exist patterns intermediate between these. If the pattern of the ellipse be altered by as much as an infinitesimal (or if you like to use such conceptions, an infinitesi-

mal part of an infinitesimal), the curve must willy-nilly take an absolutely distinct form. The geometer's world is a world made up in large part of these absolute jumps or gaps. Now, of course, the geometer's world, though it is in a sense an abstraction, is also in a sense the ordinary physical world; and the absolute discontinuities which we have just noted are found throughout the world of physical science. Parabolas are real enough to serve for the reflector in an automobile headlight or a searchlight; ellipses are real enough to serve for the path which our own earth follows about the sun. Comets return to us after years or fly off farther into space, depending upon the mathematics of their orbits. Microscopes see or fail to see the bacilli which we kill or which may kill us because their lenses conform to mathematical laws. The physical world, in other words, is a world showing all these mathematical foundations which we have described as characteristic of geometry but minus the concepts which the mathematician uses to bridge the gaps; it is a world of jumps, of breaks, of chasms over which no thread of logic can lead us. We shut our eyes and jump as far as the structure of our minds permits.

Everyone who has spent a few moments with analytical geometry will remember those beautiful three-petal and four-petal roses which an apparently dry and indifferent equation will turn out for us. The mathematical structure of the world is at the same time the structure of its harmony. Just as symmetry and the more complex principles of design are ultimately matters of conformity or non-conformity to perfectly definite mathematical laws, so music insistently and eloquently proclaims the Pythagorean principle of numerical combinations as the sum and substance of what is beautiful. There are only a few properties, as a matter of fact, which define the character of the sound wave which carries us our music; and all are purely quantitative. No matter how delicious the sighing of the 'cello or how far away and mysterious the last harmonic of the flute, its nature, its whole self is there in an equation. Much butting of heads against walls has resulted from the attempt of the

aesthetician, the religionist, and the plain man to escape somehow from these evident facts, assigning a peculiar essence or qualitative nature to each of these obviously quantitative things. It may, for example, be argued that, whereas each part of a sound wave can be stated quantitatively, there is something about the quality of the tone or even of the harmony which is itself not quantitative. But this is exactly the weakest point in the qualitative view. The interrelation between pitch, intensity, and timbre is itself just as clearly mathematical as is any one of these taken alone.

In fact, mathematics revels in a presentation of systems of interrelationship. Most of the business of mathematics consists not in counting, but in stating the interrelations between different sets of numbers. Where our musical data are most clearly definable, namely, in the sound waves, their quantitative nature is most obvious. Color, of course, is a strictly quantitative thing too; that is to say, physical color as the objective thing which arouses in us the experience of red, green, or what not, just as in referring to the sound wave reference is not to experience but to stimulus. Not only color, but all the rest of the designer's and painter's art relies similarly for its effect upon an interrelation between certain quantities. The case in regard to sculpture is almost as perfectly plain as it is for music; for sculpture cannot say anything at all except in the language of geometry, that is, in terms of points, lines and surfaces bearing highly specific quantitative relations. The world from which we define our values, in which we find beauty, to which we ascribe non-quantitative meanings is, despite all this, a quantitative world.

The only realm in which such principles had until recently failed of applicability is the realm of pure, or if you like, raw experience, the realm of sights, sounds, and feelings; and it is this realm in which science had made least progress. The really astounding thing about the Gestalt psychology is the clarity with which the genuine quantitative organization of inner experience itself has been stated. The probability is

opened to us that the realm of sights, sounds, and feelings as they succeed one another in varied experience is at last yielding to the same universal quantitative analysis which has now for four centuries given us such insight as we have into the nature of the world. Kant believed that psychology could never be a science, for reasons which were perfectly true of the psychology of his own day. Comte and recently the behaviorists have believed that subjective data were by nature proscribed from the citadel of the mathematician. The last twenty years have shown clearly that all this is a mistake; the mathematical patterns of experience are actually in the process of discovery.

But why, you ask, must the world be patterned at all? Why can there not be things existing for their own sweet sake, detached, serene, and unorganized? Why must things always be related to other things and the total patterns thus constituted be related in turn to still other patterns? Why in fact, when mathematics is such a burden to nearly all of us, should the structure of the world be mathematical at all? Well, on this point you will have to consult the architect of the universe. Just as the Abbé Haüy<sup>13</sup> found that crystals formed in some ways and not in others, because numbers were so and so; just as Mendelyeev<sup>14</sup> found that the elements arranged themselves periodically because quantity was of the very nature of the supposed qualitative difference between chemical elements; just as studies of heredity have found that the almost infinitely complicated characteristics of the different members of a species are due not to mere likeness or unlikeness, but to the permutations and combinations of independent "genes" behaving according to the law of probability, so, even the psychologist, he who presides over the inner recesses of the mind, finds that it is a stranger, the mathematician, who has the key to the treasure.

Ordinarily when we talk of numbers, we think of quantities, and when we talk of quantities we think of numbers. There are cases, however, where you may have one without the other. The distinction between tall people and short people is absolutely valid and completely satisfactory whether your measurements

are made to a quarter of an inch or to a millionth of an inch. The exact number, in other words, is of no importance. If the world were made up simply of numbers and their combinations in the simple way that we have been assuming, it would make an immense difference whether a man is 1601 millimeters high or only 1600. The numbers are absolutely distinct. They are no more alike in themselves than are the numbers in a lottery. There would be just as much sense in a person with card 1601 claiming the lottery prize assigned to 1600 as there would be in regarding one man's height as the same as that of another a millimeter higher. If the forms or Gestalten which are the means of organization of the world are, as just asserted, absolutely distinct, it is hard to see what we are to do with those cases in which slight quantitative differences are naturally of no account. Nay, the difficulty goes farther; for the same objection may be raised to our argument even in the realm of physical science itself. When we were speaking of conic sections we pointed out that the difference between a parabola and an ellipse may be due to an infinitesimal; and it was upon such arguments as this that we rested our case for the existence of absolutely distinct quantitative patterns for the world and for experience. But one parabola may also differ from another parabola and one ellipse from another ellipse through the difference of an infinitesimal in the equations. Yet as we say, all ellipses belong to one family. They are but one Gestalt. Here, then, we find that there are cases where numbers make no difference, that is, where so long as we stay within a given continuum one point or another within the continuum has no influence whatever upon the mode of organization.

There is, then, another explanatory principle to be recognized in addition to that of discontinuity. Between two Gestalten there is an absolute abyss; and this is, as we have seen, because numbers at a certain point fall away into nothingness, and when we recommence on the other side we have to begin counting in a new way. Nevertheless, as long as we stay on one side of the abyss, numbers, so to speak, go on saying the same

thing. They all speak the same language, and their slightly different accent troubles no one. The world is made up, then, just as much of continuity as it is of discontinuity, just as much of transitions as of sharp jumps, just as much (to speak psychologically) of sensations as of Gestalten. To treat a sensation as though it were a clue to everything, and as if Gestalten were but groups of sensations, is to miss half the universe; but to treat the universe as if it were all Gestalten and as if within each Gestalt there were no place for analysis and no consideration of likenesses and differences would be to miss the other half of the universe. Why, after constructing the stellar and planetary systems, and the physical and chemical foundations of our life, on such an exalted pattern of Gestalten, nature should have sunk to mere continuity, mere family resemblance, between so many of her children, is a question we shall not attempt to solve. Perhaps it is because the discontinuity between the very principles of continuity and discontinuity is itself the most perfect of discontinuities.

#### GESTALT AND PERSONALITY

THE IMPLICATIONS of the Gestalt psychology for personality study have been for the most part but vaguely intimated or lightly sketched; they are considerably more direct and profound than most presentations of Gestalt doctrine would suggest. Most Gestalters have been anxious to prove the validity of their doctrine by reference to those fields in which direct experimental evidence speaks most cogently in their favor. The developmental psychology elaborated at Leipzig in recent years has many points of affinity with Gestalt doctrine on the one hand, and with the psychology of personality-growth on the other hand.<sup>15</sup> Gestalt psychology has equally clear affinity with some of the various type psychologies.<sup>16</sup> It is therefore among the brothers and sisters of Gestalt theory rather than in the theory itself that the immediate implications of the doctrine for the study of personality are most apparent. This,

however, is largely because the Gestalters have not been interested in elaborating the theory of personality, whereas that is exactly the thing which many of us are interested in elaborating.

Every innate tendency to action or every habit in the system of habits which characterize a person needs to be defined *with reference to something*. An innate capacity or an acquired taste can only be scientifically understood by stating its relation to the system of events of which it is an aspect. In exactly the same way that the physical sciences have in recent years more and more clearly recognized that an event must be defined in terms of its *relations* to a frame of reference, the student of the personal attributes of human beings is confronted with the relativity of all psychological events. It is true that there are aspects of life — such as acute pain or a rush of ecstasy — which are felt by the experiencer to be complete, final, self-sufficient, without resort to study of their interconnections with other things. This *is* adequate as far as the experience itself is concerned. In fact, we shall probably have to agree that all experiences can be taken as pure data, stripped of their “systematic interconnections.”<sup>17</sup> The minute, however, that this is done, science is empty. Science is concerned solely with systematic interconnections; it is a study of patterns of patterns. Now psychology as science is in the same way concerned not with the isolated reflexes or sensations or feelings, but rather with the ways in which dynamic totalities are organized in the functioning person. Just as the field of vision consists of a unity not to be explained by the summation of parts, so personality consists of a peculiar integration in which parts as parts are irrelevant. Here, for example, we have a peremptory challenge to the theory of piecemeal habit-formation; a stalwart protest against the reduction of the individual to an agglomeration of independent bits. There is a certain pattern, a hanging-togetherness, which distinguishes the man from the sum of his characteristics.

But stated in this form, we have come to the gateway of a

Gestalt doctrine rather than penetrated within its domain. For the organization or interconnection between traits might still be regarded as but a final touch, a decorative flourish. A person may be regarded as an assemblage of characteristics each of which is measured in its own appropriate units, and his personality defined in terms of the way in which the parts are put together. Now though the Gestalters need not reject all of this flatly, what chiefly interests them is here omitted. The parts of personality thus defined have only an external relation to one another. The unity is a nominal unity like the hypothetical sum of a number of fractions which have never yet actually been added. The Gestalter's chief interest lies, on the contrary, in determining the way in which the person is organized as a person and, exactly as we found necessary in the case of perception, the parts are to be understood not in isolation but as aspects reflecting the nature of the whole.

The organization is the important thing. It is evident, then, that a Gestalt theory of personality must be a *type* theory. It is not, as we shall see, the only kind of type theory of personality, for the term type has proved protean and elastic almost beyond description. Type, however, in the sense of form or pattern, clearly means a certain interlocking between the traits of character. But there are dangerous pitfalls here. One may proceed, for example, to say that type is simply a matter of "correlation."<sup>18</sup> We may, for example, study the correlations of traits and undertake to find the characteristic interrelation of traits in each personality. A certain endowment in one trait may be accompanied by any degree of endowment in each other trait.<sup>19</sup> All this, however, is, from the Gestalt standpoint, misleading. Such language implies that these traits are distributed in haphazard fashion. A type in the ordinary sense might be defined by a man's possession of ten units of trait 1, twelve of trait 2, etc., while another man might have five units of trait 1, twenty units of trait 2, etc. This sort of a composite of traits is of course no type at all. A Gestalt theory, on the contrary, would conceive the matter in terms of *necessary*

linkages or interconnections. Certain traits, or certain degrees of certain traits, can only appear in conjunction with certain other personal characteristics. A man with twelve units of trait 1 would *have* to have between six and eight units of trait 2, at least twenty units of trait 3, etc. Each Gestalt (like the ellipse) allows variation in organization, but it allows variation *only within certain limits*. In some cases the pattern may be simple, in others quite complex, but the essence of a Gestalt theory of personality is the doctrine of *character as form*, a form which, like an ellipse, can be predicted from knowledge of a number of points on the line. The consistent Gestalter thus maintains that there is discontinuity between different modes of organization as much in the case of personality as in that of a simple percept. The whole determines its parts just as truly in the case of personality as in the case of the simplest act of learning or reasoning.

Thus far we have been content to describe personality as seen from the point of view of cross sections in time. Just as a single perception, like the perception of motion, may in a given instant be, so to speak, frozen and preserved for further study, so the system of tendencies to action which comprise a person may be studied from the standpoint of a momentary glimpse or snapshot. The profound unsatisfactoriness of this method has been recognized by practically all psychologists, since James Mill a hundred years ago made clear that it is of the very nature of experience to be in a flux, within which the experience of change is as fundamental as any other aspect. In practice, the introspective psychologist, as Titchener made clear, is concerned not with the absolute cross section — what you could see, so to speak, if the time dimension were reduced to zero — but rather with very short intervals of change.<sup>20</sup> It is, Wundt and Titchener maintain, of the nature of consciousness to be perpetually wavering. All contemporary psychologies, however, have been dissatisfied with these short observations, and although the formulation has not always been explicit, they have tended more and more to ask the nature of the

change over a long period. There is, then, no logical place to stop until one has completed the life story of the individual's experience. This has meant, as is becoming more and more apparent, that all psychological systems, whether their protagonists desire it or not, tend to become studies of life histories.

The tendency, however, is more marked in some places than in others. The Gestalt psychology which Köhler<sup>21</sup> so ably applied to the study of apes was so naïve as to give but little attention to this long-range view of the problem of mental change. In fact, the most telling criticisms of Köhler's experimental work have had to do with his indifference to the previous experience of the animals whose capacity for sudden insight he described. The reference to "insight" into a spatial relationship, which makes a previously baffled animal suddenly cut through his difficulties to attain a solution, is seen either as a brilliant psychological discovery or the tiresome repetition of a very old error, depending entirely upon whether the past history of the animal could or could not have laid the basis for what seems to be a new insight. Many recent Gestalt experimenters, even when concerned entirely with perception and reasoning, recognize the point and scrupulously describe the conditions which precluded the possibility of previous experience in the situation where "insight" was exhibited.<sup>22</sup>

When the dynamic unity of the individual becomes the center of interest, as in the case of personality study, this point becomes even more obviously crucial. The self is never known by reference to short-time intervals. It is rather the swing and scope, the expanding or narrowing, bumping or smoothly gliding sequence of thoughts, feelings and decisions which tells what the man or woman really is.

When the point is thus stated, there is a natural temptation to regard it as too obvious to merit description. It is worth while, however, to recall that psychologists have but slowly and with much uncertainty fought their way to such a conception, that this genetic or changing picture of the self has been

as hard to achieve in psychology as a similar genetic method was to achieve in the biological sciences. From the point of view of the early nineteenth century, the sciences of anatomy and physiology, together with the newly developed science of histology, seemed to make of living things a perfectly harmonized, stable and static system. The beginnings of embryology in the 'twenties and 'thirties and the many evolutionary theories which finally culminated in Darwin's *Origin of Species* encountered opposition not merely from religious but from scientific opponents, frequently because a generally changing and unstable order of affairs was so foreign to deeply ingrained habits of scientific thought.

Even today the same reluctance to admit the evanescence of all which we call real shows itself repeatedly in the attempt to distinguish between those sciences which proceed by the historical method and those which proceed by the method of analysis. We are even told that the physical sciences can dispense with the historical method. The atom is an atom, and its previous incarnations may be disregarded. This seems to us the veriest nonsense. The phenomena of radio-activity surely bear continual witness to the unreality of the stable "substance"; and that most gloriously comprehensive of the physical sciences, astronomy, is as much concerned with history as are any of the human or "social" sciences. Dip into any contemporary text-book of astronomy and try to find something in which the problem of genesis does not appear. The time intervals may, in some cases, be short, sometimes long, but the solar system or, if you like, the spiral nebula is, so to speak, a personality defined by its history and the cutting edge into the future which its present tendencies exhibit.

One more confusion must be blown away — the assumption that absolute time, an evenly flowing stream, is but a new medium in which the events of life are to be described. The theory of wholes and parts denies us even this convenient concession to the absolutism of seventeenth-century science. Just

as the parts fail to explain the whole, so the past fails to explain the present or the present the future. The past, the present and the future are, from the point of view of science, one dynamic reality. At the present instant the future seems simply non-existent; and James may have been right in believing the universe to be so loosely hung together that the future is a bundle of realities disjoined from the present.<sup>23</sup> This, however, is not what our gradually increasing scientific insight into the world suggests. It suggests that change is so much in the very nature of reality that every present presupposes both a past and a future, each of which can be only what the total time-space structure of the universe permits. This does not mean that the present determines the future. This would be falling into the part-whole fallacy. Rather the past, present and future are all a mighty pattern in which temporal relations are themselves abstractions from the dynamic totality. The present is as much determined by the future as it is by the past, but of course it is not determined by either. It is rather an aspect of a total which is itself an aspect of a still larger pattern in reality.

The person then, as his biographer reveals him, is as legitimately understood at each stage in his life by reference to what came later as by reference to what came before. Genetic method, when Gestalt implications are fully grasped, means the attempt to apply the theory of patterning or organization as confidently and mercilessly to the items scattered about in time as to those scattered about spatially within the organism at a given moment.

We have not undertaken here to speak *for* the Gestalters in general or for any single Gestalter in particular. The speculations in which we have been indulging during the last dozen pages have arisen from contemporary physical science as well as from Gestalt writings. Were we concerned with the points agreed upon by the Gestalt school as a school, we should probably have done better to stop on page 18. Our purpose has been to suggest an approach to personality which proceeds

to utilize the logical implications which seem to us to lie in the new theory of part-whole relationships.

#### TYPE THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

Now WHAT shall we say of the evidence for our Gestalt view and for type theories of personality in general? We might let the negative have the floor for a while.

To sort and classify personalities, to group and bundle them according to their several characteristics, has gotten to be a favorite practice. Just as the Greeks spoke of four fundamental temperaments, assuming that within any temperamental group the individual differences were of but minor consequence, so we are inclined to think of types of personality — fast types and slow types, dismal types and hilarious types, strenuous types and bovine types.

The famous division of humanity into bromides and sulphides undertaken by Gelett Burgess is really to be taken just as seriously as are any of the systems of opposites described above. If we have a fast type and a slow type, the question at once arises what to do with those who are neither fast nor slow, or indeed with those who are fast one moment and slow the next. The pigeon-hole method recognized by all the kinds of types just described assumes that humanity falls naturally into contrasting or antithetical categories; assumes that a great gulf exists between the *terra firma* of the "this" and the equally solid ground of the "that."

Actually there are but few aspects of human nature which can be described in terms of all or none, top or bottom, this or that. Fast and slow types have about as much reality as tall and short types of people. A man five feet eight inches tall has to be regarded as a "mixed" type (one might try to think what a mixed type would really be if the term type were used carefully). Actually the variations in height are distributed along a linear scale like a ruler. A person's height is simply a point upon that scale; so with his weight; so with the degree

of pigmentation of his skin; so with the cephalic index which measures the ratio of width to length of head. Types of skin pigmentation there indeed are, and types of head shape too; but only when one considers something more than *degree* of pigmentation or something more than mere *ratio* of head width to head length. In other words, so long as we stick to one variable which is allowed to vary within certain limits, people simply are 21 or 39 or 76, or whatever other number on that scale the measurement proves them to be. There is no type; there is only position on the scale.

But, the reader will protest, when we talk of generous types, lazy types, and so on, we have in mind no such mere quantitative matter. We have in mind a whole pattern of characteristics which occur together. The man who is generous is generous in a way which spreads out all over the surrounding community. He is generous, so to speak, in many directions. The man who is lazy radiates laziness in no matter what situation he be observed. His laziness is not a sheer question of degree. Laziness is a system of habits which beset him no matter where he may find himself.

Now this is exactly the question at issue. Are there systems of traits which hang together in some definite pattern so that the presence of a given trait in a given situation makes possible the determination of what will happen in different situations? Is there generosity not merely of specific mood or specific situation but of personality as a whole? Is there a generous *type*?

We have chosen generosity for our illustration because it happens that on this particular point we have rather copious and careful experimental data.<sup>24</sup> It has proved possible not only to measure the degree of generosity in a great variety of situations, but to study the variations in this generosity from year to year. The evidence is flat-footed enough. Generosity in one situation is not closely related to generosity in other situations. A child who makes a considerable sacrifice for a poor child in one test is hardly any more likely to stand in the top half than in the bottom half of the generosity scale when tested

by some other technique. It is true that at *extremes* on each of the scales there is a certain presumptive value in a given score; it does give you a little better than a chance insight into behavior on other tests. Very few of us, however, stand at these real extremes, and if we merely stand high up or far down on any given test no one can predict consistent generosity or consistent lack of it in the other tests. Exactly the same is true in the case of honesty, persistence, and self-control, all of which were measured in the same way by giving a variety of tests and finding out how consistent individuals were.

The process of character formation nevertheless seems to involve a change from year to year in the amount of consistency shown by an individual.<sup>25</sup> Children in a small semi-rural community with a good deal of common background and morale, knowing each other well and participating in the same social institutions, show increasing consistency from year to year; in other words, one can tell more from one score as to what the score on some other test will be. Children in a semi-slum neighborhood on the other hand, show almost no change in consistency from year to year. It looks then as if consistency were something which under some conditions can be more or less achieved. But even in the eighth grade, when the child has usually reached puberty, he is still in large measure a collection of specific reactions rather than a close-knit personality. What goes on in the teen age we can only guess. Probably in a good environment, consistency increases; probably in a bad environment, it remains practically unchanged. If this is the case, it would mean that such consistency as personality actually shows depends upon the particular environment to which we are subjected. Personalities then would literally be *built*.

It may be interesting to know when this building process begins. If one carries back beyond the fifth grade the lines of growth which mark the good and the bad communities *between* the fifth and eighth grades, one finds that they meet at the kindergarten. This, of course, must not be confused with proof positive. It is, however, the best guess we can make. Prob-

ably the differences between the rates of increasing consistency found in the two communities appear during the school period. The fact that the lines come together in the kindergarten leaves really very little argument in the mouths of those who would maintain that the pattern of personality, the tendency for various behavior traits to hang together is an intrinsic quality of the newborn child.

Another theory involves the assumption that some common characteristic of the body, such as the speed of conduction in the nervous system, or the metabolic rate, or the acidity of the blood, offers a basis for personality types.<sup>26</sup> But we should doubt the value of introducing any type theory where nothing more than this sort of identity is involved. If a man's movements of his right hand and his left hand, his right foot and his left foot are all *fast*, simply because his nervous system as a whole is a "fast" nervous system, what real value is there in a type theory? We might just as well say that a black or a white skin constitutes a type, because the right hand and the left hand, the right foot and the left foot are all white in one case or black in another. If what we have in mind is not a pattern or interrelation between characteristics, but simply the *same* characteristic appearing throughout the person, no clear value is served by talking about types.

Again, types may be defined on the assumption that a person is constitutionally predisposed toward a certain *kind of responses* and that a wide range of stimuli presenting no obvious similarity, one to another, may call out such responses. (In psychological language, the threshold for one kind of response is low; usually the implicit assumption is made that thresholds for some opposed type of reaction are raised.) Thus R. W. Washburn<sup>27</sup> in an extensive study of smiling and laughing in children between eight weeks and two years of age describes characteristic types: there are the persistent or inveterate laughers and smilers, just as there are the inveterate weepers. Now from one situation to another at a given age and from one age to another, there is no evident common factor which makes it

possible to explain all this in terms of mere learning. On the contrary, a wide array of stimuli was deliberately chosen. This kind of type, then, is simply a *response type*. But most of these response types are really analogous to types defined in terms of speed, co-ordination, pitch-discrimination and so on, where the presence of some differentiating common quality existing throughout the organism's behavior is assumed. But since this is usually nothing but *one trait* which varies in *degree* from one person to another it seems to call for recognition of type no more definitely than do traits like speed or skin color. If we wish to use the term type, well and good; but these types should not be confused with *patterns* of responses.

Nevertheless, such a fundamental property of the body might, very early in the child's life, determine *sets of habits* which in the course of time would appear to be inevitably linked together. The child, for example, who is slow, might be regarded as dull or as lazy or perhaps as both; he might become the butt of practical jokes, he might be slow to profit by sudden opportunities and become depressed or fatalistic about life.<sup>28</sup> One might go on in this way conjecturing the variety of different personality adjustments which might arise from one fundamental physical trait. If this causal sequence occurred with sufficient uniformity, we could say that a certain "type of personality" appears among "slow" people. So a certain kind of personality may appear in people with high body acidity. In most such cases, however, it is not clear whether the systems of personality traits which seem to occur together in people with high body acidity are the results of such sequences as we have just described, or whether they are in a sense simply ways in which one fundamental physical characteristic is manifested.

It must, moreover, be admitted that types derived in this way are probably less stable than those given by heredity, because the vagaries of the environment are unpredictable, and the recombination of response elements into new patterns may occur at any time. Nevertheless, long experience in obtaining one's major objectives by means of a certain elimination of internal

friction, and the building up of a socially unified personality, is in most cases a sufficient guarantee against the radical distortion of the type.

To what extent acquired personality types of the sort just described must be seen in terms of Gestalt psychology, *i.e.*, to what extent the whole organization, when established, *determines* the independent parts, is a problem awaiting further research. Our statistical devices measure one thing at a time and then compare or correlate the measurements. This method of treatment presupposes that the measured elements are *parts* of a total. But if the doctrine of wholes and parts is unsound, we should expect sooner or later to get into difficulties; in fact we are probably already in difficulties through failure to adjust our mathematical methods to the organismic way of looking at traits. We should expect that even if the whole thing were acquired, the trait would nevertheless express, in a sense, "the undivided personality."<sup>29</sup>

The negative seems to have made a reasonable case in showing that much of what we call type can be described without recourse to such a conception. Yet where some early or dominant trait has given rise to a system of traits held together in a fairly consistent way, and this *system* as a whole dominates all the individual traits including the primary one, it seems scarcely reasonable to dismiss the type concept. It seems nearer to a valid clue than does the method of correlation.

Some of the most obvious cases of interlocking between characteristics are those presented in the endocrine system.<sup>30</sup> Here it is probable that even before birth a pattern of interaction between the various secretions from the ductless glands is established, and unless it is seriously disturbed by some factor in childhood, it will probably continue throughout the growth period. The formation of the skeleton, the distribution of fat, the pulse rate, blood pressure, and many other characteristics are indices of no single isolated endocrine activity, but of the "glandular balance" or system of interaction between the glands. Again, however, it is necessary to remind the reader

that by interaction we do not mean the net result of one gland plus a second plus a third, and so on. Rather, no gland ever functions in isolation. The hypothetical part out of which the whole is made up has no independent existence. From the very beginning there is probably a *system of endocrines* at work.

Several other "types" or systems of personal characteristics are familiar in psychiatry; let us see whether they are types in the sense used here. Most students of "functional" insanities, that is, those insanities which are not clearly explainable in terms of organic brain disease, recognize two main groups of disorders. First, *dementia præcox*, now more commonly labeled *schizophrenia*. The difficulty is apt to show itself first in a tendency to withdraw from reality, the patient building up an imaginative world (delusions). Cases of schizophrenia belong to a "type" in the sense that they have in common a number of traits reflecting this very generalized characteristic of retreating from reality. The causes are obscure, and we do not mean to suggest that the caption necessitates the adoption of any single interpretation. But it seems reasonable to believe that this disordered state is, in some respects, merely the exaggeration of a tendency which all human beings show, to withdraw in times of crisis into the realm of the imagination.<sup>81</sup>

Second only in frequency to schizophrenia is *manic-depressive insanity*. Mania is apt to involve exaggerated hilarity, hyperactivity and excitement. Depressive cases, though they seem on the surface to be the direct antithesis of mania — displaying sadness, slowness and mental blocking, exceedingly painful to any sympathetic observer — possess nevertheless points of similarity to the manic. The manic may later become a depressive, or *vice versa*; or, strange as it may seem, the two pictures may actually be fused and confused at a single time.

Now just as schizophrenia may be regarded as merely an extreme form of a tendency to withdraw from external reality (Jung's introversion<sup>32</sup>), the manic-depressive form of emotionality may be regarded as merely an extreme form of a tendency to excessively direct reaction to the external world.

There is a certain amount of arbitrariness in this way of looking at the matter; the manic is much nearer to the ideal extrovert than is the depressive. Nevertheless, there is a general tendency to regard the manic-depressive make-up as no mere "disease," but rather as an exaggeration of a personality tendency which many normal people possess. In this way schizophrenia and manic-depressive insanity are, one might almost say, extremes on a distribution curve. All of us, except the theoretically average person, are inclined, to a slighter or greater extent, in one direction or the other.<sup>33</sup>

Now whether these conditions are "types" in the sense here recognized, or whether introversion and extroversion are but names for tendencies on a *simple linear scale*, can not be settled until we know whether each is an expression of a single tendency which displays itself here and there throughout the whole structure of personality or whether it is rather a consistent *cluster* or pattern of tendencies.

There are many other ways of classifying these emotional extremes, but it will be worth while to proceed directly to Kretschmer's conception of the relation between personality type and *physical type*.<sup>34</sup> For him, the person with "pyknic" physique, the person with large trunk and small extremities, with above-average amount of fat and consequent rounding of form and feature, inclines to the manic-depressive end of the scale; the person with small trunk and relatively large extremities, relatively small amount of fat and consequently rather angular outlines, inclines to the schizophrenic. Mental type and physical type have the same constitutional causes. There are, of course, for Kretschmer, all degrees of these two tendencies, each finding some place on a distribution curve upon which the average is the zero point. Tendencies toward schizophrenia are found in *schizothymics*, while tendencies toward the manic-depressive condition appear in *cyclothymics*.

The study of imagery has suggested at times that people could be classified according to the type of images they report, or the relative richness of each. The older type theories were

content to speak of one individual as of a visual, another as of an auditory type, and so on, on the assumption that those possessing one sort of imagery have relative shortcomings in others.<sup>35</sup> These type theories have in general been discredited, but they have given place to a form of type theory which appears to have somewhat more claim to significance.<sup>36</sup> It has long been known that some persons can recall, in remarkable vividness and detail, scenes previously observed, distinctly making out not only things which had been explicitly noticed, but even things which had never come into the center of attention. A boy sees a picture containing many details and a few printed letters.<sup>37</sup> Later when this has been removed, the letters come back one at a time, so that after a while nearly the whole name is spelled out. Successive reports of what is seen:

	0
RI	0
RIC	0
RICH	0
RIC	0
RICH	0

(The word RICHMOND had appeared in the picture)

Here the boy is not remembering what he had once spelled out for himself; he literally *sees* anew. Such cases are said to have “eidetic” imagery. Now some images are relatively fixed and stable, others fluid and inconstant.

Upon such distinctions as these, the brothers Jaensch at Marburg have constructed a typology in terms of the approximation to the two clinical entities, Basedow's disease (hyperthyroidism) and tetany. The B-type and T-type, then, are types

in which certain kinds of images are *accompanied by a large variety of other biological dispositions*. These are, then, not merely types of *imagery*. These images appear in different form in two groups of individuals, the groups being defined in terms of physiological interrelationships; they are "biotypes." Experimental work suggests that the sharp distinction between these two types of imagery is open to question and that there are many other ways in which eidetic images can be appropriately classified.<sup>38</sup> It is far from certain that the Jaensch types are the basis for a final typology of human beings. Yet the evidence that imagery is linked with many other personal traits is considerable, and by no means easily to be dismissed.

In summary, then, the concept of the interrelated *system of traits* seems a useful one, but the data in support (or refutation) of such views are insufficiently precise to warrant any convictions.<sup>39</sup>

SINCE most type theories depend on assumptions regarding heredity, it may be well to ask just what these assumptions are.

One of the commonest sorts of type theory is based on assumptions regarding necessary *interconnections between inherited traits*, or to speak more accurately, interconnections between the units underlying heredity, the "genes." Just as a Nordic type, displaying blue eyes, fair hair, and so on, can only exist where a particular combination of genes exists, so we tend to think of the individual personality type as a *pattern* depending upon a particular pattern of hereditary elements.

But since the genes are carried by many independent chromosomes which may combine in billions of different ways, we have no true type; we have only the "most frequent combination of hereditary elements." There might thus be a "typical" Italian, or poet, or despot, or flatterer, but (despite Theophrastus) most individuals in the groups conceived would lack some of the essential traits. The type, here, is a *composite* easily disturbed by throwing a few more cases into the cauldron; it is no true "type."

One might make a sort of composite photograph of all such cases and fix those points at which most cases resembled one another. Now and then one does find a classical type case, just as one may find occasionally the truly typical German or Irishman; but just as relatively few Irishmen would look like the composite photograph taken of ten thousand Irishmen, so relatively few Irish personalities would look like the abstract or composite of a thousand personality studies of Irishmen.

Nevertheless, there remains another valid genetic way of looking at types. It is possible that different traits or characteristics are carried in the *same* chromosomes. There are only forty-eight chromosomes in the determination of individual make-up, but there are, of course, thousands of "characteristics" — the exact number depends on how we measure. Now from the experimental studies of animals and from observations of human family trees, it has become certain that traits which are in themselves unconnected may appear invariably together. There is, for example, no profound or significant reason why color-blindness or pathological bleeding should be connected with masculinity rather than with femininity. The fact is, however, that these are sex-linked traits which (except under special conditions too complicated to be briefly stated) occur only in males.<sup>40</sup> Experimental study of insects, where microscopic work has made plain a good deal of the machinery of all this, has shown that the actual particles which are the physical basis of heredity cluster together in chromosomes in such a way that the chromosome (which is generally an unbreakable unit) either carries *all* these particles or genes, or *none* of them. An individual insect, then, which inherits white eyes also inherits notched wings, not because there is any fundamental or final affinity between these two, but because the genes for these two traits are carried by the same chromosome. It may well be then that human personality is a true type or pattern in the sense that when certain traits appear, other traits *must* likewise appear, simply because the physical basis lying in the chromosomes links such traits together. It

would be a wild biologist or psychologist who would proceed to build a typology on this basis at present; the approach suggested here will be of interest only to those of a speculative turn of mind.<sup>41</sup>

To recapitulate, then, several of the existing concepts of types are superfluous while others are unsubstantiated. There remain, however, three apparently real and important kinds of organization within the structure of personality, justifying, if not necessitating, the use of the type concept:

1) Systems of traits known to be *derived* in the individual's life-history from some single trait, yet holding together in a stable way.

2) Dynamic interrelations between traits such as appear in the endocrine system and in the Jaensch types. Here some biotypes are probably real and fairly stable, even if from a genetic viewpoint some one characteristic was once independent or dominant; this independence or dominance is now subordinated to the functioning system.

3) The linkage of characteristics through their determination by chromosomes carrying genes for separate traits; here the individual possesses from the beginning a peculiar organization, each characteristic dominated by the whole, and each mode of organization discontinuous from any other which the hereditary constitution of the species permits.

## CHAPTER TWO

### *PERSONALITY AND MENTAL ELEMENTS*

THE MOST natural way of getting at psychological matters has usually seemed to most people to be the asking of questions about our experience, our mental life; the science of experimental psychology was founded in the nineteenth century in an effort to find laws that govern these mental events. We may, for convenience, subdivide the data of such a psychology into two main groups, the one dealing with consciousness as it exists at any given moment, the other dealing with the transition from one state to another. Psychology analyzes the states of consciousness, just as physics or chemistry analyzes molecules and atoms into the electrons or protons of which the complex physical world is built.<sup>42</sup> The primary data known to such a psychology are *sensations*, such as the color yellow, or the pure tone of a tuning fork, or the pain from a pin-prick. Any given moment of experience is apt to reveal, upon analysis, many elements. As one looks at a sunset there are reds and yellows, greens and grays; there are sounds such as the "drowsy tinklings" that Gray loved to hear; there is the touch of the wind upon the cheek; probably there are vague strains from the muscles as we try to make out some distant outline. It will be noticed, however, that practically everything present in consciousness comes from our *senses*.

Since this kind of psychology starts with sensations, it is interested in describing all the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, pains, touches, strains, etc., that can be observed. But these sen-

sations cannot be correctly described through recourse to the casual observation of a careless moment. The study of such experiences requires a technique just as the study of anything else in nature requires a technique. A great many "common sense" observations about our senses fail when tested in the laboratory. Just as the chemist must learn how to observe what goes on in his test-tube, and as the biologist must learn to observe what happens under his microscope, so the psychologist must learn how to describe faithfully even the most fleeting of sensory impressions.

A good illustration of the point is offered by the facts of color-blindness. There have probably been color-blind individuals among us throughout the whole span of recorded history; but it was not until 1791 that Dalton,<sup>43</sup> himself color-blind, described the now familiar phenomenon of red-green color-blindness. Dalton saw the right-hand side of the spectrum (the outer rim of the rainbow) as the rest of us do, but he could not make out the colors which we call red and green; they were all lost in yellow. Now it seems incredible that any one could live in human society, in which the distinction of colors is everywhere emphasized for aesthetic and for practical purposes, and never notice that he failed to see what is, to most of us, very apparent. One reason for the oversight is probably the fact that objects differ not only in hue but in other characteristics which are sometimes confused with true color. The color-blind person can distinguish a darker shade of red from a lighter, but he does it not by seeing red but by noticing differences in brightness. The important point here, however, is to note that everyday observation cannot be relied upon to describe faithfully even the most patent facts of sensory experience.

Are there not, however, all sorts of other things in our minds besides sensations? Suppose we see a thing, not in the flesh, but in our mind's eye; suppose we have a clear-cut memory "image." The reply is that these experiences really are not so fundamentally different from sensations.<sup>44</sup> They may be

grouped according to the sense-organs which originally yielded them; in fact, they are like faint sensations. They may at times become vivid and be called *hallucinations*; a great many children, and some adults, have vivid images as described on page 33; these are called *eidetic*, from the Greek word describing a copy.<sup>45</sup> For most purposes, memory images may be regarded as *revived sensations*.

Can all human experience be derived from the senses? For centuries this has been asserted by the association psychology. But many feel that such a statement would leave out the most important of all mental events, the things which give meaning to life, namely, joys and griefs, ecstasies and miseries, exultations and depressions. Can these, we say, really be called sensations in any intelligible use of the term? For the time being let us say that these things constitute a separate group of experience, the "feelings." How may such feelings be classified? The most obvious distinction is between the pleasant and the unpleasant. But the problem now confronts us: Are there only two feelings? Or are there two large groups of feelings, within each of which qualitative distinctions must be considered? To solve this problem we shall have to remind ourselves that the business of science as here described is to analyze things into their elements. Joy is not an elementary experience in the sense in which the blueness of a given sky or the sweetness of a given sugar is elementary. The supposed feeling of joy turns out, on analysis, to be made up of a great many elements, and the task of the psychologist is not finished until he has faithfully described all the elements and the way in which they function together. For example, the flushing of the skin, the pounding of the heart, the deep breathing, all convey definite sensations from the surface or from the interior of the body. From the standpoint of analysis, all these may exist independently of the true feeling of pleasantness. In the same way the feeling of pleasantness may, of course, exist in an entirely different context, for example, in the contemplation of a curling spiral of smoke, or in the dreamy awareness on a

cold morning that we do not have to get up for another hour.

Now experimental study seems to indicate that feelings, instead of being of infinite variety, are only two. There are feelings of pleasantness and of unpleasantness, each of which, to be sure, may vary in degree from very faint to very intense, and may combine with an enormous variety of sensory elements.<sup>46</sup>

On this basis, what is to be done with the emotions? Is there no difference between rage and fear except for the different sensations occurring in the two kinds of situations? No; from the present point of view there is not. But we are apt to forget how different the sensations actually are. In rage, for example, the tone of the muscles of the arms and legs is increased; there may come about a drying of the throat, flushing of the skin, and so on, with inevitable access of their corresponding *sensations*. Although the changes occurring in rage overlap a good deal with those occurring in fear, there are, nevertheless, some striking differences, particularly as a result of the fact that the type of muscular contraction involved in fear when one is running or trying to run is different from the kind of muscular behavior involved in rage, when one is attacking or preparing to attack. It seems legitimate, then, to describe each emotion as a *compound of sensations*,<sup>47</sup> remembering that there are differences not only between easily namable states such as rage and fear, but even between different shades of the same general response; for example, differences between timidity, worry, fear, anxiety, terror, and horror. Most of our nomenclature is very unsatisfactory, and we do not even know with certainty what the fundamental emotions are, out of which the more complicated or subtle emotions are made; in fact, we do not know with certainty whether there are any fundamental or primitive emotions whose pattern is fixed and definite. But we do know that even the simple emotions which appear at first to be a single entity are really compounded of many elements. An emotion may be thought of as

a pattern of sensory elements plus either a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling.

If experience is ultimately made up of sensations and their close relatives, the images and feelings, it follows, of course, that even the most intricate trains of reasoning must consist essentially of the succession of images; that is, we must think in terms of pictures, imagined sounds, etc. Perhaps we do our thinking in terms of quite complicated mixtures of imagery from various fields. I may, for example, as I remember a camping scene, mix together visual images of the tent and fire, auditory images of the sound of splashing water, olfactory images of the aroma of the coffee, tactual images of the wind from the lake, and so on. All my thinking, however, has a sensory basis. Even in solving a thorny problem in mathematics, I should find, if I were careful enough, that sensations from my muscles account for the stresses and strains which rush through my mind as I feel for a solution and grasp at what I think may be a likely straw. I cannot even think of infinity or zero without a symbol for it, and this symbol is, of course, an image. I cannot think of even the most abstruse philosophical system — for example, that “nihilistic” theory which denies that anything whatever exists — without a vague symbol appearing before my mind’s eye which somehow for me *is* the nothingness which I cannot otherwise conceive.

It is of the utmost importance to describe the *actual content* of consciousness, and not to *interpret* it or tell what it is “about” or what it “means.”<sup>48</sup> If psychology is ever to be a science, my description of my *experience* should be intelligible to any psychologist whether he knows what it “means” to me or not, just as a description by a chemist as to the actual reaction occurring in his test tube should be intelligible to another chemist, whether he has had experience with the industrial uses of that particular rare element or not. The trouble with such things as “meanings” in psychological analysis is that they do not give the actual elements of the experience. What should

we think of an astronomer whose records read like this? "Small blue object surrounded by white film indicating bad weather next September and reflecting probable purposelessness of the universe." "Rubbish," we should say; "the first part of the sentence makes sense; the rest is not what the man saw but what his imagination threw in." Yes, but that is exactly what the psychologist is doing who gives a faithful description of the *elements of his experience* and then throws in unanalyzed lumps of interpretative material as if they were part of the data.

Up to this point we have been speaking of the justification of the analytical viewpoint and of the kind of problems which analysis must solve. The next problem, however, has to do with the synthesis of elements. This is called, in psychology, association. Associations may be simultaneous or successive. Both kinds connect both sensations and images. If asked, for example, to recall the last time one saw a leopard at the zoo, there will arise in one's mind certain patches of tawny color upon which are impressed tiny black spots, the whole thing probably moving somewhere, and perhaps seen against some sort of background. If we are rich in all sorts of imagery we may even hear zoo noises and smell zoo smells. Now all these things come back in a pattern, the parts hanging together. Study of the brain suggests that this process is a peculiarity of the brain's behavior. Certain kinds of brain injury destroy associations, so that, for example, a man might recall part of the picture of the leopard and be unable to complete the rest.<sup>40</sup> Successive association would be illustrated by cases in which a series of events would rattle itself off in consciousness because the same events had originally occurred in such a sequence in the world of sensation. This happens, for example, when one recalls going to a fire; one begins with the ringing of the alarm and runs through the mental pictures which reproduce more or less the sequence of the original experience. The common phrase, the *association of ideas*, applies well enough to what we have been describing, if by *idea* one means

a bundle of images, like the leopard or the fire alarm, and by association one means the tendency of one idea to arouse another.

It once seemed possible to conceive of association as a more or less automatic or even passive process, in which each sensation or image had the power to set going certain mental consequences. Modern experiments, however, show clearly that the association of ideas depends upon the attitude or "mental set" of the moment.<sup>50</sup> Take the law of "association by similarity," for example, the tendency when thinking of *leopard* to think of *tiger*, or when thinking of *fire* to think of *flood*. This tendency may be wholly set aside by a changed attitude; the attitude, let us say, of thinking not in terms of likenesses but in chronological sequences. If one is told to give the name of the country to which each of a long list of cities belongs, one finds, after a brief interval of practice, that one can go at almost breakneck speed. One finds oneself saying Paris, *France*; Hamburg, *Germany*; Tokyo, *Japan*; without, as one may say, *thinking* at all. If, however, in the midst of this rather mechanical test, the experimenter gives the word *cat*, one experiences an actual jolt. Though we may like to think of sensations as pieces which are passively put together, there is after all a sort of steering process or mental set which is easy to demonstrate.

Up to this point we have been writing as if a thing must either be in consciousness or out of it, all the way in or all the way out. Actually one of the most valuable parts of introspective psychology is the technique for observing the relative clearness of various elements, that is, the gradation from the clearest elements, which are in the very center of our consciousness, down to those which are least clear. There seem to be degrees of clearness, down to those barely conscious elements which one might not think of as present in consciousness at all; such things as the pressure of the book upon your hands as you hold it, which, until it was mentioned, was certainly not in the center of your attention and yet which was

probably not absolutely unconscious or out of consciousness. Other illustrations would be the awareness of the warmth of the room, or the pressure of the clothing on the body. Or suppose one is watching a fire. A fireman and the door which his axe is shattering are in the center of attention. The hose is a little less clear. The bystanders are less clear still. The sky, the horizon, the state of one's own physical well-being are probably pushed aside, hardly present in consciousness at all. After all, though, it is important that psychology should take into account not only what is clear but what is vague, not only what is easy to see but what is hard to see. The very fact that some of these items are not in the center of attention and rarely get there means that accurate study is very difficult. Here, as everywhere else in scientific work, the psychologist needs both a standardized terminology and a long and careful training in observation and description of his experiences.

THE PARTIAL outlines of a psychological system sketched above may be considered a rough description of a science of mind or consciousness, which has at times been the only psychology, and which today remains one important kind. Psychologists who feel at home in this system of thought have not always concerned themselves with the problem of personality.<sup>51</sup> They have been interested in sensations, images, feelings, associations and attention for their own sake, observing, analyzing, compounding the several ingredients of known mental states and the laws of their transition into other states.

During the middle of the nineteenth century the study of personality began to take shape, partly as a result of interest in individuality as a whole which the evolutionary theory served to stimulate, and partly through concern with the emotional and volitional aspects of human nature which somehow seemed inadequately described in terms of these simpler processes. Most of all, however, the rapid development of interest in personality was due to the work of students of abnormal or maladjusted individuals. When a complicated structure

functions badly it becomes necessary to understand not only the specific nature of the symptoms but the underlying dynamics of the whole. Physicians who had learned that the responsibility for curing a sick mind was *their* responsibility began to work their way towards a conception of what the basic structure of personality might be; they began to inquire as to the essential ingredients and laws of composition which underlay those fleeting changes and disturbances which in medical language had been called "symptoms." They were perforce driven to use whatever kind of psychology they knew. However much they might recognize its inadequacy, however much they might desire to restate the problems of psychology, they could not throw off the assumptions, the self-evident axioms, of existing psychological systems. They saw personality as the psychologist had taught them to see it.<sup>52</sup> Whether they made a direct study of psychological treatises or not, they were steeped in the atmosphere of the sensationist and associationist psychology which we have described. They saw personality as a compound of ideas, and each idea in turn, as a compound of images. Not only the experiences of the moment, not only the sequences of experiences, but the vast integration of experiences carried along in the stream of thought were to be understood in terms of sensation on the one hand and association on the other. Personality was an agglomeration of elementary *mental particles*.<sup>\*</sup> The problem of unity was regarded as but a special phase of the problem of association; the knitting together of a thousand ideas was in no way qualitatively distinct from the knitting together of two. Synthesis was basically simple association. From the same point of view no essential difference was to be found between ideas clearly in the center of attention and those which lacked such clearness. "Subconscious" ideas were still ideas; they were

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\* The exceedingly important problem of *the self*, the individual's personality as he himself knows it, is, with doubtful justification, slighted here. Some psychologists incline to the opinion that the self is simply a part of the field of consciousness; others, that it is a product of the "Polarity" of object and organism. The whole problem seems too difficult for adequate presentation here.

ideas which somehow lacked the capacity to attain consciousness. Moreover, since all ideas were held to depend upon the functions of the brain, it seemed possible to think of clear and vague ideas as depending respectively on vigorous and feeble brain activities. Some brain functions were so feeble, or so detached from other brain functions, that no corresponding ideas appeared in the field of consciousness. Here we had simple "unconscious cerebration,"<sup>53</sup> a process producing after-effects which might appear later in consciousness; one solves a problem in one's sleep, finding the solution ready at hand in the morning, because some brain functions are capable of going forward outside of the realm of consciousness. Personality as a dynamic system, a pattern of tendencies at the moment and a succession of tendencies extending through a life-time, was a name for an assemblage of mental elements dependent upon the brain; and if the brain occasionally contributed the products which it had worked out without conscious supervision, this in no way altered the doctrine of personality as a psychic synthesis.

The medical psychologists inclined sometimes towards a crudely mechanical interpretation of mental disorders as products of diseased brains and sometimes towards a strictly psychological interpretation, faulty ideas being held to lie at the root of faulty adjustments to life. Emphasis was sometimes on organic, sometimes on psychological explanations. The study of the mentally diseased underwent, in fact, during the nineteenth century, the usual advances, fluctuations, retrogressions, self-negations, which characterized the progress of most other aspects of medicine. What seem to us today to be the most preposterous of doctrines regarding the causes of mental sickness were repeatedly grasped with enthusiasm. Only one instance need be cited here—Dieffenbach's "cure" of stammering by cutting out a wedge-shaped piece from the base of the tongue, a method widely adopted and uncritically regarded as an immense triumph of surgery.<sup>54</sup> The case of Dieffenbach is a good one to illustrate the natural desire of the physician

to find a physical, and, of course if possible, a surgically removable cause of mental anguish.

The mid-nineteenth century is nevertheless the period of the first systematic psychological theories of mental disease. At Nancy from 1861 onwards, Liébeault<sup>55</sup> and Bernheim<sup>56</sup> consistently developed a psychological theory of hysteria, emphasizing direct "suggestion," sometimes in connection with the drowsy state ordinarily called hypnosis, and sometimes with the subjects in an ordinary wide-awake condition. With the situation at Nancy so definitely "psychological," it is of interest to see the flowing together of the psychological and medical streams in the brilliant and masterly work of the great Charcot.<sup>57</sup> The way for Charcot was thus paved by the studies of hysteria conducted by Braid, Richet, Azam and other students of suggestion and dissociation.

These men offer an interesting instance of the way in which the generally accepted doctrines of the association psychology were taken over and made to do duty in the explanation of mental disease, and came to serve as a foundation for a theory of personality. What happened, they believed, in the hypnotic trance, was the acceptance of an idea; for example, an idea that a paralyzed limb could again be moved. This idea, by virtue of its association with the effort to move the limb, restored the patient's voluntary control of the muscles. The association of ideas, exactly as it had been propounded by Locke and systematized by British and French thinkers in the eighteenth century, was put to work as an explanatory concept in the study of suggestion.

The most original and important step of this era, however, was the study of the association of ideas in instances in which some ideas were present in consciousness and others just outside of it in an "unconscious" mind. Despite the barrier which seemed to keep some ideas from coming into consciousness—a barrier for which the term dissociation is description rather than explanation—it seemed natural to assume that some of the troubles of the conscious mind were due to the asso-

ciations which linked conscious with unconscious ideas. The whole thing comes out clearly in some of Charcot's experiments.

Charcot found that he could induce a variety of hysterical symptoms in the hypnotic subject, and thus lay bare the mechanics of their formation, just as the bacteriologist can induce heart-disease in a guinea pig and obtain a clue which at least makes clear the nature of some forms of heart-disease in human subjects. The paralysis of the hysterical subject could, for example, be induced by the sheer affirmation that the limb was paralyzed. Upon awaking from his semi-sleeping condition, the hypnotic subject would find the arm genuinely limp and immovable, a dead thing hanging from the shoulder, over which no act of will, no matter how violent, could prevail. It naturally occurred to Charcot that the idea implanted in the sleeping mind was still operative in some stratum of the mind of the waking subject.<sup>58</sup> If this was the case in hypnotic subjects, and if, as he believed, the hypnotic state and the hysterical crisis were the same thing, why could not ordinary hysterical symptoms be regarded as the result of unconscious ideas? If so, why could not these ideas be replaced by other ideas, ideas of healing and restoration of function, which would remain in full force when the patient returned to normal consciousness? This was the sort of mental healing or "psychotherapy" which Charcot demonstrated to hundreds of clinicians during his many years of clinical lectureship in Paris.

Charcot did not, however, elaborate a psychological theory of "suggestion," or of "dissociation," or indeed of anything whatever. Already past fifty before he turned to the study of mental and nervous cases, he was by mental habit simply a physician, not a psychologist. His theories were simple, indeed crudely simple. It was to Janet, Charcot's pupil, that the mantle of the Paris school fell, for it was the young Janet who in the decade of the 'eighties made of these experiments the cornerstone of a psychological system.

The association psychology, it will be recalled, had regarded personality as a pattern woven upon the neutral ground of a blank and empty consciousness. The mind from birth onwards had been stamped by a constantly increasing complexity of experiences aroused by an outer world. These experiences were held together in a network by the "association of ideas." Education, making wise use of the laws of association, was to build up a mind not from the happy exercise of its latent capacities, but by the systematic addition of new ideas connected in the right way. It was this association psychology that Janet put to work in the theory of personality which he proceeded to construct.

Janet regarded the mind as an assemblage of ideas associated one with another. Under ordinary conditions these ideas are held together in cohesion, permitting, of course, a change from moment to moment, a "stream" of thought, but dominated throughout life by a "psychic tension" which guarantees the functional wholeness of personality.<sup>59</sup> Psychic tension may sometimes, however, be faulty. Some ideas then detach themselves from the rest and function as subconscious ideas. The personality is loosely knit, and the detachable parts represent losses from the assets of the individual as a whole. In the case of a paralysis the idea which normally initiates the moving of the arm is detached from the rest of consciousness, so that although the patient may think about his paralysis, may earnestly long for its removal, or may indeed think of how the arm would *look* if it were moved, nevertheless the ideas which are most necessary, those which we call "the will" to move it, are inaccessible. In the same way another excessively common hysterical disorder, a gap in memory (amnesia), may prevent ideas from arising in consciousness when a given time and place are mentioned. Another fairly common hysterical phenomenon, the inability to stand and walk (astasia abasia), appears in those patients who, though able to form ideas about the moving of the separate parts of the feet and legs,

and to kick about or turn over, are nevertheless entirely unable to form the idea of standing or walking in such a way as to carry out the act.

Low psychic tension, then, is in the first place a cause of the loss of ideas; it causes the dissociation of ideas from the main current of the personality. It is, in the second place, a general characteristic of the *personality*, rather than a characteristic of some particular association; for although the symptom today may be an amnesia, tomorrow it may be a paralysis, and the next day blindness or mutism. The disorder is not a failure of particular associative bonds. It is a difficulty in what we might call the pulling power or inherent attraction between ideas, and almost any idea may happen to be for a while dislodged from its ordinary connection.

When Janet asserted that an idea might be subconscious, he apparently meant it in absolute seriousness, for he based both his psychological theory and his therapy upon it. Dissociated fragments, though inaccessible to introspection, remained nevertheless ideas. If one can think of an idea existing in itself and quite aside from any mind which happens to be aware of that idea, one has Janet's conception. (Some persons find this easy to conceive, others quite impossible, and much controversy on the subject has appeared.)

Now since ideas may be split up and reorganized in an almost indefinite number of ways, there must be a great variety of personality disturbances traceable to failure of psychic tension. A simple and apparently convincing case is somnambulism. This includes not merely the common habit of "walking in one's sleep," which the person upon waking has forgotten, but the closely parallel or indeed identical dissociation of consciousness which occurs in some hysterical persons. Janet and his contemporaries described individuals who suddenly pass into a state of mind different from their ordinary consciousness, a state of mind belonging to some previous experience which had been forgotten.<sup>60</sup> Just as one may dream of an event of which one has not thought for years, so one may

in hysterical somnambulism suddenly *relive* an experience which has ceased to be a part of the dynamic working self.<sup>61</sup> Each time one wakens from the somnambulism to the waking state, however, one becomes, so to speak, a different cluster of ideas.

There is here then the primitive beginning of a double or alternating personality.<sup>62</sup> Another stage is marked by the "fugues," states in which the person forgets his identity as well as his immediate surroundings, and wanders off for a while, fitting into a different way of life; he may even show, upon detailed questioning, complete forgetfulness of his previous existence. Here one might be sure we had arrived already at double personality, but from Janet's point of view there is a long way to go, for here there is still a great deal which the new personality shares with the old. The man who wanders off in a fugue may forget a great deal but he still has many of the habits and most of the emotional and temperamental traits of his previous self. Ideas are like the bits of a mosaic which can be fitted together in various ways, and the difference between a fugue and somnambulism is simply a difference in the degree to which the old elements of the personality are displaced. But whereas in somnambulisms and fugues the individual is apt sooner or later to lapse back suddenly into his previous personality, having forgotten the period of his changed self, there are other forms of splitting of consciousness in which there is no swinging back and forth, but merely a *permanent cleft* within the structure of the self, permanent blockings which prevent certain memories ever from returning. These, though dramatic, are functionally similar to those paralyzes which result from the inability to will to move a limb.

True double personality only occurs where both the memory elements and the more complex and subtle personality elements crystallize on two sides of a dividing line; two centers of tension, so to speak, have been formed within one organism. Here the individual may suddenly change from one person to

another; in some cases the second personality may even be unaware of the existence of the first, and remember only those states of consciousness which belong to his own previous stream of thought and present identity.

Personality then, is a composite, in no wise essentially different from that outlined by the associationists, but endowed with a dynamic aspect which makes both synthesis and fragmentation of the self an aspect of the way in which the whole organism is constituted.

THE LARGEST quantity of experimental work in favor of the concept of the dissociation of consciousness is that of Binet.<sup>63</sup> Though known today chiefly for his contribution to the measurement of intelligence, Binet was, in the midst of his active career, profoundly concerned with the problem of "double consciousness." That elements of our consciousness may exist *independently of that consciousness of which we are aware*, had been clearly stated by Richet,<sup>64</sup> Azam,<sup>65</sup> and many others. It remained for Binet to meet the challenge of those few who attacked, and those many who ignored, these novel and amazing concepts. In his book *On Double Consciousness*, Binet defined a series of experimental techniques through which the reality of independent consciousness was to be demonstrated.

The hysterical patient, for example, whose right hand is anaesthetic and who shows complete ignorance of what has been done to it, frequently shows a tendency to repeat movements which have been impressed upon the hand. Anticipating the objection that this is a purely automatic (circular reflex) affair, Binet screens the hand from view and impresses upon it those movements necessary in order to make it write a series of words. When the hand is freed it not only shows a tendency to repeat the words written but even, singularly enough, to correct errors which have been made.<sup>66</sup> If for example, the subject's hand has been made to write his name while he is conversing behind a screen on some very different subject, the hand will proceed to write the name again; and if the experi-

menter has intentionally misspelled the name, the hand will upon arrival at the point of the error pause, struggle, and then proceed to complete the name correctly. Binet makes use of graphic registration of these phenomena, publishing, for example, simultaneous tracings of movements made by an anaesthetic hand and movements made by a normal hand in order to show the automatism or independent function of the former.

Binet himself appears not to have regarded these experiments as absolutely essential to the demonstration of double consciousness. He appears to have been convinced, as a large number of investigators have been convinced, by the ordinary phenomena of automatic writing; the person may appear to be in a perfectly normal state, alert and busily conversing on some topic of interest, while the hand at frantic speed writes clearly and coherently on some entirely unrelated topic.<sup>67</sup> The experiments to which Binet resorted were designed to meet the usual objection to the effect that the automatic writer does after all *give attention* to what he is writing; he felt it necessary not only to render it improbable that attention could be given to the two parallel activities, but to show that a high degree of autonomous and creative thinking could legitimately be attributed to the secondary consciousness.

The tasks assigned to the secondary consciousness were never, however, sufficiently complicated to guard against the *possibility* of a rapid fluctuation of attention from one activity to another. The long series of evidences for double consciousness reported in the period between 1890 and 1910 (such as those of Boris Sidis<sup>68</sup>) have never really advanced much beyond those of Binet. Experiments similar to Binet's are abundant, yet none *absolutely* precludes the possibility of explanation in terms of fluctuations of attention.

The same criticism is perhaps also to be leveled at the many experiments conducted from the time of Richet to the present, in which proof is offered that the subject clearly remembers an event which he never noticed. Having glanced, for example,

in the most casual way at a scene from one's window, one shows upon cross-examination only the most sketchy knowledge of what was seen. In an altered state of mind, however, one may recount a wide area of details which in ordinary consciousness were lacking; or automatic writing may give a wide and accurate inventory.<sup>69</sup> A consciousness outside of the ordinary consciousness is supposed to have been at work, access to its contents being possible only by the use of special techniques. Recent work shows that *eidetic images* may appear long after the moment of observation (page 33) but how far these may explain the results of "subconscious perception" no one has clearly shown.

A contemporary of Janet was Morton Prince, an American physician who proved in time to be an able exponent of a theory of integration much like those of Azam, Janet, Binet and Sidis. The doctrine of subconscious or unconscious ideas was taken over with enthusiasm, and made a cardinal point in Prince's theory of the structure not only of hysterical, but of all personality.<sup>70</sup> And whereas Janet as he grew older became skeptical of his own theory of detached impersonal ideas, and frankly said that the phrase "subconscious idea" was simply a *façon de parler*, such conceptions seem to have been the very cornerstone of the personality theory of Morton Prince. He never tired of citing fresh evidence for the independent operation of ideas which were not known to the subject himself.<sup>71</sup> He would, for example, have the subject give a description of what he had seen, then in a changed state of consciousness (such as that of hypnosis) the person would give another description which included many correct details never noticed by the conscious mind.<sup>72</sup> But double or multiple personality, as seen from Prince's point of view, is a somewhat more dynamic thing than it is with Janet. Prince's most famous case of multiple personality showed among the various selves a degree of mutual *antagonism* which mere dissociation would seem inadequate to explain.<sup>73</sup> When one group of ideas was dominant, the "Sally" personality was in control. One chief

aim of the mischievous young lady seemed to be to punish another of the personalities, the staid and sober "Miss Beauchamp." Such antagonisms between the different aspects of personality are not infrequent in such cases. Obviously mere *ideas* do not fight each other. We seem forced to add at least some notion as to dominance and conflict.

It is possible to urge that there is much dramatization and make-believe in such cases, that there is at bottom but one personality, which, because of early habit or present goals to be gained, plays at being different selves. Just as a child may from moment to moment play at being a policeman, a fireman, and an Indian, so the self may throw itself with abandon into the realistic dramatization of different moods, ways of life, personalities.

Thus there always remains the possibility that such personalities are primarily attitudes or moods, and that a vaguely conscious unified self exists beneath them all. From this point of view, the last-named type of dissociation would be, at least in large part, a make-believe affair, desperately real in its own realm of existence, but not reflecting a fundamental cleavage in the self. There may, then, be a well-enough integrated personality which desires to develop two inconsistent ways of functioning; it is in quest of a sort of existence which would give it a right to be two persons at once. This is but a possible interpretation; it has not been *established* any more than the other views have been established. In offering such an explanation, moreover, it is sometimes assumed that the problem of double or multiple personality has been solved. Closer examination of such an explanation will make it clear, however, that except for sounding less uncanny, this leaves us exactly where we were. The habit systems of adults are not ordinarily logic-tight compartments, between which complete amnesia appears; and the consistent bitterness manifested between two aspects of a multiple personality is not completely explained by pointing out that we do in one mood punish ourselves for what we have done in some other mood. These analogies are


useful, and the attempt to explain the unusual in terms of the usual is always a necessary scientific expedient. The boomerang aspect of such explanations appears, however, when it becomes clear that we not only fall far short of understanding the real nature of conflict within the normal personality, but that in the above argument we have evaded, rather than clarified, the mechanism of cleavage or dissociation within the personality. Perhaps if we really understood integration we might better grasp the nature of disintegration. The explanation of the unusual in terms of the usual is true "explanation" only when we understand the usual.

This description of modern aspects of the association psychology, as illustrated by Janet, Binet and Prince will serve in some degree to give orientation and background for the understanding of psychoanalysis and its successors. The doctrine of conscious and subconscious association and dissociation, integration and conflict, was a fundamental system of thought for the medical psychologists of the late nineteenth century, wherever the French school had made its influence felt.

Since Prince's recent death, there has been no generally accepted spokesman for these views in America. In Great Britain, such doctrines as these have been almost completely replaced by those of a psychoanalytic tinge, while in France the versatile Janet, though still mentally vigorous, has given himself to other problems, and has been content to leave the systematic formulation of his personality theory essentially as it stood in his presentation a generation ago.

This view of personality, however, may be regarded as a sort of greatest common divisor for all the psychogenic ways of interpreting mental disorder, and indeed for all the systematic psychologies which flourish in modern medicine.<sup>74</sup> For if one puts to one side the definitely organic notions of personality disorder, this simple theory of ideas and their association has to be employed in some form or other if one is to keep within systematic psychological territory. Freud's and Jung's psychologies differ from that of Janet not by disagreement so

much as by extension. It is true that Janet has bitterly resisted psychoanalysis. He does, however, believe in "psychological analysis" of the personality by the method of the life history<sup>75</sup>; he does believe that ideas are lost from consciousness and that the personality is limited as long as these ideas are gone. We should be entirely willing to admit that it is to Richet, Azam, and especially Charcot, rather than to Janet, that Freud and even Prince owe their inspiration. The family tree of these theories can, in fact, best be shown by the following diagram, in which "Braid" is allowed to stand for the study of hypnosis in the middle of the century.



Nevertheless, Charcot's psychology was sketchy, not systematic, and for purposes of exposition it seems worth while to recognize Janet as the ablest exponent of the implications of association psychology for the theory of personality.

HERE, as elsewhere in this volume, it is our aim to describe ways of thinking about personality rather than to insist upon decision between them. Considering the fiendish complexity of the human organism, it seems to us very improbable that this century, or even the next, will succeed in systematizing our knowledge and giving us a conception of personality as clear and as sound as the conceptions of contemporary physical

science. We need, in the meantime, clear hypotheses with which to work. One aspect of the Janet-Prince doctrine of dissociation and the subconscious has been tested by other investigators, namely, the problem of the possibility of obtaining evidence for two simultaneous streams of consciousness or mental activities going on in the same person. The classical evidence for such parallel streams of mental activity is obtained, as we saw, from instances in which two conversations may be carried on, one through writing and the other through speaking, or cases in which the conscious mind may be held intent upon one subject while a subconscious part of the mind solves a problem, the answer to which is suddenly given when a signal is presented. Most of the experiments to check this doctrine appear to confirm its validity.<sup>70</sup> It must, however, be admitted that most of these experiments are crudely controlled; nothing is commoner than to find a person jogging back and forth between two subjects of interest at a rate sufficiently rapid to give the false impression that the mind is on two things at once. The evidence for the existence of a subconscious mind rests in large part on evidence that such alternation from one subject to another is impossible. Messerschmidt<sup>71</sup> has shown in the case of three hypnotized subjects that what appears to be parallel mental activity is actually alternation between two. Having obtained the maximum speed at which the subject could work at two tasks, reading and addition, she made the purporting double consciousness read and add at the same time. The result was a very crass and grotesque performance, attention obviously wobbling between the two, and each task interfering enormously with the other. In various respects her experiments are not conclusive, but even a single experiment of this sort must be recorded as of some weight in relation to our problem. This experiment does not, however, bear upon some other problems regarding dissociation, such as the dreams of people who seem to be realistically dreaming of bandits while quite aware that they are at the same time lying safe in bed.<sup>72</sup> This kind of dis-

sociation seems to differ but little from the ordinary phenomena of attention in which one event holds a prominent place in consciousness, and another goes on in a somewhat dimmer region of the mind. There seems to be no special reason why two parallel streams of thought might not be *equally* "conscious," and no reason why each should always be aware of the other.

To this argument many psychologists reply that if one is unaware of the other, the one which can give an account of itself is the only one of whose existence we can be sure. Something appearing outside of consciousness is simply *outside*.<sup>79</sup> Psychology as a science of consciousness is only interested in it in so far as it has repercussions within the conscious field.

It may be worth while to pause to see whether our disputants understand one another. The evidence for "dissociation" is not to be judged all at once, for there are several *distinct uses* of the term "dissociation." Quite aside from the question whether conscious states or processes always have to be personal, or a part of some "self," dissociation means at least four things.

It may mean, first, that certain activities go on outside of consciousness, although these would ordinarily be expected to require conscious control. From this point of view almost any automatized habit is a product of dissociation. Life is full of dissociation, if by this one means merely that a large part of what we do is outside of the narrow realm of which we are aware.

A second use of the term refers to *potentialities*, not actualities. A memory which flashes into the mind may have been dissociated in the sense that the memory was not present in consciousness; but the fact that the memory is the reappearance of an old element or group of elements does not force us to assume that the memory has been present in some mental form all the time. Photographs taken in the Arctic thirty years ago and recently developed may show pictures of what happened to André's balloon, but the film inside the camera can scarcely

be regarded as containing the consciousness of those far-away events. All that could be meant by saying that the film "remembers" is that when acted on by a chemical solution it produces for the observer something by which he may imaginatively reconstruct what happened thirty years ago. So, parts of the brain which are not at the time functioning in such a way as to cause any conscious experience, may be said to be dissociated, and by a confusing analogy, the memory itself may be said to be dissociated.<sup>80</sup>

A very large number of aphasia cases seem simply to show loss of specific associations (*e.g.*, specific words). It is grotesque to assume that the words exist somewhere in an unconscious mind. Often enough a post-mortem examination shows that a violent brain injury has eliminated tissue upon which memory of the words depended. Cases of blocking or interference in association in normal life are abundant. Why should we in such cases assume that that which is out of consciousness exists in some other psychological realm? The assumption that such things must exist in an unconscious state is analogous to the assumption that the candle flame must exist somewhere between the extinguishing and the next lighting of the candle. Many cases of double or multiple personality also appear to involve simply the dislocation of certain memories; in cases of alternation from one set of memories to another there is no special gain in resorting to doctrines regarding the subconscious or unconscious.

A third use of the term dissociation proceeds from the assumption that the field of attention is illuminated with unequal brightness, from those things which are clearly present in the center of attention to those which are only dimly present in the fringe of consciousness. There is perhaps a gradual transition from the center to the fringe, or there may be a series of sudden drops or "stages" of attention. At any rate, we ultimately come to a point where things are on the very outer margin or rim of the world. We may retrospectively

estimate that some event was just barely conscious but no more. Our powers of observation are, however, limited, and those things which are *even less* clearly observed, those things which were even more vaguely glimpsed than those just described, might be said to be dissociated. Dissociated states of consciousness are simply fragments or patterns of consciousness which are supposed to lie just outside of the field of direct observation. They may, of course, be indirectly observed by all the techniques already described by Binet and others of the French school.

A fourth conception of dissociation presupposes a genuine splitting of the mind into two or more simultaneous streams or activities. Stratton has collected intriguing cases in which, during the impact of sudden emotion, the observer found mental activities going on concurrently and independently, neither entangling itself in, nor interfering with, the other.<sup>81</sup> Thus an aviator, in a tense moment, relived a long-past scene during the very moments of peril in which he was carrying out complicated, intelligent adjustments to a desperate situation which might well have meant death. Here, of course, we have no true splitting of *self*; no true double *personality*. We have, rather, two equally clear streams of consciousness observable by one and the same self. There are, so to speak, two foci in the ellipse of consciousness.

This form of dissociation may, and frequently does, lead to the appearance of two independent points of reference, two independent "selves" or "observers" who may, if one prefers, be called personalities; in some cases it has gone so far that neither knows the thoughts or doings of the other. Here belong some cases of "alternating personality." In other cases one personality may be ignorant of the other's doings, yet the other may know both what he has himself done and what the first has done during the period of the latter's ascendance. These cases are sufficiently frequent to have made possible about twenty good studies, but not sufficiently frequent to throw very

much light on the dynamics of ordinary personality; nor has the expectation that they would explain the nature of the self been fulfilled.

With such confusion as this it is not surprising that the term dissociation has fallen on evil days, nor that there has been a general tendency to assume that all the problems connected with the term have become obsolete. A study of recent cases such as those of Head<sup>82</sup> and of Stratton will show nevertheless that all the problems raised in the days of Sidis and Binet continue to call for solution, and that a structural analysis of personality still demands the devising of more adequate methods for the experimental study of the processes of association and dissociation.

The general revival of interest in dissociation and suggestion phenomena in the last ten years<sup>83</sup> is a sign that old clues to personality study are being followed again with improved techniques.<sup>84</sup> And there is no reason why the most careful methods used in the analysis of complicated phenomena of attentive consciousness should not also be pressed into service for the direct purpose of personality study.

## CHAPTER THREE

### *THE BEHAVIORIST'S APPROACH*

THE EVOLUTIONARY theory, shaking biology to its very foundations, reacted as powerfully upon psychology as upon biology. Animals do things; so do people. They struggle or yield, flee or pursue, group themselves with or against others of their kind or of other kinds. Turning from the introspective laboratory of psychology to the works of Darwin, Huxley and Haeckel was like turning from a delicate dream to find the manifest sunlight beating upon the solid floor in a very real and demanding world. Psychologists who had lectured upon the mind of the dog, or even of the spider, turned to new experiments to discover that the world of animal behavior had yielded to the brusque and definitive demands of objective experimental techniques; that animal psychology had, in a few years, become almost as objective as animal histology or embryology. The leaders in this objective psychology were zoölogists and physiologists; the "German objectivists," though not especially concerned to deny the existence of consciousness, dealt with problems of response to environmental stimulation exactly as they would deal with the response of the heart to an electric current or the response of a muscle to the presence of fatigue poisons.

Two Russian physiologists shared the spirit of the objectivists, and, apparently independently, contributed most powerfully to the conceptual formulation of this new psychological system. Pavlov,<sup>85</sup> working upon the physiology of digestion,

became interested in the salivary reflex, and in time came to the conclusion that automatic physical activities or *reflexes* are the elements underlying all complex behavior. Bekhterev,<sup>86</sup> in the meantime, was studying motor responses, such as the reflex jerking back of the hand, and came to the conclusion that such reflex acts were the clue to all activity, without recourse to any concepts regarding "mental life." As early as 1907, he defined a systematic "objective psychology" in terms of relations between objective situations and objective responses.<sup>87</sup> He did not, indeed, succeed in stating all the problems of subjective psychology in his new objective terminology; but he did go so far as to define human nature in terms of mechanical reflex responses to stimuli and to suggest that the *combining of reflexes* is the only clue that psychology needs to unravel the mysteries and complexities of personality. Parts of his great Russian work were translated into French and German in 1913, and in this form directly stimulated and encouraged the American psychologist J. B. Watson in his own efforts towards an objective psychology.<sup>88</sup>

We saw above that introspection becomes complicated as soon as one is asked to recall and analyze a complex experience, and it was quite inevitable that as problems became more complicated, the testimony of different introspectors should be found to present gross contradictions. The best of observers disagreed; disagreed not only on interpretation but as to what they actually found in fleeting scraps of consciousness.<sup>89</sup> The controversy left nearly all students of introspective psychology much saddened; of what could one legitimately be sure?

In the face of this situation, it was perfectly clear that a new psychological school had to appear. An Aristotle could not with all his might and main have held back the tide of behaviorism. The German and Russian objectivists, and students of animal behavior everywhere, were pointing the way, while at the same instant the elaborate structure of introspective psychology seemed to be tottering. The original Watsonian program of 1912, therefore, seems to have been a defense

of objective method as against subjective, and an uncompromising insistence upon the application of the same objective methods to the study of *human* behavior which had been found practicable in animal psychology. But though these two points attracted much attention, Watson seems to have had from the first an animus against the very concept of mind.<sup>90</sup> The objectivists had not, he believed, gone far enough. Though they regarded consciousness as inaccessible, they had not been concerned to deny the existence of mental processes. They tended to accept the nineteenth-century notion of psychophysical parallelism, the doctrine that consciousness runs along parallel with certain bodily changes. Watson would have none of this.<sup>91</sup> The problem of psychology must be restated. Here is the human body; here is what it does. There is no mental event intervening between stimulus and response.<sup>92</sup>

It was only among American psychologists, however, that any general disposition existed to accept Watson's program. Objectivism in Germany and Russia simply meant the refusal of physiology to entangle itself with psychology. German objectivism soon died an uneventful death. The course of Russian objectivism is somewhat checkered. Pavlov has been able, as a result of his immense prestige, to continue his study of reflexes and learning processes in animals and in human beings without any sort of compromise. Bekhterev, however, who had written a book on the "General Reflexology of Man" began to be influenced by the political tide of the times, and began to attune his reflexology to the Marxian psychology, which has, of course, driven all else before it in Russia like chaff before the wind.<sup>93</sup> Marxian psychology is technically known as "dialectical materialism." It is, indeed, a systematic materialism; but it recognizes the reality of conscious processes; in fact it makes them crucially important in certain situations. The old reflexology lost ground, as did all forms of "naïve materialism."

Since Bekhterev's recent death, his school of thought has found it hard to justify its continued existence. At a recent

All-Soviet educational congress, one of the chief notes is reported to have been the "beginning of the end" of reflexology. The task of social reconstruction, say the communist psychologists, cannot be carried through by any Robot-like reflex machines. Man is a conscious, planning, inventing self, with goals and adaptive intelligence. Even in Russia, then, the objectivist program may be said to have collapsed except in Pavlov's laboratory. A note of congratulation to Pavlov on his eightieth birthday, the leading article in the Russian Child Study Journal (*Pedologia*), points out that Pavlov's theory of the reflex cannot be reconciled with Marx, and must, of course, be discarded. We feel quite safe, in view of all this, in saying that behaviorism is today an exclusively American movement, destined to complete its history entirely within the boundaries of this country. Our approach then, if it is to describe a living and working system of conceptions, must be an American approach. By the term "behaviorist" we shall mean an American psychologist sympathetic with J. B. Watson's approach.

THE BEHAVIORIST doubts whether it would ever occur to anyone untutored in the philosophical tradition to begin his discussion of human nature by referring to "consciousness" or to such elements as sensations, images, or feelings. For him the first thing that we know about human nature is that we act, and the first datum of his science of human nature is the simplest form of behavior. If, moreover, man's animal descent is conceded, one must find some kind of unit in human nature which will be comparable with the units which appear in the whole world of living things. Now the sensations which animals may have are at best a matter for conjecture; feelings even more so, and images scarcely to be discussed at all.

But there are other and more serious objections to beginning the study of psychology with those forms of experience upon which the report of a "subject" is the only available evidence. We know from studies of the psychology of testimony that most people swear to things which never happened, and that

it is only under very special conditions that we may accept the statements of an eye-witness regarding something in the past. How much more is this the case when we have to consider highly complicated "inner" experiences! Confusion worse confounded appears when testimony must be produced not only with reference to what was present in the form of images, but what feelings, or compounds of images and feelings, prevailed in a state of consciousness which no longer exists. Yet if we are to study anything which has a duration in time, we are forced to resort to this kind of *retrospective* testimony wherever the "introspective" techniques are used.

The behaviorist offers, then, not merely a general objection to introspective methods, in that they divorce man from his fellow creatures, but a specific objection, to the effect that testimony as to "inner experience" can never be verified. It is not necessary to labor here the point as to the inadequacy of such testimony. The psychological literature of the last forty years is replete with instances of contradiction and even of acrimonious polemics between the leaders of rival introspective camps.

But the actual animus which impelled Watson to break with introspective psychology was no mere methodological dilemma, no mere discontent with the evanescence of introspectionists' results. It was a deep-seated conviction that human character must be seen as part of a universal naturalistic sequence.<sup>94</sup> The behaviorist maintains that the material with which he works and the results which he obtains are a part of the world of physical things, things which can be touched, weighed, measured, counted, and upon which the more complicated processes of experimental and quantitative analysis may be carried out. Now such a view could scarcely content itself with the type of solution offered by the German or the Russian objectivists. These, as we have seen, were content to leave certain aspects of human nature untouched, since these aspects were refractory to the objective methods of science. For Watson, on the contrary, nothing must be left out. *Human*

*nature as a whole* must be naturalized, made accessible to science, and if this could not be done by any simple means a more complicated technique must be found. We come, therefore, to the really crucial aspect of behaviorism, the attempt to state the higher mental processes, the functions of memory, reasoning and will, in terms of a consistent "naturalism" in which the claims of a mental or conscious something above and beyond the bodily changes of the human subject are no longer to be considered.

The concept of objective response to a stimulus must be applied throughout the domain of psychology, not as an *adjunct* to other concepts, but as the *very essence of the science*. It is this point, the inclusion of *all* of human psychology within the pale of objective science, that constitutes behaviorism. Behaviorism, then, is not mere objectivism, for psychology had been using objective methods for a hundred years or so. Titchener, justly considered the greatest of modern introspective psychologists, devotes about half of his great text-book on experimental psychology to purely objective methods.<sup>95</sup> *It is not in the mere use of objective method that behaviorism is to be defined. It is in the systematic restatement, in objective terms, of those problems of psychology which had been supposed to transcend the limits of objective method.*

First, then, what shall we do with human thought? After all, we do think, and thinking does not on first inspection appear to be found in the world of physics and chemistry. Certain observations, however, make it reasonably clear that thought is, as Plato long ago pointed out, basically *talking to oneself*, and that the analysis of thought is really the analysis of *language*.<sup>96</sup> Now language goes through four definable stages in the growth of every individual. First, overt speech, in which vocal responses are obviously nothing more than physical changes in response to physical stimuli. Second, whispered responses. The little child who has at first talked aloud (and who, as far as we know, always thinks aloud) is now reproved for breaking in upon the silence of his elders. He begins to

whisper. Close observations of children of three or four years of age show that they often think by whispering to themselves, that the whispered words serve as substitutes for the words spoken aloud.<sup>97</sup> Next comes the stage in which the child is disturbed to find himself the only person in a group who needs to whisper — others can read or make their plans for the morrow without any apparent signs of talking to themselves. The scale of movements is therefore reduced to gentle tongue and lip movements, or what Bain<sup>98</sup> long ago described as an inward "twittering." In many cases thinking depends more upon the lips than upon the tongue, or indeed upon other parts of the vocal apparatus less accessible to instrumental study. There remain, in addition, hundreds of cases in which gesture language is used. The thought of going to a certain place is the incipient moving of the hand or the head in that direction; thinking of a bad dilemma means gravely shaking our heads. A dozen similar illustrations will occur to anyone. We think with our whole bodies.

Do we inherit the capacity to think? There exist among newborn infants only two kinds of differences. First, those differences which are due to the inheritance of different structures. One child may be born with longer fingers or bigger muscles than another; and certain functions, ranging all the way from typing to throwing the javelin, may depend perforce upon these structures. On the other hand, many functions depend upon the influence of the environment even in utero. A very striking case of this is evident in relation to right- and left-handedness. Some cases are probably due to an embryonic posture which cramps one arm, and the consequent greater ease in using the other arm in the first few weeks after birth. But even when the right and left arms are equally developed and in equal use in the first few months there is nearly always much social pressure which facilitates the use of one hand and inhibits the use of the other. Characteristically, things are offered to the right hand. We actually correct a child, telling him not to use the left but the right hand.

If social pressure of this kind is sufficient to explain differences in the use of the hands, the behaviorist believes it sufficient to explain variations in linguistic and emotional behavior. Here we come to the problem of inherited differences in intelligence and personality. The correlation (degree of correspondence) between total vocabulary and total "intelligence" is usually high.<sup>99</sup> On this basis it would seem that what we have been calling intelligence is in very large part simply the accumulation of verbal symbols. Other evidence shows that skill in the manipulation of these symbols goes hand in hand with their accumulation.<sup>100</sup> Now most of our evidence on the importance of heredity in relation to individual differences has to do with differences in "intelligence." The mental tests have given us much material on the child's resemblance to his parents, his brothers, "his sisters and his cousins and his aunts." In general, it has been found that family resemblance in intelligence is great.<sup>101</sup> But linguistic opportunities offered to children in the same family can scarcely help but be rather similar. They can scarcely help but produce just the kind of uniformity which we find. In the case of the resemblance of "identical" twins,<sup>102</sup> twins derived from the same fertilized cell, the data are equally suggestive of important environmental influences. To be sure there is a basic initial similarity in identical twins. But it must be remembered that the human brain is a rather non-specific organ, capable of all sorts of complicated learning processes and of doing anything from dreaming nonsense to constructing a skyscraper. It is therefore not sufficient to know that in confronting an intelligence-test situation identical twins approximate one another's scores. The important thing is to know whether the differences between identical twins reared *together* are analogous to those which obtain in identical twins reared *apart*. Now there appear to be in the entire literature of the subject, less than ten well-reported cases of identical twins who have lived practically their entire lives apart; and these cases give us inconclusive evidence.<sup>103</sup> What value is there in knowing that identi-


cal twins resemble one another in intelligence (remembering that this means primarily in the manipulation of verbal and other symbols) unless we know to what extent they have been subjected to the same general environmental pressure? Identical twins are nearly always dressed alike and treated alike; they play with one another, go to the same school, are kept in the same grade, and in a thousand ways are made to conform far more than are other twins. "Fraternal" twins, who show considerable physical difference, are for that very reason, much less likely to be subjected to uniform environmental influences than those who resemble one another in a striking way. It seems reasonable to suppose that twins are often conditioned to the same stimuli and therefore respond in like ways to like situations. At least, the behaviorist considers this the most reasonable approach until convincing evidence to the contrary is produced.

But does an intelligence test really depend upon making certain fixed conditioned responses to more or less standardized stimuli? Are there not certain creative or inventive functions involved in the test situation? Let us see. In the Binet scale there occur not only a great many tests which depend directly upon vocabulary and a few which depend upon the knowledge of numbers (learned in the same way that words are learned), but a few tests in which some more complicated inventive functions are supposed to be exercised. One of these, for example, involves the interpretation of pictures; another involves finding a superior plan for locating one's ball which has been lost in a field; a third requires grasping the absurdities present in a series of nonsensical narratives.<sup>104</sup> How much true inventiveness is there in these functions? In the interpretation of the pictures almost everything depends upon what experience one has had with pictures and with words appropriate to the situation. With regard to recognizing absurdities, it is to be noted that a large number of these depend directly upon a child's past knowledge of social situations. Theoretically, innate intelligence of a high order might be regarded as

capable of solving an absurdities problem even if stated in *abstract* form; but this is not what we have in standard intelligence tests. We have here a problem which is easy to solve by a child whose habits have been built up with reference to such situations, but not by any other child.

THE BEHAVIORIST's personality is divided into three parts, consisting in the behavior respectively of (1) the muscles of trunk and limbs, the most *important* being those upon which "manual skill" depends; (2) the muscles of the speech organs; (3) the unstriped muscles of the viscera.


In general the behaviorist's approach to personality need presuppose only one sort of inherited characteristics which are significant for individual differences and the ultimate achievement of socialized character; namely the reflexes (or pattern responses) to which such names as "grasping," "crying," "fear" and "rage" are applied; these may for present purposes be considered distinct sensori-motor units. The organism may indeed behave as a whole, but the separate response units may be identified and independently studied. They may be simple, or relatively complex. The individual consists, then, of one hundred, or two hundred, or five hundred separate responses, each of which is touched off by a definable range of stimuli. R-1 may be touched off by S-1; R-2 may be touched off by S-2, and so on.



The R-1 may vary slightly, to be sure; and so may S-1, but each of these may be defined within limits. Such expressions as "loss of support," for instance, may be defined in terms of

the units of physical science, exactly as they would be defined by an engineer in relation to any falling body. The response of *clutching*, which occurs thereafter, is a vague term but it may be defined in the language of physical science, the range within which the muscular contractions appear being fairly narrowly circumscribed. We might then regard personality as simply the sum of the response capacities which the individual exhibits when in the presence of certain stimuli.


In place of the always rather vague concept of the association of ideas, behaviorism insists upon the importance of the direct establishing of connections between visible stimuli and visible response. Let a small boy be bowled over by a dog while rummaging in an alley-way; he shows for years a dread of alley-ways, even when he has long since forgotten the dog.<sup>105</sup> In fact, if the experience is sufficiently disturbing a morbid fear of this sort may persist for a life-time. It is not necessary to assume that the small boy has any "ideas" whatever; he is terrified, that is all. On this basis any stimulus presented *along with* some other *relatively strong* stimulus will tend to bring the response which the other stimulus called. Speaking schematically the inherited reaction S-R occurs while S-I is present. Later on S-I *alone* is able to call out directly the response R.



This is the "conditioned response," or response to a "substitute stimulus." Adult personality consists largely of learned emotional reactions of this sort. Let a child be frightened while in the dark; the darkness itself will become a stimulus for fear. Most character traits are, from the behaviorist's point of view, conditioned emotional responses.<sup>106</sup>


Now each of the one hundred or more reflex responses is

attached, by the principle of the conditioned reflex, to other stimuli than those which originally called it out.



Stimuli  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  may come to elicit  $R$ . In the course of time there will then be a wider array of  $S$ - $R$  connections. The response side of the organism may appear structurally similar, but the world to which it may respond is a bigger world.


It will, however, be noted that we can not proceed very far on the assumption that these secondary stimuli are brought in from outside of the original realm of stimuli. Before long many stimuli in the environment come to arouse responses belonging originally to *some other stimulus in the original series*.



We have, then, no longer merely a building up of many  $S$ 's in relation to each  $R$ , but a crisscrossing of  $S$ - $R$  relations, so that one  $S$  may bring about a combination of  $R$ 's, or a combination of  $S$ 's may bring about one or two or almost any combination of  $R$ 's. Character formation in this sense is the exchanging of  $S$ 's and  $R$ 's in place of those given by nature.


According to our most accurate present information, the conditioned response seems to involve the loss of a function as well as the gain of a new functional element.<sup>107</sup> The simultaneous exercise of the  $S_1 \rightarrow R_1$  and the  $S_2 \rightarrow R_2$  patterns, seems

to involve not merely the attachment of S-2 to R-1, but the complete elimination of the response R-2. Thus a dog given meat powder while receiving a slight electric shock through the paw comes in time to salivate whenever the shock is given. The salivary response to food is in this case stronger than the withdrawing response to the shock (it is unnecessary to consider the highly complicated explanations offered for this phenomenon of "dominance"). By gradually decreasing the amount of meat powder or gradually increasing the amount of the shock, it is possible to reverse these relations so that the meat powder produces the withdrawing of the paw without salivation.



In this way conditioning apparently consists in the crowding out of one response by another, as well as in the funneling or convergence of stimuli upon a final common path. It will be easy to see why behaviorism emphasizes the importance of the *strength* of stimuli, believing that habits can be formed in the way described so long as the relative strength of two S-R connections is properly arranged. The unconditioned R-1 will drop out by itself if sufficiently strong stimuli are chosen to dominate it. If the child has had the misfortune to develop negative response to some harmless object, the conditioning may be eliminated and a reconditioning substituted by combining a biologically strong stimulus with the stimulus to which the negative response is given. If the child has been frightened by a rabbit nibbling its fingers and if now the sight of the rabbit frightens the child, it is only necessary in most cases to keep the rabbit at a distance, but in sight, while the child is eating dinner or having some other agreeable experi-

ence.<sup>108</sup> Here the conditioned response  $S-2 \rightarrow R-3$  is crowded out by the powerful  $S-2 \rightarrow R-1$ .



Here  $S-1$  is the nibbling of fingers,  $S-2$  the sight of the rabbit,  $S-3$  the food.

Now one universal property of the conditioned response is the tendency of the response to appear not only upon presentation of the stimulus  $S-1$ , but upon the presentation of something *similar* to it or having a prominent element *in common with* it. Thus Watson's Albert, frightened by a rabbit, was frightened by a fur muff and cotton wool.<sup>109</sup> Thus any child who gleefully responds to the father's evening return may respond similarly to some stranger in the distance whose hat or beard or complexion is like its father's. In this way, simple conditionings become the basis for a wider and wider array of emotional responses. It will seem that if a response is intense enough, it may, on this basis, easily become a character trait, almost as fundamental as if it had been inherited as a totality. A child frightened, for example, by a man with a swarthy complexion may, if the fright be great enough, respond with intense fear to any one with a dark skin; if he has lived among light-skinned people, he might on going into an Italian community develop a generalized fear of social contact. A person once developing severe indigestion while eating unaccustomed diet may show an almost universal dread of strange foods, to a point which would be recognized at once as hypochondriacal. There is no real limit to the range to which a transferred emotional response might reach. A bad fright resulting from a stranger's handling might even generate a universal fear of strange people.

Much of the character of children as we study them upon their entering school at the six-year level seems to be of this transferred-conditioned-response type. A boy shows himself the first day at school to be a bully. Study of the home background shows that in the blind process of varied response to his environment such responses have been successful, that is, have satisfied a need, while others have failed. In the language of the conditioned response, the aggressive movements which were originally aroused by the thwarting of some activity have been carried over to all sorts of new situations which interfere with what the child is doing. Aggressiveness has, so to speak, spread out in all directions. Almost anything in the daily routine which interferes in the slightest with some activity in progress will arouse the whole aggressive repertoire. The child arrives at school and is, of course, immediately confronted with both adults and children who interfere with what he wants. He immediately makes those responses which have worked at home. It is not necessary that any one at school should look exactly like any one in the home. The transferred conditioned response is in evidence if he reacts to the teacher as he reacts to his parents. If bullying has been an effective method of handling the parents, the teachers are immediately treated to the same technique. If little brothers have been effectively put in their place by bullying, children in the school touch off the same reaction.


Or, let us take the case of the child whose technique is to yield. He, we say, is shy; he will not stand up for his rights; he seems to have a generalized character trait of submissiveness. Let us study him too in his home background. Here we find that he is the smallest and weakest of a family of four in a broken home where the mother has no possible opportunity to control the reactions of the child. The child has in this case also tried all the various techniques which can be tried at home. He has tried bullying, but it wouldn't work. He has tried pleading and teasing; they, also, are ineffective. He has tried appealing to mother — no result. Of all his repertoire the

thing which has worked best is prompt and undemonstrative yielding. This, in fact, has usually given him such peace and satisfaction as he is able to attain. He has developed an apparently generalized character trait of yielding—he is a meek or timid child. The degree to which a habit will be carried over will depend partly on the age and intelligence of the person, and on a large number of personal factors: the degree of his interest, his alertness or sleepiness, the background factors such as the general plan or purpose which he is following, and other contributing habit-systems such as susceptibility to suggestion and ability to sustain attention. If a child has been frightened repeatedly by a brutal father, one would expect him on this basis to be badly frightened by any man who looks like his father, and to be somewhat frightened by any man who resembles him,—depending, of course, on the age of the child, the degree of the man's resemblance, and so on. One would even expect fears aroused not merely by the sight of the father or a man who looks like him, but those aroused by some sign that the father is coming, such as the whistle of the commuting train. In case the child got into a chronic state of terror, a new problem would arise. We are, for the moment, considering simply the origin of specific traits; in this case, fears. Fears are limited by the degree of resemblance between the situation in question and the situation which has caused the fear. In later life the child will tend to show fear to greater or less extent as he is subjected to situations which strike at this sensitive tissue in his life. What is true here for fear would also be true for affection, for scorn, or for any other emotional response. There would be in each individual not affection in general or scorn in general, but a habit projecting itself or attaching itself to all objects *sufficiently similar* to those which formed the original habit. Certain hierarchies or patterns of habits might, of course, also be engendered where one stimulus touches off two or more habit systems.

If two or more habits work well together as a team, they

may be consolidated; if they work badly or "inconsistently" the weaker must go. The organization of habits into hierarchies depends on experience, and on elimination of combinations which bring undesirable results, so that the *integration* of habits is just as much a matter of conditioning as is the acquisition of any single habit.

We have seen that the three reaction systems with which the behaviorist is concerned are the verbal, the manual and the visceral. Reactions in all three fields are going on constantly, and the organism is being bombarded by stimuli potent to arouse one or more of the three kinds of responses. Obviously conditionings must occur. A stimulus originally adequate only to arouse a visceral response will become adequate to arouse also manual and verbal responses; the man who at first responded to machine-gun fire only by an undifferentiated terror comes to respond by dropping flat on the ground, and quickly adjusting his rifle, shouts to warn his comrades. Not only do situations come to bring about a manifold of responses, but the responses themselves become capable of bringing out other responses. Manual responses follow, for example, not only in the presence of some *external* stimulus which would arouse a visceral response, but directly upon the occurrence of the *visceral* response itself. Visceral responses give rise to manual or verbal responses or both.



In this way a crisscrossing or interlocking of the response mechanisms is established.<sup>110</sup> It is only at its simplest level that

personality can be defined in terms of conditioned emotional response; more frequently we mean the interweaving of these varied kinds of responses. A man's personality when confronted with an insulting remark is not only the system of visceral responses within him, but the kind of verbal and manual responses which are conditioned to such insults; and further the kind of verbal and manual habits which follow from such visceral responses. If, for example, the incipient wave of fury is promptly followed by a succession of inner speech responses of the order, "Now keep your head; nothing was ever gained by losing it," and if this leads instantly to restraint of the attacking movements which were already under way, all this is a most significant aspect of the individual's personality. Personality is a system of interconnections between these three major sets of responses.

We shall do well to explain the importance of language in more detail. Words are the basis for the symbolic activity which we call thought. Words are substitutes for things in the sense that the word touches off the response which the thing would touch off if it were present. When we think, words touch each other off in sequence like a fuse or a train of gun powder. Each word arouses, however, not only another word, but a posture or muscular set of the body. The child who talks to himself as he makes something in plaster, or clay, or sand, not only names the things which he has made, but by the naming of what is to come actually guides his own manual movements.<sup>111</sup>

Language behavior, that is, manipulation of words and combinations of words, is also the chief means of bringing about visceral responses of the sort basic in emotion. These responses, it will be recalled, are made primarily by the unstriped muscles. The person reliving a horrible or a thrilling adventure schematizes the thing through words or fragments of words which give rise to conditioned visceral responses at the same time that they give rise to postural (striped muscle) responses. The continuity of personality is primarily a continuity of

bodily habits, systems of interconnection between language movements, manual and postural movements, and visceral movements. When we speak of a man's personality, we mean the probability that a particular situation or group of situations in the future will bring about certain responses of one or more of these three types. Most commonly we mean that all three types in their interconnection will be brought into play. No "mind" is, of course, involved. What is ordinarily thought of as mind is, from the present point of view, the symbolic process, especially language and posture, by which the muscles run their gamut of expressive movements.

Any manual response to a stimulus tends to be itself the cause of other responses. Even in infancy one movement leads to another, and the process of acquiring skill consists largely of building up a series of responses to a series of stimuli, such that the stimuli later only need to be present in abbreviated form — or they may in special cases be absent altogether. A man finding his way about his house in pitch darkness is guided constantly by the movements which he has just made; even if he has just touched a bit of furniture which gives him a clue, the very movements, turns, steps which he has taken are important clues which lead to an appropriate succession of further movements. An easily observed case of manual movements running smoothly and without outside intervention, is the gesture language of the deaf and dumb. Let the conversation be interrupted and one sees the complexity of the process by which one must find one's way back to the link where the conversation stopped.

Now our own verbal behavior is of exactly the same sort except that it is harder to observe. We talk with our tongues, lips and other speech organs. A single word may be a response to a single stimulus but a train of words is a succession of responses to previous responses. "Let me see, where was I?" we say when the train of verbal responses is broken. Each verbal response then comes in time not only to appear in response to a stimulus but to act as a stimulus to further responses. To

be sure, a verbal response is usually determined not by one, but by a great complexity of responses going on in the body, so that the pattern of speech is subtle and intricate. The complexity of the apparatus is such that speech would be among the first things disturbed in a fatigued or worried or embarrassed individual, and this is, of course, exactly the case. Moreover, the complexity of speech is eloquently attested by the vast system of inner connections between vocal and other responses. Practically all the more complicated achievements of civilization are based upon speech, and practically all serious personality study makes verbal behavior not only vitally important for its own sake, but a most valuable clue in the tracing out of connections with manual and visceral systems. It is in fact usually through the conditionings between visceral and verbal systems that we are able to know of those visceral factors which are so important in the disturbed personality. Psychiatry, including psychoanalysis, gets at the disturbed or suppressed visceral response by a delicate process of tracing *via* the verbal connections, and the reasons why some "suppressed" memories are so hard to get at is simply the fact that they belong to the aspects of life which (through fear or shame) were never verbalized, or belong to a period so early in infancy that verbal symbols had not been acquired.<sup>112</sup> The analyst then has to rely upon vague and indirect clues much less satisfactory than those verbal symbols which with due patience can usually be found in the adult.

The degree of unity or integration existing within the individual is largely a question of the degree to which visceral habits are connected with verbal habits, or the degree to which two systems of verbal habits are connected with one another. The dissociated or badly integrated individual is simply one whose response tendencies are out of functional connection with others, and the process of readjusting the individual is largely a process of reconnecting the broken parts. To be sure, the parts would probably have been integrated long before

were there not some conflict, some tendency to antagonistic forms of response. It will be recalled, however, that when two forms of responses are allowed to occur together, the principle of dominance insures the ascendance of the one and the elimination of the other. The individual at war with himself is in a sense two individuals; if the two parts be allowed to get together and fight it out, the individual will be remade. It will be noted that except for a difference in terminology this is identically what the early psychoanalysts meant when they spoke of recalling suppressed experiences, facing reality, or understanding one's self, and that it is almost exactly what Socrates meant when he said that goodness and intelligence were identical, and laid down the maxim, "Know thyself."

Behaviorism in its modern form recognizes neither pleasure nor pain, neither good nor bad,<sup>113</sup> and is consequently proscribed from offering any ethical theory whatsoever. Paradoxically, however, there is hardly any more earnest advocate of mental hygiene or of training in socially useful habits than the behaviorist. Systems of value seem alien to this mode of thought, yet there exist in modern literature few more eloquent pleas for a systematic inculcation of habits of social co-operation than are contained in the closing pages of Watson's *Behaviorism*. Here we find, on the assumption that there are three major emotions, fear, rage and love, the appeal to society to devise intelligent modes of eliminating fear and rage and of fostering and strengthening love. One suspects that even in the citadel of scientific systems which deny the very existence of mental life, there is recognition that the world of feelings (not as they are reflected in movements but directly as they are felt), is determining the goal to which Watson and many of his followers have worked.

THE "*situational approach*" in modern sociology and education involves the explanation of variations in *behavior* in terms of variations in the *situations* rather than recourse to theories

about differences between individual human beings. From the situationists' point of view we are all essentially alike; in like situations, this view maintains, we behave about the same way.

Our conduct in any new situation is a *transferred conditioned response*, a response determined by its similarity to some situation to which we have been previously conditioned. Our differing *motives* are like the different ways of confronting a new situation already discussed in relation to pre-school children. We are the embodiment of our personal history of conditionings. And what we will do next if we confront the same situation will be very similar unless we have very different conditionings. Since society exerts fairly uniform pressure on us in most respects, there will be in practice no very profound individual differences. *What seem to be individual differences are really greater or smaller differences actually present in the situations which we confront.* Or, to state the matter in general and abstract form, the variability in human conduct is more an expression of varying situations than it is of varying make-up. Now if personality be defined behavioristically, in terms of what we actually *do*, personality is more a matter of the situation than it is of the organism. Of course situation and organism are equally "important"; the point at stake is that variations in personality which depend on variations in situations are greater than those which depend on differences between habit-organizations or character. This, of course, goes *far* beyond the statement that environment is more important than heredity. It means that even differences in *heredity and environment together*, as now expressed among different people, are of less importance than differences in the actual situations to which persons respond.

This is indeed not identical with behaviorism, yet the two points of view are congenial. To take but one illustration, the trouble with the delinquent, from this point of view, does not lie primarily in his heredity nor *even* in his habits; for the situations which many young people face in the underworld

are situations to which most people's habit-systems would respond by a transferred conditioned response of the sort which we call crime. Much experimental evidence for the situational view has been published<sup>114</sup>; some has already been mentioned (p. 27), and some will be adduced later (p. 382 ff). Our purpose here is primarily to outline the theory and to show its place in opposition to those defined in the first two chapters.



*PART TWO:*  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FREUD, JUNG,  
AND ADLER



## INTRODUCTION

THE DOCTOR, like everyone else, is a child of his age. To cure his patients he makes use of such means and methods as are placed at his disposal by the collective knowledge of his generation. This knowledge is of necessity limited, and constantly being outgrown. During the centuries when devils were believed to lodge within us and nothing was known of bacilli, no one thought of sterilization. When bacilli were discovered and methods of sterilization were invented for their destruction, we thought that we had conquered them. This proved an error, though not so dangerous an error as the belief that a sick body was possessed of a devil. What we think we know today shatters the errors and blunders of yesterday, and is tomorrow discarded as worthless. So we grow from larger mistakes to smaller mistakes—so long as we do not lose courage. This is true of all therapy; no method is final.

Nothing in the world seems harder than to free ourselves completely from nebulous ideas or irrational fears. Each generation is fully confident that it is the most clear-sighted and the most progressive, yet must bow with some embarrassment or even bitterness to the succeeding generation, conceding it a step further in wisdom and insight. Light penetrates slowly into the depths of personality. What seemed like magic nonsense appears suddenly sensible; what seemed incoherent is seen to be strung together by an invisible thread. Pieces are not really disjoined; all is governed by the laws of the whole, the system of realities which we strive to grasp. Daily we see more, uncover new things and are astonished. Perspectives,

never before imagined, open themselves: possibilities not only of curing but of re-making ourselves, never before thought of, become suddenly visible. Confidence grows with understanding. We become not only more experienced, but more self-controlled, more resilient; in short, we become autonomous. And since all human beings must in a sense be psychologists, that is to say, since all of us have to make some sort of agreement with the world and frame some notion of ourselves, the possibility of self-recognition exists theoretically for all, with a consequent self-liberation from schematic, infantile and inhibiting ideas, and the attainment of greater functional ability. Therein lies one of the chief fruits of modern psychotherapy — in that it has recognized the possibility of self-understanding and self-mastery for all human beings, and learned to combat the poison of too early resignation.

But when will mankind make use of such insight? It has not always been simple. The history of the therapy of mental disorders is a long road full of blunders, blunders due to erroneous or incomplete knowledge. During the Middle Ages, for example, the devil had to be driven out by means of fire. Up to the last century most psychologists and physicians premised a soul that existed according to its own laws, independent of the body. The soul was holy and intangible, a sort of property belonging to God and therefore not subject to treatment. Then came the swing over to the physical sciences, and emphasis on the world of matter. All that had to do with the mind or self left us helpless. And since we could do nothing with it, we tried at first to deny it. Just as the soul as an entity or thing-in-itself was banned, so in time the mind, and even the personality, was cast aside. The physiology of the senses was the important thing.

We tried inductively to make living matter the basis of the mind's functions — thinking, feeling and willing — and localized all these in the brain. Just as every expression of the mind was referred to a definite bodily sphere, so the mental disorders were held to be caused by specific changes in the bodily

organs, especially in the brain. This theory was just as unsuccessful in producing tangible results, and was impotent when confronted with the pressing demands of practice. One flaw was that in spite of great efforts the bodily substrata of most of the "mental disorders" could not be discovered, either with the naked eye or under the microscope, nor by chemical or physiological methods. And so it came about that those illnesses which showed no organic changes but only functional disturbances were called for the time being "functional disorders."

It is increasingly apparent that the functional disorders are not diseases, but disorders of personality, faulty mental habits, wrong styles of life, mistaken, impracticable forms of behavior which lead to mental as well as to physical disturbance. A gradual appreciation of the importance of psychopathology has led to a new view of personality and hence to a new sort of practical psychology. At the same time psychiatry and psychology have at many points combined sufficiently to make new perspectives visible and to shed light on problems which no one could have glimpsed a few decades ago.



## CHAPTER IV

### *PSYCHOANALYSIS*

[SIGMUND FREUD]

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

IN ITS first years Freud's psychoanalysis was a well of hope to the thirsty in the desert of the neuroses; to most of the righteous a dazzling work of the devil, a hellish child of hyper-modernity. Reactions to it were everywhere extreme. On the one hand acceptance, enthusiasm, and belief in its power of salvation; on the other, disgust, rejection and condemnation. But it left no one cold. Its flaming and inflaming spark kindled such interest that it penetrated the intellectual world in a relatively short time. While its creator still lives, its future possibilities, its reformation and its downfall are being discussed with equal earnestness,—a true reflection of our quickly moving age. It rose like a meteor, and before we could accustom ourselves to its light, or even make sure what it was, it has had to make room for newer luminaries.

Why does psychoanalysis have such an exciting, irritating effect? Why does it force those who occupy themselves with it to take sides so aggressively, *pro* or *con*? If we recall the mental state of the age in which it was born, namely, the last decade of the past century, the answer is not hard to find. In that epoch, so full of insincerity and evasion, many ideas which seem today a matter of course had the effect of a bomb. Even

today Freud's observations, as well as his theories, horrify some, and impress others as such fantastic nonsense as to merit only head-shaking. Freud himself believes that psychoanalysis has aroused so great a storm by virtue of the two revolutionary, basic ideas of his system, the rôle of the unconscious and the rôle of sexuality in life and in nervous disorder. In his words, "Psychoanalysis, with its two main tenets, insults the whole world and invites its own rejection. One tenet violates an intellectual, the other an aesthetic-moral prejudice. . . . The first of these offensive assertions says that the mental processes as such are unconscious, and what become conscious are merely single acts and parts of the mental life . . . The next statement which psychoanalysis announces as one of its findings is that urges which can only be designated as sexual in the restricted as well as in the broader sense of the word, are of exceeding importance, and have so far not been sufficiently noted in the causation of nervous and mental diseases. Yes, even more, that these very sexual urges have their share in the highest cultural, artistic and social works of the human mind. In my opinion, the aversion to this conclusion of psychoanalytical study is the most significant source of the resistance which it encounters."<sup>115</sup>

After this glance at two cardinal points of psychoanalytical teaching, we must ask the reader to make a slight detour with us before we come to the presentation of psychoanalysis itself. In order to understand the unique scientific phenomenon of its growth and rapid spread, we must investigate the darkness to which Freud's doctrine presented so brilliant and sharp a contrast. If we believe in a dialectic reconciliation of everything living, by which a higher synthesis is brought about from the union of a thesis and antithesis, it becomes clear that the violently dynamic, sweeping, impulsive trend of psychoanalysis is — from the perspective in which we see it today — the antithesis to the barrenness, aridity and poverty which characterized the usual medical and psychological attitude toward personality a generation ago. A reaction of pulsing life against a

sterile school psychology; a whistling blast of wind which swept away the layer-thick dust on the brain. In its freshness and originality, in its *urgency*, lies its significance. To determine how much of its content is *truth*, is a matter for critics, and still more, for the incorruptible criticism of time. Our intention is not to criticize, but to describe, and in describing, to measure its depth and breadth, without emotion and prejudice; to *gather* the material essential to an objective, positive, constructive criticism. If we achieve this, the reader may do with it what he will; if he really understands, he can hardly do any harm, and more likely he will co-operate consciously in freeing humanity from the fetters of an indifference which might perhaps be called non-consciousness.

THERE are those who see in Freud the founder of a new view of the world (*Weltanschauung*) and who believe that his work will have as its result a revolution of the entire social life. Some of them even call him the Copernicus of psychology, because he has demolished the sun-like, central position of consciousness in the mental system and perceived that consciousness is a dependent planet, which, like the earth, revolves about a mightier central body. Freud himself rejects such comparisons and usually explains his psychoanalysis as a natural consequence of the direction of medical thought.

What prompted his train of thought to take this direction? In what ground did psychoanalysis take root? How does that epoch appear from which it grew and against which it turned sharply and mercilessly? How was the atmosphere formed which — as an antithesis — had to arise to illuminate and dissipate the preceding dark era?

At the beginning of the nineteenth century stand the great figures of philosophy who prepared the way. Kant's work grounded the meaning of reason in its relation to the world of objects and subjects.<sup>116</sup> He constructed the philosophical framework of a century and forced all thinkers after him into discussion and analysis of his theses. The great *naturalistic*

philosopher was Nietzsche. He was the first to sketch a physical-scientific psychology, and the threads of much modern psychology lead back to him. His most daring assertion was the denial of the ego,<sup>117</sup> which he declared to be a "grammatical illusion." With inspired foresight, he illuminated with aphorisms the nature of the *unconscious*, which was later studied systematically by Freud.

But the philosophy of the early nineteenth century also introduced a development, which, progressing with amazing rapidity, overshot itself and threatened to lead to intellectual chaos. It has been said of Hegel in joking recognition that he had set the world on its head—that is to say, on its reason. This newly discovered or newly respected reason, becoming conscious of itself, threw itself with all its might into a study of matter. Technique was rapidly extended, and the physical sciences wrung more knowledge out of nature than had been won in the foregoing ten centuries. Amazing progress was made in the anatomy and physiology of the healthy and the diseased body. Biology won new recognition through Darwin's theory of evolution. Helmholtz, Pasteur, Koch gave the scientists of their age the instruments and methods which enabled them to burst the rocks of ignorance, and to make the new-won land of scientific achievement generally accessible.

Like all pioneer work, this contribution demanded the whole of a human being, and, like all pioneer work, it led to one-sidedness. But in this case the one-sidedness was not confined to one man's laboratory or study, but governed the entire intellectual life of an age and impressed its stamp on two generations. The occupation with factual data greatly restricted the concern with the conceptual; Schopenhauer had already complained that the men of his age had no "metaphysical needs." Moreover, the analysis of material diverted the eye from life till it was no longer seen, and in the end was held to be nothing but matter. Biology became a sub-head of mechanics. That was the "naïve materialism" of the late nineteenth century. The world had gone *amok* in an intoxica-

tion of a certain sort of facts which were held to offer a neat solution to biological problems. Science must hasten the de-idolization of the living. Nietzsche had looked upon the "I" as a linguistic misconception; just so, the ego, the self, of a human being was hardly mentioned in scientific psychology. Since there was as yet no possibility of grasping and working upon the personality with the help of scientific methods, the study of personality was left to the poets. Just as a child takes apart a clock in burning curiosity, thinkers split up and analyzed the manifestations of nature without observing that only by synthesis is it possible to understand the whole. The result is a typical "piece-meal psychology,"<sup>118</sup> which studies and describes the single parts with great accuracy but has obviously no notion of their interlocking and integration in living existence. And so it happened that human personality evaporated from the retorts and crucibles of the scientists and left a rather dull and trifling residue.

The intoxication that had found its expression in materialism reached its peak with the appearance of Haeckel's *Welt-räthsel*.<sup>119</sup> Haeckel believed he had solved the riddle of the world by joining together two worlds, body and soul, in a homogeneous mass. He called his point of view monistic materialism. But in spite of all his fanaticism, or because of it, it was an heir of romanticism. This became clearer later when his followers developed his teachings into a sort of nature religion, and thereby attained, grotesquely enough, the very standpoint they assumed it was their task to combat. A natural philosophy, vehemently defended, had given rise to its exact opposite. Today with our greater distance from that period of development, we are able to understand why all those efforts to produce a mechanistic world picture had to fail. They were creatively dead from the start, for they omitted life. Since the philosophical monism of Haeckel's followers failed even to regard body and mind as two basically different forms of reality, this lost child of natural philosophy had little more than the name in common with its father.

Nevertheless, Haeckel's monism was followed by a new dualistic wave; dualism assumed a basic separation of body and mind, which nevertheless were held to exist side by side in some sort of relation, dependent upon one another. The dualists have always been assigned to the camp of the idealists. Just as it seemed impossible to explain the spirit by way of matter, the new idealists had difficulty in proving that it was the spirit which built the body. Barrels of ink were used yearly in discussion of the mind-body problem. Even today patient souls try to climb to that point from which the spiritual and the material may be seen to meet. They forget that this point is probably only an idealistic (or mathematical) point of orientation, in reality non-existent. We know nothing and can know nothing of the final essence of matter and spirit.

Alongside these efforts damned to eternal failure, run other, more successful ones, which study the mutual effects observable between physical and mental manifestations. It is possible to study groups of physical and mental events and their relation to each other, and scientific progress will depend upon whether we do such work objectively, thoroughly and without premise, without stressing one side or the other to cater to favorite personal theories. It is necessary to recognize the independence of the spirit within certain limits and, for the time, to exclude the anatomists and physiologists when the more complicated mental structures are under consideration. Such procedure serves the pure and unimpeded investigation of "higher" mental processes. When we return again to elementary psychological phenomena, we shall not be able to get along without the anatomists and physiologists. In co-operation with them we shall attempt a synthesis of body and mind on a higher level. This was the road into the future when psychoanalysis began, and is, in spite of all progress, still our road into the future.

The philosophical soil from which psychoanalysis grew has, as far as we know, never been sketched.<sup>120</sup> Dry "materialism" on the one hand, romantic speculation on the other. Psycho-

analysis, in turning against many of the values so highly esteemed in the nineteenth century, turned away from idealism; but it also turned away from an experimental psychology that split its strength in thousands of experiments without realizing that it failed to throw light on the totality of the living personality. That is why it must be considered a bridge from one philosophical world to another. It developed between the two Western viewpoints, materialism and idealism. Independent of both, it first inclined more to physical science; later, in view of its goals, it was forced to join in discussion with philosophy. It is one attempt to synthesize two opposing viewpoints.

Freud was bored by the attempts to elucidate difficult basic psychological questions, such as the nature of perception, drive, emotion, will. He acted as if these concepts were clear — a drive was something that drove, a feeling was something one felt. He used these concepts which, as a matter of fact, no human understanding understands, as if their meaning were self-evident. He discovered anew the old wisdom that the field of psychology is the reality of *life as it is lived*. And so he brought form and color in place of a monotonous gray. From the rigidity of contemporary scientific psychology on the one hand, and the romanticism of the philosophers on the other hand — both ignoring him and later joining forces against him — Freud gave the impetus to the development of a new form of personality study.

Though Freud was originally a neurologist, a physician with a physician's point of view, he observed pathological events in the light of the patient's total personality. He drew his conceptions of the sick, or better, of mistaken psychic reactions, from his understanding of the mechanism of healthy life. At the same time he believed he had, out of his deepened insight, found a powerful instrument for the cure of "nervous" sufferers. He turned on the light in the dark recesses of the soul so that one could see clearly what went on there and could avoid stumbling about in fear and obscurity. He put the room in order and explored its dimensions. He saw further that

from here there were doors and passages leading to the dark tunnels of the unconscious through which no one had as yet ventured. It is not too much to say that he brought about an invasion of rational science into what had been held irrational and unexplorable. If he had done nothing more and if he had erred in every other point of his teaching, he would still have accomplished something entitling him to a place among the geniuses. He drew attention to a multitude of new problems. He found the problems, stated them, and helped and encouraged us to their solution. He opened the doors to what, in his terminology, is the underworld of the unconscious, and went part of the way himself, — only a small part of the way, in his own opinion.

THE TWO preceding parts sketch the background from which a new psychology arose. We must now devote a few pages to a concise story of the rise of the psychoanalytical movement, its sources and origins. The reader will find the key to the doctrine in the personal development of its founder. He will discover the significance of the objective-historical background, as well as the personal determination of individual men in their attempts to solve an array of problems for which no place had been allowed before. How did Freud come to "discover" psychoanalysis? How and by what means did he first conceive the idea of psychoanalysis?<sup>121</sup>

The roots of the later Freud reach back to the years 1880–1886. Contact with Dr. Josef Breuer gave Freud some insight into hysteria. At the conclusion of his clinical service in a Viennese hospital, and thorough training in neurology and brain anatomy, Freud went in 1885 to Paris to study with Charcot, at that time the most eminent of neurologists. Charcot's teaching was a turning point in Freud's life, and the beginning of a half-century of psychoanalytical thought. Charcot had accepted the new view that hysteria was a psychical malady; that is to say, not arising from bodily, organic causes. This conception was incomprehensible to the medicine of the

time. The brilliant progress made in organic medicine seemed to justify and support the belief that all sicknesses originated in organic changes in the body which were demonstrable with the help of the microscope or some one of the numerous physico-chemical methods of examination. When the cause of an illness could not be found, it was assumed that the rapid development of the means of diagnosis would sooner or later permit a solution of the riddle. But that no organic agency was at work in the case of hysteria,—that seemed sheer nonsense. (Only in the last few years has it really been generally acknowledged that psychic sicknesses are not “sicknesses” in the usual sense of the word, but the expression of an erroneous attitude toward life, and therefore a matter of character.)

Till Charcot's time, hysteria was often regarded as a simulation, a sort of swindle (and one still finds this view expressed<sup>122</sup>). Charcot proved that memories or ideas are capable of producing hysterical symptoms. He showed for example that it was possible, by striking a hypnotized person lightly on the arm, to suggest to him an hysterical laming of the arm, and that the paralysis lasted for some time after the patient was awakened from the hypnosis. And if it is possible to produce such bodily changes by suggestions coming from the outside, then it is not far to the assumption that ideas or memories in daily life might result in the same kind of symptoms.

It was also noticed that a hypnotized person, upon awakening, did not remember immediately the command or commands given him in the hypnosis. From this it was concluded that a part of the mental life was withdrawn from consciousness. The “Paris School” of Charcot started to gather other proofs for the existence of an unconscious mind and to describe them. At this point Freud received an important stimulus. What he did with the unconscious and how he built it into his teaching we shall see in a later section.

When Freud left Paris, he was working towards a new conception of the neuroses on which he could construct his own doctrine: the explanation of hysterical phenomena by a division

of the mind into the conscious and the unconscious. Alongside the officially recognized ego, there was supposed to be another, second, unconscious ego, which sometimes came into conflict with the first ego. These views met with strong disapproval in the Viennese medical circle from which Freud had come. They were regarded as a return to the belief in devils current in the Middle Ages, and Freud was looked upon at best as "having a screw loose." He soon saw himself abandoned by his colleagues and former school comrades, and cut his connections with the Viennese school. He found a strengthening support for the next few years only in his older friend, Dr. Josef Breuer. He made his next step *toward* psychoanalysis, or as others prefer it, *in* psychoanalysis, together with this friend.<sup>123</sup>

Freud and Breuer succeeded in testing some of Charcot's teachings and experiments. Charcot had demonstrated that hysterical symptoms could be evoked by certain unconscious ideas. The two Viennese physicians were able to make such symptoms disappear when, by means of hypnosis, they succeeded in making these ideas enter the conscious. According to Charcot, these images lay like poison in the mind and caused sickness. When it was possible to find access to the mind and let the poison out, it became well again. This procedure was called psycho-catharsis, from the Greek, catharsis meaning cleansing.

A case reported by Breuer and Freud in the 'nineties led to the following procedure.<sup>124</sup> A patient was suffering from severe nervous disorders, with complicated symptoms of paralysis and alternating states of semi-consciousness and extreme excitement. Symptom after symptom vanished when the patient was able to recall clearly one memory after another. The symptom was always connected with the content or time of occurrence of the event remembered. The conscious, however, was not able to see the connection. On the basis of their experience Breuer and Freud expanded Charcot's findings which had taught that hysterical symptoms were always to be referred back to ideas ("images"). They showed that hysteri-

cal symptoms are the expression of *unconscious* memories, and that when the doctor succeeded in making the patient recall and relive these memories, the symptoms would depart. This recalling seemed easiest to achieve in hypnosis. The hypnotized patient was ordered to think as clearly as possible of his complaint and to relive intently all he could remember in connection with his disorder. It was seen that the circle of consciousness suddenly widened and that much forgotten material was recalled. As soon as what had been forgotten was recognized and remembered, the moods and emotions associated with the images seized the patient, and the original scene which was the cause of the disturbance was relived. This time it was not interrupted but experienced to the end. The whole thing might be described by saying that the doctor had to grasp one end of the thread (the symptom) and follow this thread backwards to the spool (image). The symptom was dissolved. It was "abreacted," lived out, instead of being bottled up, as Breuer and Freud explained. This is the psycho-cathartic method as it is still employed by some psychotherapists today.

A simple example to illustrate the method. A young wife, happily married for two years, takes a vacation trip with her husband. Suddenly her sexual feelings are completely inhibited. Her husband tries to win her by caresses: her facial expression changes. She speaks in a strange tone of voice, becomes erotically excited, but pushes her husband, who wants to kiss her, away from her. After a few moments she seems to awaken and remembers nothing of the episode. At the doctor's office the patient suddenly remembers that certain details of the hotel room reminded her of a room in a sanatorium in which she had lived alone more than a year before. As she lay in bed one day, a man came in and tried to caress her. The man appealed to her but she rejected his advances energetically for she felt herself bound to her husband. She kept the incident a secret. "I didn't think of it any more," she said. The sexual inhibition disappeared after she told her husband the story.<sup>125</sup> (I. H. Schultz.)

How is this to be understood? Painful recollections of a former experience, associated with conditions similar to those obtaining when the incident with her husband took place, prevented this woman from acting normally. Complete sexual satisfaction demands entire unity and harmony and is made impossible by the reawakening of a disagreeable memory. The impossibility of submitting to her husband whom she loves means a mental shock sufficient to bring on an "attack" like the one described. By having the young woman recall the scene consciously, recognize the connection, understand the mechanism and relieve herself of the burden of the secret, she was cleansed, freed, "cured." This is a psycho-catharsis.

FREUD's association with Breuer had to cease. The two men were too far apart in their basic conceptions and in their mental habits. They differed widely in their explanations of the processes which they discovered and described. Breuer swore by the strictly observable, scientifically determinable facts of organic medicine. He sought for explanations; he could do nothing with interpretation. Freud, on the other hand, perceived that understanding of these phenomena was to be had through interpretation. He dared to offer hypotheses. When the question arose, "since remembering is so effective a method, why do not these memories spontaneously become conscious?", Breuer's and Freud's answers were in sharp conflict. Breuer tried to explain the facts through a constitutional inclination of hysterical persons towards a divided consciousness. He believed also that dreams and manifestations of exhaustion or intoxication were in part responsible. Freud, on the contrary, gave a purely psychological interpretation. He held the emotional conditions to be of prime importance. When an emotion cannot release itself, cannot be abreacted by crying, laughing, hate, revenge, etc., it gets "stuck" and the disposition to "split off ideas" is at hand. An emotion, or *affect*,\* is vigor-

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\* *Affect* is a more general term than emotion, since it includes all feeling-states.

ously rejected through fright, shame, disgust, or shock. In any case, the affect, an energy tension, is prevented from entering the conscious and being expressed. It is *repressed* and lives for years unconsciously, or "in the unconscious," inaccessible to digestion by the soul. From there the imprisoned energy finds an outlet: the symptom, the hysterical malady.

This is the first fundamental Freudian conception of psychic disorder. Soon after his separation from Breuer, Freud abandoned hypnosis. He has never had anything to do with it since then. The widespread assumption that psychoanalysis is a sort of hypnosis, or at least a method of suggestion, is entirely mistaken; Freud worked out the system of psychoanalysis in a very different direction. He found he could accomplish as much without hypnosis. Hypnosis is, moreover, a method which has never quite freed itself of the stigma of charlatan-ism. What determined Freud to take this decisive step were probably the following facts.

The psychiatrist Bernheim, with whom Freud also studied, arranged some experiments with hypnotized individuals at Nancy.<sup>126</sup> He suggested to one man, for example: "You will awake and five minutes later you will take the umbrella out of the corner of the room and open it." The individual was aroused and after a few minutes carried out the order. He was then asked why he opened an umbrella indoors. Instead of answering simply "I did it because I was told to," or "I don't know why but I felt as if I had to," the man became embarrassed and gave a halting, evidently false explanation: "I wanted to see if the umbrella had a hole in it." Bernheim then tried to convince the man that he was mistaken and that he had not given the real reason. "Just try to recall what happened a few minutes ago," said the psychiatrist. Gradually the subject became conscious of what he had apparently forgotten, and was then able to give the correct reason: "Because you told me to."

This experiment suggested two things: first, that we often do not know the true cause of some of our acts (and lie with-

out being aware of it or wanting to); second, that it is perhaps not necessary to hypnotize an individual in order to trace his symptoms back to their origin. By means of patient persuasion it may be possible to follow the symptoms back to the images from which they come and by which they are supported.

FREUD now stood quite alone. He had a set of ideas as a foundation such as is probably granted to most scientists once in the course of their lives. But not every one understands enough of what he has found to form something out of it. A series of fortunate events led Freud to the creation of psychoanalysis. In a history of the psychoanalytic movement, he writes:

"I did not recognize at first the special nature of my discovery. I sacrificed unthinkingly my beginning popularity as a physician and the visits of nervous patients during my office hours by asking them consistently and unswervingly for the sexual causes of their neuroses. In this way I had a number of experiences which fixed forever my conviction of the practical significance of the sexual factor. I appeared at the Viennese Neurological Society as a speaker. I treated my discoveries as indifferent contributions to science and hoped the same from the others. First the stillness which greeted the close of my speech, the empty space left around my person, the hints which were brought to me, gave me slowly to understand that assertions concerning the rôle of sexuality in the etiology of neuroses could not hope to be treated like other pieces of information. I understood that from then on I belonged to those who want to 'shake the world out of its sleep,' as Hebbel put it, and that I could not count on objectivity and toleration. Since, however, my conviction of the average correctness of my observations and conclusions grew constantly and my confidence in my own judgment as well as my moral courage were not exactly little, the result of the situation could not possibly be of minor importance either. I decided to believe that I had had the good fortune to discover especially significant connections

and was prepared to accept the fate which usually accompanies such discoveries." <sup>127</sup>

Three celebrated men have stood at the cradle of psychoanalysis, Charcot, Breuer and Bernheim. A fourth, who was the pupil of all three, succeeded in gathering together the unconnected single conceptions, in creating a unified system from a unique perspective and in seeing a human being as a dynamic totality. Freud bound together and described the unconscious, resistance, repression and transference, — all these being things of which his predecessors had had flashes but things which they could neither understand nor use.

The following pages present psychoanalytic teaching in its strict form as it is described by Freud.

#### THE BASIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

LET us examine step by step the single parts of psychoanalysis before we regard the system as a whole. No part will then be entirely unfamiliar to us, and later we shall not have to interrupt our description by extended explanation. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the explanation of single components, we must at the same time keep the whole in sight. These components are only significant in their dynamic relation to the whole and to each other. If we do not do this, we make the mistake of those schools of psychology which, instead of regarding the parts in the light of the whole, have tried to understand the mind of man as the sum of its parts; when they finish taking man apart, they *can not understand him*. This is a mistake which, as we shall see later, psychoanalysis has not entirely avoided.

#### *The Unconscious*

Psychoanalysis rests upon three main pillars: (1) the unconscious; (2) repression; (3) transference. Of these three, the unconscious is the supporting middle column.

Consciousness or the conscious is but a small portion of our mental existence in comparison with the wide field of the unconscious; *i.e.*, that field of our mental processes of which for many reasons we know nothing. The conscious has been compared with a sea swept by a searchlight, where the light is strongest in the center and weakens toward the periphery. Only *one* thing at a time receives full, clear attention in the conscious. Many things may be lying there, half known, or a quarter known, just as some objects are illuminated by the searchlight, but only indistinctly recognized. There are all degrees and gradations from full consciousness through less clear consciousness to unconsciousness. Nevertheless all that has anything to do with the conscious is but very little compared with the vast extent of the unconscious.

Freud gave most of his attention to the unconscious. He assumed that the strongest psychic forces did not concentrate at the point of the conscious, but fought for supremacy in the region of the unconscious. He wanted to eavesdrop upon them, and if possible to catch them, in order to tame and control them. This thought probably came to him from the excuses Bernheim's patients used to make to justify their execution of senseless commands given them during hypnosis.

Things not in consciousness may be of two sorts: (1) those which are not clearly noticed but can be easily called into consciousness (the pre-conscious); (2) those of which, for one reason or another, we dare not be conscious. The latter chiefly interested Freud. He found that there were always things of which the person concerned did not want to be conscious; unpleasant, offensive, stupid, immoral or compromising thoughts and images. Every one of these thoughts and images was accompanied by feelings of stress and conflict; they were in reality quantities of energy which strove for release. In order to resist the feelings' striving to get out, a counter-striving, a forcing-back had to take place; Freud called this "repression." The unconscious therefore comprises the re-

pressed, affect-laden wishes and thoughts that can find no way into the conscious. A "censorship" *bars the way*.

Now all these forgotten and repressed images and wishes in the unconscious are important for our every thought and act, as well as for our mental well-being. They influence our conscious thinking and acting quite definitely, though in the nature of the case we screen the fact from ourselves. These are the thoughts of which Balzac said, "We obey them without being aware of them."

It appears that our *unconscious* struggles and images are more responsible for many manifestations of our mental life than our consciousness. This is especially the case when such images produce effects which may harm our own person. Not many people would really admit to themselves that they have had, at some time or other, a desire to murder. But almost all people, Freud believes, have at some time had a desire to commit murder; "I could just kill that man," we say in a moment of exasperation. We mean it, Freud says, more literally than we admit.

When wishes, impulses, feeling-laden thoughts and images — and there are none absolutely free of feeling — are repressed, they try, like all pent-up energies, to find an outlet. Since the normal outlet is stopped up, they look around for a side exit. The burdened unconscious reveals itself here as an absolute, self-directing power, coming, as it were, from the core of us. The compulsion, the unloading of the energy, is always the *neurotic symptom*.

In order to free an individual of a neurotic symptom, we must first let out the pent-up energies in the unconscious in a normal way; that is to say, we must let these energies enter the conscious. All images, phantasies, wishes, emotions, and the like, in the unconscious, must come into the lit center of the field of consciousness in order to unload themselves there and to lose their sickening power. That is one of the chief tasks of the psychoanalytical system of diagnosis and treatment.

The unconscious is really the genuine psyche. We are as little familiar with its nature as with the reality of the outer world, and its components are as little revealed to us through the conscious as the outer world is revealed to us by transmission through our sense organs.

*Repression. Resistance. Transference.*

BEFORE we approach the problem from which many roads lead to the unconscious, we must consider two essential discoveries of psychoanalysis which are important for its understanding: *repression* and *resistance*. Freud asserts that everything in the mind that might lead to a psychic disturbance was *once* conscious and, becoming no longer consciously bearable, was driven into the unconscious. If it is possible to get at what is repressed by way of free associations, then it is possible to get what is repressed out of the unconscious into the conscious without the aid of hypnosis. Whatever it is that makes the soul sick, it is always something repressed. Naturally those forces which brought about the expulsion of the undesired thought or image from the conscious and prevent its return into the conscious, will not allow the conscious to reach what is repressed, and will offer strong *resistance* to direct conscious study. This resistance is the worst enemy of psychoanalysis, but also its best aid, for through it attention is called to what is repressed.

If we picture the situation in which the patient finds himself when he goes to the doctor to be analyzed, these conceptions will be clearer. According to psychoanalytical routine, the patient lies down on a divan in a comfortable position. The doctor, invisible to the patient, sits behind. The patient determines the theme of the daily work and starts to talk. He commences with whatever occurs to him first and goes freely from one idea to another, one association to another. The consultation is something between a monologue and a dialogue. The patient is in a restful relaxed position which excludes as

far as possible distracting impressions or sensations, so that he can direct his whole attention to the pictures unrolling before his eyes. The only thing demanded of him is that he say unqualifiedly everything that goes through his head, even though he may think it is nonsensical, unimportant or improper. Above all, he must not judge morally what occurs to him or what he wants to say, but must talk as if he were quite alone and as if nothing he said could compromise him.

The doctor conducts himself quite passively, listening to what is being said. He notices that the patient's flow of words is sometimes fluent, sometimes halting. In the story there are sometimes little gaps, occasionally big ones, which are at first not filled out. At other points the patient mimics or gesticulates, he yawns or laughs, or moves his hands or feet. The emotions play over him as hands do over a piano. Sometimes he stops suddenly, then again he may speak excitedly, moan, sigh, spring up, say he cannot go on talking because he is too excited. A series of affects or emotions have disturbed or stopped the current of the story.

To observe the emotions is just as important as to listen to the story. A resistance to the reappearance of certain memories can sometimes be perceived more clearly from the form than from the content of the story. The patient *cannot* tell all; he seizes upon substitute expressions that are, however, always connected with the truth that he cannot as yet recognize. Why does he not know the truth at once? Social, ethical, aesthetic reasons, impressed upon him from childhood on, force him to conform, or at least to appear to conform, to what the general pattern of society demands. In every one of us the process of repression, from childhood on, of certain "improper" thoughts, wishes or experiences goes on, inexorably guided by parental discipline, education, custom and convention. In many ways we disguise our motives from ourselves; if an impulse is unlovely, we "*project*" it to another person, and accuse him of desiring what we ourselves desire. Or we "rationalize" or find good reasons for our own conduct.

*Why* does a human being repress, and *what* does he repress? Consciousness can encompass only a certain number of thoughts. For a productive intellectual activity this number must be limited. Only those thoughts are present which are directly connected with the theme idea: one might say, the children of the theme idea. When the retention or development of this theme idea seems desirable or practicable, those thoughts which seem fruitless or harmful to it must be put aside. The choice between the ideas to be kept and those to be excluded is made in accordance with the goal of the theme idea and the intellectual character of the thinker.

Secondly, the fundamental pleasure principle in human beings urges them to seek pleasure and to avoid pain and to build up their lives as free from suffering as possible. On this basis it is easy to see how we come to put out of our mind all thoughts associated with unpleasant feelings that might disturb our sense of well-being. All those ideas and images which, when they come into the range of our consciousness, are not in accord with the general, ruling conception of propriety or morality or ethics (insofar as we recognize any one or all of such qualities) must be put quickly out of the way.

Repression, however, does not mean the same as the mastery of a thought. On the contrary, repressed images busy us much more; they rise up again and again during the day, and pursue us at night in our dreams. "One must be master of an object before one throws it away. What is merely pushed aside forces itself to the fore repeatedly with sharpened stubbornness. Only the real day conquers all night ghosts by shedding light upon them," says Feuchtersleben in his *Dialectics of the Soul*.

Those drives are especially repressed which contradict the legal, moral and aesthetic laws. In the end this repression is the command of the mass, of the organization, of society; it is the bringer of culture; it assures peace for humanity, but not always peace for each human being. For it leads to the accu-

mulation of repressed impulses and to growing tension between "willing" and "having to" (desire and necessity).

The degree of the repression depends chiefly upon two factors. (1) It depends upon the sort of material that must be repressed. A reaction that is socially, ethically or aesthetically strictly forbidden will be more quickly ejected from the conscious than a reaction that seems relatively harmless. Ordinary sexual desires and "death wishes" directed against others (occurring, according to Freud, more frequently than is imagined) are banned much more severely than, for instance, ambitious dreams of which we are usually ashamed because of their childishness.

(2) The degree of repression depends upon the form of reaction of the person concerned. People who feel things intensely react more strongly than phlegmatic persons, even though the neurotic character, through its constant conflicts and defeats, becomes in time hypersensitive. The secret admission of defeats unknown to others brings about a more or less conscious *feeling of guilt* which is the usually unremarked cause of bad humor, depression, anxiety and insecurity, with all their results. The feeling of guilt increases sensitivity and intensity of reaction and a vicious cycle is established.

The repressed material is like a sort of energy-laden foreign body in the depths of the soul. In a neurosis it airs itself by way of symptoms. Or let us suppose that the psyche is an *apartment*. (The simile is static rather than dynamic, but will serve for the moment.) In this apartment the conscious is the good living room; the unconscious is the large dark forerom. Unbidden guests, that is, all wishes, impulses and drives that are unwelcome in the living room, are not admitted and are relegated to the dark forerom and those which do succeed in "crashing the gate" are put out, "repressed." These uninvited guests do not like being put out. Since the censorship sees to it that they do not get into the good living room, they make a noise outside, rumble and grumble so that the welcome

guests in the living room become confused. Peace is gone and in the end the whole house stands on its head. This disturbance is the neurotic symptom.

In order to restore peace, the intruders must be gotten rid of. And yet singular obstacles arise which the patient himself puts in the way. This is to be understood in this way: These sick persons are certainly interested in getting rid of the symptoms which make them suffer. That is why they go to the doctor. But in spite of this, they resist a smooth course of treatment; for example, by refusing to give any explanation or sufficient information, or to accept the help of the analyst. They make trouble, come late or do not come at all, suddenly break off the treatment, or insult the doctor. How strongly and strangely resistance can manifest itself is shown by the following report of a Freudian analyst:

"Miss H., a teacher, had consulted me about three times. She arrives one morning and I ask her to sit down. She replies, 'No, I want to tell you right away that I have no more confidence in you.' I remain quiet and try to persuade her to sit down anyway and tell me more about it. She says, 'No, I must tell you further that you are altogether a disagreeable person.' I, 'That is too bad, but I can't do anything about it.' She, 'Then I'll tell you all; your very appearance is repulsive to me.' I, 'I really can do even less about that. But do go on.' She, 'No, I can't explain it; it is too embarrassing. I might be able to write it.' I give her pencil and paper and leave her alone in the room for a few minutes. Upon my return, she has covered the whole sheet with a hasty scrawl of the most intimate confessions, hands me the paper and says, 'Thank goodness, now it's out! Do you know, I really do think you are very nice.' " <sup>128</sup>  
(Mohr.)

This example shows clearly that resistance to intrusion into the unconscious manifests itself first in the form of the rejection of that person who attempts the intrusion. Worded in the simple language of conscious thought, it would go about as follows: the unconscious whispers to the conscious, "Tell him

that you don't like him, and enrage him, especially by telling him that he is physically disagreeable; then he will throw you out and you don't have to tell him anything." The imperturbability of the analyst foiled the trick. Finally the unconscious yields as soon as it feels itself unmasked. In addition the patient becomes conscious of the fact that he or she has transferred emotions to the doctor (in this case, she has made him the object of her own conflicting emotions), — something that she does not want to admit to herself, either.

This example not only gives us an idea of what resistance is, but touches the problem of *transference*, which is of so much importance in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. By transference is meant the patient's inclination to carry over all his unconscious, repressed, emotionally colored wishes, which are being slowly freed by the analysis, to the person of the analyst. This can happen in the form of love (in this case one speaks of a positive transference) or in the form of expressions of hate (here one speaks of a negative transference). The doctor is a substitute for the person toward whom the repressed, at one time active wishes, were directed; say the father or the mother, and, depending upon the situation, is pursued with passionate love or furious hate. The transference is therefore the repetition or reliving of a childhood situation.

The transference, though it may become one of the strongest kinds of resistance, is sought and cultivated by the analyst, for the Freudians assert that only by means of transference can patients be influenced. The patient's deepest resistances to intrusion into his inner being and to a change in his behavior come to light; the psychoanalyst says that they are recognizable and soluble only in this way. That is why the transference is so important in the cure of a neurosis when it is correctly understood and managed.

It is a very grave mistake to take a transference love or transference hate seriously, and to confuse it with real love or hate. It must be clearly understood that in the transference it is a matter of ties dating back to earliest childhood, that do not,

like love, come from the whole personality, but only from that part which reaches back to childhood and is no longer accessible to self-treatment. When a doctor does not know this, the transference can become a dangerous trap for him. "Many doctors sun themselves with pleasure in the superior position the patients force upon them; and the attempts of others to do away with these transferences, this self-depreciation and self-willed dependence, this one-sided, erotically tinged relationship, in order to establish a level atmosphere for the consultation, are brought to nought by the elementary demands of the patients, who want a beloved saviour."<sup>129</sup> (Jaspers.)

The transference is cultivated, but it must later be dissolved to effect a complete cure. If the course of treatment stops after the repression and resistance have been disclosed, but before the transference has been dissolved, the cure has failed or is only partly successful. The patient has only been given a new sickness in return for his old one. Since he cannot win the doctor, he does not know what to do with the childhood wishes set free by the transference and must start repressing them all over again. So the trouble merely takes a new direction.

It is necessary, then, to analyze the transference and to make clear to the patient that his tie to the doctor is not genuine, but only a warming over of old conflicts. A dissolution of this tie does not, as in the case of real love, have to mean a feeling of loss; just as the tie itself, since it does not come from the core of one's being, is nothing "to be ashamed of" as we are usually ashamed of unrequited love. The doctor can hasten the cutting of the tie by various little devices. An occasional, apparently casual inconsideration, an evil-tasting medicine or a slightly painful electric treatment can make the patient wake up; he falls out of his clouds onto the earth, out of his dream into reality. A conversation which clears the matter up leads him to realize then what it all means and the tension is gone. Emotions are now free for a different object.

After we have learned some of the characteristics of the unconscious, the question arises, how does the unconscious reveal

itself and how can we reach those parts of the unconscious which do not present themselves to the scrutinizing and critical eye of the experienced? For if the unconscious were really the breeding place of all psychic disturbances, its discovery, illumination and "purification" would be exceedingly desirable, and we should have only to find methods which would effect this as quickly and practically as possible. The simplest thing to do is to hypnotize the patient: the censoring function of the ego is temporarily weakened, and the content of the unconscious may be drawn out. This method, though, has some disadvantages, which, as already noted, forced Freud to renounce it. He was confronted by the necessity of finding other ways of reaching the unconscious store of memories. After studying his patients for a while, he decided there were three such possibilities: (1) free association; (2) mistakes; (3) dreams.

### *Free Association*

THE WHOLE Freudian system is based upon the belief in the psychic determination of mental disturbances.<sup>130</sup> That is to say, the cause of the disturbance is to be sought in the personality, and when it cannot be found in the conscious, it must be in the unconscious. Disturbance-producing causes were thought of by Freud as analogous to physical energies which spread in all directions in psychic space. This meant that it did not matter at what point one tried to enter the unconscious; all roads led theoretically to the center of the disturbing energy. Any word, any peripheral thought had to lead to the source by way of association, — like a chain of many links, the one end of which touched the conscious, the other end disappearing into the darkness of the unconscious. Even in the waking life of a normal human being, any one can observe how emotional thoughts and images, dreams and even melodies seem to try to push themselves forward, while in reality they draw all psychic material to themselves and destroy it because of their greater amount of energy.

Here everything takes place in the conscious or in regions easily accessible to the conscious so that no unhealthy symptoms need be developed. But in the case of mental disturbances, the energy-laden thought or dream or wish, comparable to a discord in the melody of life, is banned to the unconscious and would not be immediately discoverable if it had not, luckily, the characteristic of attracting attention to itself by failing to harmonize with the whole.

With his observation sharpened by experience, Freud discovered that he could reach the center of the disturbance from any thought of the patient. Going from one thought to another, he approached the unconscious sore spot by a chain of determined associations, whether the patient made all sorts of detours or not. When he succeeded in relaxing the patient, he got there much more quickly, because the patient's resistance was then very much less.

The method of free association helped the analysts a great deal and gave them opportunity to study the phenomena of repression, resistance and transference. We have seen repression as a process carried out upon those thoughts, wishes and impulses which do not coincide with the currently dominating points of view. When we eliminate this intention to select only the practical and consciously bearable components from the store of our thoughts and wish images (that is to say, when we do away with repression), then the unconscious and consciously *unbearable* elements will come into the light of consciousness and take part in the imaginative production. We exclude criticism, and a pertinent coherence suddenly appears out of the seeming incoherence of free association, characterized by Freud as the "uncritical state," — a coherence which leads to the center of the unconscious conflict. Every association is tied by invisible threads to the conflict in the unconscious. If we follow one thread we are sure to arrive at last. Nevertheless we usually try to hide the unconscious, or not to see it. And so we hop from association to association, following the thread. Our conscious is a façade, often enough a

façade of nonsense. We are afraid of what is behind it. Terra incognita.

### *Mistakes*

FREUD's experiment and practice with free association led him to an understanding of manifestations exhibited by sick and healthy alike. These were forgetting, losing, hearing incorrectly, writing incorrectly, misspeaking, mislaying, everything that can be called the mistakes of daily life.<sup>181</sup>

A child "loses" its school notebook, an adult "forgets" to return a borrowed book, to post a letter that should have been sent off long before, or to keep an appointment — are these all accidents? At first it seems so. What we forget, or what we lose, we are not responsible for.

Freud did not believe in the non-responsibility of mistakes. He thought it a trick of unconscious drives in us that can only have their way by means of such devices. There are many examples to confirm his opinion. The lover who lets his sweetheart wait half an hour on a street corner will hardly dare to excuse himself by saying that he forgot about the appointment. He will look for an excuse. Why? Would he have to excuse himself if he knew that his friend would regard his forgetting merely as an inadvertence of no further significance? Hardly. Both attitudes — his need to justify himself and her skepticism about his reasons for having come late — indicate that they (unconsciously) know that the true reason of the delay was lack of interest. In affairs of the heart we are all capable of judging much more sharply than elsewhere and come much closer to the truth.

But Freud ascribes a meaning to the apparent nonsense of every other mistake; the child for instance, loses his school book "purposely"; the reader "purposely" fails to return the book. The child prefers to lose his book, the borrower really wants to keep the book for himself. But their consciousness will not admit this deeper reason, and they may really be con-

sciously angry at the loss or forgetfulness. An impulse unknown to them came from the unconscious. In each one of these cases a mistake has taken the place of an intended deed. Something was to be done, and a wrong result, caused by repressed impulses, followed instead.

Repression and intentional secretiveness may be at the bottom of forgetfulness. We cannot remember a certain name or expression, an object or a person; we have an unconscious "intention" of avoiding pain by refusing to bring up the memory again. Nietzsche had an inkling of this when he said, "My memory says that I have done this, but my pride says that I cannot have done this, and my memory finally gives in."<sup>132</sup>

As one sees, when forgetting is a mistake, it is not a matter of loss of ability to remember (as sometimes happens in the case of organic brain diseases) but a temporary inability to recall on account of psychic reasons. When one attempts to explain the significance of mistakes to people who have made them, the reaction varies. Many admit that they have had such thoughts and wishes; others reject these suggestions indignantly and refuse to believe that such ugly, petty, egoistic impulses are part of their make-up. They simply know nothing of them.

The motives which lead to such mistakes are primarily unconscious. When they try to enter consciousness, they are held back on the threshold by a censorship, the same which also takes care of other repressions. Psychoanalysis found, in its study of human mistakes, confirmation of its hypothesis that there are in the mind repressed impulses of which the conscious has no direct knowledge (is not aware), but which still have influence in the unconscious. This is the cardinal point of the theory of psychoanalysis.

### *The Interpretation of Dreams*

THE THIRD, and according to Freud, most important method of penetrating and exploring the unconscious is the interpreta-

tion of dreams. Freud has called the interpretation of dreams the *via regia*, the royal road into the unconscious. If we follow it we arrive more surely and more deeply within the hidden sources of life than by any other road. For the dream represents a valve, so to speak, through which the unconscious can escape in a compressed and changed form.

Let us recall Freud's tenet that events, images, wishes or thoughts undesirable to our conventional consciousness are repressed into the unconscious, accumulate there, and struggle for some sort of release. The censorship guards, like Cerberus, against their re-entrance into consciousness. But at night the censorship relaxes, at least partially, and we return to a more primitive state of greater non-responsibility. The repressed presses back, wants to be released, freed. All creatures want pleasure and pleasure comes with relief from tension. In sleep the repressed impulses pour out of the unconscious and try to find a loophole to escape from their imprisonment. Since they are painful to the conscious (otherwise they would not have been repressed), their reappearance would disturb sleep were they not secret and unrecognizable,—as it were tricking the guardian of the conscious while they act upon the stage. Apparent nonsense makes up the drama of the dream; in reality, the whole person lies hidden behind this drama and in this nonsense there is a deep sense.

To preserve sleep is, in Freud's opinion, the physiological purpose of the dream. It represents the bridge between two periods of deeper sleep. That the bridge breaks so often, that we frequently awake after a dream, is probably due to the imperfection of the dream's bridge-function. Perhaps we are only aware of those dreams from which we awake, and really dream much more frequently than we know, without remembering that we have dreamt.

The sense of the dream lies elsewhere in the personality. As was said before, unconscious tendencies can express themselves more easily and more freely in dreams than in the waking state, because the control of conscious thinking cannot be so

effective during sleep. Poets recognized this fact much sooner than psychologists and doctors. Hebbel, for example, said, "Everything great of which a human being is capable comes out best in dreams." And everything mean and petty just as well, we might add.

Childhood dreams offer particularly rich material for an understanding of the dreamer's unconscious. In dreams can be found expressed, in a naïve, simple and original form, all that the child does not dare to say aloud because of its submission to the influence of the average rearing. A little boy likes to eat chocolate, and sometimes more than is good for him. His mother forbids him to eat chocolate except when she herself gives it to him. He dreams that he is surrounded by a mountain of chocolate and can eat as much as he wants. No threatening voice forbids him the sweet. Usually it is only necessary to know what a child has lived through the day before to understand his dreams. They are all dreams of fulfilled wishes.

Not only are the dreams of children fulfilled wishes, says Freud, but all dreams of grown-ups as well. Not only are the dreamer's pleasure drives fulfilled in the dream, but those drives which were repressed by the moral control of his ego. The objection that many of our dreams are not at all agreeable, but, on the contrary, sometimes accompanied by feelings of fear, and that fear cannot exactly be called a fulfilled wish, seems, paradoxically enough, to confirm his theory rather than refute it. Freud says that fear does not belong to the dream content, as one would think, but that it is the expression of the ego's moral censor. He sees it as a revulsion of the ego against an intensified, repressed wish. It is always developed where the distortion of the forbidden wish has been only partially successful. It serves the purpose of veiling the pleasure profit from the censoring consciousness by inducing pain.

A man, for example, loves the wife of his best friend. This desire to possess her appears to him, *i.e.*, to his moral personality, improper and is severely repressed. At night he dreams

of the woman: she appears doubly desirable; all daytime objection seems ridiculous; there are no obstacles in the way of a union. He wants to go to her but his legs are heavy as lead; he can hardly move from the spot. The more he struggles, the harder and more hopeless the struggle becomes; an inexplicable fear comes over him. He sees himself half-dressed on the street, followed by the mockery and laughter of the passers-by. His fear grows and grows and he awakens, bathed in perspiration. A typical anxiety dream. The elements here are distinct. The counter-command to kill his reprehensible will is powerful enough; the repression is so great that a secret wish fulfillment cannot escape being observed even in the dream. The dream distortion was not enough to hide it. His ego must send forth its strongest weapon, fear, to prevent the fulfillment of the primitive sexual desire. That every dream has a sexual root has never been asserted by Freud. But for Freud each dream has its roots in the dreamer's childhood; a correct dream analysis must disclose these infantile traces. Let us examine, in the light of psychoanalysis, how a dream arises, what it looks like, of what it is composed and how it can be interpreted.

The stimulus for the manifest content of a dream may be determined physiologically. A full stomach, tiny disturbances in the blood circulation, a change in glandular activity, or even an uncomfortable position in bed, sudden noises and many other causes may start a dream.<sup>133</sup> But what one dreams, the latent content of the dream, has a meaning always determined by the unconscious and, as we have seen, always a watchful, conflict-releasing, wish-fulfilling sense. For the interpretative analysis only the latent content of the dream is of interest. The dream as a whole falls into three parts: the latent dream thoughts; the dream work; and the manifest dream.

The manifest dream is the dream as it is actually presented to us. The latent dream thoughts, on the other hand, are the symbolized unconscious impulses and images in the dream picture. In the latent dream thoughts are to be found memory fragments of immediately preceding occurrences, the so-called

"daily residues" and repressed sexual wishes from childhood. These wishes are not acceptable to the conscious and cannot be plainly expressed in a dream. When they want to express themselves, they are forced to assume a symbolic form, and to disguise themselves with a mask.

The *symbol* is an intermediary that has on the one hand suggestions (reminiscences) of the repressed wish and on the other connections with the content of the waking conscious. In this way it serves as an opportunity for expression for the repressed wish and at the same time as veil for the moral censorship. Further we are forced by the construction of the psyche to express abstract thoughts in a dream by means of pictures, to find symbols for conceptions impossible to visualize. So that when some one wants to express power, he may dream of a lion, so far as the conception of power is for him associated with the picture of a lion. Dreams, like plays or films, are the dramatization of ideas, — produced with such economic means that film directors might learn something from them.

The manifest dream is therefore, as Freud puts it, the distorted substitution for the latent unconscious dream thoughts. The distortion is achieved by the resistance which makes it impossible for the repressed wish to enter into the conscious. These repelling forces are not completely "on the job" during sleep, but are still strong enough to make themselves felt in the form of the compulsion to disguise real tendencies. The distortion of the latent dream thoughts is the greater, the greater the resistance to the reappearance of certain impulses, wishes and thoughts. The distortion of the latent dream thoughts is the task of the "dream work."

Freud means by dream work a series of psychic functions that have to prepare the content of the unconscious event so as to make it unrecognizable. The latent dream thoughts are made unrecognizable by (1) the *shifting* of the emphasis from an important to an unimportant dream thought. (For example, I dream of my mother but see only her dress distinctly. My thought had been *shifted* to an unimportant detail so that

my attention may be led astray.) (2) In addition to the shifting of the emphasis, the condensation in dream work is important. The dream is as short as a telegram in comparison with the scope and abundance of the thoughts contained in it. One person in a dream can represent two, three or even four persons at the same time and have all their characteristics. Different things and persons melt into one single symbol under the effect of a unitary emotional process.

An example of condensation. A man recalls the following dream from his childhood. In a doll theatre there was a side-scene on which a tower was painted. One night the dreamer sees this tower coming toward him and as it approaches him it grows immense. When the tower is quite close to him and threatens to crush him, it turns suddenly into his Uncle Carl. At this instant the sleeper cries aloud, "Uncle, let me go!" and wakes up. In this dream a person appears on whom the dreamer was dependent and whose frequent brutality he had to endure. He is pictured as something heartless, massive, incapable, crushing. The person was symbolized by an object — person and object condensed into one.

At times this condensation appears in the form of new word combinations that in analysis are traced back to two or more separate words or thoughts. Words and opinions in dreams often express the opposite of what they are supposed to mean, or wholly contrary traits belonging to different individuals are unified in a single person. Condensation plus confusion or reversal. Frequently the actual characteristics of persons and things are represented reversed; above becomes below, high is low, good bad, ahead behind, and so on.

And the rest is concealed in the dream by figures which serve to mask or lead astray. These are figures that do not belong in the situation at all but appear at a decisive moment in the dream in place of the right figure. In this way the dream content is distorted at its most important point and the ego is diverted and hoodwinked. Masked figures, for example, are to be understood symbolically.

The dream has the tendency to express itself symbolically and the symbols are stronger and more bewildering, the more unacceptable the latent dream thoughts are. Symbolization is one of the simplest and most necessary means in the dream, for dreams must translate all abstract thoughts into comprehensible pictures. The dream dramatizes our thoughts; it makes use of a form of expression which we meet in the arts of poetry, painting, and even music, a form which has a powerful influence upon our feelings. Freud assumes that the symbols of which the dream makes use have a typical character for the mass of dreamers as a whole. A large number of common objects of which most people dream are assumed to be sexual symbols.

We have learned that the principal psychological means for dream distortion are: shift of emphasis, condensation, reversal, symbolization, picturization of abstractions. Wishes and hallucinatory wish fulfillments appear veiled and transformed in the manifest dream, that is, in that which we really dream and which appears to us nonsensical and incoherent (like an hysterical symptom).

The task of dream interpretation is the re-translation of what has been dreamt into the original abstract (or latent) dream thoughts. How this is done can only be touched upon lightly.

In order to understand the sense of a dream, the patient is first asked to tell the associations which arise in his mind when he thinks of his dream. One takes the dream picture by picture, or event by event, and collects all the associations the patient can be persuaded to tell. When the analyst has all the latent dream material together, it is no longer hard to bring the single parts, like the parts of a puzzle, into order in sensible coherence, and to disclose those motives to the dreamer which have caused him to dream this particular dream. It must always be remembered that dreams perform the same work as the scenario-writer, namely, the transformation of an idea into living pictures in the most concise, eco-

nomical and striking manner possible. Since it does not have to bother about logical sequence and clarity for the reasons already given, the dream is more successful in accomplishing its task than a scenario-writer has ever been.

The interpretation, which must naturally always be subjective and incomplete to a certain degree, must attempt to disentangle the pictures so as to arrive at the basic ideas. The better this is done, the more valuable is the dream interpretation as a helping means to the removal of neurotic symptoms, for which purpose alone it was determined and developed.

### *Complexes*

THE PRECEDING paragraphs have made us acquainted with some of the methods which, according to psychoanalysis, lead into the unconscious. We shall consider what we find upon our arrival. It has already been indicated that unacceptable wishes, images and thoughts are banned *in toto* from the conscious and thereupon begin to lead a life of their own in the unconscious which disturbs the whole personality. These exiled, repressed images are called *complexes*, at the suggestion of C. G. Jung. These complexes are at the root of every neurotic symptom. To find the complexes and to unravel them has the same effect as the extraction of a decayed tooth and root: freedom from a tormenting disorder.

Let us observe these complexes a little more closely. Almost every one has heard something of the Oedipus complex, yet such ideas are still vague and confused among most people. Riklin calls the complex "the little soul within the big one." That is to say, a piece of soul life grown independent, obeying its own laws and disturbing the harmony of the big soul. The complex is a predominating idea in the sphere of the unconscious. Every one knows that we remember a part of what happens to us but that we forget a much greater part. For the practical use of our reason, remembering and forgetting are of the same importance, since reasonable thinking would

be equally impossible if we could not remember at all and if we had to remember everything. Mental health, — that is, the stable equilibrium of mental functioning, — is dependent upon the right choice of what to remember and what to forget.

It occurs frequently that we overvalue an image or idea, especially when it is connected with strong feelings. Everything is sacrificed to this idea. It rules our mental being and we subordinate ourselves to it uncritically. Almost every falling in love might serve as an example. Every impression which speaks against the wisdom of the affection is rejected or not even considered. In this way we are just as little likely to arrive at a correct judgment as if we were to allow ourselves to be inhibited by over-exacting, exaggerated regard for all the counter-arguments. This predominant idea is particularly striking in cases of pathological jealousy, where the persons concerned are ruled and slavishly fascinated by their one-sided attitude, and react to each jealous impulse with vehement outbursts of fury which they think indicate the depth of their love.

A predominant idea frequently develops into a paranoid condition in which the individuals affected believe themselves singled out and persecuted. When we have had an embarrassing experience, we feel as if every one were looking at us and had lowered his opinion of us. After an actual or imaginary slight or unfairness we soon see enemies or antagonists everywhere. We project a single event upon our whole conception of the world. And we are most inclined to do this when the experience has been subjective, erroneous, imagined. Genuine and open hostility based on differently oriented conclusions is usually undervalued or held in contempt.

Every human being has ideas and complexes which he overvalues. The position of these ideas in the household of the mind and their power to disturb determines sickness or health. All thinking and acting are at times under the one-sided, tyrannizing influence of a few events; for example, after the death of a close relative, grief absorbs all power of thinking and per-

mits no contrary image to arise. But the normal personality has some knowledge of its complexes. It is conscious of its power of expansion, as well as of the disturbing forces. And though it can seldom eject these forces suddenly, it mobilizes its power of resistance in order to overcome them gradually. The essence of the complex, namely, its existence in the darkness of the unconscious, disappears.

Those people in whom complexes are especially hard at work, however, show a limited self-awareness. From their reactions one can see that predominant ideas, such as compulsion ideas, are isolating themselves in the unconscious so as to be no longer accessible to the active will to overcome them. Here are two distinct "selves," a big one and a little one, confronting and struggling with each other so that the individual appears to have a split personality.

Through the popularity which the conception of the complex has won in recent years the question has become acute as to whether every individual has complexes; how many, where they are, and whether they can be eradicated. The word complex has become a fashionable slogan, and the discovery of complexes (like dream interpretation) has sunk to the level of a party game. He who cannot produce a couple of good sizable complexes has become almost socially unacceptable in certain circles. A serious disorder has been transformed into a pleasantry. That the original sickening force of such repressed images has not been changed, is obvious. He who boasts of his complexes is further from the recognition of their true composition than when he knew nothing of their existence. He protects himself, by self-mockery, from the necessity of doing anything actively to change himself.

The two chief complexes of psychoanalysis which, it is asserted, exist in every human being, are (1) the Oedipus complex in men or Electra complex in the case of women and (2) the castration complex. Oedipus was the king in Greek legend who, under the compulsion of fate, murdered his father and married his mother. Every boy, so teaches Freud, wants to

possess his mother and destroy the father who is in the way. With girls it is reversed; they want to possess their fathers and get rid of their mothers. Since these wishes are not compatible with reality, they are repressed and remain forever as complex forces in the unconscious, the cause and source of many neurotic disorders.

The castration complex, on the other hand, was introduced much later by Freud into the world of psychoanalytical conceptions. (It is the sexually colored analogue of Adler's "inferiority feeling" at the root of neurotic confusion.) This idea comes from parental threats, is related to a peculiarity of childhood sexuality—uncertainty as to one's own sex—and is further intensified by the sexual phase of puberty. It is maintained throughout life by the double sexual standard, is subject like everything sexual to a culturally compelled repression, but is still strong enough to cause disturbances as a complex from the unconscious. Other complexes come and go, and are often discovered, upon further analysis, to be dependent upon and referable to one or the other of the above.

The question now arises: what becomes of the complexes and in what way do the "little souls" lose their sickening power within the big one? We have seen that the complex becomes a sort of mental reflex center, and that certain stimulations which hit it change into the most varied, self-acting bodily and mental manifestations. Whether the activating of the complex manifests itself in a bodily symptom, like vomiting, depends upon whether the body has "somatic peculiarities" (as Freud has called them) making such reactions possible. Freud means by this that many organs, such as the stomach, are constitutionally weak so that any mental disturbance affects this weak spot and expresses itself through it (organic neurosis). It is therefore necessary to discover the complex in order to cure the organic disturbance. Physical and mental symptoms cannot be entirely separated from each other. They always go together, with emphasis laid sometimes on one, sometimes on the other. A cure must always take care of

bodily as well as mental factors, and the doctor must not let himself be tricked by the functional weakness of any one organ.

Psychoanalysis asserts that there is a complex at the root of all such manifestations and conditions, whether they are physical (when the organ itself, of course, is not really sick) or mental. These conditions include absentmindedness, taciturnity, gestures indicating embarrassment, self-consciousness, mistakes, forgetfulness, tics, heart palpitation, neurotic partial paralyses, and the whole series of neurotic symptoms; in short, the whole symbolism of the unconscious and whatever is painful or unpleasant to the unconscious leads back to the complex. Complexes gradually lessen under normal psychic conditions. They lose their central position, their automatic energy and must make place for new images. Many ideas do not really become complexes in the full sense of the word; that is, they do not become operating, unattackable, unrecognized forces emanating from the unconscious. For the mind that sees through itself allows no splitting into complexes which work against it.

Genuine developed complexes often break out in a sort of explosion, an outburst of rage, or an act of animal cruelty or violence, without being lessened or cured. Psychoanalysis has offered as the best means for the riddance of complexes the complete unveiling and disclosure of the complex from the unconscious and its sterilization by the rays of reason.

Most of us — even if we did not know how to express it in the language of psychoanalysis — have either had the experience, or observed others have it, of discovering how far our talking ourself out with a trusted person can relieve us of emotional tension; we breathe easily again, and feel liberated as if a weight had been lifted from our hearts. It will be remembered that this primitive form of passive self-analysis was the beginning of psychoanalysis, and was called psychic cleansing, psycho-catharsis. Moreover, in the further development of psychoanalytical teaching, this “talking-out” cure, as one of

Breuer's patients called it, has remained an important part of psychoanalytical therapy.

The real therapeutic goal of psychoanalysis lies in reforming the unconscious, misdirected drives and complexes into a valuable, culturally directed activity, in order to afford the sources of energy a profitable and constant outlet. This process has been called by Freud "sublimation." The word had been used in a similar sense before Nietzsche wrote, "We yearn for the clear light of morning tranquillity, but we divine: this light too is passionate movement, but sublimated, invisible to the coarse." And Plato was of the opinion that the desire for knowledge and philosophy is a sublimated sex drive. Freud came to similar conclusions without, as he says, knowing what Nietzsche had said. Freud thinks that sublimation appears when there is "successful resistance" to the violent form of the "sexual drives," *i.e.* when there is a genuinely saving, social reconciliation between these impulses and the demands of law and custom. Where the sublimation function falls short, where "the resistance fails," there remains the unsolved conflict between cultural goal and natural drive, the disorganizing complex which makes itself apparent in a neurosis.

These ideas lead us further into the realm of psychopathology and we shall occupy ourselves next with the root of all "good and bad," as it may be seen in sexuality.

### *Sexuality*

WE HAVE heretofore looked upon the unconscious, in contrast to the conscious, as the great reservoir in which all forbidden and improper wishes, impulses and images, driven out of the conscious, are kept. We have seen that it is possible to get at the unconscious by way of free association, interpretation of mistakes, and analysis of dreams, and have recognized the complex as the precipitate resulting from the conflict of those various components which were repressed.

Psychoanalysis says that the shortest answer to the question,

"What is repressed?" is "instinctive drives." We have mentioned several times the *images, wishes, impulses* and *thoughts* which are repressed. Psychoanalysis asserts that their common denominator is their sexual content. In spite of other tendencies in the unconscious, such as egotism, striving for power, and even lust to destroy, psychoanalysis asserts that they all have a sexual origin in some way or other. The sexual drive, according to psychoanalysis, dominates human beings; their whole existence, whether they know it or not, revolves about and depends upon this. It must be borne in mind, though, that Freud has broadened the conception of sexuality immensely, and does not mean by it only sexual intercourse or preparation for propagation, but all varieties of hunger or pleasure drive. Sexuality does not commence with puberty; it is inborn and appears in diverse ways. Knowledge of this has led to a better understanding of the sexual development of human beings.

Sexuality in children, however, is quite different from sexuality in adults. The young child extracts a feeling of pleasure from everything it can take hold of, chiefly from its own body; what was formerly looked upon as mere playfulness in the child, now assumes sexual significance in the light of psychoanalysis. In childhood those first steps toward adult sexuality are taken which are later forever retained as the introductory awakeners of sexual pleasure. To this belong the inspection and touching of the body, sucking, "sublimated" to kissing, and so on. Wherever possible, the child uses his own body and that of others as a source of pleasure. Those parts of the body which give most pleasure become "erogenous zones"; that is, they are the parts most sensitive and most immediately responsive to sexual excitation. The nipples and the extremities of the alimentary canal are likely to belong in this classification. As a matter of fact, any part of the body can be developed into an erogenous zone. Those parts which are preferred depend for their preference, in addition to their somewhat greater supply of nerves, on all sorts of accidental contact and "discovery." Only later, when the concentration of sexuality on the sex

organs themselves has taken place, do the erogenous zones in normal cases lose their significance. In nervous (neurotic) people, however, the sex function often remains at the level of childhood sexuality. This form of sexuality in adults cannot reconcile itself to reality, never satisfies and is therefore repressed. The result of this repression only serves to make the neurosis worse.

In the first childhood phase of sexuality, the child's libido leads it to occupy itself with its own person. Freud designates this phase as "auto-eroticism." An important form of auto-erotic indulgence is masturbation, which sometimes starts very early in childhood. Masturbation is in itself nothing abnormal. This is more easily understood when we keep in mind the development of sexuality from infantile auto-eroticism, which is exclusively self-indulgence. The more absurd, therefore, are the punishments and threats with which a child is overwhelmed by his parents or caretakers when it is discovered that it masturbates. Aside from the fact that the most frightening threats and punishments usually produce the opposite effect, they burden the child with wholly unnecessary fear and guilt feelings and only strengthen the habit. Masturbation, like every other sexual activity, is *physically* harmless.

The libido normally projects itself in the following phases on the persons in the immediate environment. There is the incestuous phase in which develops the seed of what we have learned to call so nonchalantly the "Oedipus complex." The child's primitive choice, closely connected with his need of help, turns first to the individual nearest him. The caresses it receives from mother and father, the care of the body, and innumerable other occasions offer abundant opportunity for the cultivation of the most intimate bodily contact. Since the child's sexuality is in that early stage which permits it to extract pleasure from every bodily part caressed or touched, it makes of both parents, and of one especially, the object of its vague sexual desires. Fathers generally favor daughters, and mothers sons, and the result is that the son wants to take his

father's place and the daughter her mother's. Between child and parents and between sisters and brothers arise positive (love) as well as negative (hate, jealousy) feelings.

We are usually brought up in such a fashion that only positive, friendly feelings toward our family are proper and permitted. A great part of our early childhood wishes and impulses must therefore be repressed and repression starts at a very early age. This repression becomes stronger and more inclusive with the years.

The root complex of repressed sexual impulses is the Oedipus complex and, according to Freud, the chief motif of every neurosis. Fear and guilt feelings, usually fused into the pivot of the neurotic life circle, come regularly from the Oedipus complex. Guilt feelings originate in the Oedipus complex and are a reaction to the two deeply criminal intentions — to kill the father and to possess the mother. "The Oedipus complex is correctly designated as the nucleus of the neurosis," writes Freud.<sup>134</sup>

A later phase is narcissism,<sup>135</sup> and this lasts till puberty. It is in this phase that the masturbation starts again which was practised in early childhood and abandoned. Shortly before and during puberty arise the homosexual inclinations which find their expression in the short and violent friendships between girls or between boys where there is an obvious, passionate rejection of the opposite sex. If the development proceeds normally, the libido finds its way in the end, after its adventurous trips in abnormal directions, into the harbor of so-called normal sexuality. It seeks and finds its object in the opposite sex.

This psychoanalytical description of our sexual development usually proves correct where a normal sexual life has been achieved after puberty without any serious disturbance.

It is natural that such statements provoke a storm of indignation, since it is not agreeable to hear that what we have been accustomed to condemn with moral disgust in others, or what we have excused at best by calling it sickness or exception, we

too, have passed through. Psychoanalysis, however, dethrones the exceptions, unveils sickness and morality, and decides that an auto-erotic, incestuous, bisexual development is generally human and humanly general. The normal person gets over his infantile desires, partly by way of healthy sexual life, partly by employing his free energies in working out important cultural problems (sublimation). The presence of illegitimate desires in an adult is therefore by no means a sign of a degenerate character or unnatural disposition, as a self-righteous morality would like to have it, but simply a left-over from childhood.

Such rudiments, infantile remnants, are found in an undeveloped state in most adults. In the one they manifest themselves as wishes directed toward persons of the same sex (homosexual), in the other as desire for intimate association with near relatives (incestuous). Some individuals are sexually excited by inflicting pain on their love object (sadists); others by having pain inflicted upon themselves (masochists). Others again love themselves only and obtain their sexual satisfaction through their own person (auto-erotics, narcissists). But all these and many other sexual perversions have their root in sexual desires which never got beyond the infantile stage, and which have consequently remained powerful enough to compel the individual to obtain his sexual satisfaction in this primitive way.

The libido does not always attain its goal of normal sexuality easily. Where it is impeded or retarded, a neurotic indisposition results. Freud states that such disturbances usually appear when an individual, because of outer obstacles or inner lack of adjustment, fails to satisfy his erotic need in a normal way. He "takes refuge in sickness" and awaits from his disorder a substitute satisfaction in place of the real, normal one. The symptoms always express the sexual wishes of the patient in masked form. The severe hysterical attack, for instance, is described by psychoanalysis as a disguised orgasm. The sexual drives are not willing to give up their substitute satisfaction as

long as reality cannot offer them anything better. This is why the patient resists the doctor and retains so stubbornly his painful symptoms. The flight into sickness also takes place by way of regression to former phases of sexual life.<sup>136</sup> The regression is "temporal" in that the libido, the erotic need, turns back to early steps in development, and "formal" in that the original and primitive psychic means of expression are used to manifest this need. Both sorts of regression co-operate in the production of an infantile state of sexual life.

Freud gives the following graphic picture to represent the conversion of the libido into neurotic symptoms. It contains at the same time the entire sexual development of the human being as seen from the standpoint of psychoanalysis.

Before human beings acquired the habit of settling in one place, they wandered about on earth in large groups. Let us assume that one of these tribes came from a distant land in the north and finally remained in a southern territory. Some members of the tribe, either through fatigue or inadequate resistance to weather changes, or because some spot appealed to them especially, did not keep on with the main body but stopped along the way. They settled on land about midway between the starting point and the original goal. It is only necessary to substitute the word "libido" for the word "tribe" to understand what Freud means by the word "fixation"; namely, stopping off at some place before arriving at the goal. For one reason or another, the libido, during its childhood wanderings, may remain either entirely or partially at a certain point, fixated there. It may have stayed at the level of self-gratification, or at a sadistic level (where sexual satisfaction results from damaging the love object) or at the level of sexual love for father and mother.

To continue our analogy: that part of the tribe which pressed on further and finally arrived at its southern goal, met there unexpected obstacles, hostile resistance and severe storms, or barren regions unsuitable for pioneer settlement. This is what Freud calls the "external failure." The libido has landed

at its goal after a long journey and comes in contact at last with reality, a reality which in no way corresponds to the libido's demands. Either the youth finds no acceptable wife, or sexual intercourse is impossible because of such circumstances as illness. A damming up of the libido with its unavoidable consequence results.

In the third phase of this analogy, the tribe, insofar as it believes it cannot adjust itself to the prevailing conditions, decides to return to those comrades who had settled further north at an earlier stage of the wandering. There they hope to find a place where they can remain and thrive. Just so does the inhibited libido return to levels it had already passed in its development. The individual reconciles himself to an infantile sexual life at which point a part of his libido has indeed already remained. This is the *regression* mentioned before. According to Freud, perverse sexual desires (homosexuality, sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, fetishism, etc.) are to be thus understood. The result is total or partial incapability of normal sexual relations, manifested in impotence, frigidity, etc., since the libido has not kept pace with the physical ripening of the adult, but has remained at the premature, childish stage.

Sexual abnormalities develop where the infantile sexual desires enter the conscious and are translated into fact. Such individuals become permanent sadists, fetishists, exhibitionists. They give their infantile desires free rein either by way of their own body, or by using another's. The libido is not dammed up since it is afforded an outlet, though an abnormal one.

Something quite different happens when the ego, described by Freud as one of the repressing activities opposing the unsublimated sexual drives, does not permit abnormal sexual activity and exiles the infantile libidinous wishes to the unconscious as forbidden. The libido-energy accumulates, seeks outlets and finds them in the symptoms of the neurotic disorder. The frigid woman, whose libido is not free for normal

expression, whose conscious ego does not permit her libido to choose the way out by infantile-perverse activity, converts her sexual desires into hysterical attacks. It is no longer a matter of perverse individuals, but of neurotic individuals.

We have now gotten to the point where it is possible to understand the psychoanalytical scheme of neurotic disorders. What attracts our attention in nervous illnesses is the symptom. Every symptom is an unconscious substitute satisfaction for renounced infantile pleasure. The sick individual could not reconcile himself to reality, and so returned to earlier stages in his development; or, he never got as far as reality. The gratification of his childish sexual desires is denied; two tendencies fight against each other and the ego ostensibly wins the fight. Actually the suppressed pleasure tendencies win a partial victory, and find a satisfaction in the neurotic symptom. And it is all the same whether they are compulsion neuroses symptoms, fear symptoms, melancholia, or hysterical attacks. The ego is struggling with the primitive will to pleasure, and sickness is the wretched victory.

A man struggles unconsciously against homosexual desires, — regression to a former sexual level, — since his ego had repressed this inclination long before. The reason is that he has failed to make a normal adult adjustment. He wants to get rid of his wife — unconsciously, of course. His life with her does not satisfy him. It would even occur to him to murder his wife if the censor, his moral ego, did not eject this thought from his conscious. Instead he suffers from sleeplessness. If one is ignorant of the cause, his sleeplessness is incomprehensible since there are hundreds of causes of sleeplessness. The analysis gradually discloses the facts. It turns out that the cause of his insomnia is fear of an outbreak of his repressed drives. By means of free association and interpretation of his dreams it is possible to obtain a clear picture of the disturbance. Gratification of the drive appears disguised and distorted in the form of a neurotic symptom, for the ego permits neither the longing for homosexuality nor the intent to murder to enter

the conscious. After disclosure of the state of affairs, the sleeplessness disappears.

This simple example gives a good schematic picture of the growth of a neurotic symptom. All symptoms arise through such compromises between the sexual drive and the ego drive. Complications form only because neither the sexual nor the ego drive is single and uncomplicated, but split up in subdivisions or partial drives which move in various directions and cross each other. This fact increases the difficulty of correct diagnosis but in no way changes the basic scheme of the picture.

Now that we have the main threads to be found in the human character, and have seen the fundamental possibility of their getting entangled and confused, we can present the general pattern of character as Freud and his school see it. It is to be emphasized that psychoanalysis, in its years of work, has contributed piece by piece to the construction of the "character picture" which we shall sketch here in short strokes. And yet gaps have shown themselves again and again, and repairing and new superstructures have been necessary to perfect the building. But—is the foundation sufficient to carry the structure? That is the question.

#### THE THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

A BRIEF survey of what we have learned so far of the development of the psychoanalytical theory would be about as follows:

Freud started with orthodox medicine, and left it as a result of association with Breuer, Charcot, and others, as we have seen. His study of hypnosis led him to the idea of the purely psychogenic origin of nervous symptoms. He soon abandoned hypnosis and developed the cathartic, that is, the cleansing method for the solution of mental conflicts. Then he built up definite viewpoints on the division of mental life into the conscious and the unconscious. He tried to find a way to reach the unconscious as the real spot where psychic disturbances be-

gan. With the help of (1) free association, (2) mistakes as an involuntary betrayal of what was going on in the unconscious, and, above all, (3) the interpretation of dreams, he was able, without the aid of hypnosis, to obtain a picture of the state of the carefully hidden unconscious of his patients. He found that its main content in nervous patients was composed of repressed fragments from the conscious, concentrated into complexes, comparable to undigested parts of events or experiences disturbing the smooth functioning of the organism as a whole. He then succeeded in dissolving and making such complexes conscious. The nervous symptoms thereupon disappeared and the patient seemed cured.

The discovery of an apparent direct causal relation between the existence of complexes and the presence of neurotic symptoms, as shown by the fact that dissolution of the symptoms occurred when previously unrecognized systems of ideas were brought to light through analysis and admitted into consciousness, strengthened Freud's already firmly established belief in a thoroughly complete determinism of all psychological phenomena. All ideas, wishes, desires, activities of every sort, anxieties, compulsions, neurotic symptoms—in fact, all events within any individual's experience and behavior, "normal" or "abnormal," "voluntary" or "involuntary,"—are determined by the organization of innate urges and drives reacting within the limitations of a physical and social environment. The tasks of psychoanalysis, according to Freud, were those of discovering the basic urges or instincts, describing the ways in which these were expressed in the form of thoughts and acts, analyzing the structure of the personality as formed on this basis, explaining the mechanisms involved in normal and abnormal behavior, and determining adequate therapeutic techniques for the reorganization of those personalities in which faulty developmental processes precluded the possibility of satisfactory social adjustments.

In attempting to solve these problems, one of the first things to attract Freud's attention was the very evident importance of

the early sexual life of the child. In the analysis of complexes, it appeared that the simple content of the unconscious, and the components of the complexes, always had sexual roots. Instinctive drives were the source of the urgent, impelling forces activating the complexes. These discoveries led Freud to the establishment of his theory of infantile sexuality on which he then constructed his doctrine of the libido.

The importance of childhood sexuality in the development of psychoanalytic theory can hardly be overemphasized. Freud brought out the fact that every individual has sexual drives much earlier than was formerly assumed. By interpreting sexuality broadly, many of the acts and gestures of the child could be brought under his classification. Infantile wishes are present, many of which cannot be gratified and must be repressed into the unconscious, where they persist in the form of complexes and eventually find expression in the form of dreams, neurotic symptoms and nervous disorders. The libido, or sexual drive, is the primary moving force in mental life.

Freud's concept of the libido has often been misinterpreted and greatly misunderstood. *Libido*, in the broad, inclusive sense in which Freud uses it, is a term designating the energy, force, or drive involved in all those activities which can be included in the various meanings of the word "love." This inevitably centers about the concept of sexual love of the normal adult sort, but it also includes such varied forms of affection as filial devotion, the "puppy love" affairs of adolescence, parental love, philanthropic love of mankind, and even self-love.

The libido is, then, a native drive or urge, present in every human being even before birth, entering into every human activity, subject to modification and control as the individual himself grows and develops. Several distinct stages may be observed in the manifestations of the libido in the transition from the infantile to the adult level. The first of these is designated by Freud as the "infancy period"—from birth to about five years of age. This is the stage which has been named

"polymorphous perverse," from the fact that the activities of the child in seeking gratification of his libidinal desires resemble those which in adults are considered perversions. The satisfaction of the libido, at this level, is gained through the excitation of "erogenous zones"—those parts of the body which are especially sensitive to stimulation through slight pressure. Among the most important erogenous zones may be mentioned the sexual organs themselves and the mucous surfaces at both ends of the digestive tract, but any part of the body may at times be erogenous. The masturbation observed frequently in infants is an attempt to satisfy the demands of the libido. The child at this stage is primarily interested in gaining immediate, direct satisfactions of his physical needs. His interests and activities center about his own body. All of these are indications that the force of the libido in the infant is directed toward himself, hence the use of the term "auto-erotic" in referring to this level of development.

The second stage in the child's development, from five to about twelve years, is called the "latency period." Here may be noticed an almost complete disappearance of the undisguised sexual interests and activities of the earlier infantile period. The libido is directed outwards, toward the persons and objects in the immediate environment.

In the third stage, the adolescent or pubertal period, the manifestations of the libido are again primarily sexual. The child again shows an impelling curiosity about sexual matters, a re-arousal of auto-erotic activities. The development of primary and secondary sexual characteristics forces upon him the realization of his increasing maturity. The increasing force of the sexual drive shows itself often at first in a recurrence of masturbation, and later in a rapid growth of interest in members of the opposite sex. From the later developments of the adolescent period, the normal individual passes over into the overt heterosexual interests and activities of the adult.

Early in the child's development, during the infancy period, the unconscious desire for sexual satisfaction becomes directed

toward the parent of the opposite sex, resulting in the formation of the group of ideas called the "Oedipus complex." Conscious expression of these desires may take the form of seeking caresses, bodily contact, or demonstrations of affection from the parent. Unconsciously, the child desires direct (organ) satisfaction. The normal process of outgrowing the Oedipus complex consists partly in repressing some of the desires, partly in finding direct sexual satisfactions through auto-erotic activities, partly in finding substitute satisfactions for others. Largely because of the presence of the auto-erotic actions, the "castration complex" also arises late in the infancy period, through threats of punishment on the part of the parents. That part of the Oedipus complex which is not sublimated persists as castration complex.

When it was found that the expression of the libido in the form of wishes and desires met with resistance because of the incompatibility of the latter with the already existing tendencies in consciousness, it became necessary to make a further analysis of the mechanisms involved in this resistance. We have already referred to this process under the term which Freud originated for it, "repression." Through an agency which we shall discuss later, those ideas which do not fit in with the existing pattern of consciousness *fail to be recognized*, are not admitted to consciousness, and are apparently banished to some other region of mental life. In order to account fully for these phenomena, the psychoanalytic hierarchy of the various divisions of mental life was developed as follows.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF CHARACTER

MENTAL life, according to psychoanalysis, is divided "topically" into the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. Of these, the unconscious constitutes by far the greater part. It is made up of those elements of mental life which have never been in consciousness, or, having once been conscious, have been repressed. It is prior to both the conscious and the pre-

conscious, in the sense of appearing earlier, both in the race and in the individual. It consists of un verbalized ideas, together with their related affects, and of various instinctive strivings or impulses. Knowledge of the unconscious can come about only through the translation or transformation of its contents into conscious form. This may occur spontaneously, or may be effected through the use of the psychoanalytic technique.

The conscious consists only of that part of mental life of which one is aware at any given instant. Consciousness appears early in the development of the individual, probably in the first year of life, through the action of instinctive strivings coming into contact with the restrictions of the external world. The content of consciousness varies with the activities of the individual, always shifting, always changing, never at any given time very large in comparison with the vastness of the unconscious.

Between these two fields of mental activity there lies a third, the preconscious, which has some of the characteristics of each of the others and yet may be differentiated from both of them. The preconscious consists of that part of mental life which has not been definitely repressed and which can therefore be brought into the field of consciousness more or less easily by associative processes. For this reason the preconscious is considered to be related more closely to the conscious than to the unconscious.

These are the fields, then, in which the mental life of the individual is organized and constituted. We have already shown that the libido dominates the activity in all mental life. But although the libido has long been recognized as the primary driving force, Freud soon found that other tendencies opposed it. These he grouped together and called the self-preservative instinct. Further observations in the analysis of cases brought out the fact that the self-preservative tendencies were, after all, expressions of the libido in the form of self-love or narcissism. Even this conception turned out to be inade-

quate for the satisfactory explanation of neurotic mechanisms, and so Freud finally came to the conclusion that there must be a group of destructive drives or urges, entirely separate from and opposed to the libido. This he called the "death instinct."<sup>137</sup> Both the expression of the libido in the form of the "life instinct" (also called "Eros"), and the destructive tendencies which make up the "death instinct," may be given any one of three directions in being converted into overt activity. The life instinct may be (1) directed outward, toward the objects or persons of the external world, and thus be given immediate satisfaction; (2) inhibited or repressed, and then be given indirect satisfaction (sublimation); and (3) directed inward, resulting in narcissism and its modifications in the form of self-preservative tendencies. The death instinct, likewise, may be (1) directed outwards, in the form of aggressive activities toward other persons or objects; (2) inhibited (through conflict with reality), resulting in the regression to a previous level of development; and (3) directed inward, taking the form of self-destructive, self-injuring behavior. Combinations of these two instincts in different ways may give rise to sadism, masochism, and various other kinds of behavior.

In the very early life of the child, the expression of these instincts in actual behavior is controlled, inhibited, and directed by the parents. Somewhat later, other persons outside the immediate family — those constituting the various social groups in which the child finds himself — through their expressions of approval and disapproval, add to the burden of authority to which the child is subjected. As the child's personality develops — as he becomes more socialized, we say — the responsibility for the proper direction and control of these impulses shifts from the parents and society in general to the child himself. The study of this process of development gave rise to a more clearly defined concept of the structure of personality.

The basic part of the personality, as we have already indicated, is made up of unconscious strivings and urges, tendencies

of the libido to find expression, — various forms and modifications of the life and death instincts. This Freud named the “Id,” — a term used by Nietzsche.<sup>138</sup> It directly or indirectly produces the driving power for all activity. It seeks immediate satisfaction of the instincts and urges which compose it. It is, in itself, tumultuous, chaotic, uncontrolled. It is entirely unconscious, though it is not identical with *all* that part of mental life which we have previously designated as “*the unconscious*.” Arising from the Id, but never entirely differentiated from it, Freud found another pattern of activities and experiences, a second part of personality, — the “Ego.” The Ego is partly conscious, partly unconscious, and partly preconscious. Just as the Id is made up largely of instincts, urges, and habit tendencies, so the Ego is made up largely of ideational elements. The Id is in itself unregulated, while the Ego possesses a regulatory power which it extends not only over its own activities but those of the Id as well. The Ego is molded from the contacts of the strivings and urges of the Id with the external world. (In non-Freudian language, the activities of the infant in finding satisfactions for his organic needs give rise to conscious experiences, ideas, percepts and concepts.) There remains yet a third part of the mental apparatus. This has been termed the ego-ideal, or the “Super-ego.” Like the Ego, the Super-ego is partly conscious, partly unconscious, and partly preconscious. The best term for it in ordinary terminology is “conscience.” It is partly the result of identification of the child with one or both of his parents, partly the result of the accumulation of prohibitions and moral concepts from extra-familial sources. The Super-ego is more intimately related and more closely connected with the Id than with the Ego, but its tendencies are for the most part in opposition to those of the Id, and consequently we find a continual struggle between the Super-ego and the Id on the battleground of the Ego. From the Super-ego additional power is derived which is used in repressing the tendencies of the Id; the Ego is thus allowed to guide the libido to socialized activities.

From this we see that the all-important process of repression is a function of the Ego, to a large extent motivated and directed by the Super-ego, holding in check the forces and impulses of the Id as these attempt to find expression in overt, objective, real form. Neurotic symptoms are the indirect expressions of unsuccessfully repressed ideas, wishes, impulses and desires. In many persons, it is true, successful repression may take place: ideas, in being relegated to the limbo of the unconscious, are divested of their emotional force and consequently have no tendency to seek expression in the disguise of symptoms, while unacceptable impulses are temporarily repressed but are later given satisfactory and adequate expression in some modified and thoroughly desirable form. It is through the study of the *unsuccessful* cases of repression (the neurotic cases who come to the analyst for treatment), however, that the process of repression and the consequent formation of symptoms may best be understood.

WE NOW have the structure of the human character, as psychoanalysis has described it. The framework, which gives form to the character, is the organization of Id, Ego, and Super-ego; the content is the libido, at a more complicated stage the drives, and their constellations, the complexes. Form and content are bound together and complement each other, since the construction of the character comes from the libido and is directed by it. Psychoanalysis, however, has *not* taken the next step, which was to regard character as a totality.

Psychoanalysis has tried to show that the law of the "bipolarity" of natural events holds good for mental life as well. Bi-polarity (Stekel) is the concurrent presence of two opposing tensions in one and the same object; as for example, the positive and negative poles of a magnet. Everything that takes place in the mind is governed by two poles, and where we can only discover one pole, we may be sure that there is a second opposing pole present. No inclination without disinclination,

no love without hate, no drive without fear; there are always two currents working against each other.

Psychoanalysis did not like the word bi-polar, and borrowed a word from chemistry to describe this state: ambivalence (Bleuler). There are chemical elements that can exhibit more than one "valence"; they are ambivalent. Mental elements are also capable of combining with others in various ways. We love and hate a person at the same time; we want something and we don't want it; we are attracted and yet struggle against the attraction. Every conflict shows a self torn in two directions, the fight of the unconscious against the conscious.

Without having made use of this term, Freud's observations were directed toward the polar opposition in the mind. We recall his conception of the neurosis as a compromise between the sexual drive in the unconscious and the Ego drive in the conscious. In his attempt to give this bi-polarity an historical basis, he came upon two guiding factors which govern the human mental life; namely, the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

The pleasure principle is the older of the two. In humanity's early days, in the time of luxuriant vegetation, there was no lack. All the drives were simply unlimited pleasure drives and could be satisfied. Mankind used its energies then only for the attainment of pleasure and self-preservation demanded no struggle which would have opposed the pleasure principle.

Then vegetation became scarcer and the number of human beings increased. The consequent food insufficiency forced the people to obey the command: adjust yourself or you will perish. A cold reality drove them out of their pleasure paradise and alongside the pleasure principle appeared the reality principle. A number of the drives bowed to the inevitable. To save man from destruction, the drives had to be sublimated into speaking, thinking, reason, work, communal government, culture and civilization. The chief manifestation of the reality principle was the struggle for self-preservation.

Other drives, however, did not subject themselves to the necessity of civilization and remained wild and untamed, far from reality, desiring only boundless gratification. These are the sexual drives, governed to this very day by the pleasure principle. A fight between these two groups was unavoidable. In our hard and restricted life, pleasure and necessity cannot be satisfied equally. The stronger wins. The reality principle appears as the maintainer of life, the father of the Ego-drive, fighting constantly to safeguard life, uninfluenced by pleasure or pain; governing, managing and suppressing.

Just as the bodily development of each individual is in some ways a brief repetition of the development of the whole race, so does the developmental process from pleasure principle to reality principle, which mankind has gone through in hundreds of thousands of years, repeat itself within a few years in each growing child. All education and adjustment mean a gradual subduing of the pleasure principle. The reality motive, the compulsion "You must," interferes, limits, curtails pleasure. The Id resists. The result is constant conflict, fluctuation of the pleasure-pain curve, the restless dissatisfaction of life.

Freud has applied the law of bi-polarity in later years to an increasing extent. The pleasure and reality principles are both supporters of life; both are based upon the life drive. The opposite pole of the life drive is the death drive. In his book *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* he comes to the question whether the pleasure principle is really the only governing force in the unconscious or whether it is not to be supplemented by a deeper, further-reaching energy.

The individual's most elemental, primeval striving seems to be to subdue stimulation and excitement; in other words, to lessen tension. This tendency supports the compulsion to repeat psychic events, manifested in recurring dreams, and in reliving previous experiences. The repeated dream, the repeated experience are responses to stimulations which give rise recurrently to unpleasant tensions. It is an attempt to achieve a former state of low tension and, seen from this point of view, the drives

would be a means to this end. The goal of all life is death, for lifelessness is older than life. Life is therefore only a dying, temporarily hindered. The obstacle is the sexual drive, the *life* drive, which aims at the unity of our dissevered life. The current of life, however, is guided by those drives proceeding toward the death goal and whose ground is the death drive. The riddle of life can probably be solved by assuming that the life and death drives wage war against each other and that life struggles in a great detour toward the everlasting peace of the "inorganic."

We have traversed psychoanalysis and have arrived at the boundary line where facts have become vague and speculation takes the place of exact observation. A quotation from a book written over a decade ago is still apposite: "I might be asked" asks Freud, "whether and to what extent I myself am convinced of the assumptions set forth here. My answer would be that I am not convinced nor do I endeavor to win over others to believe in them. Or better, I do not know how far I believe in them . . . One can yield to a train of thought, follow it as far as it leads, simply out of scientific curiosity, or as *advocatus diaboli*, without, however, selling himself to the devil on that account." <sup>139</sup>

With these words of the founder of a great theory, we close our short presentation. A Freudian analysis follows. We shall proceed next to the description of those therapeutic systems which have developed from psychoanalysis either as continuation of it or in sharp reaction against it.

\* \* \*

## A FREUDIAN ANALYSIS \*

THE PATIENT, whom we shall call Rachel, is a Turkish Jewish woman who was brought by her family to America when she was ten years old. In this country she developed into an alert, capable girl, able to provide for herself and financially independent of her parents, although she continued to live with them. In her early twenties she met her future husband, a Gentile, member of a prominent aristocratic family. He fell in love with her and after a long courtship and after hesitation on her part for about five or six years, they were married. One year after marriage she gave birth to a boy. In the fourth year of their married life, her husband's mother, who resided in England, came to visit them. Immediately after her arrival, the patient developed ideas of persecution. The illness progressed during her mother-in-law's stay, which lasted about one year. At the climax, the patient, suffering from states of excitement and exaltation, had to be brought to a sanitarium for one week or so. After her mother-in-law's departure for England, the patient's ideas of persecution became more and more systematized and intensified, centering about the delusion that her husband was plotting to force her into a divorce, to kidnap and kill her, himself or through accomplices.

The patient's health, like her family life, was approaching the breaking point when she applied for analytic treatment. She was thirty-two years old when the analysis was begun.

She came, as analysis later revealed, because she feared she might be otherwise confined to an insane asylum. Even in advanced analysis her entrance was accompanied by fright,

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\* Portions of an article by Dorian Feigenbaum, M.D., *Analysis of a Case of Paranoia Persecutoria: Structure and Cure*, *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1930, vol. 17, 159-182. This type of case is especially complicated, but will merit study as a practical application of modern psychoanalytic concepts. The author of the article calls attention to the fact that in its present abridged form it is lacking throughout in a number of findings (case material and deductions) important for a technical understanding of the case. Neither the preceding account, nor the selections from Dr. Feigenbaum's article, will give the reader anything more than a glimpse of some aspects of psychoanalysis; they must serve merely as an introduction.

paleness, fixed gaze, and general hesitation. During the first few months she would constantly try to look at the analyst whenever her own thoughts astounded her.

Rachel was the third of nine children, seven of whom were girls. Outside of her elder sister's case, who died of epilepsy at an early age, there was no trace of mental disorder in the family. Her four-year-old brother died when she was six, and in this connection she recalls a striking example of her father's "coldness," declaring that he did not express any emotion at the child's funeral. At the same time, the patient was very envious of her father's preference for this brother and recalls her father walking with the little boy and looking very proud. She had a very strong feeling of being unwanted — by her father because she was another girl, and by both parents because they dated their misfortunes from the day of her birth. As a child, she experienced definite feelings of racial inferiority and was glad that she did not look Jewish.

The patient's menstrual period began late, at the age of sixteen. When she told her mother about it, the mother responded by slapping her face, with the explanation "the slap would preserve rosy cheeks and a blush throughout life." At first, the child was furious and resentful but afterward thought that "perhaps this was necessary." At eighteen, she was called "the vampire" by the people in her neighborhood because she liked to attract boys, whose advances, however, she rejected, believing that they were of no importance to her.

The patient led a very active social life, confining her friendships to women. They were older women, masculine, unmarried. In contrast to her readiness to associate with women, the patient manifested a definite indifference towards men. She refers to her flirtatious advances as "tricks" to excite men, to see if they would be "crazy about her." "Not that I wanted to kill any one, but to possess the power that women need to have." She was a virgin until she was married. With few exceptions, the sexual act had been disgusting to her. "I am immune to my husband. My mind rules over my body."

About a year after marriage, the patient gave birth to a boy whom she calls "my little fellow." She always treated him either with excessive love or with an ill-concealed indifference. She took great care to conceal her pregnancy from her women friends. She recalls that immediately after the birth of her child she heard her dead sister's voice "calling her." This voice developed later on into a powerful medium for "warning her" of dangers that she believed were threatening her. She became progressively enwrapped in fears and doubts and began to concentrate on these warnings. She finally came to the conclusion that her husband regretted having married her.

First manifestations of the patient's illness center on the arrival of her husband's mother. She felt that her mother-in-law, believing herself considerably above her, was displeased with her son's marriage. Coming from aristocratic lineage and being of another faith, mother-in-law frequently referred to "lower classes," as the patient claimed to have noticed.

When her mother-in-law first arrived, the patient pretended that she had missed her menstrual period and feigned another pregnancy so as to prevent her husband from divorcing her as she feared. She believed that behind every written and spoken word of her mother-in-law was the sinister warning to her son: "you cannot help yourself unless you take action and get rid of her." Before mother-in-law's arrival, in spite of Rachel's aversion to sex life, she believed she had adjusted herself to married life and to the racial and social differences between her husband and herself. But now her suspicions increased and she looked upon her mother-in-law as the arch conspirator in her husband's supposed plan of getting rid of her.

To achieve his purpose, her husband, she was sure, had secured a force of gangsters, to whom she referred as the "clique" or the "bunch" or "the members of the ring." For more than a year and a half, she saw them stationed on corners, watching her, making signs, and looking at her with malicious intentions. She believed that her husband not only hired pro-

fessional gangsters, but engaged the services of all his friends to assist him in getting rid of her. One day the patient returned home and found the initials "KKK" carved on the door with a knife. Panic stricken, she believed that her husband was announcing her death in this way. She had these letters photographed and took them to a handwriting expert, to compare them with her husband's handwriting; following this, the patient was convinced of the similarity.

The patient's suspicions and fears were characterized by extreme vagueness. She spoke of "men in the street who appeared and disappeared in the wink of an eye"; "men looking at me in the park," and "men waiting to overpower, to kidnap, to shoot me." Fears of being shot recurred. When her husband greeted her with a smile, she accused him of wearing a mask; when he did not smile, she used to think that it was a "mean" face.

Finally, the patient decided to hire detectives to watch her husband. She secured the services of professional detectives and of a few friends. The first man whom she had engaged for shadowing her husband was, strange to say, her father. However, "after ten minutes I had to discharge my father," she reported. She had told him "to look at the bunch over there" and he replied "I don't see anything." She became angry, and found him "good for nothing." Her neighbors, however, were more inclined to give her fears definite support and served to increase her suspicions. She also purchased a revolver, "just to show the bunch that I am armed."

#### SESSION I

AT THE beginning of the session when asked to repeat her name because it was not in harmony with her accent, the patient replied that it was her husband's name, showed some hesitation, became pale, and said, as if ashamed and apologetic, that she was a Turkish Jewess born in Smyrna. She entered in a slightly excited mood which persisted throughout the session.

Fears and hopes, confidence and skepticism, urge to unburden and tendency to withhold, were the contrasting colorings of her state of mind. Sometimes hesitant, at other times very direct and quick, she enumerated her symptoms not as such but rather as confidential unburdenings of "what is happening to her," glancing about shyly, as if to see if anyone was looking at her or overhearing her conversation.

She spoke of the misery she suffered since marriage, which was aggravated by the arrival of her mother-in-law whom she described as a snobbish, stiff, haughty, formal, unapproachable and even formidable person, who looked down upon her as one of the lower classes and reproached her husband for not having married one of "their class." She had to swallow this and many other insults until she broke down finally. Then she enumerated a series of incidents all of which she did not doubt were evidence of husband's and mother-in-law's desire to get rid of her. That they would not even stop at criminal methods to do away with her; that the husband is engaging all sorts of suspicious individuals to pursue her, to either kidnap or shoot her, etc. She presents these instances with great vagueness, believing that the listener will not fail to understand.

At about the fiftieth minute of the session, the telephone on my desk rang and the message I received brought the session to a sudden close. I was informed of the sudden death of a most intimate friend and colleague in this country whom I had left two days before in relatively good health. I was advised to leave everything and come immediately, as the funeral procession was about to start. Witnessing my uncontrolled reaction to the shocking news, my patient became pale, and asked me what had happened. I told her in a few words of the death of my analyst friend. She arose, ready to leave, saying, "I see something terrible has happened. I had better not be in your way. I shall go now." As she was leaving I asked her to call me two days later, which she did.

This sympathetic reaction I found rather unexpected and encouraging as demonstrating the patient's faculty for trans-

ference in spite of the indications of paranoia which the material brought to this session disclosed. Further analysis revealed what was impossible to understand at this point — that this telephone incident, which certainly might be called a technical mishap, proved to be of far-reaching effect, especially upon the patient's transference. "You must be a marvellous soul!" she said during later sessions when she expressed her surprise at my reaction to the news. Later on she debated and argued with herself that "a man who can display so much sincere emotion should not be suspected of murder plots." Analysis of the patient's impression derived from the telephone call in the light of later material yields the following: her first appearance in the analyst's office and this death were both assimilated by the unconscious in a *magical way*. A causative relationship was established. She conceived that this death of a friend of the analyst was caused by her presence just as the ruin of her family had been caused by her birth. The following two facts certainly merit consideration: first, the identity of the medical specialty of her analyst and his dead friend's had suggested to her the death of her analyst; secondly, the name of this analyst who died, happened, oddly enough, to be "Turck" (I mentioned the doctor's name when telling her of the message) and this name was not only familiar to her but, in addition, verbally suggestive of her native land. The death embraced not only the analyst to whom she came for help, but through the similarity of sound also the death of the representative of her fatherland, which means her father. Here there was a kind of repetition of the disastrous situation in her family which followed her advent into the world. Her birth caused reversal of the family's fortune and especially a change in her father's position and activeness. Her coming to analysis causes death of the analyst! This infantile impression acts, moreover, as a "belated-obedience" factor in her life: she is compelled to bring misfortune. This appeases her primitive (Id) instincts of vengeance because it implies magical potentiality for bringing bad luck. Hence the occurrence of the misfortune, interpreted in

a magical way, depends on her mental activity and will give her gratification. We then come to the other main factor of the death-message-incident, which is fulfillment of a kind of mission. The "mission to bring hard luck," however, meets with a defense set up by her Super-ego. Super-ego in paranoia is usually strong. The projection-mechanism, forming the delusion of persecution, is one great apparatus for counteracting destructive Id-cravings. This mechanism allowed her to feel, "*I do not bring misfortune to others; others bring misfortune to me.*" In the disguised form, behind the projection, the destructive Id-cravings find their desired outlet. As we will see later on, her sadistic phantasy of vengeance transferred from her mother to her husband and subjected to the mechanism of projection, has found in the analyst's personal tragedy a source of gratification which the patient accepts as "advance payment" in part. The positive transference, unavoidable in the process of cure, thus finds fertile soil in the incident at the first session. The patient (wife-child), now gratified, says: "the analyst (husband-parents) is good. I cannot think of him (them) any longer as plotting my destruction."

Dream 1. "I saw Mrs. Coolidge. She came to my house saying that she wanted me to accompany her, since she was in great trouble. I took a kimono; it was blue and white. She said, 'Look at your chest and knees, there are great spots of blood.' I looked and said, 'Is that not awful!' I tried to hide it because I was ashamed. I woke up and saw my little boy bleeding at the nose."

Mrs. Coolidge, the President's wife, represents the typical queen-mother image of myths, whom (by distortion, here also projection) the dreamer (child) approaches in "great trouble." The identification mother-analyst is formed. Her positive transference seems to lead the patient to this identification which, thus, at the very beginning of the analysis, shows libidinous attachment to a homosexual object. The queen rôle created for the analyst also exposes her castration complex, cravings for advancement to higher positions which are so evident throughout the history of her pre-analytic life and aristocratic marriage. We may guess that the higher classes, aristocracy, kingdom, etc., which exert such a fascination upon the patient, are merely

symbols for her infantile mother-worship. The "blue and white kimono" that the dreamer wears is associated with her frequent reference to her husband's and mother-in-law's "blue (aristocratic) and cold blood." The "kimono" and color "white" thus both stand for her husband (paleness is also interpreted by the patient to mean a cold, unsympathetic attitude). "Kimono," in view of the patient's poor home environment, seems to be a symbol of comfort and luxury and a further derivative of the castration complex that manifests itself in her identification with Mrs. Coolidge. Hiding and shame prove the libidinous significance of the indignation at the sight of spots of blood on her chest and knees, and it is a feeling of indignation parallel to the one Rachel experienced in the past at the sight of menstrual blood, the nucleus of her castration complex.

Summarizing, we construct the unconscious thoughts as follows: the patient (child) approaches the analyst (mother) with complaints of her "troubles" making him at the same time responsible for them. Faith and reproach (symptoms) both appear to be superimposed upon repressed indignation that attended the first menstruation which then was directed against her mother. We see here the transference of her ambivalent attitude from her mother to the analyst. The projection mechanism evident in the delusion of persecution seems here, for the first time, to be a derivative of the old projection of hatred on account of the female destination (castration complex) for which her mother is held responsible and which may have remained latent since that time, awaiting further localization.

### SESSION 3. DREAM 2

"I am in an empty apartment freshly decorated. Beautiful rays of sun are pouring into the windows. Somehow I had seen this apartment before. A woman was there saying, 'I will rent it.' 'It's funny,' I thought, 'I have taken exactly the same place but it looks much larger.' I was surprised. I was renting the apartment."\*

\* The patient's associations, without which no dream analysis is possible, are omitted here. — D. F.

Dream 2 contains regressive cravings for her mother, or urges to the intrauterine past: "somehow I had seen this apartment before." The desire for the uterus, "an empty apartment," is expressed by "to rent the apartment," — "renting" indicating not only desire to return to mother's body but also to possess her. In this connection we can hardly fail to see in the "sun rays pouring into the windows" the complementary masculine (paternal) energy tending towards the maternal abdomen. With reference to the Oedipus situation this means the dreamer's identification with her father. The patient's reaction to the analytic situation will be the identification of the analyst with her mother.

Three circumstances proved to be decisive in bringing about a satisfactory positive transference. The first took place during the patient's first visit at the office: my "death-message." A second situation was the patient's pregnancy. The third favorable factor was the money problem. A trio of circumstances, namely, (1) *magical murder of the analyst*, (2) *enslaving her husband with her new pregnancy*, (3) *depriving her husband of money*, seems to be the fortunate foundation for the cure of the delusion. *They are fulfillments of the patient's active castration cravings of destruction and revenge.* The gratification from her castration complex produces a reaction of guilt within the Super-ego. Alteration of the Super-ego means cure. The trio of fortunate experiences bribed the Id and brought about change in the Super-ego. *From our case we get some insight into the balance and effects of the workings of both: the resisting and assisting — or curative — agents. Both are derived from the Super-ego and both must be useful for the reestablishment of sanity.*

#### Record of progress

Analysis began the middle of March

*End of June:* Patient exhibits first signs of controlling her fears and suspicions of her husband. Speaking of her own fears and suspicions the patient stated, "I had a peculiar spell again. Again I was afraid."

*End of August:* She received a letter from her mother-in-law without experiencing fears and feelings of indignation. She discovered a friendly, nice tone in the letter. Patient does not seem to be afraid of her new pregnancy.

*Early September:* Patient observes that her husband is being nice to her and reproaches herself for having had thoughts about him, only that morning. She speaks of her "vicious thoughts." While still fighting and battling with her ideas of persecution, she reflects, "I believe he is not a scoundrel, but sometimes I can't help thinking so."

*Middle of September:* Patient's resistance increases as well as her impatience — "analysis lasts so long."

*End of September:* The patient recalls her suspicions about the "KKK" signs and the handwriting expert who identified the initials for her. She laughs, saying, "If you pay them they will always do or say anything to please you."

Thinking of the woman professor, she begins to notice that she is becoming old and adds that there is nothing nicer than having a few children. The patient no longer envies her. The patient exhibits an increasing interest in psychoanalysis and wonders why ordinary physicians know so little about it.

*October 6:* The patient reflects, "I have too much confidence in myself. I believe in what I think regardless of whether it exists or not. *Yet I have moments when all seems to be so mysterious.*"

*Middle of October:* The patient states, "All my thoughts are directed towards retaining faith and confidence in my husband." She has no fears about walking on the street. "I thought it better to die than to be afraid of being kidnapped, thoughts of which are as painful as the actual occurrence." "I saw a man today staring at me. Last year, if it had happened, what wouldn't I have thought. Now I know it was a flirt." "I don't think of my mother-in-law so often. I used to think of her about ten times in one hour." The patient began to speak her native jargon, that of the Turkish Jews, and to remember sentimental songs; one in particular was a translation of a

longing for Jerusalem. She recalls another song — a soldier singing a love song to a beautiful girl.

The patient celebrated her husband's birthday with a party.

*Middle of November:* She says she would be ashamed to have the analyst know her thoughts of persecution — if she still had them.

*About one year and a half after leaving analysis:* Patient gratefully accepted invitation to come to the office. Is happy and tells of her improved affairs. She is no longer absorbed with terrible thoughts. Understands well that everything was "exaggerated" and due to her nervous condition. Thinks it was foolish of her to suspect her husband of such maliciousness. Reports that her relationship towards her husband and his family has improved and that her sex-life has changed for the better. She desires, and finds sexual intercourse enjoyable. She reacts normally to the letters received from her mother-in-law and finds them very nice. Speaks of her children, of the frequent illness of her older boy and of her wonderful second child. She looks well, has gained weight and seems to be in good spirits. It was interesting to observe the remarkable change in her facial expression. From an artistic standpoint her face looked rather commonplace now, in contrast to its former fascinating expression. The former tension, fright, anticipation of danger expressed in the eyes, has disappeared, and now her face strikes one as being very docile, placid and expressionless.

CHAPTER V

*ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY*

[C. G. JUNG]

INTRODUCTION

TWO OF Freud's ablest students and co-workers have left him to start their own schools in therapeutic psychology. One is Alfred Adler, of whom Freud has said that he had a relapse from psychoanalysis to a sort of medical pedagogy. The other was C. G. Jung. Jung came into psychoanalysis from the Swiss school of psychiatry, worked for years in close co-operation with Freud, was highly esteemed by the latter and overwhelmed with a horde of stimulating ideas. Nevertheless Jung and his group gradually grew away from the orthodox psychoanalytical system. Freud recognized Jung's incapacity to "endure another's authority," and it came to a formal break. Since then Jung's analytical school exists as an entity in itself, and is not recognized by Freud and his followers as "a legitimate continuation of psychoanalysis." Freud's Viennese school and Jung's Zurich school work independently, and diverge more and more as time goes on. The Viennese, of course, deny the Zurich psychiatrists the right to call themselves psychoanalysts, while the latter willingly accept the distinctive designation "analytical psychologists." Jung's analytical activity therefore falls into two parts: the time spent with Freud and the time after the break with Freud.

Jung's contributions to psychoanalysis, some of which he developed before he knew Freud, were concerned chiefly with three topics: (1) interpretation and utilization of the (Wundtian) association experiments in the light of psychoanalysis; (2) contributions to the understanding and interpretation of mental diseases (especially dementia praecox); (3) construction of the doctrine of complexes, which grew out of the "diagnostic word association tests," and which quickly won recognition.

All these contributions were welcome to the Freudians. But Jung's urge to independence was too great to allow him to keep on playing the subordinate rôle as the satellite of the master. He therefore went to work to widen the field of psychoanalysis, by trying to win new points of view for the psychoanalytical system. He succeeded moreover in making certain discoveries which strengthened his reputation as a psychiatrist of singular perspective and penetration. He perceived in the unconscious, whose anti-moral tendencies had been so exactly described by Freud, a counter-striving toward the good, the higher — tendencies which he found in what he called the "collective unconscious" of mankind and which he asserted to be essential inborn components of the individual. It took twenty years before Freud recognized this perspective of an unconscious divided into moral and anti-moral parts, and adopted it in his structure of the mind in the form of the "Id" and "Super-ego." Freud probably never expected to find anything in the unconscious but animal-like traits. Otherwise he would surely have come upon the Super-ego in the unconscious much sooner.

Yet Jung's early belief in moral tendencies in the unconscious indicated how far he had strayed from Freud. He had really had another view of the unconscious from the start. His later development into a more religious apprehension of psychoanalysis confirms this. Later the Swiss group separated entirely from their erstwhile teacher and denied almost all psychoanalytical discoveries and achievements. That, of course, did not make Freud any the more willing to let himself be

taught by the unfaithful. Jung had created a new doctrine which, as Freud said, "would like to be the substitute for psychoanalysis, but has instead turned out to be an abjuration of and descent from it." Since Jung was one of Freud's most gifted and beloved pupils, one can understand the pain and disappointment of the creator of psychoanalysis at the distortion, as he regards it, of his work. At the end of a report of the historical development of psychoanalysis, Freud utters the following words, characteristic of his proud, injured personality, and characteristic of the consistent and somewhat rigid manner of thinking of a genius. "Men are strong so long as they represent a strong idea. They become powerless when they oppose it. Psychoanalysis will be able to bear this loss and will gain new adherents for those lost.

"I can only conclude with the wish that the fates may prepare an easy ascension for those who found their sojourn in the underworld of psychoanalysis uncomfortable. May it be vouchsafed to the others to bring to a happy conclusion their work in the deep."<sup>140</sup> (Written February, 1914.)

With this we shall turn from psychoanalysis, and give our whole attention to the continuation or "descent" movement. What ideas has Jung's psychology contributed?

#### THE WORD ASSOCIATION TEST

AT MORE than one point the historical development of the Freudian movement has seemed to pass beyond Freud himself. In 1904 Jung published his studies in word association,<sup>141</sup> which are to be taken as contributions from experimental psychology, embodying methods complementary to those used by Freud. When Freud gave up the method of hypnotic psychocatharsis, he did it on the premise that what was suppressed could be brought to light just as well during full consciousness. This was, in fact, the way in which the interpretative method of psychoanalysis started. Jung adopted experimental methods to discover the functioning of suppressed material in the un-

conscious. He used the association test, the technique of which is briefly as follows:

The experimenter reads to the subject a series of words, called "stimulus" words. To each of these he must respond with the word which first occurs to him after hearing the stimulus. If he cannot answer with a response word at once, he must describe what took place within him when he heard the word, what he thought of or felt, or visualized or heard in memory, or what kept him from answering. The time between the sound of the stimulus word and the subject's reaction, normally the response word, is measured by a stop-watch with one-fifth of a second divisions. For instance, one says the word *ice*, and a second later comes the response *cold*. Or one says *lion*, and the subject does not answer at first but after six seconds responds with an embarrassed smile, flushing, signs of slight fear and finally the words, "When you said *lion*, I felt as if I had a stitch in my heart and couldn't breathe for a moment. Many years ago in a circus I saw a lion attack his trainer and tear him severely. There was a great panic." Here the reaction *fear* is not verbalized, but expressed in bodily signs.

Such reaction tests had been in general use in psychology, to determine the course of and connection between words or ideas and other words or ideas associated with them. It appeared that most stimulus words were answered with words obviously associated either in *sound* or *meaning*. The word *pot* evoked the response *hot*, or the word *light* evoked *dark*, and so on. These experiments were at first done in the laboratory and had very little to do with the demands of daily life. Psychiatrists (especially Kraepelin<sup>142</sup> and his pupils) had adopted the reaction tests, which were easy to carry out, for the diagnosis of the mentally deranged and for the study of the normal and pathological mental life of children.<sup>143</sup> The Zurich School, Jung and his co-workers, were the first to employ these tests in the study of the neuroses.

Jung usually succeeded in gaining a short, preliminary survey of some of the essential complexes; that is, groups of

related, affect-laden images. Indifferent test words were answered quickly and without inhibition, but when the stimulus word was a "complex" word, the subject responded with hesitation and often with visible embarrassment,—flushed or paled, moved about uneasily, stammered or laughed without apparent cause. Such laughter, on account of its frequent appearance in response to a complex word, acquired the designation of *complex laughter*, because it is released by the activation of the hidden complex. At times, also, the *meaning* of the response word is a valuable clue. Words having no apparent connection with the test word are given, or response words are repeated, or words are uttered which are a direct indication of the complex.

The technique of administering the association test and analyzing the results may best be illustrated by quoting from a report of one of Jung's early experiments <sup>144</sup>:

ON THE 6th of February, 1908, our supervisor reported to me that a nurse complained to her of having been robbed during the forenoon of the previous day. The facts were as follows: The nurse kept her money, amounting to 70 francs, in a pocket-book which she had placed in her cupboard where she also kept her clothes. The cupboard contained two compartments, of which one belonged to the nurse who was robbed, and the other to the head nurse. These two nurses and a third one, who was an intimate friend of the head nurse, slept in the same room where the cupboard was. This room was in a section which was regularly occupied in common by six nurses who had free access to this room. Given such a state of affairs it is not to be wondered that the supervisor shrugged her shoulders when I asked her whom she most suspected.

Further investigation showed that on the morning of the theft the above-mentioned friend of the head nurse was slightly indisposed and remained in bed in the room the whole morning. Hence, following the indications of the plaintiff, the theft could have taken place only in the afternoon. Of the

other four nurses upon whom suspicion could fall, there was only one who attended regularly to the cleaning of the room in question, while the remaining three had nothing to do in this room, nor was it shown that any of them had spent any time there on the previous day.

It was therefore natural that these last three nurses should be regarded for the time being as less implicated, and I therefore began by subjecting the first three to the experiment.

From the particulars of the case, I also knew that the cupboard was locked but that the key was kept not far away in a very conspicuous place, that on opening the cupboard the first thing to be seen was a fur ornament (boa), and moreover, that the pocketbook was between the linen in an inconspicuous place. The pocketbook was of dark reddish leather, and contained the following objects: one 50-franc banknote, one 20-franc piece, some centimes, one small silver watch-chain, one stencil used in the insane asylum to mark the kitchen utensils, and one small receipt from Dosenbach's shoeshop in Zurich.

Besides the plaintiff and the guilty one, only the head nurse knew the exact particulars of the deed, for as soon as the former missed her money she immediately asked the head nurse to help her find it, thus the head nurse had been able to learn the smallest details, which naturally rendered the experiment still more difficult, for she was precisely the one most suspected. The conditions for the experiment were better for the others, since they knew nothing concerning the particulars of the deed, and some not even that a crime had been committed. As critical stimulus words I selected the name of the robbed nurse, plus the following words: cupboard, door, open, key, yesterday, banknote, gold, 70, 50, 20, money, watch, pocketbook, chain, silver, to hide, fur, darkish red, leather, centimes, stencil, receipt, Dosenbach. Besides these words which referred directly to the deed, I took also the following, which had a special affective value: theft, to take, to steal, suspicion, blame, court, police, to lie, to fear, to discover, to arrest, innocent.

The objection is often made to the last species of words that they may produce a strong affective resentment even in innocent persons, and for that reason one cannot attribute to them any comparative value. Nevertheless, it may always be questioned whether the affective resentment of an innocent person will have the same effect on the association as that of a guilty one, and that question can only be authoritatively answered by experience. Until the contrary shall be demonstrated, I maintain that even words of the above-mentioned type may profitably be used.

I then distributed these critical words among twice as many indifferent stimulus words in such a manner that each critical word was followed by two indifferent ones. As a rule it is well to follow up the critical words by indifferent words in order that the action of the first may be clearly distinguished. But one may also follow up one critical word by another, especially if one wishes to bring into relief the action of the second. Thus I placed together "darkish red" and "leather," and "chain" and "silver."

After this preparatory work I undertook the experiment with the three above mentioned nurses. As examinations of this kind can be rendered into a foreign tongue only with the greatest difficulty, I will content myself with presenting the general results, and with giving some examples. I first undertook the experiment with the friend of the head nurse, and judging by the circumstances she appeared only slightly moved. The head nurse was next examined; she showed marked excitement, her pulse being 120 per minute immediately after the experiment. The last to be examined was the nurse who attended to the cleaning of the room in which the theft occurred. She was the most tranquil of the three; she displayed but little embarrassment, and only in the course of the experiment did it occur to her that she was suspected of stealing, a fact which manifestly disturbed her towards the end of the experiment.

The general impression from the examination spoke strongly against the head nurse. It seemed to me that she evinced a very "suspicious," or I might almost say, "impudent" countenance. With the definite idea of finding in her the guilty one I set about adding up the results.

One can make use of many special methods of computing, but they are not all equally good and equally exact. (One must always resort to calculation, as appearances are enormously deceptive.) The method which is most to be recommended is that of the probable average of the reaction time. It shows at a glance the difficulties which the person in the experiment had to overcome in the reaction. ["Probable average" = "median."]

The technique of this calculation is very simple. The probable average is the middle number of the various reaction times arranged in a series. The reaction times are, for example,\* placed in the following manner: 5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 9, 9, 9, 12, 13, 14. The number found in the middle (8) is the probable average of this series. Following the order of the experiment, I shall denote the friend of the head nurse by the letter A, the head nurse by B, and the third nurse by C.

The probable averages of the reaction are:

A	B	C
10.0	12.0	13.5

No conclusions can be drawn from this result. But the average reaction times calculated separately for the indifferent reactions, for the critical, and for those immediately following the critical (post-critical) are more interesting.

From this example we see that whereas A has the shortest reaction time for the indifferent reactions, she shows in comparison to the other two persons of the experiment, the longest time for the critical reactions.

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\* Reaction times are always given in fifths of a second.

## THE PROBABLE AVERAGE OF THE REACTION TIME

for	A	B	C	
Indifferent reactions	10.0	11.0	12.0	
Critical reactions	16.0	13.0	15.0	
Post-critical reactions	10.0	11.0	13.0	

The difference between the reaction times, let us say between the indifferent and the critical, is 6 for A, 2 for B, and 3 for C, that is, it is more than double for A when compared with the other two persons.

In the same way we can calculate how many complex indicators there are on an average for the indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.

## THE AVERAGE COMPLEX-INDICATORS FOR EACH REACTION

for	A	B	C	
Indifferent reactions	0.6	0.9	0.8	
Critical reactions	1.3	0.9	1.2	
Post-critical reactions	0.6	1.0	0.8	

The difference between the indifferent and critical reactions for A = 0.7, for B = 0, for C = 0.4. A is again the highest.

Another question to consider, in what special way did the imperfect reactions behave?

The result for A = 34%, for B = 28%, and for C = 30%.

Here, too, A reaches the highest value, and in this, I believe, we see the characteristic moment of the guilt-complex in A. I am, however, unable to explain here circumstantially the reasons why I maintain that memory errors are related to an emotional complex, as this would lead me beyond the limits of the present work . . .

As it often happens that an association of strong feeling tone

produces in the experiment a perseveration, with the result that not only the critical association, but also two or three successive associations are imperfectly reproduced, it will be very interesting for our cases to see how many imperfect reproductions are so arranged in the series. The result of computation shows that the imperfect reproductions thus arranged in series are for A 64.7%, for B 55.5%, and for C 30.0%.

Again we find that A has the greatest percentage. To be sure this may partially depend on the fact that A also possesses the greatest number of imperfect reproductions. Given a small quantity of reactions it is usual that the greater the total number of the same the more imperfect reactions will occur in groups. But in order that this should be probable it could not occur in so great a measure as in our case, where on the other hand, B and C have not a much smaller number of imperfect reactions when compared to A. It is significant that C with her slight emotions during the experiment shows the minimum of imperfect reproductions arranged in series.

As imperfect reproductions are also complex indicators, it is necessary to see how they distribute themselves in respect to the indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.

IMPERFECT REPRODUCTIONS WHICH OCCUR

in	A	B	C	
Indifferent reactions	10	12	11	
Critical reactions	19	9	12	
Post-critical reactions	5	7	7	

It is hardly necessary to bring into prominence the differences between the indifferent and the critical reactions of the various subjects as shown by the resulting numbers of the table. In this respect, too, A occupies first place.

Naturally, here, too, there is a probability that the greater the quantity of the imperfect reproductions the greater is their

number in the critical reactions. If we suppose that the imperfect reproductions are distributed regularly and without choice among all the reactions there will be a greater number of them for A (in comparison to B and C) even as reactions to critical words, since A has the greater number of imperfect reproductions. Admitting such a uniform distribution of the imperfect reproductions, it is easy to calculate how many we ought to expect to belong to each individual kind of reaction.

From this calculation it appears that the disturbances of reproductions which concern the critical reactions for A surpass by far the expected, for C they are 0.9 higher than the expected, while for B the real number is less than the one expected.

## IMPERFECT REPRODUCTIONS

for	which may be expected			which really occur		
	indifferent reactions	critical reactions	post-crit. reactions	indifferent reactions	critical reactions	post-crit. reactions
A	11.2	12.5	10.2	10	19	5
B	9.2	10.3	8.4	12	9	7
C	9.9	11.1	9.0	11	12	7

All this points to the fact that in the subject A the critical stimulus words acted with the greatest intensity, and hence the greatest suspicion falls on A. Practically one may venture to designate such a subject as probably guilty. The same evening A made a complete confession of the theft, and thus the success of the experiment was confirmed.

ANY ONE who has himself had the experience of being the subject in such a test knows best how automatically compelling the reactions and their variations usually are. After having answered a series of words quickly and unhesitatingly, suddenly one halts. An intense emotion has been unexpectedly released by a test word. It may be that the emotion is a general

(universal) human emotion (one might say, physiological); or it may be an individual complex understandable only in relation to the subject. (General complexes are to be assumed where the stimulus word is chosen from a life sphere which is connected with strong feeling for most human beings; such as honor, fortune, suffering, war, fatherland, etc.)

It is not at all necessary that the affect be unconscious. The Jung school goes beyond the Freudian school in including conscious affects as well. When the subject tries consciously to control his answers in order to change the total result, he usually fails. The complex reactions are as a rule so powerful that the attempt to change or replace them leads to a complete inhibition. Either the reaction time is markedly drawn out or there is no reaction at all.

Further details of the word association test can be found in Jung's published works. (See Bibliography.) Our concern here is simply to make clear the purpose and effect of this procedure and its significance within the frame of analytical technique.

We have seen that Jung's experiments enabled him to gain a comprehensive survey of an individual's store of complexes. Complexes are ordinarily to be found in the sphere of the unconscious. Jung's experiments pointed out a new and more penetrating way into the unconscious — in addition to Freud's methods of free association and the interpretation of mistakes and dreams. It should be noted that so far Jung's work is compatible with that of Freud.

Further advantages of Jung's methods are these:

1. If a deadlock is reached during an analysis, that is, if the patient becomes taciturn, or says he has nothing more to tell, the word association test is valuable to enable patient and analyst to proceed. The experiment serves as a sort of boring or explosive material to pierce further into the depths.
2. Incredulous or stubborn patients can be more easily and more speedily convinced of the presence and power of complexes than by any other analytical method.

3. An occasional repetition of the word test during an analysis of long duration can be utilized to demonstrate to the patient that he is making concrete progress. If he has previously taken a long time to react, he now responds more quickly, or where the reaction tried to hide something, it is now more open and spontaneous. There are no longer large gaps in the answers. The experiment may therefore be used to encourage the patient.

4. Finally, an important application of the Jungian procedure, now familiar to all psychologists of whatever school, is the technique for determining, as already shown, whether a person has knowledge of a certain event or not (*Tatbestand-diagnostik*). A criminal, for example, is aware of his deed, which is connected, in most cases, with feelings. If it were possible to lull him into a sense of security by a series of non-committal test words, he would be more certain to stumble at those test words which were related to his deed. It might then be possible to point out to him how unequivocal his response words were, and force him to a confession of the crime.

But this sounds much easier than it really is. First of all, the words to be used in the beginning must not stir any complex reaction in other directions, and no one can guarantee this of any word. Secondly, an accused person can refuse to participate in the experiment or he can answer consistently with nonsense. Though what sounds like nonsense sometimes reveals a meaning perceptible only to the trained psychologist, irrelevant answers can nevertheless frequently destroy the value of the test. The use of the word association test to obtain proof of knowledge therefore requires the utmost care, reserve and objectivity. Practical success in criminology is scarcely to be hoped for at present, but as a step to more reliable methods for the objective determination of facts the test is of undeniable value. It is, moreover, true that some of these criminological studies have thrown interesting light on the psychology of complexes.

To summarize the work with the word association test:

Jung was frequently able to evoke complex reactions in neurotic, and especially in hysterical individuals. He regarded the method as a confirmation, by clinical experiments, of his belief that affects are of predominant importance in the conscious and unconscious life of these people. This method therefore seems to us the most significant contribution of the first psychoanalytical period of Jung's work.

#### THE THEORY OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

THOUGH Jung severed his connection with Freud's school in 1913, and though, since that time, the two men have bitterly opposed one another, the examination of the two doctrines side by side, leads us to feel that the difference is much less profound than the difference between the theses of Freud and Adler.

Jung's doctrine is a broadening of psychoanalysis past the bounds of natural science into the realm of metaphysics, especially into the field of religion — in this case a transition from the rational to the irrational. Yet when we examine its tenets more closely, their origin in Freud's psychoanalysis is unmistakable. In most essential points the two schools coincide. Even though Jung calls Freud's sexual hypothesis an exaggeration, regards the theory of suppression an unwarranted pushing of pathological manifestations into normal mental life, and considers the theory of the unconscious too narrow, his own theory can scarcely be looked upon as anything else than the endeavor to broaden and complement the basic conceptions of psychoanalysis.

For example, Jung makes the sexual drive the artistic, religious and aesthetic drive. The mind (soul) is to him "a moving and flowing activity which changes kaleidoscopically" in agreement with changes in the predominating instincts. He extends the Freudian conception of the unconscious to include the "collective racial unconscious." He substituted for suppression a "searchlight theory of attention," for which he used the

physical analogy of increase and decrease of energy tensions. In spite of all these additional hypotheses, Jung had not, up to this point, left the actual field of psychoanalysis. This, of course, does not mean at all that he was not an original thinker. Some of the paths of his own thought must now be traced.

The concept of the sexual drive in Freudian analysis is not quite clear. Freud has declared repeatedly that his comprehension of the sexual drive is not identical with the current understanding of it. Laymen usually think it means the urge of sexually mature human beings to sexual satisfaction. The psychoanalytical understanding of this drive goes much further, and really includes all of a human being's manifestations of life instincts from birth to death. Nevertheless, in the practice of psychoanalysis, one sees again and again a narrowing down of the concept to its primal sense. Sexual drive or libido is sexual desire, a striving toward sexual union, with the difference that many more things in human beings are now regarded as sexual than was heretofore the case, and that libidinous tendencies can be discovered in children much sooner than was formerly believed. Sexuality is thus used in two senses.

Jung held the Freudian conception of the libido to be too narrow. The Freudian idea of sex seemed to him too vague and ill-defined. The libido, in Jung's doctrine, came to be an all-embracing name for everything having to do with affects and drives. He saw the libido not only in the individual but in human civilization, and followed its historical development in mankind's conflicts. In the primitive state of man, according to Jung, the libido, or sexuality, was everything. But a portion of this primeval power was desexualized and has now nothing to do with the sexuality which has remained in us. Two equally powerful tendencies were therewith assumed in the psyche, one sexual, the other anti-sexual.

Jung then asked himself what force it could have been which compelled the original sexuality to split and become partly desexualized, so that there are today two libidos. He believes that it is "unthinkable that there was any outside resistance,

any concrete obstacle." There must have been a force *within* the human mind that struggled against sexuality. What is spiritual in us fights against what is animal in us. Here Jung's theory differs sharply from Freud's, and here it branches off into religion. With the recognition of an innate morality and the conclusion that forces within the soul had brought about the split in the libido, Jung finds himself in the sphere of theology.

He explains that the division has been deepened greatly by Christianity, which compelled the civilized human being to sublimate a good portion of his sexuality. The practice of religion was in itself a form of sublimation. This fact was first seen by Jung, and later acknowledged in another form by orthodox psychoanalysis. Up to this point the Freudian and Jungian schools differ chiefly in that Freud speaks of the libido of the individual, and Jung of the libido of mankind and the remnants within us which come from archaic stages in the development of the race.

In similar fashion, Jung broadened the conception of the unconscious. In order to explain the processes occurring in the mental life of the individual, Jung found it necessary to study the development of mental life in the race, as evidenced by the facts of mythology, anthropology, and primitive religions. Thought processes had obviously gone through a long history of development — an interminable sequence of increasingly complex mental activities. Man has had to *learn* to think, to substitute images for perceptions, manipulation of ideas for manipulation of things, word-symbols for concrete objects. In the course of his psychoanalytic practice, Jung found many evidences of similarities between the dreams and phantasies of his patients and the forms of thinking that primitive man manifested in his religious ceremonials, his myths and superstitions. From this Jung concluded that each individual not only inherits instinctive tendencies to action, but *instinctive modes of thought*. Where Freud found a repressing Ego which forced the unconscious to express itself in condensed, disguised,

symbolic form, Jung found a mind which, on occasion, reverted to the simpler, easier, primitive forms of thought which it had inherited from the innumerable generations of the past.

The unconscious, according to Jung, consists of all mental activity below the threshold of consciousness. It is divided into two major parts—the *personal unconscious* (“the forgotten, the repressed, the subliminally perceived, thought, and felt”), and the *collective unconscious* (racially determined ways of thinking, depending upon inherited organizations or patterns of brain structure). Dreams and phantasies are undirected forms of thinking, determined not by the Ego or any form of conscious control, but by the collective unconscious. In contrast to this we find the directed thinking of consciousness which we call rational thought. The directive activity of the conscious is selective, in the sense of necessarily excluding everything which is irrelevant to the rational process of the immediate moment. The ideas excluded from consciousness by this selective process are relegated to the unconscious, where they form a counterbalance to the conscious patterns of thought. The accumulation of these excluded mental contents results in a growing tension between the conscious and the unconscious, requiring increased effort to avoid inhibition of conscious activity. The relation between the conscious and the unconscious is thus antithetical, supplementary, and compensatory. All that takes place in consciousness finds its opposite in the unconscious.

The contents of the unconscious are expressed in conscious form as images. Just as we find a division of the unconscious into its personal and collective aspects, so the images in which it is expressed may be divided into those having a basis in personal experience and those which are based on the remnants of the innumerable repeated, universal experiences of primitive man. The latter have been termed “*primordial images*,” to distinguish them from the *personal images* which are peculiar to each individual. These primordial images, or inherited patterns of thought, which are used by Jung to explain the origin

of a large part of the contents of dreams and phantasies, correspond closely to the universal symbolisms which are involved in the Freudian schematization of dream-work.

"When the unconscious is taken as the historic fundament of the psyche," writes Jung, "it contains in concentrated form the entire sequence of imprints which have conditioned the contemporary psychic structure from the beginning. These psychic imprints are nothing but traces of functions indicating which influences were most powerful in fashioning the human mind. They are identical or similar among all peoples, and are easily to be found in the unconscious of the present-day human being. It is therefore clear that unmistakably animal-like traits or elements appear in the content of the unconscious, besides those divine figures which have ever accompanied human beings on their life journey."<sup>145</sup> The conscious has gradually crystallized from the unconscious, that great reservoir of the human mind, and this process repeats itself anew in each single individual.

For Jung, *consciousness* manifests itself in two different ways. One is in moments of extreme emotional tension, as for example, in fear. The other way in is a contemplative state in which images move like dream pictures. Associations rise up between two apparently unconnected and distant images, and release a latent tension.

This development of consciousness does not take place in everyone in the same fashion. Some persons are more inclined to become conscious through emotional tension; others through contemplation or introspection. To take account of these differences Jung has worked out various *personality types*.<sup>146</sup> These types have become popular, because they are the most easily understood part of his highly involved doctrine.

According to Jung, not only an individual's manner of conscious development, but his whole way of life, including his neurosis, depends upon a definite pattern of inborn *tendencies*. There are two outstanding mental types: the extroverts and the introverts. The extroverts are open to the world, persons

who go straight at what they want. The introverts, on the other hand, withdraw, let things come to them, and try to get along with the world by thinking things out. The weapons of the extrovert are feeling and open aggressiveness; the introvert uses reserved reflection. Extroversion is a turning outwards of the libido; introversion a turning inwards.

The one type or the other is dominant in each human being; first and foremost, he is either an emotional or a reflective person. If he is an emotional individual, then his feelings rule his consciousness and the less developed habit of thinking remains usually in the unconscious. Or the rôles may be reversed. Jung thinks the conflicts resulting from the tension between functions form the basis of the neuroses.

This essential difference in type is of the utmost importance in life. It is the reason why emotional and reasoning people do not understand each other. The man who is ruled by his feelings does not know how to get along with the man whose head rules his heart, and does not understand that reason has been highly developed in the other into a valuable function. In the opposite case, the intellectual rejects the person who lets himself be governed by his feelings, because he knows feelings only in so far as he himself has any, and he does not think much of them. The solution of this tension is regarded by Jung as the task of psychotherapy. A one sided personality is apt to become a sick personality.

Passing beyond the earlier account of extroversion-introversion, Jung has laid emphasis upon four fundamental psychic processes: thought, feeling, sensation, and intuition. Any one of these four processes may be developed to a high degree so as to overshadow the whole psychic structure. All four, however, may be found in extroverts or introverts; instead of simply describing the extrovert as dominated by feeling and the introvert as dominated by thinking, Jung speaks of the thinking extrovert, the thinking introvert, etc. Each one of the four processes may be given an extroverted or introverted direction. Whatever tendency finds exaggerated expression in the con-

scious provokes (as in Newton's third law) compensatory or antagonistic reactions in the unconscious. Thus he whose feeling finds inadequate expression in the conscious may be unconsciously dominated by feeling, and so on.

Jung believed that a person cured is a person turned religious. He looks upon religion as a moralizing, desexualizing and sublimating force. But he says there are two kinds of religion. One kind is only a conversion of erotic drives into religious drives. "The unconscious transformation of an erotic conflict into religious activity is something *ethically wholly worthless*."<sup>147</sup> The other, genuine religion, says Jung, lies in the religious raptness of the whole personality. This train of thought and religious fervor permeate Jung's psychotherapy. They must be understood in order to realize the application of his theories to practice.

#### JUNG'S THEORIES IN PRACTICE

JUNG has gone beyond Freud's orthodox psychoanalysis in practice as well as in theory. He does not regard the passive procedure of psychoanalytical therapy, which contents itself with releasing the patient's complexes by analysis and then abandoning the rest to the individual's social drives, as adequate. In addition to the analysis, there must be an active influence upon and education of the neurotic person. He must be given some hold. The analyst must co-operate with the patient in finding the latter's lost thread of life and dismiss him only when he has firm hold of it. That is, not only psychoanalysis, but psychosynthesis. The patient's new hold on life must be strengthened by religion. Psychoanalysis has of course severely attacked this aspect of Jung's theory. Jung has been accused of teaching his pupils only to "scratch the surface" of the unconscious and then to overwhelm the poor patient with a flood of psychosynthetic moralistic admonitions which represent merely the therapist's limited view of the world and his own will. Freud rejects such therapy as too subjective. Jung has not

been deterred, and has continued to build up his principles of "synthetic psychoanalysis." He asserts that one can rid a patient of his symptoms when one has discovered their original cause, but when the therapist has not shown the patient a new road into a new life, his work is only half done.

The essential task of every psychotherapy is to give the patient a picture of his *full individuality* and to substitute this picture for the former complexes. The analysis and clarification of the genesis of a symptom or neurosis is not sufficient, for psychoanalysis as practised by Freud only gives the patient a picture of his torn personality. What has been accomplished by that? The patient is more helpless than ever, perhaps rid of his complexes, but without orientation in life, the playball of his drives and the forces of his environment. If no Ego, unified by Jung's synthetic procedure, comes to take the place of the split self, the ever recurring picture of his inner division affects the patient's unconscious more and more unfavorably. There has been no cure to speak of.

The chief accent in Jung's treatment is not laid on the case history, on childhood traumata and the like, but on the actual, present conflict. Most members of the psychoanalytical school, he thinks, are obsessed with the notion of childhood sexuality; as a result psychoanalysts think that the infantile history must be aired on all sides in order to discover the conditioning phantasies. This is futile effort. The analyst, in doing this, loses sight of the most important point; namely, the conflict and the resulting demands on the *present* environment. The more we understand of the mental growth of children, the more we see that there is very little conclusive material to be gathered there. If, in our analytical investigation, we venture far from the manifest neurosis, we can scarcely hope ever to discover its true cause. For the dynamic disproportions which give the neurosis its form become indistinct when we try to penetrate far into the past. When we construct our theories on the assumption that the causes of neuroses are to be referred to the remote past, we obey the unconscious maneuver of our patients to

divert our attention from the critical present. Yet the reason for the neurosis lies chiefly in the present, as does also the possibility of eradicating it.

Jung rejects Freud's purely "historical" theory of drives in favor of a new one which takes the immediate conflict as the starting point. Symptoms are significant not only in relation to the past but in relation to present and future. They are weapons in the struggle of life. No "explanation" of a symptom will eradicate it as long as it serves a present purpose. The disturbance of the present life balance is the heart of the neurotic's problem.

This disturbance can be removed by analysis. But the analysis must not tear the patient's personality into pieces, as so often happens. It must judge the personality as a whole. An analytical psychologist will not interpret a belief to a religious individual as an infantile complex, but will understand it as an experience of deep significance in its present context for the patient. This experience will be used as a means to help the sufferer overcome his neurosis. If it is disclosed that the patient misuses his religiousness to suppress his normal sexual or other drives, then the therapist must find out the underlying complexes and reveal their true nature. In this way the faith which has probably been only a means to support the neurosis will be elevated to a higher level through understanding.

Jung regards neurotic symptoms as a means of protecting the personality. They should always be taken as blundering attempts at self-cure. They contain within themselves indications as to how a real cure should be effected. When a patient dreams that he is a hero, the dream shows not merely the infantile wish to be greater than others and the underlying feeling of inferiority, but also the striving to overcome the inferiority. (This idea of healing a neurosis by grasping the whole personality closely approaches Adler's individual psychology. There we shall meet the same hypothesis seen in another perspective.)

The following is part of an early analysis by Jung.<sup>148</sup>

## AN ANALYSIS BY JUNG

I KNOW the case of a young woman who suffered from severe hysteria as a result of a sudden fright. She was at a party one evening and left the house with about twelve other people to go home. As they were walking along the road, they suddenly heard the quick trot of horses' feet coming behind them. The others ran to the side of the road, but she was so stunned by fright that she remained in the middle of the road, and then began to run in front of the horses. The coachman cracked his whip and swore, but she could not be made to swerve to the side of the road. She ran the whole length of the street which led to a bridge. There she lost her strength and in her desperate fear of falling beneath the horses' hoofs, she tried to jump into the river but was held back by passers-by.

This same woman happened to be in St. Petersburg on the bloody 22nd of January. She was in a street which was just being "cleaned up" by the militia with salvo fire. The people were being shot down right and left but she remained perfectly calm. She spied a courtyard door through which she was able to escape into another street. These terrible minutes did not disturb her in the least.

An essentially similar form of behavior can often be observed. The conclusion to be drawn is that the intensity of a trauma is obviously not of primary importance; when a trauma has a sickening effect, it is due to special circumstances. This leads to the idea of *disposition*. We have to ask ourselves: under what circumstances did the scene with the carriage take place? Her fear began when she heard the horses galloping in her direction. For a second it seemed to her as if that sound were a terrible doom, as if it meant her death or something just as awful. Then she lost her presence of mind completely.

The effective moment starts obviously with the horses. The patient's disposition to react to so insignificant an event in such senseless fashion is probably accounted for by the fact that horses mean something special to her. It may be presumed that,

at some time in her life, she has had a dangerous experience with horses.

This proved to be the case. When she was seven years old, she went out driving one day. The horses shied, the coachman lost control and the span raced along the road directly toward the brink of a vertical cliff far above a river. The coachman sprang off and shouted that she should do likewise. She was so afraid that she could not decide to jump at first and sprang from her seat the moment before horses and carriage dropped from the cliff to fall into the river below. That such an experience leaves a deep impression does not have to be proved. Nevertheless it does not explain why a harmless incident many years later should call forth such a disproportionate reaction. So far we only know that the later symptom had a precedent in childhood. The pathological side is still obscure.

We understand that horses play a special rôle in this patient's life, but do not understand the later reaction, so exaggerated and uncalled-for. What is remarkable in this story is that it is the horses of which she is afraid. If we recall our acceptance of the fact that a traumatic experience is always accompanied by some disturbance in the person's love life, then it is necessary here to see whether anything is out of order in this respect.

This young woman has a suitor whom she is planning to accept. She loves him and hopes to be happy with him. There is nothing else to be discovered at first. The analyst must not be discouraged when his first findings are negative. When direct questions do not lead to the root, one must try indirect methods. We return therefore to the important moment when the patient ran away from the horses. We inquire about the party and ask why it was given. It was a dinner in honor of her best friend who was leaving the same night for a foreign resort to undergo treatment for nervousness. The patient tells us her friend is happily married, and the mother of a child.

. . . I believe the best thing I can do is to describe the further development of the theory by demonstrating the case of that young lady whose story you have heard in part in one of the former lectures. You will probably remember that the shying of the horses, by means of the anamnestic explanation, brought back the reminiscence of a comparable scene in childhood. We here discussed the trauma theory. We found that we had to look for the real pathological element in the exaggerated phantasy, which took its origin in a certain retardation of the psychic sexual development. We have now to apply our theoretical standpoint to the origin of this particular type of illness, so that we may understand how, just at that moment, this event of her childhood, which seemed to be of such potency, could come to constellation.

The simplest way to come to an understanding of this important event would be by making an exact inquiry into the circumstances of the moment. The first thing I did was to question the patient about the society in which she had been at that time, and as to what was the farewell gathering to which she had been just before. She had been at a farewell supper, given in honor of her best friend, who was going to a foreign health-resort for a nervous illness. We hear that this friend is happily married, and is the mother of one child. We have some right to doubt this assertion of her happiness. If she were really happily married, she probably would not be nervous and would not need a cure. When I put my question differently, I learned that my patient had been brought back into the host's house as soon as she was overtaken by her friends, as this house was the nearest place to bring her to in safety. In her exhausted condition she received his hospitality. As the patient came to this part of her history she suddenly broke off, was embarrassed, fidgetted and tried to turn to another subject. Evidently we had now come upon some dis-

agreeable reminiscences, which suddenly presented themselves. After the patient had overcome obstinate resistances, it was admitted that something very remarkable had happened that night. The host made her a passionate declaration of love, thus giving rise to a situation that might well be considered difficult and painful, considering the absence of the hostess. Ostensibly this declaration came like a flash of lightning from a clear sky. A small dose of criticism applied to this assertion will teach us that these things never drop from the clouds, but have always their previous history. It was the work of the following weeks to dig out piecemeal a whole, long love-story.

I can thus roughly describe the picture I got at finally. As a child the patient was thoroughly boyish, loved only turbulent games for boys, laughed at her own sex, and flung aside all feminine ways and occupations. After puberty, the time when the sex-question should have come nearer to her, she began to shun all society; she hated and despised, as it were, everything which could remind her even remotely of the biological destination of mankind, and lived in a world of phantasies which had nothing in common with the rude reality. So she escaped, up to her twenty-fourth year, all the little adventures, hopes and expectations which ordinarily move a woman of this age. (In this respect women are very often remarkably insincere towards themselves and towards the physician.) But she became acquainted with two men who were destined to destroy the thorny hedge which had grown all around her. Mr. A. was the husband of her best friend at the time; Mr. B. was the bachelor-friend of this family. Both were to her taste. It seemed to her pretty soon that Mr. B. was much more sympathetic to her, and from this resulted a more intimate relationship between herself and him, and the possibility of an engagement was discussed. Through her relations with Mr. B., and through her friend, she met Mr. A. frequently. In an inexplicable way his presence very often excited her and made her nervous. Just at this time our friend went to a big party. All her friends were there. She became lost in thought, and

played as in a dream with her ring, which suddenly slipped from her hand and rolled under the table. Both men tried to find it, and Mr. B. managed to get it. With an expressive smile he put the ring back on her finger and said: "You know what this means?" At that moment a strange and irresistible feeling came over her, she tore the ring from her finger and threw it out of the open window. Evidently a painful moment ensued, and she soon left the company, feeling deeply depressed. A short time later she found herself, for her holidays, accidentally in the same health-resort where Mr. A. and his wife were staying. Mrs. A. now became more and more nervous, and, as she felt ill, had to stay frequently at home. The patient often went out with Mr. A. alone. One day they were out in a small boat. She was boisterously merry, and suddenly fell overboard. Mr. A. saved her with great difficulty, and lifted her, half unconscious, into the boat. He then kissed her. With this romantic event the bonds were woven fast. To defend herself, our patient tried energetically to get herself engaged to Mr. B., and to imagine that she loved him. Of course this queer play did not escape the sharp eye of feminine jealousy. Mrs. A., her friend, felt the secret, was worried by it, and her nervousness grew proportionately. It became more and more necessary for her to go to a foreign health-resort. The farewell-party was a dangerous opportunity. The patient knew that her friend and rival was going off the same evening, so Mr. A. would be alone. Certainly she did not see this opportunity clearly, as women have the notable capacity "to think" purely emotionally, and not intellectually. For this reason, it seems to them as if they never thought about certain matters at all, but as a matter of fact she had a queer feeling all the evening. She felt extremely nervous, and when Mrs. A. had been accompanied to the station and had gone, the hysterical attack occurred on her way back. I asked her of what she had been thinking, or what she felt at the actual moment when the trotting horses came along. Her answer was, she had only a frightful feeling, the feeling that something dreadful was very near to her, which she could not

escape. As you know, the consequence was that the exhausted patient was brought back into the house of the host, Mr. A. A simple human mind would understand the situation without difficulty. An uninitiated person would say: "Well, that is clear enough, she only intended to return by one way or another to Mr. A.'s house," but the psychologist would reproach this layman for his incorrect way of expressing himself, and would tell him that the patient was not conscious of the motives of her behavior, and that it was, therefore, not permissible to speak of the patient's intention to return to Mr. A.'s house.

There are, of course, learned psychologists who are capable of furnishing many theoretical reasons for disputing the meaning of this behavior. They base their reasons on the dogma of the identity of consciousness and psyche. The psychology inaugurated by Freud recognized long ago that it is impossible to estimate psychological actions as to their final meaning by conscious motives, but that the objective standard of their psychological results has to be applied for their right evaluation. Now-a-days it cannot be contested any longer that there are unconscious tendencies too, which have a great influence on our modes of reaction, and on the effects to which these in turn give rise. What happened in Mr. A.'s house bears out this observation; our patient made a sentimental scene, and Mr. A. was induced to answer it with a declaration of love. Looked at in the light of this last event, the whole previous history seems to be very ingeniously directed towards just this end, but throughout the conscience of the patient struggled consciously against it. Our theoretical profit from this story is the clear perception that an unconscious purpose or tendency has brought on to the stage the scene of the fright of the horses, utilizing thus very possibly the infantile reminiscence, where the shying horses galloped towards the catastrophe. Reviewing the whole material, the scene with the horses—the starting point of the illness—seems now to be the keystone of a planned edifice. The fright, and the apparent traumatic effect of the event in childhood, are only brought on the stage

in the peculiar way characteristic of hysteria. But what is thus put on the stage has become almost a reality. We know from hundreds of experiences that certain hysterical pains are only put on the stage in order to reap certain advantages from the sufferer's surroundings. The patients not only believe that they suffer, but their sufferings are, from a psychological standpoint, as real as those due to organic causes; nevertheless, they are but stage-effects.

## CHAPTER VI

### *INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY*

[ALFRED ADLER]

#### HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

EVERY great thesis is apt to be followed by an antithesis. Psychoanalysis was an antithesis to the medical psychology which preceded it; today, thirty-five years after its birth, the perspective has changed again. We may regard psychoanalysis as a thesis, and individual psychology as its antithesis. Alfred Adler's doctrine is sometimes confused with psychoanalysis, but it has moved far indeed from it, and today differs from it very radically.

Jung's analytical psychology once thought itself the synthesis of Freud's thesis and Adler's antithesis. Time has proven this belief incorrect. Synthesis means the union of thesis and antithesis to form something new, and must perforce include both thesis and antithesis. As we have seen, however, Jung's psychology is at best a bridge leading from Freudian to Adlerian psychology. Freud and Adler, on the other hand, are two poles diametrically opposed, disjunctive, antithetical; yet two sequent steps in a development. From the point of view of individual psychology, psychoanalysis was yesterday's truth; individual psychology is today's truth; what tomorrow's truth will be nobody yet knows.

The presentation of individual psychology *must* take a criti-

cal position with respect to psychoanalysis, for the criticism of "yesterday's truth" has been the chief reason for its growth. He who makes a report must identify himself temporarily with what he reports in order to get at its core. And the core of individual psychology is criticism. But from it has arisen, as we shall see, a positive doctrine, and when we examine without prejudice the present status of interpretative psychology, we must acknowledge that individual psychology has gone beyond its original state as antithesis to psychoanalysis and seems on the way to becoming a synthesis. This development will be described in the following pages.

Psychoanalysis had aroused the most violent objections from laymen and physicians. It must not be forgotten that Freud had proceeded, in a manner far from gentle, to demolish the then generally accepted conceptions of morals, aesthetics and the so-called higher values of life. The first storm of criticism, arising out of insulted morality and conventional objections to uncomfortable new ideas, was quite harmless, because of its lack of factual knowledge with which to refute the Freudian theory. Its sole effect was to stimulate Freud and his students to a further polishing of his system, in order to avoid gross misunderstandings. Freud never attempted a polemic defense of his work. He had absolute faith in the elasticity of his psychology, and was certain that it would prevail in the course of time and prove its truth.

The most objective and therefore the sharpest criticism of psychoanalysis came from the circle of Freud's own followers. As soon as the platform of a dynamic psychology was created, the ablest minds began to separate. Several of the old co-workers went further in the development of neurosis-psychology, while Freud occupied himself entirely with improving his system by adding new constructions to support the original platform.

One of Freud's outstanding associates was Alfred Adler. Through his studies of bodily and mental compensations set in motion by defective organs, Adler stumbled upon a basic

fact implicit in the psychic life of every human being, and this basic fact appeared worthy of extensive elaboration. It was the *desire for power*. What does every human being want? To be powerful. What cuts him most deeply? Powerlessness, weakness, inferiority, inadequacy. When a person feels inferior, or interprets his situation as such, a mental compensatory activity, comparable to a bodily compensatory activity, is started in an effort to make up for this inferiority defect. If the effort to compensate is successful, the inferiority is counter-balanced and sometimes more than counter-balanced. A superiority then grows out of the inferiority.

When an individual feels unable to compensate for his inferiority, when he is too discouraged, his original desire for power remains, but is diverted to a useless field of activity, which promises him nothing more than an easy way of satisfying his personal necessity for recognition. Such an individual forces the members of his environment to give him extra care, sympathy, money, and in turn he rules and tyrannizes over them. Protected in most cases by a sham illness, he thus wins an appearance of superiority with which he nourishes his starving Ego.

On these facts, drawn from his observation of neuroses and psychoses, Adler based his theory and method for the treatment of nervous disturbances. He called his system "individual psychology," since it is a means for the study of the individual and the individual's relation to his environment.

Adler's continued co-operation was important to Freud, who tried to fit the new ideas into the psychoanalytic system. In addition to the sexual drive, Freud recognized the Ego drive, or what is generally known as the aggression drive, directed toward the acquiring of power. Nevertheless the chasm between Adler's and Freud's ideas grew deeper and wider and more difficult to bridge. In 1911 Adler left Freud and founded his own school.

Since the break between the two Viennese teachers, there has been no lack of thinkers who, while appreciating the differ-

ences in the two systems, have tried repeatedly to bring them together. Some say that individual psychology is nothing more than an appendix, or a subdivision of psychoanalysis, and that the cleavage exists only because of the personal ambitions of the two leaders. (Freud himself speaks of individual psychology as a "division which has remained behind while the main army has gone forward.") It is asserted that the chief difference between the two schools lies in the fact that one emphasizes the sexual drive and the other the drive for power. Otherwise all differences are supposed to be matters of terminology exaggerated on account of personal hostility between the two men. It is asserted that Adler's method touches only the social level in people, which is considered superficial and of recent acquisition in the development of mankind, while Freud's goes to the deeper level of primitive drives; and further, that both methods can be united in medical practice depending upon the level at which the neurosis is to be found, *i.e.*, the superficial social level or the deep drive level.

Such attempts at compromise are energetically rejected by the principal exponents of the two schools. Psychoanalysis and individual psychology are for them disjunctive opposites, necessitating a detailed explanation and clear exposition of the position taken by each. The difference between the two teachings rests on the difference between two conceptions of life (*Weltanschauungen*). Individual psychology is just as little a subdivision of psychoanalysis as Protestantism is a subdivision of Catholicism. And just as it is impossible to have two conceptions of life—to be, for example, a genuine Christian and a genuine Buddhist at the same time—it is impossible, if one really understands both systems, to use psychoanalysis and individual psychology in conjunction in the diagnosis and treatment of nervous disorders.

Whether the gap between the two schools is really so great, and whether it is necessary to widen it further by sharp criticism, will be taken care of by the future. A critic of psychoanalysis recapitulates the present situation as follows:

"There is an unmistakable tie between the two schools. It is the tie of historical dependence, which, as is well known, usually finds its expression in the contrariety of standpoints. The two systems are related to each other like thesis and antithesis. And between them lies a basic change in the art of thinking and conception of life which makes wholly impossible a continual transition from one to the other, or a comprehensible fusion and general subordination under some higher principle. This means that a later synthesis in some combination or other cannot be expected, but that a third, radically new theory must be created."<sup>149</sup>

#### THE BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

##### *Our Way of Looking at Things*

ALL MODERN therapeutic psychologies are, or ought to be, interpretative psychologies. To interpret means to disclose and make understandable the parts of an individual (meaningless in themselves) in relation to the total personality; that is, to interpret a symptom in the light of the whole. We are interpreting all the time. We interpret from the otherwise senseless distortion of a person's countenance, and from certain gestures, that he is suffering pain. We recognize that this behavior is an expression of suffering, though we ourselves may not feel the suffering. We also interpret in advance; we try to guess from a person's facial expression, movements, gestures and general behavior, what he will do. There are three ways of interpretation: (1) the causal, explanatory method of science; (2) the teleological ("final") method of religion; and (3) a synthesis of the first two, applied in the causal-final way of looking at events and human beings. This synthesis was developed by individual psychology.

From Adler's point of view, causality, the doctrine that all events have a cause, premises an indissoluble *tie* between cause and effect. If we know the effect — and what we usually see

is the effect—we must look for the cause. All science is founded on this simple causal principle. Science tracks down causes and conditions which bring about a manifestation; when it finds them it can offer an explanation. The walls of a house fall in. What was the cause? Faulty construction? Soft ground? Landslide? The event can be explained in detail and we can even deduce rules from it to prevent its happening again. Or night falls: cause—the sun's rays no longer reach this part of the earth's surface. In short, every physical, chemical or natural occurrence or process has one or more causes, whether we know them or not. If we know the cause, we have understood the process. Is this true? Have we really always understood it?

A nine-year-old only child, pampered daughter of rich parents, is afraid to go alone into a dark room. Not only this; she is afraid to remain alone in the house, to sleep in a room with closed doors and to walk through empty streets. Cause: when she was six years old, a servant who wanted to play a joke on her frightened her in a dark room. Since then the child, who had always been considered nervous, developed an extraordinary timidity and could be terrified by almost anything. We know the cause, but we still do not understand the child. Why did this particular child become so timid and easy to frighten? Other children are frightened, too, without being noticeably harmed by it. The cause is not sufficient to explain this girl's behavior.

But when we ask: "what does she gain by her conduct?", we see that her fear has infected the whole family, that she cannot be left alone, especially in the dark, that she must be treated considerately and protected from all fright and danger. Her symptom had a cause, but it is unimportant. What is more important is the fact that the symptom has been interpolated between her and life, and influences her future. It is like a warning sign: I must not be left alone or something might happen to me. It becomes obvious that the symptom is a means to make her life as easy as possible. It is not a practi-

cal method, but she knows no other. The cause was only the external stimulus to behavior for which she had been in training for a long time.

This behavior is an attack on the girl's environment, a demand upon the individuals about her to busy themselves with her. We can discover a number of other traits all tending in the same direction: to make her life as easy as possible. She likes to be waited on, plays a lot with dolls and very little with other children of her age, cries so heartbreakingly when she does not get her way that every one around gives in in the end. It is as if everything she did were governed by a goal within her of which she is unaware. That this goal was determined in the past either by one or a combination of causes is not denied, but this causal determination is inadequate to understand a human being. For the diagnosis and therapy of the disturbance it is more practicable to look for the cause of her behavior in her *goal*.

From this example we can draw the following conclusion. The purely causal method, as applied in physics and chemistry, and as it has been applied by science to human personality and psychological events, does not suffice for the swift comprehension of living occurrences. Without doubt every process in life has a cause which "explains" it. The so-called psyche in us, expressed in our behavior, can be understood scientifically, for life and the world of natural science are not two different things, as those scientists would like to have it who speak of "dead" nature. The causal viewpoint, however, appears impracticable and insufficient for the understanding and cure of nervous disorders, which is the goal of individual psychology. In other words, an individual psychologist arrives at his goal more quickly with the help of the patient's goal. Adler remarks: "Of course it is true that sickness or disorders come from harmful changes in the body or in the mind. But I can't do anything with this 'whence' since I cannot discover each cause of each sickness, remove it and prevent its return.

In addition to the 'whence' of a neurosis, I must find out its 'whither,' its goal." <sup>150</sup>

Another illustration: a woman suffers from compulsive crying spells. A hard life, a cruel rearing, may have produced the disposition and a recent tragic event acted as direct release for the attacks. These things are all causal and lie in her past. But there is more. Let us watch her a little longer. She gains much from crying: pity, attention, partial or total relief from her duties. These all lie ahead of her, in her future. But they operate as causes too, especially since the patient has learned from former experience all that she can achieve through her behavior. In other words her behavior has a purpose, and this purpose in the behavior of human beings has appeared to Adler especially worthy of emphasis. We generally judge people according to what we think their intentions are, without however perceiving that each life is dictated by a single, general intention and merely presents variations on this basic theme.

The difference between the causal and the purposive or "final" manner of observation is that in the former a preceding cause is what brought about the result and in the latter a "future" cause, a goal to be reached, is effective.

The Latin *finis* means the same as the Greek *telos*, namely, *end*. Nevertheless there is an essential difference between the "finalistic" and the teleological method which science denies. Most of the teleological views regard the course of all events as connected with a purpose coming from *outside*, whether it be God (religion), or absolute morality (ethics), or necessity (fatalism), etc. It regards sickness as a test, or fate, or punishment, or purification, and finds an adequate explanation in such purposes. Individual psychology refers events to a purpose, or rather a goal set up unconsciously, by the *individual himself*. It does not occupy itself at all with religious, ethical or other absolute postulates. It is normative, but its norm is reason, common sense, oriented according to a hygienic sociality.

It is easy to see that all processes in the realm of so-called "dead" nature can be practically explained by causes (insofar as one can discover them). All living beings, on the other hand, from the lowest biological to the most complicated organisms are, though conditioned causally, at the same time purposeful, striving toward a goal, and as dependent upon this goal as upon any preceding cause. All functions of the human organism serve a superior purpose; namely, the preservation of the organism. The means to this end may not always be the best or most effective, yet they are aimed at this end. The individual psychologists call this the biological striving toward a goal, or *finality* (Wexberg<sup>151</sup>). It is scarcely to be assumed that a falling stone or a flying bullet is in itself purposeful. They are dead objects and their flight is the result of certain energy combinations. If the stone or the bullet hits something, that may be either chance or intention. If intention, then it is not the inanimate object's intention, but that of the living being who released this energy at a certain time and in a certain direction. His behavior had a purpose, wanted to reach or accomplish something — the result achieved. This is so with every event in organic life. All life strives toward a goal.

In addition to the biological or primary finality of all organisms, there is another personal, secondary finality which is especially peculiar to the human being (Wexberg). The biological finality is inherent; the personal finality is acquired later. A child hurts itself and cries. The mother comes and comforts the child. This comforting is so agreeable that a little later it cries again without having any pain. It wants to get its mother's sympathy. This illustrates how an inherent, biologically purposeful reaction has been *refinalized* into a personally egoistic reaction; the original goal, lessening of the pain by relaxation through crying, has been replaced by the goal of pity and attention for its own person. Psychotherapy must deal with this personal-egoistic finality.

To overlook life's purposeful striving means to renounce understanding of life's processes. *The question of determin-*

*ism or indeterminism is not of major importance here.* A cause for every action or reaction is to be found whether it precedes or lies beyond. But it is of prime importance to know that the cause for a human being's actions, that is to say, his total behavior, is to be sought ahead of him. Taking only causes into account is not enough. One must think of the goal in order to understand behavior in relation to the whole personality. Only when one learns to think in this way, says individual psychology, can one interpret correctly.

This method of causal-final observation of all living processes has become one of individual psychology's basic ideas. Adler has shown that neuroses, which are after all nothing but complex life processes, cannot be understood from a study of preceding causes alone. It is necessary to discover the neurotic's goal and see just how his disorder fits into his scheme of life. This demands an intimate knowledge of the nervous patient's general direction. A neurosis is a striving toward a false goal, false because it is non-social. A human being is bound to humanity: without it he perishes. Every divergence from sociality leads to disturbances expressed in more or less visible symptoms. The doctor sees the symptoms. But how could he ever understand them if he did not look upon them as parts of a whole human being, incapable of existence apart from social totality? A symptom is only significant and comprehensible when it is referred to the individual's position in the world.

The approach of individual psychology has been accused of being unscientific. It retorts that a scientific method, as its accusers mean it, is of no value when it does not result in practical social help. Individual psychology is no more a science than any other technique is. Its task is not the discovery of new laws, but the application of already known natural laws. It makes practical experiments for certain practical purposes. These purposes are to predict and to influence human conduct. If certain general laws result which bear some resemblance to natural laws, they are by no means as

categorical as natural laws. They are neither demonstrable nor refutable as are natural laws. They can be confirmed only by practical work. Individual psychology is not a science nor is it a system of ethics. It is a hygiene of correct living. It says that correct living means social living. It has defined social living by offering a number of maxims for behavior to help human beings orient themselves.

### *The Individual as Totality*

THE SECOND basic tenet of individual psychology, perhaps even more important than the first, is this: each human being is an indivisible totality. A statement, one might say, which is almost "ridiculously" true. And yet probably no one lives according to this truth; no psychology, including Freudian psychoanalysis, ever oriented itself in fact according to this simple truth. Again and again systematic thinkers have tried to tear the individual into pieces—to divide him into body and soul; sensations and images; into thinking, feeling and willing; conscious and unconscious; and what not. Gestalt psychology premised the totality of the human being, and founded its doctrines on this conception; then individual psychology turned the theory into practice.

In spite of the fact that each individual is an indivisible totality, he thinks of himself as if he were made up of single parts and were merely the sum of these parts. For example, in a marriage analysis the husband is asked, "Why did you marry this particular woman?" He answers, "Because she was pretty and charming and appeared to know how to run a house." So that he picked out several qualities to marry, and overlooked everything else until it disturbed the marriage and led to difficulties.

Each human being has a unified structure, complete in itself. When we divide a human being into parts, what remains is not a living being, but something utterly indifferent, either a dissected corpse or a pile of complexes. One can split

a woodblock into two parts: then one has two blocks of wood. Some dead objects can be divided into as many pieces as one likes; the products are always smaller units of the same object. A divided human being is not, however, two human beings. Symptoms or habits are functions of the whole personality. Individual psychology emphasizes the doctrine of the functional unity of the organism.

Though we continue to use disjunctive terms we do so because sometimes we are more aware of the body, and at other times of the mind. We emphasize the body *or* the mind, but the basic unity remains the same.

WHAT purposes, according to individual psychology, does the mind serve?

Almost every animal has one or more natural weapons to protect it from its enemies and to be used in its struggle for existence. Many animals are colored to suit their environment; this prevents them from being easily discovered. But human beings are helpless, weak, naked and without natural protection. They have not always been so helpless. In prehistoric times man was strong, his senses keen, his body covered with hair. He could defend his life alone. It is no mere paradox that human beings lost their individual capacity to protect themselves singly to the degree to which they began to live socially. What a human being had to accomplish alone was divided among ten, and each one had to do only one-tenth of the kinds of things he was compelled to do before. The larger the groups became, the less strength the individual members needed, and the more they developed special, single abilities in the division of labor. The rule of each-for-himself was replaced by the rule of sociality *which then persisted*. Sociality brought forth specialization, refinements, individual weakness and collective strength. But the collective physical strength was not sufficient to compensate for the individual weakness. A more powerful weapon had to be produced to lessen the danger of perishing at the hand of nature. Man

still found himself in the midst of countless things and events which he did not understand and with which he did not know what to do. He needed to understand all that threatened him, to orient himself in his world. This need was filled by the human psyche, an "organ of security" that made it possible for him to find his way through the jungle of life and directed his fight for existence. The mind thinks in advance, works in advance, breaks paths, smooths them, makes them safe and remembers them when they have served their purpose well.

Now the psyche is no entity in itself, but an integral part of a unified organism, burdened with certain tasks just as is the liver or the heart. And this unified organism with its safety-apparatus, mind, orients itself by setting a general goal which is variable but which seems to begin with self-preservation. The goal determines each reaction of an individual, and also the pattern of all reactions, the attitude toward life which we call character.

All that we can observe of mental abilities and behavior is to be taken as a means to achieve the goal which has been set. The unity is maintained unbroken. Our whole perception, thinking, feeling, willing and acting, are dictated by this goal and must bring us nearer to it. We perceive what we think is necessary for us, and what we believe adds to our security. We think in order to protect ourselves. There is no ideal logic, but there is a socially correct logic which is *generally* true. The neurotic has a "private" logic which he turns and twists to fit his own situation. And when illogical thinking seems to bring us nearer our egoistic goal, we think illogically without being in the least aware of it. Feelings are also determined by the unified personality, — trained, intensified, repressed, depending upon our ideal private goal. "Feelings are not arguments," writes Adler; "everybody feels as it suits his purpose to feel." And we all will and act only according to our driving desire to approach our goal. Strong will and weak will are only functionally different; they indicate the

degree of interest in willing. Even a state of indecision which seems to split a person is only a sham; for something is decided, namely, that no decision be made, and *that* is intended. All the various drives which struggle for supremacy in the individual are servants of the same master.

It follows that conscious and unconscious, stressed so much by psychoanalysis, are not really antagonistic to one another. Individual psychology believes that the conscious and the unconscious are only two forms of expression of the safety apparatus, the psyche. Both strive toward the individual's goal. This is one of the underlying differences between individual psychology and psychoanalysis. Individual psychology believes that when a neurotic does not see through his nervous symptoms and cannot understand them in relation to the basic tendency of his personality, it is by no means to be taken for granted that a second unconscious Ego is hidden behind his conscious. The situation is that he *dare* not understand his symptoms, for he would then have to assume responsibility for them. If he were aware of the fact that his symptoms were wilfully produced by his psyche as a means to come nearer his egoistic goal, this would entail his acknowledging this non-social goal and giving up his symptoms, — in short, changing his character. Only so long as he does not see through the neurotic structure of his character can he maintain his non-social style of life. His ignorance of the connection between his symptoms and his goal is a psychic device, a "trick" (Adler) to exclude entirely whatever remains of social feeling. That is why Adler calls the unconscious simply that part which is not understood, though it is governed by the same laws which rule the understood conscious.

Individual psychology therefore asserts that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious, which every neurotic assumes he has, is a figment of the imagination, a useful fiction. Every neurotic tries to destroy the unity of his own personality to escape responsibility for his behavior. It is never he, but always some one or something else, — God, or love, or traits inherited

from parents, or the stamp of the environment. He turns and twists all normal principles of thinking until they no longer hold good generally, but are applicable only to him, the individual. He mistakes license for freedom, personal ambition for ideals, self-righteousness for perfection. Out of the fiction of a general ideal he constructs his own idealism, which reveals itself as a false valuation. He believes himself responsible for his good deeds and blames his ancestors, education or fellow men for his failures.

This arrangement makes it possible for him to live as if he were really sick, and had the right to make demands on others, and, at the same time, to be relieved of all duties. He must suffer for this; but this futile suffering only increases his sham idealism and decorates him with a martyr's crown. And when his suffering assumes proportions even greater than his terror of life, when his neurotic income no longer covers the deficit, then he cannot find his way alone out of the vicious cycle.

He spins himself into the "meshes of his private fiction" as if he were a split personality and not a unified being. Curative training commences only when he realizes that the split in his Ego is of his own arrangement, a product of his unnecessary fear, and that his egoistic goal is incompatible with the demands of reality.

### *The Inferiority Feeling*

WHEN we have grasped the tenets of individual psychology, namely (1) that a human being's behavior is determined by his egoistic goal and (2) that a human being is a unified personality, all further theses follow easily. The single parts are apprehended as the logical, interrelated components of a significant, purposeful totality. The doctrine endeavors to be a faithful copy of life; it must therefore be purposeful. Its goal is the understanding of all life's manifestations in order to correct erroneous behavior.

A good deal has been said of the goals of human beings. What are they? In general everybody's goal is to be great, powerful, strong, ruling, in short, to be *superior*, because everybody was once small, weak, helpless, ruled, *inferior*. It is clear that the smaller and more inferior a person has once felt (whether rightly or wrongly does not matter) the more deeply he yearns for strength and power, and the higher he sets the goal which will narcotize the feeling of littleness. So long as the goal of superiority is compatible with sociality, the individual is within the bounds of normality. Where the striving for superiority becomes ruthless and oppresses others, the individual has gone over into the realm of the neuroses.

A person who is neurotic tends to isolate himself more and more. His private logic, his attempts to rule his environment, his exaggeration of his own ailments makes him unsocial and anti-social. His neurotic style of life brings him defeat after defeat, and this reminds him constantly of his imaginary weakness, which at last becomes real. He sets his goal of superiority higher and higher to compensate for his growing feeling of inferiority, and increases his neurotic striving to attain this goal, which, of course, finally turns into an irrational one: to be all-powerful, all-knowing, superior to all, absolutely free, a hero unblemished by fear or reproach. Since the only unassailable power is divine power, that which every neurotic really wants, if only in the small circle of the family, is to be a god. Since this is impossible, his striving is thwarted again and again until, burning with ambition, embittered by failure and defeat, exhausted by his futile efforts, he crashes amidst the confusion he has made. Nervous breakdown.

It has been indicated that this senseless striving toward worthless heights implies an original state of real or imagined lowness which was exceedingly hard to bear. The path to each human being's goal originates in a mental state described by individual psychology as the primary inferiority feeling; it begins low and climbs high. This inferiority feeling is one end of a path of development, whose other end ought to be

and could be a useful human being. The trouble is that the striving for recognition usually leads the upper end to terminate in the clouds, far from reality and rational living.

The primary inferiority feeling is a bio-social necessity. Man enters the world as an infant, weak, helpless, ignorant. He is entirely unoriented and dependent in every respect upon the help of adults. The child is at a disadvantage compared to the gigantic, apparently self-sufficient grown-ups about him. They are not only big; they can apparently do what they like. The child's world is restricted by what he may and may not do. The adult is free; the child is handicapped, limited by nature and environment. He needs help; he is mentally and physically inferior. These facts are obviously sufficient to make the child feel himself and his position inferior. This is how the primary inferiority feeling arises, by no means always consciously present, but clear if one observes the results, the child's behavior.

There are a number of factors which can strengthen this inferiority feeling, so that this primary or "relative" feeling which no one escapes turns into an "absolute" one and leads to a neurosis. When we compare children, we see that they are by no means born equal. Their start in life varies. Some are born healthy, others sick from their first day. They are born with greater or lesser bodily defects, called by Adler organ inferiorities.<sup>152</sup> A sick child is at a disadvantage compared with a healthy child. Many children are born with defective sense-organs, with a sick or weak gastro-intestinal tract, with weak limbs, with a disposition to rickets, cramps, eczema, which becomes manifest at a very early age. Such children are much more in need of help and protection and much more restricted than are the lucky children who are perfectly well. Weakness and sickness can, but do not have to, lead to a pessimistic view of one's position in the world; in other words, they deepen the inferiority feeling.

A child's *social* environment can be felt as keenly as a bodily defect or superiority. The children of rich parents

usually live under less pressure than working-class children. Poor children enjoy less care and attention, and therefore less help, during the time when they are most in need. They are exposed to unhygienic living conditions, to sicknesses such as tuberculosis and rickets, are compelled to start earning part of the family income while still very little and miss the joys and carefreeness of better-situated children. They grow up in an atmosphere of worry, suffering, and discouragement; it is no wonder that they are so apt to become embittered by their inferior economic position.

The child's place in the family counts, too, as part of his environment.<sup>153</sup> It is of great importance whether the child is a pampered, only child or the tenth in a hardened, poverty-stricken family; whether it is a step-child, an orphan, the only girl among boys, or the only boy among girls. The family constellation usually determines the parents' attitude toward each child. Too much display of affection may lead to the inferiority feeling, just as too little affection does. One of the most important factors in making the relative inferiority feeling absolute is an upbringing devoid of insight. Since the purpose of every upbringing is to help the child grow into a useful human being, it fails of its purpose when it does not make the growing child an independent and co-operative member of society. Most parents believe they own their children and can do with them what they like. Many spoil them outrageously or treat them like dirt under their feet. They beat them, order them about, force them to perform odious, unnecessary tasks, work off their moods on them, or spur them on to material goals which they themselves lacked courage or capacity to attain.

Individual psychology believes that what is wrong is an upbringing based simply on authority. The products of training by resort to authority are the stubborn or the lying child, the impertinent or the silly *enfant terrible*, the over-docile, over-respectful, timid, oppressed, apathetic child. Such parents believe that *above all* the child must learn to obey. Of course,

a purely "authoritative" education is rare. Where it is actually enforced, the child suffers serious mental damage from exaggerated inferiority feeling; it develops various protest symptoms. Such children, however, turn the tables. In time their parents no longer own them; they own their parents. They bully them, drive them wild, and revenge themselves for their parents' egoism. And if life itself did not tear these children out of the claws of these parents whose "intentions are of the best," the number of serious neurotics would be greater than it already is. For nothing proves a greater obstacle to the necessary assimilation of human beings into the reality of life than a misguided development due to the uncomprehending authority of those on whom they are dependent.

Only a few of the outstanding factors have been selected to illustrate how an inferiority feeling can be stamped into a person as searingly and indelibly as a brandmark. These factors vary and are sometimes cumulative. A child is born, for example, into a wretchedly poor family. It has in addition serious organ defects, and to cap it all, its parents curse it and the day it was born. What can one expect of such a child? No child escapes all harmful influence, and it is a wonder that no more damage results than we have to cope with as it is.

Many people cannot recall ever having a conscious feeling of inferiority. There are many children who present the picture of anything but beings weighed down by an inferiority feeling. Their behavior points rather to a superiority feeling. The question arises: what leads an individual psychologist to diagnose a present or past inferiority feeling even when a child's behavior seems to indicate the contrary? This is answered by the reply to the question: what are the expressions of the inferiority feeling?

### *The Striving for Superiority*

BIOLOGY has taught us that organs which do not function well have the tendency to counteract the defect in some way or

other. A weak heart grows larger and increases its muscular strength. When one kidney is removed by operation, the remaining kidney grows to almost double its original size. When an organ's natural resources do not suffice to compensate for its functional weakness, the central nervous system assumes the task. The attempt at compensation is not restricted to the organ where complete compensation has already proved impossible; the task is transferred to the mind. Persons with defective vision frequently become painters or draughtsmen, or other types whose perception is markedly visual. Those whose hearing is not perfect may become musicians. Many actors and athletes have at one time had functional speech or limb defects.

This must not be misunderstood to mean that an organic defect alone determines one's later occupation. Not at all. Many conditions are responsible for the choice of a profession. Individual psychology merely wishes to emphasize the fact that such defects are often made good by compensation and even overcompensation. The compensation takes place along the line of the defect, and the naturally limited capacity is spurred on to artificially increased accomplishment.

It is Adler's discovery that the biological principle of compensation, as a phenomenon of all living things, is just as active in mental life as in physical life. It is the motor of psychic preservation and development. The propelling force of the motor is life itself. Every inferiority feeling, whether it comes from an organ inferiority, an economic need, a brutal upbringing, or an infelicitous family constellation, is experienced as a defect. Those laws which apply to organic defects hold good for such psychic defects as well. That is to say, the inferiority feeling begets a compensatory striving. The stronger the inferiority feeling, the greater the striving. Out of the child's feeling of weakness, littleness, insufficiency, sickness, develops an urge to power and greatness, health and superiority, to an impregnable sufficiency which must not only balance the scales, but outweigh the defects, to prevent the

danger of a relapse. "I am inferior to all; I want to be superior to all. I am the weakest; I would be the strongest."

The result of the inferiority feeling is therefore a striving for superiority, for recognition, power and security. Where we have not perceived the child's primary inferiority feeling, but only been made aware of the exaggerated compensation, we may estimate from this very compensation the depth and extent of the propelling inferiority feeling. The individual acts *as if* he once had an inferiority feeling. What he himself knows about it is unimportant. We prefer to forget unhappy experiences when we no longer need to remember them. Forgetting and remembering, like all mental faculties, are determined by our goal. If we are pessimists, we feed our pessimism by remembering all the bad things that happen to us and forget promptly the good things which offset the bad.<sup>154</sup> And vice versa. (Individual psychology doubts whether suppression takes place for the reasons offered by psychoanalysis.)

Many persons can remember distinctly having been frequently conscious of an inferiority feeling. Some feel inferior all the time. If one tries to find the meaning of this attitude, one discovers that the conscious inferiority feeling of adults is essentially different from that of children. The difference is that the child's inferiority feeling produces a compensatory *striving*, while the adult's conscious inferiority feeling makes him passive, self-righteous, conceited and affected. The latter is the expression of the discouraged individual who has suffered defeat. It is secondary, arranged, not a stimulus to compensation but itself a futile compensation. This secondary inferiority feeling, of which patients often complain, must be explained to them as an arrangement to avoid the duties life imposes upon them. They say, "I feel so inferior; I am not equal to this or that task." This sounds like modesty. It is instead a good way to avoid doing anything, to avoid the danger of a test and possible failure because one's ideal picture of oneself would suffer.

One neurotic, for example, points to actually present in-

abilities, but does not notice that he judges himself far more severely than he does others. His behavior appears modest, but is in reality only an attack upon his environment. It is a "trick" frequently employed by melancholia patients. Others think their inferiority is ordained by fate, believe they are congenitally burdened or persecuted by life, "children of sorrow." They put the responsibility for their failures and defeats upon some external destiny. Others *believe* they are inferior because they feel inferior and because the feeling depresses them so that they cannot in fact accomplish anything. Here, as everywhere in a neurosis, is the visible flight from life through a false logic.

The secondary inferiority feeling is indirectly related to the primary inferiority feeling, as are all neurotic devices. It is used as a reason for escaping burdensome duties, and is therefore cultivated and maintained by all possible means. It serves a fiction; namely, that life is unbearably hard and that one must find loopholes of escape. Since it may be looked upon as a foil to offset the primary inferiority feeling, we shall investigate the goal of compensation in general, and in particular whether all compensatory striving is based on a fiction.

Individual psychology believes that all compensation arising from an intensified inferiority feeling has the character of a fiction. This view results from the grasp of the personality as a unity struggling toward a goal. All psychic manifestations are understood by individual psychology as attempts to go from below to above, from an inferiority to a superiority feeling. There is only one biologically correct way, and that is the way of accomplishment, the fulfillment of life's tasks within the frame of the community. Life's center of gravity must be laid in society, the immediate social community in which one lives. One must detach oneself from one's egocentric personality and turn to objective, social achievements. This is reality. Persons who go about with a deep inferiority feeling miss this road. The idea of social living remains strange to them. They avoid reality and entangle themselves in fictions. The healthy

individual and the nervous individual reason differently. The healthy person judges his deeds and thoughts more or less objectively. He is not unduly discouraged if success comes a little more slowly than he thought, nor is he exaggeratedly, maniacally happy if it comes more quickly. He is reasonable and tolerant. The neurotic person, on the contrary, judges his thinking and acting by his private logic, which is full of extremes dictated by his need of recognition.

The fiction is always an "as if." The nervous child, tortured by its inferiority feelings, struggles *as if* it could and had to acquire power and superiority over all others. It creates an unattainable ideal which serves as a guiding image, and this fictitious image is a crass contrast to its own person. The guiding image represents everything it hopes to be in the future. The person or character who has made the most powerful impression on the child serves as a pattern. It struggles with all its might to become like its guiding image. It creates a life plan of its own.

Adler has called this simplified manner of thinking in extremes, to be found in all nervous people, "tendentious apperception." The whole world is divided into an *either-or*, into an *everything-or-nothing*. Persons with such life plans must have extreme character traits. A young man walks into the doctor's office and says at once, "Doctor, you are my last hope. Either you cure me, or I'll put a bullet through my head." Here are to be found almost all the signs of a neurosis: helplessness (he cannot help himself); animosity (threat to commit suicide); avoidance of responsibility (the doctor is made responsible for the result of the treatment); extreme mode of thinking (either I live or I die through you, there is no middle road).

The neurotic's extreme traits are often visible at first glance. He is impudent, or stubborn, obtrusive, or shy and timid; immaculately clean or markedly disorderly; unusually industrious or strikingly lazy; exceedingly ambitious or especially indolent. His behavior can alternate between two extremes as it serves his purpose. He tries direct aggressiveness through

cruelty, brutality, stubbornness, egotism or whatever mode of conduct he believes will procure him triumphs. Or he uses an indirect method such as illness, weakness, indifference or a sham passivity.

Adler calls this general syndrome the masculine protest. Men still have a superior and privileged position in the world even though it sometimes seems as if the reverse were the case. It is therefore easy to understand why persons suffering from inferiority feelings try to be as manly as possible. Everything feminine is considered inferior. Each individual, of course, has a different interpretation of manliness. Every neurotic tries to become like his ideal of manliness, some through brutality and absolute lack of consideration for others, others through the tyranny of weakness. As was said before, the nervous person thinks in extremes and lives in extremes, and so his character develops in extremes. His masculine protest means: I want to be a *man*. He rejects everything feminine or effeminate which is to him synonymous with inferior, incapable.

In this way the character traits which are weapons in the struggle toward the fictive goal arise and are trained. These traits, which are complex behavior patterns, are all formed in childhood. All variations of the masculine protest, as well as all methods of compensatory aggression, can be traced back to the first few years, and are rooted without exception in the inferiority feeling, whose strength is in proportion to the strength of the aggression. Whether the child continues in the direction of active aggression (Jung's extroverts) or whether it switches off to passive aggression (Jung's introverts) depends on how much courage it retains. Both styles of life lead to an asocial, egocentric attitude (neurosis) insofar as an exaggerated inferiority feeling is their basis. An active aggression is more anti-social than asocial. It can easily lead to brutal criminality.<sup>155</sup>

The masculine protest, the striving from the inferiority feeling toward power or at least to a semblance of power, is not only an attribute of girls, but of boys as well. In order to

attain the goal of superiority, certain modes of behavior are tried out and if found effective, are trained. To these traits belong stubbornness, obedience, lying, blind confidence, raw aggressiveness and shy reserve. All these traits are or can be means toward the desired goal of power. Their training starts in early childhood as soon as the child is forced to make some sort of compromise with its environment.

Only that human being whose goals are compatible with reality, that is, one who has a community sense, matures and deserves the designation adult. The ambitious fantasist whose goal is set in the clouds bruises himself on reality and remains almost wholly infantile (not only sexually, as Freud says). He lives as if he were still a child, weak, inferior, in need of help. Whenever the world shatters one of his dreams, he experiences it as a defeat. His courage grows less and the world appears to him as a hostile, superior force. His reactions are correct, only his premises are wholly wrong. For he wants far more than he is prepared to give. And so the nervous malady results which individual psychology took as its starting point,—not a real malady, but a reaction of the discouraged, overambitious individual. The symptoms which he himself produces serve to elevate himself in his own eyes, to degrade every one else and to relieve himself of responsibility. To understand the language of symptoms is, according to Adler, the chief task of psychotherapeutic endeavor, and the neurotic disease is nothing but the price the cowardly, asocial egotist must pay for offending the “logic of life.”

#### THE NEUROTIC CHARACTER

THE FOREGOING sections have sought to give a general picture of the main principles of psychic life in the sick and the healthy. We saw the individual, suspended between the poles of inferiority and superiority, fleeing from his inferiority feeling, striving toward superiority, security, power. We saw the causes and results of the increased inferiority feeling, the con-

struction and development of training patterns, psychic weapons and qualities to be used in the fight for the goal to supersede all others. We have indicated the way to psychic health and its detours into neuroses. This has all been described in broad strokes. We propose now to present in more detail the views of individual psychology on character and character formation.

A HUMAN being's character is not, as is so often assumed, inborn or inherited; it is not something unchangeable. Adler uses the word character to mean the sum of qualities, modes of behavior and capacities which the child forms in accordance with its goal and its own interpretation of its situation.<sup>156</sup> Character is composed of all that has been imprinted on the individual through the senses, of all that he has experienced. This material is then formed by the guiding image. The guiding image is like a mold and the character is the clay. The form of the clay is changed as the guiding image changes.

The child starts to map out his life plan roughly at a very early age. Character is to him, as it is to the adult, only a crutch for his personality. The goal is to elevate or make safe this personality, and the single character traits like stubbornness, wildness, false modesty, meekness, lying, or bursting into tears on every occasion, are the means to prepare the way. The child derives experiences from the use of such character traits. Every one of these experiences leaves its impression: it encourages, frightens, or it is made more complex and is interpreted in the light of the particular situation. One "makes" these experiences; this is true of the child as well as the grown-up, the healthy as well as the nervous individual. The difference is that the child and the nervous individual evaluate their experiences according to their fictive, fantastic relation to the world, while the healthy adult uses his experiences to comprehend reality.

The child develops slowly from a helpless, useless little para-

site that only wants to take and is not prepared to give, to an active fellow human being. The love it receives from its mother and other members of its surroundings gradually instills in it the feeling that it means something to them, that it is loved, that is to say, that it also has something to give. There follow tentative, trial-and-error attempts to create a reciprocal social relationship such as the attempt to misuse tyrannically the love of the adults to further its own striving for recognition, to give its share to sociality only on certain conditions. When the adults are successful in teaching the child that it has something to give—to give itself in the ideal sense of the phrase—the revolutionizing force of community sense begins. It abandons its absolute egoism and abandons the division “I” and “you” for the co-operative conception “we” or “all of us.” Its life circle has broadened constantly; it sees much more. It has grasped the essence of love as an unconditional attachment and has been formed into a useful, positive member of society. Where this fails, the inferiority feeling grows. The child has not been able to find a way out of its egocentric attitude. The social unfolding of its character has been inhibited. A series of primitive, infantile character traits of aggressive or disguised aggressive nature have instead been retained and strengthened. The sum of such traits always presents the same picture of “the nervous character.”

Individual psychology denies that any one-hundred-percent psychically healthy adults exist. Perfect psychic health is an ideal concept. But the character of the relatively healthy is as rich in variations as life itself, elastic, adjustable, friendly to society. The nervous character, on the contrary, is *always* narrow, limited, rigid, self-conscious and anxious, schematic; and it is easily recognizable. The healthy person also strives for recognition, but not for power in order to exploit others. He too is led by the fiction “to amount to something,” to be rewarded for his deeds. He knows, though, that ideals should be used only as measures of comparison and should not be taken as absolutes. His conduct orients itself by reality, directed

lightly by his fictions, so that he does not make impossible demands upon himself and the world, does not avoid compromise and does not take inevitable obstacles as personal misfortunes, or defeats as personal disgrace. The neurotic, on the other hand, is inelastic, unbending, enmeshed by his fictions which blind him to reality.

In order to find his way about in the confusion of his life, the neurotic constructs an artful system of tricks and lies, over which he stumbles continually. The nervous person constructs effective training patterns for his willing, acting and thinking.<sup>157</sup> The outstanding pattern is the masculine protest, with the traits of power lust, prying inquisitiveness, tyranny, ambition and nasty temper, on the one hand; and exaggerated cautiousness, timorousness, hyper-conscientiousness, skepticism, suspiciousness and brooding on the other hand. The neurotic rarely has time for anything; he is always busy and yet nothing much is accomplished. He is interested in so many things that no time is left to concentrate on one thing which might reveal his own inadequacy to him.

Two character traits, in all gradations, can be found in every neurotic: (1) a pronounced ambitiousness as a derivative of the masculine protest, and (2) exceeding cautiousness as a means of security. The latter manifests itself in doubt, wavering, temporizing, in what Adler calls "the hesitating attitude." It helps increase the distance to anticipated dangers and to avoid decisions. The nervous individual refers everything to himself; believes everybody looks at him and expects heroic deeds of him. He is constantly in dread of defeat or failure because of the exorbitantly high demands which he thinks others make on him or he makes on himself. He uses every possible device to get out of a task or decision, wastes his time, is a busybody and works little, depreciates and degrades others, mocks at himself and finds fault with everything. He does not feel comfortable in public life. There he is compelled to deliver proofs of his ability which he always either over- or under-estimates. He withdraws from the open battlefields of

life into the safer sphere of the family, isolates himself in a region where he can have cheap triumphs daily, where he rules unconditionally, is honored or feared, where he is "understood."

The nervous person's character picture appears as a rare mixture of provocative and timorous traits, a composition of a domination lust and a fearful withdrawing from the world. He always thinks and feels in extremes. He is either extremely enthusiastic or extremely depressed; ardently friendly or full of bitter hate. One day everybody seems to him especially attractive, the next day repulsive and contemptible. Boundless optimism and blackest pessimism alternate in his judgment of himself, the world and its inhabitants.

Individual psychology tries to explain this character split, which is taken as a reality by the Freudians, who call it ambivalence or bi-polarity. It is clear that the neurotic has two rôles to play in life; one is his real self, the human being he undervalues as inferior, weak, constantly in need of help; the other the hero he has constructed as ideal and guiding image whose possibilities he overestimates by far. He judges other people as erroneously as he judges himself. Either he looks up to them, honors them as big and superior — when he underestimates himself — or he tears them to pieces with his criticism, elevates himself and depreciates those about him — when he overestimates himself.

It is therefore no wonder that the neurotic meets with one disappointment after another. He approaches every one with overtense expectations and demands which no one can fulfill. Or he isolates himself because he regards everybody else as unworthy or simply dangerous. The result is increasing difficulty in establishing contact with other people; disappointments, social failure, and gradual isolation. This meager understanding of human nature is itself a trick, a psychic arrangement which serves as legitimation for his serious mistakes. Such a neurotic says, "I simply can't understand people, so I always fall for the wrong ones and distrust the honest ones.

To avoid being deceived in the future, I shall not have anything to do with anybody."

The world appears confused to him because he has assumed, from childhood on, that he must play a star's rôle on the stage of life. It never occurs to him that life demands good fellow human beings and not stars, for the simple rôle of a working individual does not satisfy his craving for recognition. When he does not succeed in pushing forward to the front, he is deeply mortified. He is discouraged as soon as he encounters difficulties. The triumphs which his childish imagination pictures do not come. His exaggerated aggressiveness changes to just as exaggerated precautions. He has become neither cleverer nor wiser. On the contrary, he is convinced that he is surrounded by all sorts of pitfalls. His "tendentious apperception" has followed him to see nothing else. He constructs a system of security based on his misinterpreted experiences. He avoids further damage to his self-respect by not making decisions and by excluding all self-criticism. He makes only a weak attempt to solve the tasks presented to him by life — vocation, sociality and marriage, or he occupies himself to such an extent with something where he feels absolutely safe that he has a sham justification for not attending to the real things. This holds just as good for the overworked business man who has time neither for family nor friends as it does for the Don Juan, masculine or feminine, who is so busy flirting that there is no time left for anything else. Our social milieu influences greatly the form of our behavior. In any case, the nervous individual is always characterized by a lack of courage, no matter whether he appears under the mask of depression or snobbishness, or an anxiety neurosis, or criminality, or as a house tyrant of weak or brutal type.

Every one of us seems to be born with a certain amount of capital in courage, or at least the positive tendency to be courageous if given a chance. Early experiences develop this courage or destroy it, inhibit it or spur it on to excess, the result of which is capital loss. The strength of the inferiority feel-

ing — that is, a diminishing of the capacity to endure disagreeable situations — depends upon how long these negative experiences have continued and what impression they have made. That is why the neurotic never can wait. His patience is really a measuring rod for his neurosis. For to wait means to remain in a state of tension, and the neurotic, oversensitized by hundreds of defeats, most of them brought about by himself, hates nothing more than a state of tension in which he feels himself helpless and which, therefore, irritates him exceedingly.

Adler says that the neurotic has no time not to be a neurotic. He is kept busy all the time maintaining and improving his cleverly constructed arrangement of asociality and private logic. All his strength is used for his neurotic goal. How can he be expected to do anything useful? He fools himself by holding his hands before his eyes and then saying, "I see nothing. The world does not exist for me." That is his logic, meaningful only to him because it negates his fellow human beings.

He defends his neurosis as a mother her child. He fights with himself even more — to all appearances. He always wants to do the best and always ends by doing nothing. His willingness is clearly apparent but no deed follows. Or he excuses himself by saying that he really wants to, but he has not enough energy. Individual psychology looks upon weakness and strength as relative concepts. An individual is weak or strong as it suits his goals and the form of his neurosis.

Another essential trait in every neurotic's character is that he feels strange everywhere. He wants to obey none but his own laws, his own system of logic. He is always more sensitive than others and this prevents him from making friends. He is just as incomprehensible to others as they are to him. He is further from reality than the healthy individual, who is more adjustable and who feels at home more easily. The neurotic wants to take and to give nothing in return. Since this goes against the general law of human society, he is afraid

of the laws governing social living and respects only his own. He spins himself into an unreal world of sham values and imaginary conditions, and has only a distant connection with the real world, to which he nevertheless feels himself obligated. Why otherwise should he have a bad conscience and need the legitimization of sickness? When one does what is right, one has a clear conscience and needs no excuses.

These are the main characteristics of the nervous character: the antitheses discouragement and exaggerated ambition; inferiority feeling and megalomania; the group of so-called hesitating character traits (overcautiousness, timidity, pedantry, doubt, envy, malice, nagging, mental self-castigation, depreciation of others — all these an expression of self-underestimation) and the group of aggressive character traits (brutality, domineering, lust for power, temper, foolhardiness, jealousy, egoism, conceit — the expression of self-overestimation). All neurotic character traits are essentially aggressive, and represent in active or passive form the means used to the attainment of the neurotic goal. Since this goal is unattainable, the neurotic must slacken his efforts sooner or later. At first he sharpens his character traits or develops new ones to strengthen the aggression. When that does not suffice and the discouragement keeps on progressing, he runs away from the battle front of life where his tasks and obligations await him. And the best refuge is sickness. He who is sick is excused, is nursed and gets whatever he wants to salve his inferiority feeling: attention, love, care. He has achieved by simple means what he could not accomplish at life's front; he rules. That costs him the price of suffering which increases because the lack of a reasonable activity stimulates his inferiority feeling. When the expense (suffering) is greater than the income (profit from being sick) the neurosis drives the individual sooner or later into a psychosis or to suicide, the latter regarded as a successful revenge on fate, the family included. Or the time comes when he goes to the psychotherapist and begs to be relieved of his torments.

To cure a neurosis, one must understand it, and to understand it one must comprehend the nervous character. The basis of the nervous disturbance is, of course, the nervous character; it is indispensable to know the skeleton structure and the scheme of the nervous character in order to appreciate the malady. The neurosis then appears as an artful abstraction and assemblage of certain characteristics of the nervous character. In reality there are no neuroses, only neurotic individuals, just as there are no sicknesses, only sick people. The concept neurosis is a fiction, and only useful when we remain constantly aware of the purpose of the abstraction and the fact that the abstraction is less important than the human being.

The description of the neurosis will concern itself mainly with the general features, as the outline of the nervous character did. What makes one neurosis differ from another is not as important as what all neuroses have in common. The discovery of this common denominator is not difficult. Individual psychology emphasizes that one must bear in mind the unity of the human personality, the structure of the human character, and apply the principles of the finalistic method of observation (the search for purposes).

Every human being strives from below to above. The healthy individual (in this sense *courageous*) estimates the difficulties of his life course approximately correctly, adjusts himself to them and looks for rational means to overcome them. He finds these means chiefly in the development of his mental and physical strength and in his realization that he is a member of a community of fellow human beings. He makes himself useful and contributes a part of what he accomplishes for the welfare of the whole. He does not take more than he gives. He does not remain still; he is always engaged in an activity which brings him gradually nearer to the realizable goal he has set. Recognition and respect, happiness and content, all of which he did *not* consider first of all, are the natural consequences of his behavior.

The neurotic is also in constant motion, but his activity

differs from that of the healthy individual as the running of a disconnected motor does from that of a traveling automobile. His motion is futile, for he lacks community sense, fellow feeling. Seen from the perspective of the healthy, progressive individual, the neurosis is a slowing up of tempo, standstill or regression, the latter then being flight. The neurotic overvalues or undervalues the difficulties he encounters in his development, tackles them too hastily and without deliberation. He is *a priori* or becomes quickly discouraged, and evades the realities which are too much hardship for him. He takes refuge in neurosis or psychosis which promise him alleviation, but only bring him suffering instead. The neurotic runs about in these blind alleys like an imprisoned animal, or comes to the end of it, which is suicide, or finds his way back either alone or with outside help, to the broad stream of life.

The neurotic's expedients are the safety devices of the nervous character which have already been described. At the beginning of the development of the neurosis, Adler asserts, is the feeling of insecurity and inferiority; this demands a guiding, sheltering and quieting goal. The essence of the neurosis consists in the increased application of "available means." Among these are "supporting fictions" in thinking, acting and willing, mistrust of self and others, envy, malice; or aggressive, cruel tendencies appear, in order to win the upper hand over the environment. Then come the attempts to bind the others by obedience, subordination and meekness, which are occasionally carried so far as to turn into masochistic traits. But active aggression, like passivity, is a device, a trick, brought about by the fictive goal of greater power, of wanting to be on top.

Neurosis is, for the neurotic, sham, uselessness, non-responsibility, non-productivity, isolation, oppression of others, pseudo-freedom, and suffering. The picture and the symptoms of every neurosis are designed and influenced by the imaginary end goal (godlikeness) which has a forming, directive force. A

woman who is possessed of the idea of being cleaner than everybody else organizes a washing compulsion that compels her to wash her hands all day long. The result is that there is no time left for any other more useful occupation. This sort of neurosis is called a compulsion neurosis.

A man who was very much impressed by muscle power, perhaps because he had too little at one time, is constantly engaged in fights, boxing, and provocative disputes. He trains to be a "rowdy." He procures for himself in this way constant proof that he is a hero, and only succeeds in convincing others that he is at heart a neurotic coward who could use his strength to much better ends (basis of criminal neurosis). The goal is the cause.

The neurosis demonstrates the plan and carrying out of erroneous premises. When we return to the neurotic's childhood we find without exception that he has built up his life on far-reaching mistakes. Individual psychology asserts that the tendency of every neurosis is to safeguard its possessor, and not, as psychoanalysis says, to fulfill suppressed, childhood sex desires. Sexuality is subordinated to the dominant idea, "I want to be a *man*." Some men think they can achieve this by proving how potent they are, or by perversions, or by generally overvaluing the sexual drive and making it of prime importance.

People whose neurosis has a sexual coloring have at one time or another suffered especially under the antithesis man-woman. With the help of their extreme, schematic, tendentious apperception, they have made masculine-feminine the symbol of the world and utilize a sexual jargon to express their neurosis. But behind that is the goal of their personality, which uses this "manliness" as a means to security and self-elevation, and this is what individual psychology believes psychoanalysis has failed to see.

Fear is the core of every neurosis. Fear is the materialized, physically expressed inferiority feeling. Originally fear was a biologically necessary mechanism in all living beings, a safe-

guard against danger. It was the signal to be wary. Human beings have made it serve their goal. This biological preparedness serves, from then on, personal desires. Anxiety arises not when real danger threatens, but when the goal of superiority is jeopardized. Fear means: I am weak; I am helpless, imperilled; consequently, I must be helped, protected, given care and attention. Others must sacrifice their time for me. Fear is like a compulsion; it inhibits, oppresses those living with the neurotic and relieves him of fulfilling his duties. Fear arises only when it can be used as a weapon by the neurotic, which is why the causes of fear vary indefinitely from one person to another. Fear is a hypostatic symptom in all neuroses. It is sometimes not immediately apparent, but it is always present. Like every other symptom it is incomprehensible when taken alone. It wins significance only in the light of the total personality.

The neurosis is the fiction of a sickness. Every sickness has symptoms. The neurotic creates them, develops and trains them. Wexberg describes the neurotic symptom as a mode of mental and physical behavior employed for the attainment of an egocentric goal, characterized by the fiction of involuntariness and morbidity, and having implicit in it an excuse for evading partially or wholly the fulfillment of life's tasks.

Neurotic symptoms offer the neurotic the opportunity:

(1) To make an exception of himself by securing privileges and special protection.

(2) To lessen the demands of the community upon his cooperation to a degree compatible with his discouraged state.

(3) To protect himself from defeat by erecting a barrier of inhibition and difficulties between himself and the outerworld. The fiction of the symptom represents that "handicap" of which the neurotic takes advantage whether he has success or not. If he succeeds in accomplishing something in spite of the handicap, his success appears all the more laudable; if he fails he has an excellent excuse. A singer who has to sing and who suffers from stage fright has two tasks: to sing and

to fight his fright. If he sings well in spite of his fear, his success in his own eyes is doubled. If he sings badly, the cause is his stage fright.

(4) To decrease his circle of activity. Some duties are entirely neglected on account of certain symptoms. An individual suffering from agoraphobia confines his activity to his house. The person with a compulsion neurosis is "filled" by his compulsion and can be given work only to the extent to which his compulsion leaves him free to do something. The sexual neurasthenic whose potency depends upon certain conditions most difficult of fulfillment cannot marry as a result. "The diminished basis of operation secures the neurotic a sort of power equilibrium at the price of his nervous disorder." (Wexberg.)

(5) To avoid the possibility of a final judgment of the value or worthlessness of his person. He increases constantly the distance between himself and such evaluation because it implies another defeat. He arranges obstacles and excuses to postpone as long as possible the dreaded moment when he must stand the test.

(6) To find an alibi for having evaded the problems of life and an excuse for having refused to assume responsibility.

(7) To use the symptoms as a cloak when life withholds longed-for triumphs.

(8) To postpone decisions.

Every neurosis achieves its goal and yet does not achieve it. Though the neurotic usually conquers in his fight for the mastery, he must pay a heavy price for his victory in suffering and torment, gradual isolation in psychosis or in suicide. No one is *only* neurotic, just as no one is untinged by neurosis. Every one has a larger or smaller amount of the will to be healthy expressed in his community sense (sociality). This can be proved objectively by the neurotic's need to justify himself, by his "I want to, *but* I cannot." Adler calls it the "yes-but" attitude. Who would find it necessary to justify himself when he believed that what he was doing was absolutely right and that

everybody else would find it right too? The therapeutic possibilities and the chances of a cure are based on this very need for self-justification. So long as the neurotic consciously feels that something is wrong with him, he is curable; the more so, the sicker he feels. For the greater the deficit resulting from his style of life, the higher the cost of his self-dramatization, the livelier his inclination to improvement. The neurosis is bad business with life. But business methods can be changed.

#### THE TECHNIQUE OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE INDIVIDUAL psychologist's method of therapy differs in various essentials from that of the Freudian school. It does not use the divan method of psychoanalysis. Doctor and patient face each other in conversation. All suggestion of mysticism is avoided. Transference and resistance are of minor importance, and repression of none.

Individual psychology says that the individual does not suppress at all, but that he remembers tendentiously; that is, he remembers only what helps him nearer his goal. Everything else is "passively" forgotten and this cannot be called suppression. During the course of the treatment the patient recalls new material from his memory storehouse, either to defend himself or to corroborate the doctor's interpretations. This material seems suppressed, but it was only not remembered because it contradicted the tendencies of the so-called "conscious" memories.

The transference is regarded as a trick of the patient to master the doctor. Individual psychology rejects this trick and unveils it instead of cultivating it as psychoanalysis does. The patient transfers his general attitude toward life, his belligerence, to the therapist as a matter of course. He tries to conquer him through love or hate. This is the content and the goal of the transference. If the doctor allows himself to be duped by the stratagem, or if he overlooks it, he harms, or at least delays considerably, the success of the treatment. The

aim of every individual-psychological therapy is the production of a new situation, a situation never before experienced by the patient. Revelation of the patient's war tactics and accustoming him to an atmosphere of understanding humanness, co-operation and confidence, make his subterfuges superfluous.

Individual psychology explains the *resistance* offered by the patient to the therapist (1) by the construction of the neurosis, which needs the fiction of non-responsibility to be able to exist, (2) by the patient's need of confirmation of his malady by the doctor, who is supposed to make up the deficit without the patient's having to do anything himself, and (3) finally, by the patient's disinclination to let himself be looked through and shown up. The neurotic would take it as a defeat, and think the doctor had triumphed. Psychoanalysis says that the mechanism of resistance consists in the Ego drive's preventing the original sex drive from entering consciousness. Individual psychology does not agree, just as it does not agree at all with the psychoanalytical construction of the drive conflicts. Individual psychology tries to demonstrate that the so-called drive conflicts are a self-made arrangement.

The goal of therapy in individual psychology is to change radically the patient's goal. Since his life is dependent upon his originally set goal,—the goal of absolute security,—the influencing of his life is only possible by way of modifying his wrong goal. It is therefore necessary (1) to discover the individual's goal and to specify it as definitely as possible, (2) to refer to his mistaken attitude toward life, which was the cause of his setting up such a mistaken goal. When the therapist has succeeded in convincing the patient that it is best for him to relinquish his egocentric goal, his complaint, his symptoms, his schematic mode of apperception disappear of themselves. One does not have to bother about the rest.

The therapist uses the analysis to bring the patient back over the neurotic part of his life to the point where he turned away in fear from the main road onto the sidetracks of the asociality of the neurosis. During the analysis the general scheme of the

neuroses is made clear to the neurotic by way of his own neurosis. The treatment of neuroses is largely psychological instruction, the best example being the patient's own derangement. The patient offers resistance (for the reasons already given), refusing to comprehend the meaning of his behavior. He needs a whole bag of excuses: inheritance, infelicitous social conditions, bodily defects, his upbringing, or the power of sex and other drives. The doctor must possess sufficient therapeutic skill (psychotherapy still being a delicate *art*) to recognize all his patient's natural and concocted pretexts and to destroy them by objective logic to which the private logic of the nervous individual is not equal. In this way the patient gains insight slowly or swiftly into the mistakenness of his schematic, anxious, rigid mode of existence. Insight is the first successful step in therapy.

Insight alone, however, is not enough. It may lead to good intentions, but everybody knows that they pave the road to hell. When some one says, "I ought to be sensible," and then does nothing about building up a sensible life, there is no real success to speak of. To eradicate the gaps between insight, good will and deed, in order to fuse them, is the second, far more difficult therapeutic task. The patient must learn how to train for this. He has trained from babyhood on, but in the false direction; for failure, excuses, alleviation, sickness and non-responsibility. The neurotic gathers experience in non-success to corroborate his retreat. Now he must learn how to collect a store of experiences in being successful. The therapist must overhaul the training apparatus and turn it in a positive direction.

Assuming that the neurosis is "hesitation in the forward march of life," the cause of this hesitation, which is lack of courage, must be remedied. Courage is instilled best by success. A first success stimulates to new activity, broadens the radius of activity and furthers the training in purposeful, useful behavior. When the neurotic person finds himself suddenly free of the vicious cycle of fear, — helplessness, defeat,

discouragement, — his self-confidence and activity start up as if freed from a heavy burden, his rigidity softens, and he finds pleasure in the training of adjustment. This joy in movement is a positive pleasure feeling. The convalescent's style of life changes and with it his view of the world. His egocentricity lessens, his strength increases just as does his ability to trust himself to the realities of life. He becomes a useful member of human society to the extent to which his capacity to co-operate grows.

Individual psychology teaches every neurotic that there exists a disposition to neurosis, but no obligation; a ground, but no compulsion; reason enough, but no right. Everybody was once a child; everybody has felt, and some painfully, the difference between big and little, strong and weak, free and bound, isolated and social. Everybody has had chance enough to judge himself wrongly and to acquire a deep inferiority feeling. But it is not *necessary* that he do this. Every one has the chance to start something else. No one and nothing force him to develop an antagonistic instead of a friendly attitude toward his fellow human beings. He can overcome his difficulties. There are always others who have overcome far greater difficulties. *Omnia ex opinione suspensa sunt.*

Every neurosis brings with it a compulsion to make comparisons. The neurotic projects a fictive scale of values. He measures all persons and things according to this scale, and since he takes constant stock of himself, it follows that he is always comparing himself with others. The comparison almost always falls out to his disadvantage. This is the well from which he draws to add to his inferiority feeling and to fuel his drive for neurotic superiority. This trick is analyzed and relinquished by substituting for it active connections with the community. When the nervous person realizes with a shock that human beings are neither so infinitely superior nor so repulsive as he childishly imagined, the energy he used to waste on futile comparison is now at his disposal for the solution of his life tasks. There are always enough difficulties to

be attacked courageously and to be overcome best by co-operating with fellow human beings.

Individual psychology teaches individuals how to use their strength economically and advantageously. The cure of a neurosis is a matter of reason. Adler sets up no ethical postulates. He suggests instead an energy-saving, hygienic mode of living as rational. "Make your life a little easier," he says with friendly irony to the neurotic who exhausts himself in fruitless struggle.

His therapy is essential to make the patient aware of his unconscious life plan, to broaden his conscious to include the realization of what he is really doing. The errors in his life plan are uncovered and presented to his usually reluctant eyes. Whether he acknowledges them and changes accordingly is for him to decide. The right thing to do cannot be taught. We can learn only what is wrong and how to avoid it. No doctor can *cure* a neurotic in the literal sense of the word. He can only call his attention to mistakes and futile behavior and their consequences. The patient cures himself through fruitful training. Courageous conduct is infectious.

The therapeutic *means* of individual psychology are practically the same as those used in the psychoanalytical school; namely, clarification of the unconscious material by means of free association, interpretation of dreams, and painstaking observation of the patient's total behavior. Behavior is far more significant than the spoken word. A patient can lie with words, but his behavior reveals the truth to the trained eye. A patient says, "For the last ten years I have wanted to sell my business and take a pleasure trip with my wife, *but*," and there follows a batch of reasons why he has not sold his business and therefore not taken the trip. The decisive fact here is that he did not sell his business.

Adler gives the following example: A young man goes to a ball with his fiancée. While they are dancing he slips and falls, dragging her with him. His pince-nez is knocked off his nose. He is very near-sighted and while he runs one hand

over the floor to find his glasses, he holds the girl tightly with the other so that she cannot get up. The gesture speaks for itself. The man wants to rule by strength and by weakness. His dominating character betrays itself in a moment of danger. He may have promised his future wife any amount of freedom, but his behavior is to be believed and not his words. When he has a little accident, he forces the person or persons nearest him to give up their freedom, partly by clinging to them and partly by oppressing them. A skilful individual psychologist can recognize a person's style of life from his behavior alone.

Though the *means* employed by both systems resemble each other, the basic views as to the utilization of the material are radically different. This is best illustrated in dream interpretation. Individual psychology believes the conscious and unconscious are directed toward the same psychic goal, that they are two forms of expression of one and the same mind, and not, as the Freudian school claims, opposing forms of expression. Individual psychology therefore sees in the dream the confirmation of the patient's visible style of life. Dream interpretation is used consequently more for the patient's clarification than for the doctor's. The patient's behavior pattern is expressed in pictures in the dream and reveals more clearly this childish-neurotic manner of thinking than his conscious thoughts. The Adlerians occupy themselves less with the interpretation of symbols and far more with the discovery of the dream's linear direction. Dream symbols are the jargon by which the individual expresses himself, and have individual significance for every dreamer. They sometimes even change their meaning during the course of years or through changed circumstances.

Adler's conception is that dreams represent advance attempts by the dreamer to tackle the problems immediately ahead of him. They always point to the future. The dreamer's more or less courageous attitude to the tasks ahead of him becomes apparent. Dreams warn or encourage; they anticipate situations; they flatter the dreamer or they degrade some one else.

They disclose clearly the dreamer's true posture or attitude toward life.

The dream's chief task is to produce a certain mood to be maintained a long time after. This mood influences the dreamer's actions in daily life. A man who has a depressing dream wakes up depressed and then wonders why everything goes wrong that day. Anxiety dreams are warnings against life's dangers and admonish the dreamer to be still more careful. Joyous dreams are rare but those who have had them will remember their feeling of happiness and elation upon awakening.

When a student dreams of a coming examination, the analyst can recognize from the direction the dream takes and from its end how the student really views it — courageously or hesitatingly. Is he going to tackle it hopefully or await it anxiously, or even arrange something to give him an excuse to get out of it? When some one dreams of examinations passed some time before, the dream still has prospective significance. The old fear of the examination is now a "safety first" signal for future, imaginary or actual difficulties. Flying dreams indicate ambition. Falling dreams are vivid warnings of the dangers of the striving for recognition.

Each dream, just as each symptom, is comprehensible only in connection with the personal totality. Many dreams have a sexual accent. Individual psychology cautions against deducing from this fact an exaggerated emphasis on sexuality as Freudian psychoanalysis does. The dreamer uses a simplified, symbolic language in his dreams and applies everywhere his childish apperception scheme of "masculine-feminine," and its correspondent "above-below." He often symbolizes below by a female figure or female symbol and above by a masculine figure or symbol. Sexual dreams are like allegories used to warn the dreamer of love and its consequences, or they use sex to get out of other tasks. The sexual rôle is then like a "fate" for which one is not responsible. It may take the form of exag-

gerated or decreased potency, polygamy, frigidity, homosexuality or perversions. Sexuality is of no greater importance than any other biological function such as eating or sleeping. Where sexuality plays a dominant rôle in dreams, it by no means proves an exceptionally strong sexual disposition but a consecutive training to use it as a means to power.

Other means used in individual-psychological technique to recognize and clarify the style of life are the interpretation of childhood remembrances (especially the first remembrance), day dreams and definite fears. A detailed description of all these technical points would lead too far and can be studied in the rich material on the subject.<sup>158</sup>

WE HAVE tried to present here at least the scaffolding of individual psychology, its basic tendencies and way of looking at things. A complete picture would require the inclusion of a number of practical examples: how the neurotic applies his neurotic logic to his daily life; successful and unsuccessful compensation; case histories; dream interpretation. The theory then loses its generalizing character of which it has been accused occasionally. The latest individual-psychological studies branch off in two main directions: (1) the psychology of the mental sciences—cultural psychology, the psychology of art, religion and philosophy; and (2) the psychology of the social situation—social economy, social currents, the world's social and economic development. Progress is being made in recognizing the connections between social and economic conditions on the one hand, and social and cultural psychology on the other. Individual psychology studies the human being not only in his own unity but as an integral part of the total structure of his environment. It is not only a psychology of the individual; it is also a psychology of racial, national and world unities. It is just as interested in the neuroses of large cultural bodies as it is in the neurosis of the single human being. It believes that the individual neurosis depends upon the cultural neurosis; that it is impossible to be unneurotic in this day and

age, and that a perfect cure is only possible in a far less neurotic world order. The goal of individual psychology is the reduction of the "neuroses of our time."

We should, in closing this section, like to indicate the points of similarity between individual psychology and behaviorism, which are many, despite the apparently great differences in the terminology of the two doctrines. A certain direction in individual psychology could be very well identified with a similar direction in behaviorism, so that behaviorism could be taken as the theoretical basis and individual psychology as the empirical confirmation and practical application of the theory. It seems to the writer that in such a combination lie the greatest possibilities for psychological progress in the future.

#### A COMPARISON BETWEEN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

THIS work purposes an impartial objective juxtaposition of the modern direction in psychotherapy so far as that is possible and feasible. Comparisons between Freudian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology and also between the Jungian and Adlerian theories have already been suggested and need no protracted discussion here. A concurrent examination of the two systems which appear to be in the foreground of contemporary psychotherapeutic effort, however, promises valuable insight.

Individual psychology is younger, and like a younger child, inclined to criticize the elder. This is why we find it aggressively critical and psychoanalysis defensively critical. A comparison of the two systems must never lose sight of this fact. Nevertheless we shall let the critical objections of each system speak for themselves and merely indicate the points at which the two doctrines touch.

Individual psychology and psychoanalysis are inimical relatives. What binds them is concern with one and the same problem: the study and treatment of neuroses, and, beyond

that, the question of the nature of human personality. What keeps the two systems forever apart are the totally different roads they take to solve these problems. The mode of observation and the field of observation are wholly unlike. Individual psychology and psychoanalysis simply cannot be lumped together and taken as the same merely because they are boughs from one trunk. Such ideas do both Freud and Adler injustice, and lead to gross misunderstanding of both thinkers. The divergence of the theories does *not* rest on single and personal differences of opinion rooted in the same manner of thinking. It is not a cleft, but the separate development of two systems in diametrically opposed directions.

The section on the historical development of psychoanalysis pointed out that science was passing from the observation of single parts to the observance of the totality. This motif can be seen in all contemporary striving to grasp life as a whole, as a significantly functioning totality. Individual psychology holds itself nearer this spirit of unification than psychoanalysis and consequently believes that it has passed far beyond psychoanalysis.

What do individual psychology and psychoanalysis have in common? First, as already indicated, the object of their work: clarification and cure of the neuroses. Both are set against the belief that neuroses are of organic origin, and fight for the acceptance of the psychogenesis of neuroses. Their psychic symptoms *are always*, while their organic symptoms *can be* psychically determined. A brooding compulsion, for example, can be understood and cured only psychically. Dizziness can be a psychic or a purely physical symptom. Both psychologies assume that the psychic causes of neuroses lie in the unconscious, the significance of which, however, is different in the two systems. Both doctrines emphasize the importance of childhood experiences for a neurotic disposition, and base their curative measures on a search for a correct interpretation of these experiences. But they differ in opinion as to what is correct.

Individual psychology insists that psychoanalysis is not a genuine interpretative psychology, but like every naturalistic psychology, an explanatory one. Psychoanalysis is based on the principle of cause and effect, like every explanatory science, applicable only to "dead" material, whereas an interpretative psychology must be oriented finalistically. Life is movement. Every movement comes from somewhere and aims at something. If it did not proceed to something else it would not be movement. The significance of a human being's mental movement is identical with his goal. If we ask any one for the sense of his life, this means that we want to find out his end goal. Psychic life is therefore to be grasped only with the aid of a causal-final or dialectic method which connects origin and end of mental movement. The human being is understandable to psychoanalysis from one point only and to individual psychology from two. *Causa* and *finis* are the two determinations, and *finis* the decisive one. Every human being lives toward a tomorrow, toward a future. Where this thought fails, life loses its value, and finally itself. The differences between individual psychology and psychoanalysis arise of themselves out of these fundamentally varying views and the widely diverging results of their studies. The opinions as to the cause and structure of the neuroses, the part sexuality plays, the pleasure-pain principle, the construction of the human character, the individual's position in the community, are basically unlike.

Psychoanalysis says the neurosis is the result of a conflict among the drives in the unconscious. The neurosis breaks out like an infectious disease. A marital conflict is represented by psychoanalysis as a drive conflict between an incestuous desire for the father and a general sexual drive directed toward the husband. Psychoanalysis says the cure is effected by reconciliation among the drives. Individual psychology has it that every neurosis is an arrangement the purpose of which is to evade dreaded life tasks or problems and excuse the evasion by a sickness "legitimation." The neurosis is an active, but negative accomplishment. It does not break out, but is latently present

and becomes manifest under certain pressure conditions. Psychoanalysis postulates a rigid scheme of mental construction. Individual psychology says that whenever the mind is compressed into a rigid scheme it is neurotic. Every schematization, every stereotyping (conscious-unconscious, fight of the Ego against the Id, masculine protest, tendentious apperception and so on), is a neurotic war weapon. Psychoanalysis believes that the patient really struggles against his neurosis, and so justifies him. Individual psychology does not believe this, but asserts the neurosis is a self-made arrangement and the ostensible struggle against it part of the same arrangement.

A rough simile will be helpful. There is smoke in a room. Psychoanalysis opens the window. The smoke grows less but the fire remains. Psychoanalysis does not extinguish it but preaches a religious-submissive agreement to it — sublimation. Individual psychology tries to extinguish the fire by removing the fuel — activation.

A concrete example: During an analysis, a woman who had come for treatment because of an anxiety neurosis, reported that when she was a five-year-old child, a man spoke to her on the street and offered her some candy. She went a few blocks with him and came to a lonely lot. There he exhibited himself to her. That terrified her so deeply that she was upset, fearful, "nervous" from then on. This episode came to light after the treatment had been going on for some time, and was related hesitatingly and stammeringly. It had been "forgotten" up to the time she produced it in the therapist's office.

Psychoanalysis claims that the cause of this woman's neurosis lies in this sexual trauma. The woman suppressed the experience, which was originally lustful, from her consciousness, but the suppressed energy kept on being active. It was forbidden to enter the conscious, so it had to find another outlet. The lust sought satisfaction and found a substitute in nervousness, in anxiety and various other symptoms. The symptoms meant that the experience called from the uncon-

scious for repetition and fulfillment in some form or other. This is a typical psychoanalytical example of how a symptom arises from sexual causes.

Individual psychology sees this case differently. When one traces a neurosis back to the patient's early childhood, one arrives almost always at remembrances resembling sexual trauma, remembrances connected with that part of human life designated as sexual by the adult. Such events impress themselves deeply and are frequently the apparent provocation of a neurosis. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that such memories are by no means always suppressed. Some people who become neurotic have, on the contrary, kept just these incidents alive and fresh in their memory and used them as motive and support for their inimical attitude toward the community. That events of such a nature are always forcibly suppressed, as psychoanalysis believes, does not hold good in every case.

The remembrance has not been retained because of its sexual content, says individual psychology, but because it has acquired a new function. It is a warning signal, a reminder lighting the neurotic's whole life. "Human beings are dangerous, be on your guard!" is the motto. Such an attack can shatter a child's feeling of security toward its fellow human beings so badly that restoration is a delicate, difficult task.

Individual psychology claims that every neurosis is based on a disturbance of interhuman relationships and not, as psychoanalysis thinks, on a disturbance of the drives within the individual. Consequently sexuality cannot play an independent part in the neurosis and is only a symptomatic expression of the disturbance between human being and human being. Psychoanalysis says sexuality is a drive that determines a human being's conduct. Individual psychology says that the individual is an organism in which sexuality is a function along with many other functions. The human being is above it. He is always a unity and everything in him is subordinated to this unity. Freud destroyed the unity of the personality by the

introduction of the drives as singly independent energies. He regards the human being as a bundle of drives, as a battlefield on which the drives fight for supremacy. He sees the individual and his drives disconnectedly, conscious and unconscious separately, Ego and Id each for itself. He believes in ambivalence and multivalence, in split personalities, which Adler considers an arrangement, an unconscious deceitful game. The neurotic resembles the chess player who plays with the black and the white figures at the same time and who lets one or the other side win as it suits him. But only *one* player is playing.

Psychoanalysis is dualistic. Individual psychology is monistic; its contention is that the ostensible split in personality is brought about by one single force, the exalted goal, and that such a goal is constructed when the individual believes he is better off playing a double rôle. The products of the split, the symptoms, are used by the neurotic as a mask to safeguard himself and to awaken the appearance of non-responsibility. "I drink because a drive drives me," argues the drinker. Or because irresistible sexuality, or inherited disposition, or the malice of others, or fear or vanity compel me — so the neurotics talk themselves into their neuroses or out of the situations the neuroses produce.

Individual psychology never recognizes the inhibited or restrained energy of the drives as the cause of the neurosis; only and always a disturbance in the equilibrium of the total self. This unbalance makes itself painfully noticeable in all inter-human relationships, and since sexuality is an essential form of such relationships, the derangement of the sexual tie is striking in almost all neuroses. Individual psychology points out that Freud's pansexual theory is an exaggeration, even more, a grave blunder, a misinterpretation of the facts caused by reversal of the order of things, a misleading of the therapist by the neurotic, who obviously would prefer any theory which relieved him of responsibility.

Freud premises an inborn sexual constitution in human beings. Occupation with one's own body in early childhood, as

well as the formation of early childish sexual theories, are to be explained by the components of the sexual drive already astir in the childish organism. Adler asks: is that which children and even *nervous* adults show of sexuality really genuine sexuality? Is it a drive? Or is not this expression of sexuality much more under the influence of other powers, a changeable force in itself, which can be increased or diminished as necessary? We have seen that Adler's investigations led him to reject the primariness of sexuality and to subordinate sexuality to the primariness of the will to power and superiority. Children who suffer from an aggravated inferiority feeling and who have a scheme of apperceiving in extremes busy themselves at a tender age with the question of sex life and therefore arouse the impression of premature sexual ripeness. This sexuality, however, says individual psychology, is a manner of speaking, a jargon, an instrument usable in manifold ways on the road to security.

Psychoanalysis goes on to say that each individual is given a certain quantity of libido, and that it is possible for this libido to function wrongly by starting a conflict with the Ego. This libido, though basically hostile to culture, neither extinguishable nor reduceable, can be put to use at best by way of shifting, taming or splitting it into several channels. By the process of sublimation (the moral turn in psychoanalysis), it is possible to direct the libido to cultural accomplishment, art, humanity, friendship, etc., so that it finds an adequate satisfaction psychically.

The possibility of such a shifting of the libido, which remains quantitatively the same under all conditions, seems most questionable to individual psychology. The picture of a divertible libido-energy, transferable from the unconscious into the conscious, from one object to another, to the extent of transference to another person, appears biologically impossible. Adler does not regard this libido, which when freed from the Oedipus complex (fixation on the mother) can be turned to the wife, as libido *per se*, but as a temporary tension in feeling useful for

the moment, dictated by the superior goal of power, to which goal all drives are adjusted and subordinated. Libido and the other drives rise and sink depending upon whether we need them or not. As Wexberg remarks, the task of psychotherapy is not to transfer quantities of libido from one place to another, but to help a human being who is out of tune with himself and the world.

The differences expressed succinctly between psychoanalysis and individual psychology are as follows: According to Freud the human being is split and driven. His drives are inborn and strive in various directions, toward contradictory goals — life and death, cultural progress and cultural destruction, moral Super-ego and antimoral Id. The opposing drives tear the individual here and there. The task of psychoanalytical therapy is the disclosure of the causes of the drive conflict going on in the personality. The therapy must lead the drive conflict back from its place of banishment, the unconscious, to the conscious and bring about a respectable compromise among the drives themselves and between the drives collectively and the moral self.

Adler says the individual is a unified being. Ambivalence, split feelings, drive conflicts, opposing intentions are arranged to serve a goal and used in the last analysis to evade decisions, to make oneself non-responsible, to avoid difficulties, to safeguard oneself. His system tries to free the human being from his encystment of egocentric power fantasies. It does *not* recognize an inborn sexual constitution; still less does it recognize inborn character traits, the distinction between conscious and unconscious as two separate entities, and the shifting of energies and drive conflicts. It explains them as means and pretexts supporting an erroneous life plan. It therefore feels justified in expecting a wholly new orientation in the patient by way of a definite about-face. This new orientation consists in increase in courage, with resulting change in goal compatible with reality, augmented objectivity, self-confidence, community sense, fellow-humanness, working capacity and actual ability. The cure

is not reached when the symptoms disappear but when the ex-neurotic begins to tackle, courageously and freely, his life tasks: work, sociality, and love. He is cured when he realizes himself subjectively as an integral part of society and stops thinking of himself as the center of all things.

Freud and Adler have both paid much attention to dreams and have found that there are certain points of resemblance between nervous dreams and nervous symptoms. The dream is in sleep what the symptom is in waking life. Psychoanalysis says the dream as well as the symptom is the distorted fulfillment of a suppressed desire. Adler too holds dream and symptom to be related forms of expression. Both manifestations mirror that which the individual constantly experiences. And what does he experience? Defeats. From these come the urgent striving for security, the stereotyped behavior pattern of superiority. That is the content of neurotic dreams in a thousand variations. This struggle for safety demands slow or swift driving, pulling up sharply or making a quick detour, according to the situation. Like a coachman in his box, fear holds the reins and directs the horses of willing and thinking, feeling and emotion, sometimes spurring them on with the whip, at other times pulling and jerking them back. It is the coachman's duty to avoid the danger of a defeat, or a humiliation, a wound to self-esteem. The inferiority feeling never lets the neurotic forget the danger.

It is clear by now that individual psychology and psychoanalysis interpret even the tiniest details in fundamentally different ways. The problems are the same. The discovery and correct formulation of the problems is the imperishable work of Freud and his followers. Where the two systems diverge sharply and irreconcilably is in the solution of these problems. Freud says that Adler is right in his claim that the will to power is significant, but adds that behind it is sexuality. Adler says Freud is right in his claim that sexuality is significant, but adds that behind it is the will to power.

Psychoanalysis accuses individual psychology of appealing to

common human understanding in order to win cheap laurels from the lay public through superficial knowledge, instead of going down into the deeper regions of research with scientific thoroughness. Individual psychology meets this accusation with the emphatic statement that science is not an exalted reservation for a few chosen individuals and that the judging power of common understanding is grossly underestimated. In reality common sense is the product of the community, its compelling logic to which all people are willy-nilly subjected. He who turns against the community — as every neurotic does — lacks common sense. The science of common sense, of clear, rational human understanding liberates from neurosis. This science is accessible to everybody and applicable to and by everybody. That is why it appeals to all human beings and not only to a few especially gifted ones, and the laurels, by no means easily won, are the natural consequences of its healing power.

Adler's doctrine is fundamentally optimistic. "Everything is possible for everybody," is his belief. Obstacles can be overcome; one must only know them. Mankind, like its single components, human beings, progresses from greater to lesser errors. Individual and mankind are maturing. What has not yet been can still be achieved, for there are no absolute and definite obstacles, only relative and adjustable ones. Individual psychology believes the human being is bad, that is, asocial, only to the extent to which he does not participate in the logic of human gregariousness. Things negative, injurious to the community, are not primally present, but are produced and made effective by the individual's later experiences (and here Freud and Adler agree) which almost all occur early, especially during the child's fourth and fifth years. The education to sociality, that is, the rationalization of mental life, means also the training of individual intelligence.

Freud looks upon the individual as *a priori* socially incapable, and thus incapable of life. He is the poor victim of his drive

organization, in which the good drives arise only after the bad, and in which the good drives fight and lose to the bad, to win finally after successful psychoanalytical treatment. The conclusion is moral, *i.e.*, sublimation, struggling with and suppressing the bad, as religion has been teaching us for thousands of years. Triumph of "light over darkness," "good over bad," the conscious over the unconscious. Nothing has really changed here except the names. And so individual psychology has come to the paradoxical judgment: Freud is biblical and moral, his doctrine is a religion.

Psychoanalysis says further: the individual's victory over the bad (Id) in himself is never complete. The dualism can never be eradicated. There can never be peace nor harmony. Libido confronts reality, life is against death; ambivalence, bi-polarity, splitting and tearing are rules of existence. The whole life process is made up of opposing forces. There can be no settlement; for Freud there is a profound and an absolute obstacle. In his doctrine of escape by returning to a "lost peace," he reveals his deep pessimism.

The further we go, the greater appears the gulf between psychoanalysis and individual psychology. Only a superficial observer will or can conceive of the possibility of combining the two theories. Precisely taken, the conflict of individual psychology and psychoanalysis is analogous to the philosophic conflict between a monistic and a dualistic cosmogony. In a new sphere and with new variations the old fight is on again, a fight to win the soul of mankind which religion cultivates and science seems to deny. From this point the road leads to more complex psychological theories, hypotheses and speculations. This road we must leave our readers to follow for themselves.

It is still too early to estimate the value and permanent significance of the two doctrines. Whether we agree with one or with the other, or with neither, is still more a matter of temperament and rearing than of pure reason. It is entirely cer-

tain that both systems have contributed enormously to the theoretical investigation of human behavior and to the broadening of human consciousness. They are equally significant historically. A knowledge of the one without a knowledge of the other is unthinkable for a thorough understanding of modern psychology. Which doctrine will help mankind more can only be decided when it is known which has the greater content of truth. This only the future can show.

## SKETCH OF A COMPULSION NEUROSIS, BY ADLER.\*

PATIENT: a young woman, thirty years of age, unmarried, of the "lower middle" class and strongly religious *milieu*. She has a number of brothers and sisters, among whom is an older sister whose prettiness and charm place all the others in the shade. This fact, related at the beginning of the analysis, together with a description of the sister, reveals an important cause of an inferiority feeling upon which her avoidance of marriage is undoubtedly based. In spite of her family's desire that she marry, she tries to escape it because she fears being set aside for a prettier girl, a situation she has had to endure in her family for many years. During the first two years of her existence she was the youngest child in the family and was very much spoiled. Her inferiority feeling was consequently deepened when the pampering stopped. Children feel this change in treatment quite sharply and their inferiority feeling is greatly augmented when it takes place. Many start to develop "on the useless side" of life, to grow into behavior problem children and later neurotics.

She started at an early age to evade her problems instead of trying to solve them. Her inferiority feeling was expressed in her shyness, reserve, tendency to isolate herself, and disparagement of others. She was so afraid of failure that she never succeeded in bringing anything to a successful conclusion; so everybody thought her incapable and clumsy. She had no close friends and avoided company as much as she could. She began to suffer from moral and religious compulsion ideas before puberty. She reproached herself constantly for sins and mistakes for which she tried to atone by vows and prayers. She was compelled to make these vows for fear lest some one else in the family land in hell on account of her transgressions.

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\* *Intern. Zsch. f. Individualpsychol.*, 1926, vol. 4, 253-256.

When we empty these compulsion thoughts and acts of their content, as individual-psychological technique prescribes, a purely formal movement remains which leads distinctly from below to above. This movement accomplishes nothing useful, and does not change her relations with her fellow human beings. She has chosen what appears to her the way of least resistance, a way especially attractive because it relieves her of competition with her favored sister, namely, to become a person infallible, free from sin. She is thus wholly occupied chasing the tiniest, most ridiculous mistakes or faults, and in purifying herself. This gives her the feeling of being more righteous than others. She is not aware of the exalted position she assumes, but she takes it just as if she were. She does not realize that she has achieved superiority over her sister in this way, but it is the way in which she compensates for her feeling of inferiority. She has developed an upward striving out of the unbearable situation of being inferior to her sister. This striving serves as a consoling substitute for her feeling of not being worth anything, and promises her future triumphs in addition. She pays all the costs of this substitution, and this the more willingly as she gradually gains the legitimization of sickness for herself, which relieves her of the necessity of having to do anything useful. But she cannot mourn and complain and suffer *enough*, for the more she suffers, the greater her claim to holiness and righteousness.

The other part of her compulsion ideas confirms this upward trend. It is in her power to determine whether some one else goes to hell or not. A vow formed by her lips and he is saved. Here is manifest the godlikeness which individual psychology says is part of every neurosis. The restlessness and anxiety which trouble her when she does not utilize her omnipotence are now fully comprehensible. These, like her feeling of compulsion to utter the vow, are means of retaining her power and maintaining the behavior pattern which results from her inferiority feeling. The vitality of this girl, too cowardly to

solve her life problems, suffices only for this fictive, lying arrangement.

When she was twenty-four years old, she had a severe blow. A young man, just as weak as she, courted her. His sister objected and he at once dropped his suit. She had been hit by defeat just where she might at last have acquired a feeling of equality to her sister. Her discouragement increased and it was not difficult to have her confirm our assumption that she withdrew still further from a solution to the great problem of love. She had no further interest in men from that time on. The affair with this man was itself enough to disclose the girl's weak hold on life. She herself characterized him as a weakling. It is remarkable how difficulties always seem to pile up for just those individuals too discouraged to face their life problems; and it is their tragic fate that they so often take partners who are just as discouraged. How frail such relationships are is shown clearly in the case before us.

But one might ask, "Where does the *masculine protest* come in? Where is the feeling of feminine inferiority?" There are still some critics who regard the masculine protest as the most important tenet of individual psychology, without understanding that it is only *one* important expression of the striving for superiority. Perhaps we can grasp it more clearly when we put some questions. Why has this girl developed so far from the feminine norm? Because she was not as pretty as her sister. We may conclude from this that she believed a girl had to be pretty to have any success. This overvaluation of woman's beauty, a thoroughly masculine device, makes the woman dependent upon man's appraisal of her. This dependence is harmful as well as senseless; it rules both men and women and restricts women to an extraordinary degree. This deeply rooted attitude is to be found in all nervous women; and they are all discouraged women. The male privilege in our culture permits a falsification and reversal of the important principle of natural selection; it becomes a powerful agency used by men for

their own advantage. Our patient, who found herself in the same dependence, was forced automatically to evade the woman's rôle, not to find in it the realization of her desires, and to strive for a position of fictive power, in which she behaved as if she were doing something. She had, of course, often speculated upon how much better it would be to have been a man.

Her feminine inferiority feeling seems clear. But where is the masculine protest? Her whole neurotic style of life is rebellion against her female rôle, is striving for masculine power. One day she discovers unequivocal, active homosexual tendencies. An individual's eroticism assumes that form in childhood as well as in adulthood which belongs to his style of life as manifested in any given situation. We could have guessed easily how this girl, after having suffered defeat in normal love, would divert her unquestionably present eroticism according to her masculine protest into a channel that would exclude men. One of her many doctors, misled by the erroneousness of some sexual psychologies, seems to have believed he could cure her by making love to her. The result was a state of confusion lasting many weeks. (It is possible that the girl only imagined it; it is her reaction that matters.) This was not only another indication of her incapacity for any normal love relation, but a warning that the so-called transference must be prevented during therapy. Since she was a victim of the universal error that a woman's chief task is to fascinate a man, and since she did not believe she could do this, every urge in the direction of love only produced a panic in her. A great number of the psychoses and some neuroses arise during such a panic. The connection between this overwhelming feeling of panic and the resulting psychosis or neurosis is frequently unintelligible to the psychiatrist.

The content of her compulsion thoughts is a glaring misuse of religious forms and the manifest striving for power, — the formal, compensatory movement. They premise such a quantity of power as can be ascribed only to a god. It is up to her whether some one is to be damned to hell or saved, and so

she has to decide the fate of the human beings about her. Another compulsion thought that tormented her was that she could poison people by a glance during mealtime.

Many neurologists and psychologists will object at this point. Why is it that when the patient achieves such a feeling of power through her symptoms, these very symptoms are so painful and make her suffer? If the patient were to feel a sense of enjoyment in her power in the way that women poisoners do, without, however, having her power become any the more real for it, we should have a case of melancholia or schizophrenia before us. This means that the patient would have broken the ties connecting her to the community so far that the logic and reason forming these ties would have vanished. This is not so in a compulsion neurosis. The patient herself realizes that her compulsion thoughts are nonsensical. Absurd as they are, they are perfectly suitable when observed from the viewpoint of an individual whose goal is to detach herself from dreaded tasks. In addition, she believes herself justified in remaining on the useless side of life. She would lose this justification were she to extract pleasure from her absurd conduct. So she suffers. Another necessity to suffer comes from the success the patient has in subduing her environment. Could she make her family accede to her wishes if she presented an appearance of happiness?

Thirdly, the suffering caused by her compulsion thoughts acts as an indicator to her magic power, her magnanimity, her holiness. The more she suffers, the more apparent her power. She cannot suffer sufficiently, for her suffering is the only part of her compulsion system which tries to make some adjustment to reality. She sees only her suffering and is not aware of her power. We must teach her to become conscious of and pay attention to how her fictive power grows with her suffering. It is the vicious cycle of all neuroses.

The replacement of the neurotic system by a system of co-operation with her fellow human beings—and that is the task of individual psychology—is synonymous with the en-

couragement of the patient. It was possible to readjust the patient to social, vocational and erotic problems. The time wasted by her neurosis is probably to be regretted. But the neurosis led her to a point from which she can have a better survey of life and can divine the necessity of useful, co-operative accomplishment.

*PART THREE:*

THE CHILD GUIDANCE APPROACH TO THE  
STUDY OF PERSONALITY



## CHAPTER VII

### *THE CHILD GUIDANCE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY*

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THE CHILD guidance approach to the study of personality is a study of the total behavior of the child, its development, and its relation to a many-sided background. Personality studies, from the child guidance point of view, are attempts to learn how the child under investigation differs from other children, and the causes for these differences. It is perhaps the study of these individual variations and the interpretation given to their significance—always in terms of the setting in which they arise—that give this type of approach its differentiating stamp. To understand this differentiating process a few steps in seven league boots across the history of the child guidance movement will prepare one for the more technical ground beyond.

Psychiatric interest in the individual began about a hundred and fifty years ago when Pinel in France humanized the care of the insane. Interestingly enough, alongside this humanizing activity was his more technical concern in classification of mental disorders. While classification might seem to group individuals rather than to separate them, this procedure was

necessary in order to recognize individual variation at all. Previous to Pinel's time all mentally disturbed patients had been thrown together in the same diagnostic black hole. Following Pinel, Griesinger, and later Kraepelin, refined and delimited Pinel's work, both retaining, however, a major interest in observable effects rather than in psychodynamic causes. This typological approach obtained until the end of the last century, when the psychoanalytical point of view, with its emphasis upon early developmental influences and dynamic relationships, began to permeate and make its teachings felt upon the earlier static approach. Bleuler in Europe and Adolf Meyer in this country are seen as interesting transition figures, each stepping out toward and anticipating the new, while retaining a sympathetic faithfulness to the earlier approach. As a result of the psychoanalytical invasion there arose a preoccupation with the earlier years of childhood and their influence upon later behavior and personality development, which, as already suggested, help to give the present child guidance movement individuality.

Side by side with this development in psychiatry, comparable progress was manifesting itself in the ranks of psychology. The growth of the mental testing movement in psychology dovetailed into the interest of the psychiatrist in individual variations. The psychiatrist, busy with the emotional field, had done little but recognize gross and abnormal intellectual variations. The psychologist now supplied a measuring rod, especially applicable to children, which could mark off with precision and objectivity slight variations in intelligence. In this way the psychologist reinforced the psychiatrist's increasing attention to the child's complete make-up. The psychologist, using the same objective and quantitative methods, next made an important contribution in the measurement of individual aptitudes and capabilities, especially in the educational and vocational fields. This further contribution enlarged the scope of the study of a child's total personality; it helped, too, to hold the more subjective approach of the psychiatrist within

the bounds of strictly scientific method. The more recent development of the psychologist's interest in the nursery school — a field which the psychologists have almost preëmpted — offers the psychiatrist a human laboratory for the purpose of testing out his hypotheses with regard to the causes of variation in personality development and the value of different remedial methods.

In general medicine, two movements of interest to the mental hygienist had developed; the splitting off from general medicine of pediatrics, which later enlarged its concern with physical prophylaxis; and the growth of endocrinology, with its avowed claim of controlling the effects of heredity upon personality by means of glandular influences. The latter movement offers immense therapeutic possibilities for overcoming both the constitutional defects and the undesirable environmental influences of childhood. Theoretically, when the endocrinologists learn to "regulate personality," it will only be necessary for the psychiatrist and psychologist to outline to the glandular experts the effects to be obtained in order to do away with the present time-consuming and frequently unsatisfactory psychotherapeutic methods. The pediatrician's interest in preventing sickness and strengthening children's physical development has given him a concern with matters outside of the medical textbook. It has given him an interest in more obscure influences upon health, such as routine, posture, constitutional make-up and parental attitudes. It has brought to his attention the influence of tension and emotions in general upon the child's health. This concern with more minute physical variations of children and their relationship to non-physical factors make the pediatrician an excellent partner in a give-and-take relationship in the larger field of the child guidance movement.

From what has already been said it will be seen that study of a child's environment is important both from the point of view of understanding the development of behavior and personality, and from the point of view of treating undesirable deviations. The importance of this study and treatment of the

environmental causes of behavior deviation demonstrated itself in the evolution of psychiatric social work, which about fifteen years ago outgrew family case work and organized its own approach. Perhaps next to the changes already mentioned going on within psychiatry itself, the most important for the development of the child guidance approach is this development within the ranks of social service. In the first place, there is the actual study, on the part of the social worker, of the culture medium, as it were, in which the behavior virus is functioning. This study of the community and the child's social and family background is important not only for the rich data which are supplied for understanding children's behavior, but it yields, secondarily, a further check against hasty psychiatric diagnosis, which might in its enthusiasm neglect the evidence and the facts. Setting up machinery for carrying out the social prescriptions evolving from individual cases studied is another function of the social service worker. More recently there has grown up, as an extension of this function, more direct treatment by the worker of parental attitudes, and even of children's attitudes, a function which heretofore had usually been reserved for the psychiatrist. This enlarged activity has grown up as a result of the growth of psychiatry in the curricula of schools for social service, and as more and more workers have themselves been psychoanalyzed.

During this historical survey we have from time to time hinted at what is the underlying methodology of the child guidance approach to the study of behavior or personality. That method is essentially the method of physical science, applied, with the necessary limitations, to social science. Arthur Jones, five years of age, is referred to the child guidance clinic because of restlessness, disobedience and temper tantrums. Before any hypothesis can be set up to explain this phenomenon the facts of the case must be assembled and studied. This fact-finding process is called "getting the history," and is usually in the hands of the social worker. It is first necessary for

the worker to check up the report of the child's behavior for herself. Is it actually as reported by the parents or other original source of reference? What can the worker by her own observations and investigations add to that report? Two chief sources of evidence are open to her: (a) observing the child at home, in school, at play and in the community in general, (b) conferring with parents, relatives, teachers, and other people who know the child intimately. In these various ways she obtains a many-sided, carefully checked account of the child's personality traits, interests, activities, capabilities, aptitudes, likes and dislikes, which, were it not for the to-and-fro personality reaction between worker and informant, would have all the objective validity of a Newtonian account of falling apples. While carrying out this minute observation, the social worker, like any other scientist, keeps in mind the possible cause or causes of the behavior being studied, the child guidance approach being built upon the assumption—perhaps a metaphysical one—that personality and behavior are the effects of existing or pre-existing environmental and constitutional causes. The worker, therefore, attempts to learn as much as possible about deviations in the child's earlier development in order to relate them to present conditions. (This process, when interpreted too narrowly by those handling the case as always a cause-effect relationship, sometimes becomes a *post hoc* fallacy). In this way she is frequently able to obtain an historical view of a continuous developmental process beginning in infancy, and continuing into the present. Variations from time to time in the expression of this process can then be interpreted as due to differences in physiological, chronological, social and familial factors. In order that all examiners working with the case may be able to envisage this developmental process as completely as possible, it is necessary for the worker to learn from the informants about the child's gestation period, its medical history from birth to date, early habit formation and training, early personality development, school adjust-

ment, recreational and social life, and sexual development.\* This thorough survey of the child's life from prenatal days to date also yields valuable suggestions as to the underlying causes of the difficulties for which the child is being referred, as well as of other difficulties which the history taking process unearths. Since experience has shown that these etiological factors are frequently related in one way or another to parental influence and attitudes in addition to the child's independent experiences, the parents' lives are investigated with the same fine-tooth comb. Relatives and siblings are also studied in this attempt to trace out dynamic relationships between the child's personality and all other factors in the equation. Social, economic and cultural patterns, representing the dynamic forces of the child's larger environment and possibly influencing personality development, are also examined in an attempt to see behavior as the resultant of many varying forces, rather than as determined by any single and ever present cause.

The following social history obtained in a routine way for a case referred to the clinic because of personality difficulties illustrates this fact-finding process.† It is given in detail in order to show the thoroughness of this procedure. (The reader might be interested to learn that this history would be considered by workers in the field as of *average* quality only; the purpose is not to show what ought to be done, but what is being done.) Sources of information given in parentheses, thus: (Father.)

PALMER, PAUL

#### IDENTIFYING DATA:

White boy, youngest of two siblings, 13 years 2 months old (born 2-6-1914, verified) of American born parents. Eng-

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\* See appended detailed social history chart which is used as a guide to obtain this material.

† It will be observed that this history does not quite conform with the attached guide—the guide being the writer's own elaboration and not used in the clinic which studied the case under discussion. The writer is indebted to Dr. Henry C. Schumacher for permission to use this case as illustrative material. Names have been changed to prevent its identification.

lish spoken in the home. 8B grade, Randolph Junior High. Protestant. Living with mother, Mrs. Ethel Palmer.

PROBLEM AS REFERRED:

Patient cries very easily, has always been babied. His arm was injured some time ago but there is nothing wrong with it now. He refuses to use it.

REFERRED:

3-7-27 by mother at the request of Dr. Ray, school doctor.

FAMILY HISTORY:

*Paternal Relatives:*

*Grandparents: Grandfather*, Mr. Palmer, born about 1864. He is of Scotch descent, has spent practically all of his life in the city where he is living at present. Protestant. He had less than grammar school education. His occupation is that of constructing fire places; he does fancy work in cement and rock. At present he is in extremely poor health. He is a pleasant, easy-going man. Since before parents' divorce grandfather's sympathies have been with father. (Father).

*Grandmother*: Mrs. Palmer. She is a number of years younger than grandfather and of German descent. She resides with the grandfather. Protestant. Meager education.

*Collaterals*: There are six paternal siblings and all are living and in good health. All collaterals are married and are adequate individuals in moderate financial circumstances.

*Maternal Relatives:*

*Grandparents: Grandfather*. Mr. Schmidt. Born about 1864 in Germany. Came to the city as a boy and spent the greater part of his life and reared his family here. Protestant. He had a meager academic education. By trade is a carpenter foreman. Has always been in only moderate economic cir-

cumstances. He is in ill health, has had stomach trouble for 15 years.

*Grandmother:* Mrs. Schmidt. Born about 1864. She is of German descent, resides with her husband. Protestant. She has a meager education. She is in good health, is an excellent housekeeper.

*Collaterals:* Mother is the eldest of eight collaterals of whom six are living. Two died of influenza after reaching adulthood. One collateral is in Indiana, the others reside in the city. One brother is manager for a garage company. All are economically independent. Father and collaterals were raised as neighbors together. He feels that his wife is the superior one and that they are all rather unstable in one way or another.

#### FATHER:

John Palmer. Born 1887 in city. Protestant. He has an 8th grade education. He went to work young and never re-entered school. He is a sheet metal man, has his own business, "The Palmer Co.," which previously he jointly owned with his brother. He is also a good mechanic. He belongs to a lodge and is an active member. He is in good health and has always been so. Mother states that he is "nervous" and explains this in terms of fidgety-ness in that he will move from one side of his chair to the other and can never really remain still. Following his divorce in June 1926 he remarried in October of the same year. According to mother, for a year before their divorce their relationship had been strained. He had become unduly interested in a woman friend of the family. Before the death of this woman's husband which occurred the preceding year the two families had been very close. The men were brother lodge members and the best of friends. When the man died both parents felt that they should do all they could for the woman. She took advantage of this and would call on the father when it was

not necessary. The woman has two children, a girl thirteen and another child seven or eight years old. Mother speaks of the girl as being low grade mentally, perhaps feeble-minded. Mother states that father is a "great deal like patient." He is sensitive, has a vivid imagination, loves to go out, likes company. He mixes well with men and gets along well with them. Likes outdoor life.

*Worker's Impression of Father:* Father is a tall, well built, well-dressed man. He has poise. Considers himself a successful business man. He is talkative and inclined toward slang. He gives the impression of being something of a man about town. He came to the clinic of his own accord, having heard through his attorney that patient was to be studied here. He wished to know the cause. Since his divorce, though he has not been in the home, he knows to the minutest detail just what has been going on. Worker is unable to give his real reason for acquiring such information, but he does seem to have a genuine interest in his children and deeply wishes to resume contact with them. He feels that now particularly patient needs a man's influence and companionship and would like to be the man to supply it. He realizes that the boy avoids seeing him and feels that it is due to a child's humiliation at a parent's second marriage plus the mother's influence against him.

#### MOTHER:

Ethel Schmidt Palmer. Born 1884 in city. She is a member of the First Presbyterian Church and attends regularly. She did not finish elementary school, went to work in her early teens and was employed until the time of her marriage at 23 years of age. During her married life with father she was not employed. At present she is a saleswoman in Reed's Department Store working part time. She does not think that she will ever be able to hold a better position as she has not the necessary background for anything else. She is only

in fair health as she is passing through menopause. For a year previous to divorce mother showed jealousy of the present wife and chaffed father about her.

Mother is nervous and very high strung. She seems even-tempered and meek when things are going to suit her but she loses all control of herself when she is angry and is likely to go to any extreme. Divorce from father made her physically ill. She has no knowledge of budgeting or conservation in running of the household. Though the father made a good salary they were always in debt. Miss Day of Doan School esteems mother highly. She speaks of her as a self-made woman, one taking advantage of every opportunity. At one time she was president of the Mother's Club at Doan School. She filled the office unusually well. Miss Day further stated that she would take her word as truth on any subject, that she was an excellent mother devoted to her family, and a good housekeeper.

*Worker's Impression of Mother:* Mother is a woman of medium height and complexion, fairly well dressed on plain lines. She talks in a quiet, rather monotonous voice. Her family constitutes the main thing in her life. She never once criticized father for leaving the family. She stated that she tried to hold his affection but had been unable to. She has some insight into the fact that she has been over-protective of patient and that this has contributed to his difficulty. She is co-operative.

It was felt that father's criticism of her that she has little knowledge of real conservation may be well founded. She seems to complain to a great extent and to slightly assume the attitude of martyrdom.

#### SIBLINGS:

1. Ethel, born January 18, 1909, City. She is a member of the First Presbyterian Church. She finished two years of

high school and took a business course which covered a year. At present she is employed at the General Electric Co. She has been there only a short while but likes it very much. She is in line for advancement. She is in good health. She is interested in a boy whom she has known for a number of years. They cannot think of marriage in the near future as they are "both kids" but they are eventually looking forward to this. Mother likes the boy and approves of him. Mother's summing up of the girl is that she is just an average, normal girl. Father feels that "she thinks that she knows it all," is unusually stubborn and headstrong. When she changed from her previous place of employment to the General Electric Co. she said nothing to her mother about it until after the change had been made (Father). Shortly before father's second marriage Ethel wrote the present wife a "very disgusting letter" accusing her of everything that a woman could be accused of. Father feels that this was done under the mother's influence but it is the thing that he referred to as hastening his marriage. Taking all in all he thinks the girl is a wholesome person and capable and lovable.

2. Paul, born 2-6-1914 (verified) City. Patient.

#### HOME AND HOME CONDITIONS:

Parents were married March 23, 1908 in city, where they established their home. They lived together until the spring of 1926 when in June of that year the mother was granted a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty of father. He was accused of having an ungovernable temper, of going for days without speaking civilly to mother and of calling her names in presence of the children; of a nagging disposition and of constant complaining. He is said to have left home April 1, 1926 and to have remained away. Both parents stated that grounds on which the divorce was obtained were merely legal tools toward an end.

At time of divorce father owned two fairly valuable pieces of city property. Mother turned over all of her rights to these for \$500. At the present time father pays her alimony of \$20 per week, \$10 for herself and \$10 for patient. He has never failed to send this. The sister, Ethel, is employed, earning \$65 per month. She contributes to the family budget. Mother's wages vary in accordance with the number of days she works each week. She pays \$25 per month for house rent. She is always able to make ends meet but has little left over. Patient has no allowance but is given about 35 cents spending money a week.

Family have resided in their present home since patient's infancy. It is a five room cottage situated in what is now only a fairly desirable neighborhood. The foreign population is growing (mostly Italian of middle class) while the American population is diminishing. The home is reported to be very neat, clean and well kept. It is an old place and takes more work each year to keep it in good condition. The furniture is adequate and tastily arranged. The rooms are of medium size with the exception of the kitchen which is quite small. Patient has a room to himself and sleeps alone. The meals are regularly served and are well balanced. The family is particularly fond of steak dinners consisting of steak, potatoes, a vegetable and dessert. Coffee and tea are occasionally used. Miss Day of Doan School has eaten in the home a number of times. She described the meals as excellently planned, cooked and served.

There is a piano in the home which Ethel plays and a mouth organ and banjo-ukelele belonging to patient. All members of the family like to sing. There are a number of magazines in the home but few good books are read by any member of the family. The children have always attended church and been given strict moral training with high ideals concerning right and wrong as exemplified in their conduct. Before father was out of the home the family spent most of their

leisure time together. They were an unusually well consolidated group, had great family pride, loved to be together and to go out together. They had many mutual friends and wholesome outside contacts. Since father has been out of the home mother has tried to go on as before but it has been very difficult. Her brother-in-law will frequently take the family out. Father more than mother has dropped out from the old group. Both sister and patient are encouraged to entertain their friends in the home, which they do.

Mother's story of the married life is that conditions were very satisfactory until a year preceding the divorce. Even at this time she wished to hold father and did all that she could to do so. His story is that little by little he lost all faith in her and that the last few years of their married life were as unsatisfactory as they could possibly be. He stayed away from home much of the time. Their sexual relationship was unbearable. After the divorce the children were told that their father had left his family for another woman (Mother, Father). They were hurt but kept up some contact with him until he was married and then broke all ties. At school patient recently was asked concerning his father; he broke down, cried and said that his father was dead (Mother).

If the girl sees him on the street she openly cuts him, refusing to recognize him. After the boy had hurt his arm the father was very much upset. One day he had his attorney, Mr. William Carr, call Ethel and tell her that in 20 minutes he would be over if they would be at home and could see him. She stated that they would be there. When he arrived he found the house locked and a note on the door saying that they had gone to the hospital and would not be back that afternoon. He later learned that they were both home and watched him from the window (Father). The divorce decree gave him the "right and privilege to visit the children at all reasonable times." The mother states that the boy now hates the father. He idolizes her. She in return is

bound up in him and has always been over-protective, shielding him and making him to a degree feminine and something of a baby. She has never wanted him to fight or to be much away from home. Father has tried to encourage fighting but was unsuccessful. Mother has felt that the boys in the neighborhood were not his equal and that he should not play with them. Recently he has been considering hiking with a group of boys to a certain country estate where they know the caretaker. They can fix their meals out and sleep in the barn. Mother does not really want him to go and has been telling him how dark it will be there and how large he will find the rats. As punishment she generally just "scolds" him. The father used to make him sit in a corner. He has been whipped for what were considered serious offences but this was not often (Mother). When mother is angry she is then likely to beat the boy unmercifully (Father). Miss Day's (Doan School) first contact with the family was father's visit to the school in 1915 concerning the conduct of Ethel. She had left school, pretending that she was ill and had worked this same excuse with mother. She was not ill and the father saw through it at once. Frequently it came out that father was a better judge of the children's motives than mother. The parents have never greatly conflicted in their methods of discipline and supervision and have never openly criticized or opposed the other in the presence of the children. Ethel and patient get along agreeably together except when patient endeavors to monopolize his sister's company which causes conflict.

#### PERSONAL HISTORY:

Paul Palmer. Born February 6, 1914 (verified) City.

*Impression:* Physically he is a well developed boy. He is a decided blond with light hair and fair complexion, good features. He is unusually well mannered.

*Developmental:* Parents were in good mental and physical condition at time of conception. Nothing outstanding in mother's condition during pregnancy. Birth was normal, infant weighed 11 $\frac{3}{4}$  lbs; was breast fed for two months but the mother's milk didn't agree with him. Bottle was supplemented, nutritional difficulties persisted until 9 months when infant was put on cow's milk. This seemed to agree with him. He cut his first teeth at 9 months; was walking and talking clearly at two years of age. Before his first birthday he had double pneumonia and was seriously ill. Seemingly there were no sequelae.

*Health:* When about three years old he had whooping cough which went into double pneumonia. He was quite ill and this was followed by asthma. He was troubled with asthma for two years but it has not recurred again. At five years of age he had his tonsils and adenoids removed. "Took all the children's diseases that came along" though never had diphtheria, scarlet fever nor small pox. He has never been vaccinated for small pox as father does not believe in vaccinations. (Father had a friend who was vaccinated, later took small pox and died.) The last of November 1926 patient had a pain in his right arm which bothered him considerably. It seemed to follow merely stubbing his toe. On December 1st he went to the out-patient Department of the Sloan Hospital. They could find nothing wrong but "treated" the arm on Dec. 3rd and Feb. 12th he was discharged. A few weeks following this he fell at the gym in school and fractured a bone at the elbow. This was given adequate attention. It was later X-Rayed and the condition found to be all right. As yet patient cannot be made to use this arm. This term he was given a superficial examination by Dr. Ray which was essentially negative in all details. He was found to be a well developed boy. Recently patient had a bilious spell culminating in acute indigestion. For a number of months he

has not looked well, and is becoming sallow. The family doctor is Dr. Louis Ahern, 1413 Gunn Ave.

*Puberty:* Puberty is being established.

*Habits:* He has fairly regular bed hours. He is frequently restless at night and dreams a great deal but mother does not know the content of these dreams. He has regular meals, is a "heartly eater." On the whole he is not finicky about his food although he dislikes one or two vegetables, including carrots. He is very fond of desserts and sweets. Occasionally he will drink coffee and tea when he comes home to lunch. Personally he is clean and interested in his appearance. He has many fears. He is very much afraid of the dark and does not want to be left alone at night. He has a Knight of Pythias sword which he insists upon hanging over his bed for protection in case of need. Although he loves animals his fear is also concentrated on dogs. Mother cannot recall an occasion where he has either been bitten or frightened by a dog. No enuresis. There is no suspicion that patient has ever masturbated. He has been given little sex information, has made few inquiries on the subject. He does not smoke.

*School:* Patient entered kindergarten at Doan School when six years of age. He attended regularly through the grades in this school. His grades were about average. Mentally he seemed to be just average and a plodder. He was extremely well liked in this school and "all the teachers made a great fuss over him." (Mother and Miss Day's report.) He took elocution there and recited for the classes. Miss Day thought that he had talent in this line. He was well liked by the pupils. He never gave any difficulty, was refined, well mannered, a "perfect gentleman." Miss Day considered him a thoroughly normal boy with unusually good home training.

*Impression:* Miss Day is a woman past middle age. She has firm ideas of right and wrong but would always give one the benefit of a doubt. She is intelligent. Is much attached to

patient and though he is no longer in her school she would be anxious to do what she could for him.

Since entering Junior High patient has been in Randolph School. He is now in 8B. His grades for 7B and 7A are as follows:

	7B	7A		7B	7A
English	76	70	Manual Training	75	70
Mathematics	72	70	Mechanical Drawing		78
Hygiene	95	75	Music	75	80
Geography	73	70	Physical Training	75	70
History		70	Metal	70	
Applied Art	75	82			

In 7A he really received 69 in Physical Training instead of 70 which failed him in that subject. A number of his teachers thought it unfair to hold him back on account of that and took the matter up with Mr. Hall, the physical training teacher. He would not change the grade a figure so it was changed over his head and without his knowledge. He thoroughly disliked patient. Miss Wright's opinion of him is that he is a thoroughly disagreeable character.

Patient's present grades to date are English P; Mathematics D; History P; Manual Training P. Practically every teacher gave the same criticism of patient concerning his work which is that he has done nothing. He has used his arm as an excuse. In mathematics at the beginning of the term the teacher suggested to him that he try to use his left hand to do his problems with. He would not consider this, he has not followed the class and has merely used the period as a study hall. In English it was the same thing; there he did not even do the required outside reading that could have been done.

Miss McGowan, home room teacher, was interviewed. She considers patient a "perfect lady"; if he desires a library permit he is overly polite in his requests for it, etc. This term

she has found him frequently using his arm as a means of getting out of things. He comes up to her saying that he feels ill and had better go home. He gives the impression of having been greatly babied for many years. He has little self reliance.

*Impression:* Miss McGowan is a person who is fully down to earth, so to speak. She seems to be very practical, to lack imagination. She is a woman who would be greatly annoyed by one of patient's personality. She is pleasant, co-operative.

Miss Wright, patient's English teacher of last term, was talked with. She feels that patient has one of the most desirable dispositions of any child that she has ever known. He is always pleasant, affable and agreeable. He cannot be downed and takes corrections gracefully. After a scolding he is willing to start over again and do the best that he is capable of doing. Mentally he is slow to grasp but if made to he will stick to a thing. She feels that his present idling in class is more of the teacher's fault than his own. She thinks that he was liked by the group.

He has much school loyalty. For an entertainment around Xmas he volunteered to bring a box of fudge from home though he did not think he could be present. Last fall he memorized a Scotch poem in dialect to give to the class and learned a Scotch dance of the Highland Fling variety. Miss Wright thought that he gave the poem excellently and that he has histrionic ability.

*Impression:* Miss Wright is very fond of patient, so much so that she fails to see his faults and exaggerates his good points. She is aware of this herself and remarked on the fact. Though she does not have the boy in her class this term she is willing to go to any amount of trouble to help him.

Miss Fitch, in charge of the dramatic club, was seen. Last fall she tried patient out in two plays and decided that she

could never use him again. He did not come to rehearsals regularly, was much slower than the others in learning his lines and due to these two reasons made the group impatient. Above all she cannot see that he has any ability, he "orates" but produces nothing.

*Work:* Patient has no work record. He has no special task to do at home but occasionally helps with the dishes and other small chores around the house.

*Interests and Recreation:* Mother stressed patient's interest in Dramatics and his excellence along this line. She told of his connection with the club at school. When in his first year of grammar school he took elocution. During this time he was called "sissy" on this account and has not taken it since though he still likes to recite and participate in plays. He once won 13 first prizes for recitations. He is interested in music. When younger took piano lessons from Miss Fisher of the Y.M.C.A. He has not kept this up. He plays the mouth organ and is trying to learn a few pieces on the banjo-ukelele. He has a pleasant voice and likes to sing. He belongs to the Boy Scouts and infrequently goes on some of their hikes. He likes swimming and is pretty good at this. (Loves animals, particularly horses.) He goes to a picture show about once a week. His favorite pictures are the comedies and Western ones, he thinks Harold Lloyd and Tom Mix are great. He is a very poor reader though recently has been reading a number of Tom Swift books. He frequently amuses himself around home by reprinting newspaper onto white paper, knitting or merely idling. His ambition is to be able to attend the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

*Companions:* Since father has been out of the home patient's life has been devoid of any adult male influence. He has no close companion who is a boy; in fact he has few companions. Since his early childhood the mother has not considered the neighbor boys fit associates for him and he has

been denied their company. He does occasionally go with the Boy Scouts. Most frequently he plays with the little girl next door, who is eight years of age. He is associated with his mother and older sister. He is becoming closely attached to his mother and dependent on her.

*Personality Traits and Conduct:* Dr. Ray, school doctor, first noticed abnormality in patient's personality when he became associated with him due to the difficulty with his arm. The arm, as far as Dr. Ray can see, is in good condition but patient refuses to use it. He holds the hand rigid in a paralytic position. At home he tries not to use the arm or hand but occasionally forgets himself and uses it. In a conversation concerning his father he cried. Dr. Ray believes him masochistic. Mother spoke of patient's crying which he seeks refuge in frequently and for the slightest cause. In his relationship to other boys he is cowardly, in a scrap will "back water." He has never had a fight. He day-dreams. He has an unusually vivid imagination. He tells tales about his activities that are very doubtful though they have some semblance of truth to them. Mother never tries to verify these as she wishes to take the boy's word at face value. He frequently tells these "fanciful lies or imaginary stories" to gain the center of the stage. He is somewhat uppish and plays to the grandstand. Earlier one of his principal difficulties with children was due to the fact that he always wanted to be "it." Mother feels that he is really entertaining to adults and well liked by them. He is very affectionate, being particularly devoted to all members of the family.

#### WORK OF OTHER AGENCIES:

Sloan Hospital O.P.D. Patient entered there for examination of his arm. Dec. 1, 1926, was treated and dismissed 2-12-27. He has not been back since.

Central Visiting Nurse Association. The Social Service Clearing House gave a record of the family's contact with

this agency on January 29, 1918. All records of the Visiting Nurse Association of that far back have been destroyed.

#### DISPOSITION:

The School is willing to co-operate as the clinic sees best but has no suggestion to make.

The father greatly desires to re-establish his contact with the boy and wishes advice of the clinic as to the desirability of this. He will co-operate in any way.

The mother is thoroughly interested and co-operative.

ELIZABETH CLARKE

*Social Worker.*

The worker, having obtained the above material, sums up her findings as follows:

#### PROBLEM:

Patient's arm was injured in February 1926 but is now in normal condition. He refuses to use it and makes it an excuse to get out of many duties and school work. He is restless during sleep; has a fear of dogs; is afraid of the dark and of being alone at night. He is cowardly, has no close friendship with boys his age, plays to the grandstand and must be "it." He cries on the slightest provocation. He day-dreams and has a vivid imagination which manifests itself in imaginative lying. He is emotionally upset over the father's second marriage. In manner is outstandingly feminine.

In school patient is barely passing in all his subjects and is uninterested in his work.

#### HISTORICAL DATA

Both paternal and maternal grandfathers have cancer. Father, forty years of age, has an 8th grade education, is a

sheet metal man and owns his own business. He is in good health, though he is said to be nervous. Following his divorce from mother in June 1926 he married again in October. The woman he married had for years been a close friend of the family. Following her husband's death a year previous, according to mother, she had taken advantage of parents' friendship and purposely started out to make father dissatisfied with his family. Father considers his marrying her partly mother's fault, as after the divorce the mother with her jealousy and open condemning criticism of the woman, forced him to go to her. Father is sensitive, has a vivid imagination, loves to associate with a group. He is interested in his family and knows all that has been going on in the home since his absence. He would like to resume his contact with the family.

*Mother* is 43 years of age. She did not complete elementary school and was employed before her marriage. At present she is passing through menopause. Father gave for her a long history of sexual misconduct which he feels caused a great deal of marital difficulty and ended in the divorce. She is nervous and high strung, losing control of herself when she is angry. She has little knowledge of budgeting or conservation in running the household. Her family constitutes the main thing in her life and in caring for the various members she has put forth much effort. Patient is the younger of two siblings. The older girl, now employed, completed two years of high school and took a business course. She is said to be an average normal girl but is somewhat stubborn and headstrong and "thinks she knows it all." She is interested in a boy whom she hopes later to marry.

### *Social*

The divorce, which was granted to the mother, gave her custody of the children and to the father gave the right to see them at any reasonable time. Until just preceding the

divorce the home had never been broken. Economic status of the home is above marginal. All housekeeping facilities are adequate. Patient has a room to himself and sleeps alone. The children have been given strict moral training with high ideals. There was great family pride and before the divorce the family was an unusually well consolidated group. Patient and his sister have broken all ties with the father and refuse to recognize him on the street. Patient is said to hate him. Mother is bound up in the boy and has always been over-protective and shielding of him. Father tried to encourage him to be self-assertive and feels that he now needs a man's influence and companionship. Patient is generally scolded for a misdemeanor but has rarely been whipped.

Patient's development included normal pregnancy, birth and early infancy. He has had double pneumonia twice. At three years of age pneumonia was followed by asthma which persisted for two years. Since then he has never been seriously ill. Puberty is established. He has been given little sex information and has made few inquiries on the subject. He progressed regularly through the grades. He is very affectionate and is becoming closely attached to his mother.

From this history and summary it will be observed that the worker attempted to relate both this boy's problems and his general personality development to his own individual experiences from birth to date, to the environmental stresses and strains both in and out of the home and the interaction between these two groups of influences. Some possibly significant findings so far as the boy's own side of the equation is concerned are his ordinal position in the family with an older, more independent sister ahead of him; the discrepancy in age between the patient and this sister; the early feeding difficulty of the boy and its relationship to the mother's milk supply; his prolonged poor physical health; his more recent accident; limited and atypical interests and companions amounting to a sissified

attitude; his dreams, fears and fanciful stories; a diminishing interest in school work and a correspondingly increasing interest in home; his poor social contact with adult men, especially his father; and his mixed relationship to women. On the other side of the interaction there stand out as intra-familial factors the divorce of the parents and their disturbed sex life; the father's remarriage and the mother's relative solitude; the previously close family ties; the mother's over-solicitous attitude toward the boy; the mother's high-strung nature, aggravated by the menopause, and her questionable intelligence; the father's capability and his keen interest in the children; the strong religious atmosphere of the home. Moving away from the home to other branches of the family one comes across as possibly important causal factors underlying the case the divided attitude of the relatives towards the parents' divorce, the questionable stability of the mother's siblings. Social, economic and cultural influences which might have some bearing on the study are the rather poor social and educational background of both parents, especially of the mother; the mother's present economic needs compared to the father's independence; the mixed racial background of the parents; and in the case of the father, the strong conventional (Scotch) pattern. The influx of Italian families into the neighborhood should also be considered in connection with the presence of any possible cultural conflict in the home.

In some clinics the worker puts these factors together and adds an interpretative summary in which, on the basis of her own insight and experience, she attempts to suggest an hypothesis which will explain the facts as summarized. In the present case the full history was placed in the hands of subsequent examiners without this tentative formulation and interpretation. The pediatrician, psychologist, and psychiatrist were thus given the facts upon which to base their own hypotheses and interpretations of those aspects of the problem pertinent to their field, and then set free to check this explanation against the data brought out by direct examination of the patient or pa-

tient's relatives. (Frequently the psychiatrist interviews the parents independently to check or elaborate upon material obtained by the social worker.)

The first examiner to see the subject is usually the pediatrician. From his study of the history of this case he would be interested in investigating these questions: Is there a physical constitutional basis for the boy's sissified behavior? Is there any evidence of delayed sexual development? What influence did Paul's earlier illnesses have upon his physical development and his later conduct? Is there any adequate organic cause to account for the paralysis of his arm? What are the reactions of the boy toward his own body? Are there any body zones toward which Paul over or under reacts?\*

In this case the more conventional type of physical examination was carried out.

#### PHYSICAL EXAMINATION

Name — Paul Palmer   Age — 13   Sex — Male   Date — April 8, 1927  
Ht.  
Wt.

Height — 63½"   Weight — 109   Weight for Height — 109%   Variance  
Wt.   O.K.  
Ht.

General Observations: Fairly well developed. Pallid features. Heavy respiration.

Skin: Warm, moist, smooth.   Skull: Negative

Eyes: O.K.   Vision R.   Not tested   Ears: O.K.   Hearing R.   O.K.  
L.   L.

Nose — No anterior obstruction.

Mouth and Pharynx: Tonsils removed. Mucous membranes of post pharyngeal wall injected.

Teeth: In good condition. Endocrine System: Thyroid palpable, soft consistency.

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\* This latter type of investigation is best carried out by means of the psycho-physical examination organized by Dr. David M. Levy, Institute for Child Guidance, New York City.

## 282      APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY

Glands: Ant & Post Cervical + +    Axillary — Epitrochlear +  
Inguinal + +

Chest: Rather flat chest. Symmetrical, expansion good.

Lungs: Clear to percussion and auscultation.

Heart: Not enlarged, no murmurs, sounds regular — Pulse Rate  
72 — Blood Pressure — S 108 D 68

Abdomen: Negative to palpation and percussion.

Genitalia: Testes descended. Puberty established.

Bones and Joints: Negative. Right elbow bruised. No definite deformity or limitation of motion.

Posture	Erect
Spine	Flexible
Pelvis	Negative
Extremities	Hands cold

Neurological:

Pupils Round; equal reaction to light and accommodation

Strabismus    None                      Nystagmus    No.

Cranial Nerves    O.K.

Reflexes: No pathological reflexes.	Superficial	2 plus even
	Deep	2 plus even

Gait O.K.                      Station O.K.

Tremors	Outstretched hand	Involuntary Movements	None
		Co-ordination	Good

Vasomotor Disturbances    1 plus dermatographia

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Behavior during examination: Co-operative, mildly apprehensive.

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Summary: General development good. Heart, lungs, abdomen, negative. Neurological negative. Right elbow shows old bruising. No definite deformity and no limitation of motion noted.

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Recommendations: None

Signature

H. R. Theller, M.D.

The findings from this examination suggest that no physical factors are playing an outstanding part at the present time in shaping Paul's behavior. His general development is normal and free from the constitutional bias for which one would be tempted to search. His sexual development is adequate. Earlier illnesses have left no organic sequelae. No demon-

strable lesion can be found to account for the disuse of the right arm. His reactions to his own body were unfortunately not learned during this examination.

The psychologist, having learned from the pediatrician about the absence of physical reasons to account for the subject's disturbed personality development, is ready to pursue her own investigations with added vigor. From the history she has learned about Paul's social background, the questionable intelligence of the mother, the limited education of both parents, the poor reading habits of the household. She will be much interested in discovering what influences these factors may have had upon the boy's intelligence, upon his uneven showing in different school subjects and upon his more recent general scholastic slump. She will be interested, too, in discovering whether his inadequate social development is related to any intellectual difficulty, whether they are both part and parcel of a more general immaturity. His musical interests would also warrant investigation: are they founded upon any true ability? Independent of Paul's problems she will be concerned with learning what his general mental make-up is like, what special scholastic aptitudes or disabilities he might have, what vocational possibilities lie ahead of him. Realizing, too, that during the test situations she has a controlled laboratory set-up, the psychologist will keep in mind the importance of the boy's qualitative reactions, and thus add further objective material to the study of Paul's behavior.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION

Name — Palmer, Paul      Date — 4-8-27

Examiner G. Young      Date of Birth 2-6-14    Age 13 yrs. 2 mo.

##### *Intelligence Examinations:*

Stanford-Binet: (Basal Year X; Completely failed XVIII)

Mental age 14 years 1 mo.      I.Q. 107

##### *Supplementary Examinations*

Stenquist Mechanical — Score 64: exceeded by 22.6% 14 year olds.

*Educational Achievement*

Test Stanford Achievement Advanced	Present Grade	8 B
Examination, Form A — Score	59.1	
Graded above C.A.	0 Below C.A.	0 Educational age 12 yrs. 8 mo.
Graded above M.A.	Below M.A.	½ Average Grade for C.A. 8 B.
Graded above E.A.	1½ Below E.A.	Average Grade for M.A. 8 A
		Average Grade for E.A. 6 A

Subject	Name of test	Score	Subject Age	National & Cf. Cleveland Norms
Reading	Stanford Achievement	161	12-6	6.7 Below 75%ile 6 A
Paragraph Mean.	"	72	13-3	7.5
Sentence Mean.	"	42	12-1	6.3
Word Meaning	"	47	12-5	6.6
Arithmetic	"	172	12-0	6.2 Above Med. 6 B
Computation	"	100	11-8	5.8
Reasoning	"	72	12-7	6.8
Nature Study & science	"	65	14-9	8.8
History & Literature	"	39	13-0	7.3
Language Usage	"	30	13-5	7.6
Spelling	"	124	12-8	7.0 Above Med. 6 A
Teacher's Estimate of ability	Average School Grade			

*Behavior during interview:* Patient was completely co-operative at the clinic. He performed all educational and mechanical tests without question, using his right arm continuously. He is very effeminate in appearance and conversation. This effect is enhanced by the fact that the varnish was just disappearing from his fingernails and he showed the effect of an amateur manicure.

*Emotional factors revealed:* Patient likes to cook and apparently does not mind housework. He makes it his habit to do a lot of dusting and always helps with dinner at night. Says that the household schedule is so planned that dinner is

ready in the evening when the mother comes home. Patient admits that he is awkward in playing baseball and that he does not do as well as the other boys.

Patient mentioned the fact that he was reading Lamb's "Tales from Shakespeare" and that he got a big kick out of reading the Altschelder books. Patient's ambition is to go to the Naval Academy. He was unable to give any reason for this decision but says that this has always been his ambition from an early age.

Patient mentioned playing with several girls in the neighborhood and he hauls around in a coaster wagon the little girl next door. Says that he has begun the study of music and that he wants to study piano before beginning violin. This concurs with his mother's plan who assures him that he will never be able to play the violin properly unless he knows piano. Says that he took music lessons several years ago but that neither he nor his mother was satisfied with the two or three music teachers that he tried.

*Aberrant responses on the Stanford-Binet:* The patient did a very peculiar thing on the Ball and Field Test. He took about ten minutes to thoroughly cover the field, laying it off in sectors and then doubling on his tracks. From the minuteness with which the field was covered it may be inferred that his responses on a Rorschach <sup>(1)</sup> examination would be very circumstantial and minute. For this reason more than any other it is suggested that the patient return for a Rorschach test.

*Summary:* This indicates high average general intelligence. There is a scatter on the Stanford-Binet examination over four test years. There is nothing unusual with the exception

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<sup>(1)</sup> This is carried out through a specially devised series of ink blots with already partially standardized scoring norms. It originally aimed to make through the subject's visual associations with these blots a survey of personality, including intellectual level. This latter use is not being emphasized as much by the American workers using this material.

of his type of figure on the Ball and Field Test which has been outlined above.

His educational accomplishments are inferior both for his present grade placement and in relation to his general mental ability as revealed by this examination. He shows 6A grade achievement in reading and arithmetic, and 7th grade achievement in history, language and spelling. Undoubtedly this examination reflects his disinterestedness and his unwillingness to submit to school room methods and shows that he has absorbed practically none of the material that has been presented in the course of the year.

His mechanical aptitude is high average for boys of his age. His present location in grade 8B is correct with reference to his life age, is  $\frac{1}{2}$  below the level of his mental ability but is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  grades above the level of his present school accomplishments. On the basis of intelligence alone he should be able to meet school requirements satisfactorily for grade 8. He might be expected to do High School work satisfactorily. However, this factor must be discounted in light of the personality findings.

*Recommendations:* It is suggested that he continue in his present school placement, that no attempt be made to tutor him and that he be failed unless he does the work. It is felt that the school is on the right track in making it easy for him to commence using his arm once more.

G. YOUNG,  
*Psychologist.*

From our point of view the psychologist's report shows that Paul does not deviate intellectually in any extreme way, and that his scholastic difficulties are due mainly to limited interest in school work, rather than to lack of ability or special ineptitude. The test situations also revealed in one instance the existence on Paul's part of over-conscientiousness. These findings, together with the negative physical examination, are

of much interest to the psychiatrist since they place almost entirely upon him the burden of explaining Paul's problems and his other personality deviations.

After reading the history and studying the reports of pediatrician and psychologist, the psychiatrist's general and tentative formulation of the underlying factors in this case would be as follows:

Paul was presumably a much wanted child due to the mother's long period of sterility following the birth of his older sister. After his birth there occurred one of Mrs. Palmer's periods of unfaithfulness (to be checked up later by psychiatrist in interview with mother). This episode would heighten her self-accusatory feelings when lactation ceased and Paul subsequently developed feeding difficulties. This mother-child bond was intensified by Paul's long series of serious illnesses. On Paul's side the attachment to his mother was increased by the presence in the home of an older aggressive sister. Between brother and sister jealousies developed. Thus were engendered the beginnings of a sissified make-up. This relationship between mother and son did not express itself in its full vigor while the father's sociability dominated the home. His departure from the house gave the boy a chance to take the father's place. Paul now took charge of the household, as it were. These duties were incompatible with attendance at and interest in school. An accident to his arm supplied the necessary conventional tool to make possible this unconventional relationship to his home and mother. In the meantime her needs for the boy's attention and affection were increased as her daughter's interests took her out of the home in the company of boys, and as her husband's companionship — as well as most of his economic support — were withdrawn. Never a very intelligent woman, Mrs. Palmer could not be expected to work out her problems with judgment. The presence of the menopause, too, added to her difficulties and made her need

for solicitude more acute. The relatives did not come to her support. In order to obtain from Paul the support she needed Mrs. Palmer closed down more firmly upon his extra-mural activities, thus taking away from him opportunities of balancing through group activity a skewed personality development.

In connection with this formulation the psychiatrist will further wonder how large a part a sex conflict is playing in this case, and be interested in the following evidence. Paul is going through puberty, and therefore experiencing physiological sex irritation. The separation of the parents was due to overt sex indiscretions about which Paul knew. The home had a strong religious atmosphere which would tend to intensify any conflict. The critical attitude of the relatives and the shift downwards in neighborhood standards would also help keep alive conventional taboos. A boy going through a period of sex consciousness is living in an environment where in and out of the home sex life is functioning in its more sordid aspects. In this sexually weighted and conflicting setting Paul is given and assumes the rôle of the father. Is he subconsciously interested in taking on the father's complete function in the home? Is the ability to use his arm only in this specially constructed home atmosphere indicative — and symbolically, if you like — of that desire?

The psychiatrist in order to test out this hypothesis will in his contacts with Paul look for evidence along these two main lines: (a) signs of thwarted social development as a result of the relationship to his mother, (b) signs of sex conflict. It is quite possible that many interviews will be necessary to establish confirmatory or destructive evidence for the latter hunch because of the unacceptable (to the boy) nature of the conflict and Paul's general immaturity. In the course of obtaining

this material the psychiatrist will have the opportunity of making a more general personality study. He will for this purpose start off by attempting to establish contact with the boy. In the present case one would suspect that this contact might be difficult to obtain because of the boy's dislike for his father and hence any other man who is identified with the latter. After this rapport is satisfactorily set up the psychiatrist, perhaps guided in a very loose way by some outline \* he has in mind, will attempt to survey through discussion the child's inner mental life. Even after a workable relationship is established between psychiatrist and subject, it seldom happens that the conversational approach to a psychiatric study of children is alone adequate. (This conversational approach includes of course careful observation of the behavior and reactions of the child during the interview.) Depending upon the age of the child various supplementary techniques are open to the psychiatrist for a more complete study of personality. If the child is very young carefully selected play material (*e.g.* disjointable dolls, clay) which the child uses to act out mental mechanisms is available.† For older children spontaneous drawings frequently furnish valuable leads for the psychiatrist to follow conversationally. Mention has already been made of the possible uses of the psychophysical examination and the Rorschach test. Standardized pictures reproducing social situations have also recently been employed for obtaining a child's reactions to home and group. Story telling procedures, make-believe games, autobiographies in the case of older children, and reversing rôles of doctor and patient are other methods of obtaining material from recalcitrant subjects.

In the present case the conversational approach alone was used in the initial psychiatric interview. It yielded the following material.

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\* See appended outline for psychiatric examination of children.

† The more Freudian minded psychiatrists make much use of miniature toilets, bath tubs, and beds.

## INITIAL PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION

Contact was first had with this boy during the physical examination. He was co-operative and agreeable, mildly apprehensive and extremely self-conscious. He co-operated fairly well, verbally at least, throughout the psychiatric examination, but it was very difficult to obtain subjective material from him. He attempts frequently to impress the examiner with his fine intentions.

He stated that he was 13 years old and in the 8B of Randolph Junior High School. He took mechanical drawing and printing, history, English, Mathematics, Hygiene, Gym and Art. He was questioned as to which of these subjects he liked best and said he liked gym work the best. He admitted, however, that he was not as good in this subject as he was in some of the others and was not good in the work as a whole. He excused himself immediately for this defect on the basis that he had hurt his elbow and had not been able to go to class and did not have some of the equipment which was needed some time before; so that was the reason he had not been doing so well in this particular subject. He was questioned further along this line, that is, his adjustment with the other boys in the gym, and his ability along this line before he had been handicapped by this arm defect. He became very evasive and vague in his responses, and it was clear that the subject was quite distasteful to him. He stated that he had always passed regularly in school, and gave as his ambition a desire to go to naval college and be a lieutenant or something on a boat. He has had this idea for a long time.

He says that in his home there are three, his mother, his sister and himself—that he was twelve years old when his father left. He says he did not like his father and does not like his father at the present time. He liked his mother the better of the two, and gives as reasons the fact that his

father wouldn't have any patience with him, his father always expected him at a whistle and was always very demanding, and never had patience with him as his mother did. He says, too, that his mother helps him and tries to do things for him. He admits that his mother has had to scold and even whip him on occasion, but not very much. His mother has to scold him when he doesn't do the dishes. His father used to scold and whip him frequently.

He states that the thing he likes to do best of all is to build things. Now he is building a ship model in school. He gave cooking as another thing he liked to do. He states that he cooks sometimes at home, cooks for the family frequently, and that he made a cake once. As to getting supper and things like that, his sister does most of that work. He says he has cooked outdoors and cooked steak once and roasted potatoes.

He states that he has belonged to the Scouts since last summer vacation. When further questioned concerning his activity in the Scouts and his liking for it, he became rather vague and indifferent and said it was not always possible for him to go to the meetings. He said, however, that he went camping with them last summer and liked it very much. This year he hoped to go camping with them for a longer time.

When questioned as to whether he played with the other boys he stated that he did. He said, too, that the other boys liked him and he knew this because they chummed around with him. When questioned as to the number of boys and the type of activity which he engaged in with the group he became rather evasive and reticent in his responses, and finally replied that there were not so many around his house that he cared for. He said his mother allowed him to go out and play with the boys who lived around his house but that he didn't care for them and as a result he didn't go

with them very much. Questions as to why he didn't care for them availed little, except that they weren't interested in the things which interested him. Attempts to get at these interests also availed nothing, inasmuch as one or two which he mentioned were also interests in which other boys might readily engage. He said that when he comes home from school he usually works around the house and does what work his mother leaves for him and then he goes out and plays in the back yard. He spends his time there, he says, playing with the landlord's little daughter. There is a little boy, too, and they pull this little girl around in a wagon. When questioned as to how the group of boys his own age would look upon such activities, he admitted that they wouldn't do it, but as he didn't care for them he might just as well spend his time playing with this little girl.

He states that he goes to movies about once a week and that he likes western pictures best of any. He says, too, that he reads considerably. At the present time he is reading Charles and Mary Lamb's "Tales from Shakespeare." He likes the Tom Swift series very well.

He was questioned as to whether he had seen his father since his father left the home and says that he saw him just once; that he has never tried to see him because he didn't like him. He didn't like his father because of the way he treated his sister and his mother and that was always nagging or something, or else hollering at his mother or sister. He denied that his mother ever hollered at his father or that she ever presented any fault which would make his father holler at her. He responds to this by saying that his mother doesn't holler much, but that his father usually picked a fight and naturally she would try to hold up her own. On the occasion that he did meet his father he says it was when he was in the hospital and his father called and he didn't like him at all, and his father spent the whole time asking him questions that he didn't like.

When asked concerning those questions which were distasteful to him he said they consisted of such ideas as "Is your mother good to you?" etc.; then the boy adds "He is a dummy, because he knows my mother is good to me." He says his father has the idea he can get him away from his mother, but it is quite impossible for him to do that. He doesn't like his father and doesn't like his father's new wife, or the children either. He personally would rather be with his mother.

He was questioned as to whether he worried over anything. He responded in a rather drawling, slow manner that he did not worry much. About report card time he usually got a little concerned as to his marks because if he had low marks his mother deprived him of something that he liked very well, such as going to a show. Asked whether he thought he was different from other boys he stated that he didn't know, but followed this immediately by saying that some were awful toughs. When questioned as to whether he thought he was different he stated that in some ways he was, and added "I get a little bossy myself sometimes, and get hollered at by the teacher." Asked whether the boys called him names he replied: "No, not if they dare to." When questioned as to whether they used to call him names, "Well, no, except in grammar school when I took elocution and used to speak pieces in school." He says at that time they used to call him "sissy," but they do not call him that any more. He says at the present time he is taking piano lessons but he would like violin better. His mother said he should learn piano first and then he could take up violin. As to his speaking pieces in school he says that his mother spoke to the principal and so he got to speak at the mothers' club and in class sometimes. He was asked whether he was always obedient and stated immediately "Yes, sir." When this question was followed up, he replied by saying that sometimes he wasn't because sometimes he wanted to do

other things instead of the things his mother wanted him to do. When asked whether he whined or cried often to get his ends, after much hesitation and much questioning he admitted that sometimes he did, he didn't know why, that sometimes he got licked and sometimes he felt badly and that was the reason he cried. He added following this that his sister hollered at him sometimes and he didn't like that either and as a result that made him cry. When questioned as to why his sister hollered at him he said he did not know, it was seemingly for no cause whatsoever.

When questioned as to whether he had any dreams, he said his bicycle was stolen and he dreamed he found the person who took it, but just as soon as he found that person he woke up. He dreamed that he was in the movies, or something like that, or sometimes he was an aviator. When questioned whether he was happy in his present adjustment, in an exceedingly surprised and over-determined manner he said "Surely." He followed this by saying that this was always so except when his sister asked him to do some of her work. This he didn't like to do and it made him unhappy.

#### SUMMARY

The boy is co-operative during the psychiatric examination, at least verbally. He tends to make light of his poor group adjustment and finds excuses of various sorts for this. He says he is allowed to have contact with the boys around where he lives but that he doesn't care for them himself. He states that he is different from the other boys and gives as his reason the fact that some of them are awfully tough. He follows this up with the idea that sometimes he gets a little bossy himself and the teacher has to holler at him. He gives as the things he likes best to do to build things and to cook. He tells of playing with the landlord's little

daughter, around five or six years old, and pulling her in a wagon. He says that he does this because he does not care for the boys in his neighborhood and would just as soon be doing this for her. He does not care about their attitude toward him because of such small boy activities. He was reticent regarding being called names by the other boys, or not being considered one of them. He states that he dislikes his father very much and gives as a reason the fact that his father mistreated his mother and sister and himself and his father never had any patience with him. He says that one time when he was in the hospital his father came to call on him and one of the questions he asked was whether his mother was good to him. He said his father was a dumb-bell or he would know this. He thinks that his father is trying to get him away from his mother but knows his father cannot do this because he will stay with his mother, whom he likes much better. He says he is happy all the time except when his sister wants him to do some of her work. His dreams are regarding hero ideas. Many of his responses are quite over-determined and many of them are given with the idea of impressing the examiner with his good intentions.

H. R. TELLER, M.D.

From this initial psychiatric interview definite evidence substantiating the history already received of Paul's poor group adjustment was forthcoming. His overattachment to mother and a reciprocal dislike for father were also confirmed. The psychiatrist was impressed, too, by the way this boy had built up an artificial superstructure of conventional, and therefore socially acceptable, attitudes to impress those in authority. This mechanism might be significantly related to the presence of a sex conflict in Paul's mind, these attitudes being attempts "to hide his guilty shame." Further psychiatric interviews

with Paul are necessary before this explanation of more recent behavior can be proved or disproved.

The next step in the child guidance approach to the study of behavior is the colloquium or conference. This is usually held immediately after the initial examinations are completed. Psychiatrist, pediatrician, psychologist and social worker come together to pool their material and impressions. From this collaboration, and the two-way discussion that accompanies it, there now evolves a more certain explanation of what is happening in the case. Hypotheses give way to theories. These theories await further check.

In the present case all examiners accepted the theory of a disturbed mother-child relationship, intensified by a sex conflict on the part of both of them as the underlying causes of Paul's reactions. There was a question in the minds of some members of the conference as to whether the father was as independent and mature as he seemed; whether a hasty second marriage on his part might not suggest a need to be mothered. It was also suggested that Paul's sex conflict gave him a feeling of guilt which self-punishment could expiate. Hence Paul placed himself in situations meriting scoldings—especially from the mother. But these elaborations do not affect the main gist of the theory.

One of the ways of testing the truth of any theory is by predicting successfully what is going to happen when any of the factors in the total constellation is changed. If the law of gravitation is true, coins and feathers will, in a vacuum, fall at the same rate of speed. This same scientific method—perhaps somewhat disguised among treatment recommendations—is used in a child guidance approach. If it is true that Paul is suffering from too much mother, then treating the mother-child relationship should improve his behavior. If it is true that Paul is suffering from a sex conflict, then release from this conflict should help his adjustment. It was with this type of assumption in the back of their heads that the conferees made the following treatment recommendations:

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is suggested that he continue in his present school placement, that no attempt be made to tutor him, and that he be failed unless he does the work. It is felt that the school is on the right track in making it easy for him to commence using his arm once more.

Further psychiatric study is indicated in an attempt to uncover some of the mental conflicts existing and if possible to give enough insight into them so that a happier state of adjustment will ensue. As to what part the father should play in present treatment plans cannot as yet be ascertained. Certainly some suggestions as to change in the mother's attitude toward the boy are necessary. The idea of his later adjustment should be the basis of discussion with her in order to give her insight into how she may be playing a part in his difficulties, so that some change will take place in her attitude. Supervised group activities should be stimulated in an attempt to give the boy a better socialization and a less self-conscious feeling when with a group. Various outlets and outside interests should be attempted to help along this separating process. A camp placement seems a desirable treatment measure to look forward to as also likely to get the boy out of the home.

Treatment in this case was to proceed along three main lines: (a) further psychiatric contact with Paul with a view to releasing buried mental conflicts, (b) the social worker's contact with the mother for the purpose of changing the relationship to her son, (c) recreational and group activity for the patient to improve his attitude toward, and increase his ability to play with boys his own age. As already suggested above those actively engaged in carrying out therapy—chiefly the psychiatrist and social worker in this case—are at the same time on the lookout for further evidence relating to their theories.

From time to time group conferences among the examiners are held to consider the new data obtained, to re-evaluate the case in the light of this fresh evidence, and to change theories and treatment procedures, if necessary.

This follow-up procedure given in the following series of notes just as it occurred is one of the outstanding aspects of child guidance technique. In addition to giving this type of approach objectivity, acting as it were in the nature of "a control" or check upon theories, careful follow-up work supplies valuable material for the education of all personnel possessing an open mind and the ability to observe. It makes of the case a human laboratory wherein the conditions of the experiment can frequently be juggled around to suit the purposes of the experimenter. In spite of the personal and social nature of the material under study, it is often possible to single out and experiment with a relatively isolated variable and study its effect upon the total situation in much the same way that the chemist withdraws or adds bromides in studying the behavior of the family of halogen derivatives.

The first step in the treatment and follow-up program was a visit by the social worker to the school recorded as follows:

4-21-27 (Clark) Visit was made to Randolph Junior High to interview patient's gym teacher concerning patient's use of his arm, his ability in the gym work and his general adjustment in the class. Gym teacher was seen. His report is that the boy is still just a "visitor" in the class. He holds his arm rigidly in a sling position. That morning teacher had questioned him concerning his arm. He had complained that it was uncomfortable and that after school he was going to have it X-Rayed. Teacher thinks, in the first place, that it was very queer how he hurt his arm, and that it would seem almost impossible to do so under the circumstances. (He fell off of a stool upon which he was sitting in the gym.) In

the second place he feels that the boy is lazy and "flighty." His arm is a good excuse. His class work is average when he joins in. Teacher has 800 boys a day so is unable to give any one boy special attention.

This visit brought out the interesting impression of the gym-teacher that the accident to Paul's arm had occurred under unusual and impossible circumstances. From the point of view of our psychiatric theory one would hope to be able to learn later whether this fall was to some extent subconsciously self-imposed. Was it related to a desire to escape distasteful gymnasium? Did the fall have even a deeper significance? Was it related to a desire for self-punishment which might express itself in the virile set-up of a gymnasium?

A little later Paul visited the psychiatrist for treatment. The visit is recorded in these words:

4-28-27 (Dr. Theller) Patient came in for further interview today. He sat in the waiting room very quietly. It was noticed that he held his arms at a very secure angle across his chest and attempted in general to give the impression that his arm was still badly hurt. (His mother had telephoned previously to say Paul was using his arm perfectly at home.) However, when questioned in the examiner's office about the use of his arm he stated that he had been using it and that it was all well now. When questioned as to whether he was using it in school, with some hesitation he replied that he was and that he was getting along very well with it there. Attempts were made to discuss with him the possibilities of how he might use the fact that his arm had been hurt to his own advantage, that is, to help him in getting out of unpleasant situations in school. He was rather reticent to discuss this subject and tended to make light of the whole issue. He stated that he liked gym class and was getting along very well in this class, whereas the report is that he does very poorly in this line of work and has no interest in it.

Some discussion was had with him regarding the home situation and he gave practically the same type of responses that he did in the initial examination. He again made reference to the fact that his father was trying to get him away from his mother but that he would be unsuccessful in this. When questioned as to the exact moves which the father had made along this line he was at a loss to respond. He stated that he went to Boy Scout meetings. When questioned further he admitted that he did not always attend.

He was questioned as to his feeling regarding his position in the home and became very embarrassed and showed considerable emotional tension before responding to this question. This was especially true when attempts were made to get at his attitude toward his mother in contrast to that which he had toward his father. He was rather suddenly confronted with the question as to whether he thought he was filling the father's shoes in the home. There was a marked flushing of the face and respiratory disturbance and much hesitation before he responded. He finally smiled and began with many "Well, ur's" and finally said his mother and sister bossed him so that he couldn't be considered very much of a boss. Attempts were made to find out whether he tried to boss, but these he denied, but with the same reticence and hesitancy which he had shown in responding to the previous question.

Many attempts were made to get him to discuss his group adjustment and conduct as it might be interpreted from the standpoint of others, either boys in his grade or the teachers. This he would not do, except to say he thought they thought he was all right and they would not see anything particularly wrong with him. He was asked to think over this question, namely the various things in his conduct which might give other people a different impression than the one he himself had. He was asked to think of this especially in the light of his conduct in the past and of his actual feelings in regard to

much of the activity in which he indulged. He stated that he would do this. The boy is to return for further psychiatric interviews.

Two significant pieces of evidence tending to confirm the theory upon which the case was being organized evolved from this interview: Paul's emotional reactions in response to questions directed at his relationship to his mother; and his even greater physical disturbance when asked whether he was "filling his father's shoes in the home." One would suspect that this head-on collision between psychiatrist and subject might be a little hard on their relationship, but it was very valuable in yielding the type of material in which we are interested for the purpose of testing our case.

The mother was next seen by the psychiatrist for a lengthy interview.

5-24-27 (Dr. Theller) Mrs. Palmer came in for a clinic report on the examinations of her son, Paul. She has not been able to keep several appointments which have been made for her in an attempt to get her to come to the Clinic for this report. She is working and has difficulty in getting away from her work long enough to come up to the Clinic. Some rather lengthy discussion was had with her concerning the type of work in which the Clinic engages and the general nature of the examinations. Various examination procedures were discussed in detail and connected up with the boy's personality, and attempts were made to show Mrs. Palmer how defects might be operating to bring about certain activities in the child either through direct pressure or by roundabout ways.

The physical and social fields were especially stressed and various case illustrations were used in discussing these particular phases. She seemed very much interested in this conversation and was rather quick to apply some of this discussion in

a personal way, namely, she brought out of her own accord the possibility of her having made Paul rather dependent on her for his various satisfactions and desires. A rather long discussion was had with her regarding the discipline in the home and the need for a very careful, non-emotional type of control to bring about a better adjustment for the child.

The discussion of the psychiatric examination and the development of psychiatry and its application in the mental hygiene field were taken up with her in an attempt to show her why we were requesting the boy to return for further psychiatric interviews. Various details of the psychiatric examination were discussed in an attempt to show the possibility of various mental conflicts in this field by showing her the boy's statements in a limited degree and at the same time showing his emotional reactions and general motor activity accompanying such expression. This chiefly centered around the boy's feelings in regard to himself and in regard to his arm and his not using his arm during the school period. Discussion, too, centered around the boy's group contact and it was suggested to the mother that the boy was possibly reacting to such feelings going on within himself which were preventing him from engaging in group activities. At the same time it was pointed out that possibly he was getting much satisfaction in his present home set-up and as a result did not feel the need to become more self-reliant and determined in his efforts on the outside, and therefore would not try more satisfactory means of bringing about a better adjustment in the group. It was felt, too, that possibly some of the boy's conduct of a rather extravagant sort might also be due to the fact that he had been able to gain much sympathy and attention by use of this same conduct in the home. This was pointed out to Mrs. Palmer in an attempt to show her that maybe this did not exist but that there was such a possibility. She agreed that probably there was much more to this than she had realized.

In the discussion Mrs. Palmer was made conscious of the fact that Mr. Palmer knew of the boy's study at the clinic. It was not pointed out to her that this had not been done through anyone at the clinic but that he had heard that the boy was to be studied here and that he had come in and gave such facts as his attitude and feelings toward the boy. She showed no emotion. There was a rather short period of hesitancy but she responded very quickly and maintained her poise. She felt, however, that the father had absolutely no interest in the boy. It was pointed out to her that he still wished to have a clinic report of the boy's conduct and wanted to be of what help he could, which did not indicate that he had no use for the boy, but rather indicated that he was willing to do for him as best he could. She tended to make light of this issue, however, and to pass it off rather quickly. The impression gained during the interview was a rather favorable one. It is felt that she would be amenable to changing her discipline. A summer camp was suggested for the boy and she agreed to make further investigation of this.

The points standing out in this report are: (a) the mother's spontaneous recognition of her share in the development of Paul's character, (b) the psychiatrist's attempt to treat the mother-child relationship. The ready co-operation obtained from Mrs. Palmer—perhaps related to a desire to make amends for the damage she felt she had done to Paul—was encouraging. It meant that the clinic would have a very excellent chance of putting its treatment program into effect, and testing out its theory of the causes underlying the case.

One of the main planks in this treatment program was psychiatric interviews for Paul. He again visited the psychiatrist a few weeks later.

5-26-27 (Theller) The patient came to the clinic for further follow-up work with the examiner. He was very polite, smiled in a gracious manner on seeing the examiner and ac-

accompanied the examiner quite willingly to his office. He stated that things were going much better both at home and in school and that he was getting along all right. In response to more general questions he replied that things were going very nicely. The examiner discussed with him various outlets, etc., and camp projects. He stated that one of his cousins was going to the Boy Scout Camp and he thought that probably he would like to go to that camp but his mother had talked to him about another summer camp and he was interested in that and thought he would like it very much. He stated, too, to the examiner that he liked the Scouts and Scout activities but when questioned as to his actual attendance at Scout meetings he became rather confused in his statements. He told that on some occasions he was busy on nights that they have meetings and on other occasions he was tired or interested in reading some book and so he did not get around to the meeting. However, he was still very much interested in them and intended to take this up more seriously some time in the future.

The discussion of various activities brought up a discussion of those which he himself liked and he talked at great length about his delight in fishing. He said that he went with his uncle on several occasions and liked the activity very much. He liked to fish because it gave one a chance to sit and think, and also because it was sport catching fish and talking with his uncle. He told about the various baits that he used and also how he had been able to get minnows already canned in a hardware store somewhere near his house. The examiner incidentally was going on a fishing expedition that evening and had part of his equipment at the office. Some of this equipment was reviewed with the boy and the boy was very much interested to learn that the examiner also had a can of canned minnows much larger than the kind he had purchased and incidentally at a much lower price. This concerned the boy very much and he said that

the next time he went fishing he would go to the same place where the examiner had purchased the minnows. Some discussion was had as to the various types of fishing and it was suggested to the boy that he ask his mother to attend with him the Outdoor Exposition or else get permission to go to this Exposition and see the various exhibits there. He stated that he would try to go to this.

During this discussion of his interest in fishing, etc., the examiner suddenly asked how his arm was getting along. He was rather startled by the question and after some initial stammering he stated that his arm was much better and that he was able to use it more than he had formerly. The examiner tried to discuss the arm with him from the standpoint of reassurance. It was pointed out to him that use of it in its present stage would be very helpful in building up the tissue around the broken bone and help the bone itself to become stronger because of the added tension supplied through activity. An attempt was made to bring about in a casual way a reassurance for the boy and at the time show him the need for continued use of the arm.

He left the interview in a rather happy frame of mind and seemed much more spontaneous and elated at this particular interview than he had on any previous interview.

This interview was valuable, we feel, because of the way the psychiatrist was able to improve his rapport with Paul. He also took the opportunity to discuss the paralyzed arm in a manner likely to reduce Paul's conflict concerning it.

The psychiatrist next saw Mr. Palmer to hear his story and determine what part in therapy the father should play.

Either May or June 1927 (Dr. Theller) Although separated from his wife and children and remarried, Mr. Palmer still continues to show an interest in the boy and has called the clinic relative to an appointment with the examiner to find

out the facts concerning Paul's examination at this clinic. He told of Mrs. Palmer's treatment of Paul, stating that she would whine when Paul was not around and when Paul appeared on the scene would tell him in a very whining voice that he looks sick and tired and that he had better lie down. Pretty soon Paul would be lying down and would be quite ill, during which time the mother would be tending to him with marked over-solicitousness.

He also told how Paul at first tried in the hospital to turn away from him. Without noticing this, however, Mr. Palmer went over to him and in a very casual way said "Well, what's the matter, Paul, tried to break your neck?" and started in a conversation with the boy. Soon the boy was entering in and seemingly enjoying it. He told of taking the boy home and having a good time during the entire trip home, but as soon as they arrived in view of the mother Paul's attitude toward him changed entirely. He felt that Paul needed the supervision of a man and greater company of a man, but said that it had never been possible for him to bring it about in the home because of the prompt interference of the mother. He was quite sure that Paul was very dependent on the mother and that the mother had made him so due to her method of treatment.

He was anxious to know whether or not there was some way in which he could be of help in the present situation. It was pointed out that in certain respects it was true Paul needed the companionship of males and a change in the type of discipline, but at the present time it was thought best to do this through giving the mother a little more insight into her method of handling Paul, and through providing other outlets and activities for the boy. It was felt that first incidentally a greater amount of psychiatric work should be done with Paul. Camp was explained to the man and he stated that as far as financing was concerned, Paul should go to this camp. He wished to know if he could be of further service.

In the light of the mother's own confessions with regard to the ways she had spoiled Paul, the father's illustrative examples of the process are enlightening. It is rather interesting to observe, in relation to Paul's paralysis, that Mr. Palmer dwelt chiefly upon the hypochondriacal relationship between mother and son. Apparently the matter of health had become for Paul a psychological locus of least resistance. The first evidence of environmental pressure would therefore be likely to manifest itself in this direction.

It will be remembered that the psychologist was interested in Paul's basic musical ability. An unsuccessful attempt was made as follows to check this point.

4-18-27 (Clark) Due to patient's interest in music and mother's desire to have him given instruction, visit was made to the Waite School Department of Music to inquire concerning their tests for musical ability. They could give a Seashore Test as a special concession to the clinic but feel that it would actually mean little or nothing. If it is felt that he has ability this could be taken up with the department of music at school and they undoubtedly would know whether he warranted instruction. If so they would see that he is put in contact with the right source.

In considering the situation it is doubtful in worker's mind if patient actually has real ability but there is seemingly no reason why that should bar his taking music or dampen his interest in music. If he gets enjoyment out of it and if it is a satisfaction to him that would suffice.

The staff now felt the time had arrived for further group conference. Dr. Theller, the psychiatrist, was leaving for the same camp to which Paul was going. Changes in the treatment program indicated by material obtained from the various interviews might concern him. This conference is briefly summarized in the follow-up note.

Following the last staff meeting and treatment interview with patient, both the mother and father were separately given an initial report by the psychiatrist. With them the psychiatrist went into the causative mechanisms underlying patient's behavior. Mother was further told that father had been in the clinic and that he would be given a report. Dr. Ray has remained interested in the case and was given a minimum summary of the case over the telephone by the psychiatrist. Continued psychiatric contact has been maintained with the boy at intervals. His problem as referred (refusal to use his arm and making this an excuse to get out of many duties and school work and gain sympathy) was indirectly handled.

Psychiatrist feels that from this point a direct handling should be attempted. Degree of progress with the boy cannot be ascertained at this period. Although he now uses his arm he has not continuously done so. Recently he feigned blindness for a period at school. He states that he passed his grade this term but no official report of this has been gained. The question came up in staff of the advisability of change of school next fall. On the one hand it would give him a fresh start by placing him in a new environment where his past conduct is unknown but on the other hand it would be the use of the same method of evasion which he and his family have employed throughout his life. Arrangements have been made for camp placement for this summer.

This case should be held open and continued psychiatric work with the boy maintained. It would be advisable that a conference be held at the end of the summer to evaluate camp experience and adjustment there. Future plan should be formulated from this basis. Also contact with parents would be advisable at this time. Regarding school placement for the fall consensus of opinion seemed to be that patient remain in present school.

From this conference one learns about the temporary switch in symptoms on Paul's part. Hysterical paralysis has given way to hysterical blindness. This change of symptom by patients is not infrequent in the early stages of psychotherapy. Treatment at this point, being still on a basis of suggestion, has gone far enough to dislodge the original symptom but not far enough to reach the causes underlying those symptoms. In the light of the psychiatrist's explanation for the need of using the arm, and because of Paul's acceptance of the psychiatrist, it was now necessary for Paul to find a new outlet for the exploitation of the mechanism back of this behavior. The mother, too, was changing her methods of handling Paul. Was the displacement from arm to eye in any way related to Mrs. Palmer's manoeuvres? Did the change in symptom have any special unconscious significance? \* Paul alone could tell.

The conference approved of the general direction in which the case was developing.

Paul went to camp. The sudden change in environment, and perhaps separation from the mother, proved too much of a strain on his flexibility, as the following report shows.

6-29-27 Patient is very dissatisfied and wishes to come home. All of his difficulty seems to have arisen over very petty matters and usually something pertaining to another boy and not to himself at all. He has only been denied one privilege. He wished to wire his mother for a number of articles of clothing and as the counselors felt this unnecessary requested that he write and not wire. This irritated him. He is not only dissatisfied himself but is causing another boy there to become dissatisfied. It has been learned

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\* The psychoanalysts would probably interpret the manifestation of this new symptom as evidence of the existence of a castration complex in Paul, based on a feeling of guilt because of his relationship to his mother and a desire for punishment. From our point of view this hypothesis is not a necessary explanation of the case; moreover enough evidence has not been adduced to support it.

that he was wholly unable to adjust at the Boy Scout Camp last year and remained only three days. Dr. Theller feels that patient should stay on, as it is the thing he most needs. Dr. Theller requested worker to telephone the mother and explain the situation to her. He felt it imperative to impress her with the desirability of patient's remaining there and to ask her to write Paul a special delivery letter encouraging him to remain. Dr. Theller thinks that perhaps her past letters have played their part in his dissatisfaction.

*Later:* Mother was telephoned and the camp situation explained in detail. She is not surprised at his condition as it is the same thing she has gone through for years. She greatly desires that he remain there, though, and will do all in her power to see that he does. She will write him a special tonight and will talk with Dr. Theller Sunday. Mother took a different attitude toward the boy than she has ever taken before. She does not want him home now, as she has spent the money for camp on him, bought him clothes he requested, etc. She does not think that he appreciates what she has done for him. She realizes that she is partly responsible for his conduct through babying him, but it makes it none the less hard on her now. She inquired if his father came out. Worker told mother that she was inclined to believe that this had nothing to do with it, as his contact with the father on this occasion seemed wholesome. She stated that she has tried to get the children to accept the father but that they simply will not and the father thinks that it is her fault.

6-30-27 Dr. Theller telephoned that patient ran away this morning because of nothing in particular. He wishes mother to return the boy and he will then go over the boy's relationship with the other boys in his tent.

Paul had run away. A fresh treatment conference was quickly held in which it was decided that Paul should return to camp.

6-30-27 (Rich) *Treatment Conference*: Present, Dr. Roe, Dr. White, Dr. Hale, Miss Rich, Miss Clark. Conference was arranged to discuss question of returning Paul to camp. From one standpoint there would seem to be no question but that he should go back, since to allow him to evade facing the camp issue would be to do exactly the thing which has so frequently occurred before. On the other hand, if he is forced to return against his will there is a possibility of his making further use of neurotic manifestations such as he has used before. It is to be noted that his running away is a fairly healthy reaction in his case, since he might have fallen back upon his supposed inability to use his arm or the hysterical blindness. Dr. White feels that sending Paul to camp was a grave risk in itself, although if Paul could live it through it would be beneficial, otherwise exceedingly deleterious. Dr. Roe appreciates that the risk of breaking Paul in the camp environment is a real danger, but feels that Paul should be returned by his mother as soon as possible.

Due largely to the mother's co-operation the patient returned, the social worker in the meantime having gone through the following procedure:

Later: Miss Clark was unable to see mother at the store, but landlady with whom family has been living reported that Paul came home about two o'clock. Landlady sent him down at once to tell his mother of his return, since she knew Mrs. Palmer would not want him at home. Told in detail how Paul has been able since the divorce to get anything he wants from his mother.

Later: Miss Clark telephoned Mrs. Palmer to tell her that the clinic felt Paul should by all means be returned to camp. As the matter was left, Mrs. Palmer was to take Paul to camp on the 6.15 bus. Mrs. Palmer was discouraged, since she thought she had lost her job at the store.

Mrs. Palmer was not at all pleased to see Paul yesterday when he appeared and she refused to kiss him or make any fuss over him as he expected. She stated that there was no doubt in her mind that he should return at once. She accordingly took him back on the 6:15 bus. When they were approaching camp Paul remarked, "I suppose Dr. Theller will give me a good bawling out, but I need it." At camp no fuss was made over the boy's return and he joined his tent mates at the evening camp fire.

Dr. Theller had a long talk with Mrs. Palmer and later he and Mrs. Theller drove Mrs. Palmer to town. Dr. Theller later reported when at the clinic that the entire situation was discussed at length on the way in and he believed that Mrs. Palmer profited from the discussion. In her interview with worker Mrs. Palmer admitted having done too much for Paul always and she seemed firm in her belief that he must now begin to learn to stand on his own feet, realizing also that his re-education would not be the easiest thing to accomplish.

Paul remained at camp the remaining weeks of the summer. His conduct during the first month was unimproved as the following note shows:

7-8-27 (Rich) Dr. Theller telephoned that Paul since his return to camp has used other physical ills as an excuse to get out of camp activity. Soon after his return he complained of having hurt his ankle. On Sunday July 3rd when the boys went on an all day hike he was allowed to go in the truck but when he arrived at the destination he roamed the hills and fields without limping or complaining. Arriving back at camp he again began to complain. In some way he got in touch with a nearby doctor who, not knowing Paul, recommended X-Ray and Paul has since been hobbling around on crutches. Dr. Theller has talked over the situation with

the doctor and both are now trying to get the idea of X-Ray out of Paul's head.

The second month saw a marked change for the better. Paul's change of attitude during this period, and the reasons he gave for it, are related in the account of his interview with the psychiatrist which took place at the end of the summer.

#### TREATMENT INTERVIEW

9-12-27 (Dr. Theller) Paul came to the clinic to gather up some of his belongings which he had left at camp on his departure. He told of starting to school; he stated that he could hardly wait for school to start on this occasion; he spent some time in discussing with the examiner the adjustment which he had been able to make during the last camp period. He stated that he had gotten along better with the older boys than with the younger ones; he explained that on the basis of feeling more at home with the older ones; he told of his interest in swimming; he stated that he had been able to pass the 100-yard test and had been able to go in the canoes. He told of a canoe trip which the camp went on and other episodes of interest which had occurred following the examiner's departure. He stated that he liked it very much; that he had seen some of the boys that had been out at camp since and made mention to one of the social workers of the fact that one of the boys was going to visit him in the near future, namely, Tom Mix.

He was interested in the school work which he was about to start; had some discussion of the various subjects and the examiner took advantage of this discussion to impress on him the need of carrying other outside interests and hobbies along with his school work and pointed out to him the possibility of carrying over some of his camp work throughout the present school term. Swimming was especially accentuated at this time inasmuch as he has seemingly made so

much improvement along this line. He states that he has been going to swimming pools since he arrived in the city and was interested in joining a club up in his vicinity which was somewhat similar to the Y that had a swimming pool and a center.

He told of the fact that his family had now moved and he had his printing press set up in the basement and made \$5.00 for the first job which he had put out. He added, however, that this was not all profit, inasmuch as the stock had cost him \$2.00 and something. This brought up the discussion of printing and various tricks to the trade which the examiner knew from past experience, such as fake embossing, fake etching, etc., in which he seemed greatly interested. He inquired after the examiner's wife and asked to be remembered; told of the fact that he felt that he had been helped while he had been out at camp and wanted to return to that same camp next year. He told of one of his cousins who had gone to the Boy Scout Camp. They had been discussing various experiences and he felt that he had had the better time of the two.

The examiner asked him to come in of his own accord for interviews on frequent occasions so that the examiner would know how he was getting along and to come in if anything bothered him or worried him, and talk it over before he began any definite procedure in that situation. This was discussed from the standpoint of some of the school difficulty which he had had the past year, in the hope that possibly he may be pulled out of some of the situations into which he had precipitated himself through his conduct in the past.

The time was now ripe for a fresh conference to review the work of the summer and formulate treatment plans for the future. The conference summarized the ground covered during the preceding two months in these entries.

9-13-27 After Paul had injured his foot, as has been noted above, he was taken to the dispensary for an X-Ray. The diagnosis was a very slight metatarsal fracture. The foot was accordingly taped and Paul was told to go on crutches for four weeks. The counselors managed to keep the other boys from giving him sympathy by a more or less isolation policy. Then one day when Paul was hobbling up from the beach a crutch slipped and he claimed serious injury in the armpit. He made a great fuss over this. Dr. Theller examined him and considered that if there was an actual injury it was only in the pectoral muscle; but he thought there might have been the possibility of one of the nerve trunks having been touched. The next thing was that Paul claimed to have hurt the foot again and his other knee and also to be unable to use his arms. In three or four days, however, he expressed a desire to swim and when Dr. Theller tried to dissuade him he demonstrated his recovery by running up and down the lot. After this time he started in to play games with the boys and from then on he even took part in new activities.

Paul caused considerable trouble at first by his tendency to exaggerate stories. One of these was a story about himself on a hiking expedition during which it was necessary to swim 150 yards one-handed. The boys soon began to demand proof of his swimming ability, which he could not produce as he was not a good swimmer. He was involved in this situation at the time he ran away from camp. During the camp period, however, he toned down his stories. He also indulged in complaining. But at the end of the camp period he received a reward for telling a story without exaggeration, and for demonstrable improvement in the matter of complaining. Paul was quite hurt over this award.

Paul was not anxious to return for the second camp period but his mother handled the situation adequately by simply assuming that he would return. He offered no objection. During August he made a definite effort to get in with the

boys, his swimming improved and he tried to play baseball; on the whole he did very well during the period. His interview yesterday with Dr. Theller substantiated this; he seemed to show a fair amount of insight and was in Dr. Theller's opinion unquestionably benefited by camp. Yesterday he was interested in going ahead with his swimming at a Y.M.C.A. pool and he named another west side organization which provides athletic interests of various kinds. He seems to be carrying over his camp friendship with Tom Mix, which is a desirable thing.

Paul's father visited camp occasionally but never on visiting days. On one day very early in the summer Paul greeted his father like an old pal. Mr. Palmer either gave him money for some needed equipment or sent it to him. Paul would always walk to the road with his father. His behavior would indicate that he really cared for Mr. Palmer although it is possible that in his mother's presence he pretends not to like him.

Paul seemed to be anxious for school to begin; he told Dr. Theller yesterday of his interest in his new schedule. At camp Dr. Theller talked with Paul about his school attitude last year, but Paul has tried definitely to avoid talking about the issue. This evasiveness was taken up at various times at camp in connection with specific situations with reference to both present and past.

Paul became much enamored with a nearby girl at camp and at present is interested in girls. This certainly seems to be a normal manifestation in an adolescent boy of Paul's age.

Paul's behavior and personality definitely changed while at camp. He became "one of the boys." His physical adequacy was improved and there was evidence that Paul had developed some insight into the mechanisms of his own conduct. The development of a new interest in girls his own age was en-

couraging to the examiners as suggesting a break-up in his over-attachment to mother.

Two important pieces of evidence in relation to school and father came out during the summer. Paul's true desire to return to school would tend to confirm the initial theory that his school difficulties were secondary to the emotional mess he had gotten into with his mother. As this relationship simmered down, Paul's drive was released to return to school interests. (Incidentally, this case illustrates the influence of domestic problems on some cases of scholastic maladjustment.) The change in attitude toward Mr. Palmer is interesting and perhaps calls for a slight revision in the original theory of the case. At the outset it was assumed that there existed a strong fundamental antagonism always in abeyance between father and son. The experience of the summer would suggest that this antagonism had developed secondarily to the mother's possessive attitude toward Paul. When this attitude on the part of Mrs. Palmer became a little more generous Paul was left freer to assume a more wholesome relationship with his father.

At this conference future treatment was also outlined in the following paragraphs.

*With mother.* Mrs. Palmer seems to be fairly stabilized and her co-operation will probably continue. It would be advisable for the clinic to maintain an active contact with her in order to discuss the issues which may arise. Dr. Theller suggested that she be given a reading list including at first some mental hygiene material and going on to include some selected current fiction which could be discussed from a mental hygiene point of view.

*With father.* Probably Mr. Palmer will come to the clinic from time to time but it is apparently not feasible to carry on any planned treatment with him. He might be called upon, however, to provide special facilities in treatment should such need arise in the future,

The question arose as to the feasibility of interviewing other relatives with regard to the present and past home situation but it was considered inexpedient at the time. Paul has mentioned a cousin who is a junior life guard and Dr. Theller recalls that Paul goes occasionally to the home of the paternal grandmother who is still interested in the family. In casual contacts with Mrs. Palmer, however, the subject of how she and the children feel toward other relatives might be touched, but interviews with the relatives would not seem to be indicated at this point.

Confirmation of the clinic's feeling that Paul had improved during the summer was obtained from an interview with the mother.

9-21-27 (Wolcott) *Clinic Interview with mother.* Mrs. Palmer is very much pleased with Paul's improvement since the camp experience. She gave several examples of changed attitude on his part. At Sunday dinner when Ethel was entertaining two young men, the subject of who should say grace was discussed but both the guests declined so Mrs. Palmer jokingly asked Paul to, and much to everyone's surprise he said it very nicely. She told him she didn't know he knew one and he proudly asserted he had learned it at camp. Worker complimented her on the way she had handled his running away, and the week-end visit. Agreed that Dr. Theller felt that Paul had been benefited generally by camp. Paul often reminisces about the summer to his mother, expressing his enjoyment and hope of returning next summer. He has telephoned Tom Mix several times but has not had him come to his house. Suggested that Mrs. Palmer encourage the furtherance of acquaintance with both Tom Mix and John Shoe. Mrs. Palmer spoke voluntarily of his newly awakened interest in girls. He has telephoned the girl from camp since he has been home but has not made a date with her. He also has a mild "crush" on one of his

young, attractive, good-looking teachers at school. He seems to be getting along well in school so far. We told Mrs. Palmer worker would probably call at school soon to report to them.

Although he still shuns the company of boys his own age at school mother is relieved that he is showing interest in several healthful outlets. He enjoys swimming and wants to go on with it this winter. The equipment at the Y is not so good as the Bath House so he thinks he will join there. He shows no interest in competitive athletics at school yet; worker suggested that if he could prove his adequacy to himself as a swimmer it might help to overcome his timidity to compete in other sports. He has done several odd printing jobs and earned a little money out of which he bought mother a birthday gift. We told her that Dr. Theller was going to look up some printing material for Paul which he might come in for sometime soon. Advised that Paul's visits to the clinic, as long as things were running smoothly, would be left up to him; but that he had better telephone ahead for an appointment.

Asked if she felt that she had a better understanding of Paul now through her experiences with the clinic. Her contacts have been very helpful but she is sorry she has not been able to read any of the books on the list given her. She has very little time to herself. Suggested Gruenberg's "Guidance in Childhood and Youth" because it is a symposium of short excerpts on various topics. She seemed quite interested.

During the winter Paul's schoolwork showed definite improvement, his teacher reporting to the clinic that:

"his academic work is better this year than last. He has received several G's (good) and fewer P's (poor), although his marks average just fair work. In the class room, how-

ever, he shows much more initiative and has taken charge of picture hanging and participates interestedly in other class room activities. His standing in the class and school groups is better and he has gained satisfactory recognition. He is one of the Student Council guards, and is on the finance committee for the Xmas party. Teacher has had no indication of any eye trouble. She is very much pleased with his general improvements.

"He has still quite a sissy manner and at the Halloween party he came dressed as a girl and all the boys teased him about it. He looked very well and seemed to know it; was very proud of being able to wear his sister's shoes and persisted for a long time in keeping them on although they were tight and hurt. When he did finally take them off he would not put on his own but walked around in his stocking feet."

Teacher will soon have the opportunity of advising all her students about courses which will lead to future Senior High School work. She feels patient ought to go to a technical High School for the sake of taking up some manual work which would be more becoming to the masculine rôle he ought to play but she is afraid his mother may want him to take the academic course, and considering his personality some kind of white collar clerk job will probably suit him best, a commercial High School would be most advisable. Worker agreed with this conclusion.

As Paul took up his school work again he moved with the same steps farther away from his mother. One day the social worker telephoned to Mrs. Palmer to inquire how the patient was getting along.

Mother reports he is doing well and she has no difficulty with him except once in a while he does not seem to think her word carries any weight. Assured her that it is quite normal for adolescents to think they know more than their

parents but that it is a passing phase of development. Patient had remarked to mother only a few days before that he thought he would come in to visit clinic soon. Explained Dr. Theller's absence on account of illness and asked to have him phone sometime not too far in the future for an appointment, when Dr. Theller probably would have returned.

During the winter Paul continued to get along well at school, receiving good reports. His extra-curricular activities had increased and his friendships with boys his own age were now more numerous. He was now visiting the Y with friends on swimming parties instead of staying home to take care of the cooking and the housework. Next year's visit to camp was already being planned by him.

In spite of this general change in interests, activities, and personality Paul during the year complained of eye symptoms for which no physical basis could be found. Frequent interviews in which Paul speaks with much enthusiasm about his new interests and activities were held with the psychiatrist. These reports suggest that Paul had taken on a much more manly attitude toward the world in spite of the continued existence of what can now be accepted as conversion symptoms. The psychiatrist apparently was not able (or considered it inadvisable) to cut deeply enough to perform a radical operation on this boy's psyche—and so the sex conflict remained smoldering.

Enough of the history and techniques of this case have been cited to illustrate the methodology of the child guidance approach to the study of personality and behavior. This method can be briefly recapitulated as follows.

The facts of the case are first assembled in the history; and studied. An hypothesis is then made to explain the deviations discovered in the child's conduct. This guess is checked by means of physical, psychological, and psychiatric examinations by the patient and, where necessary, relatives. A theory of the causes underlying the behavior studied is set up by this group

of examiners. This is then checked by observing the degree of effectiveness of treatment procedures based on that theory.

In the present case this last check behaved with almost textbook like precision. It was assumed that Paul's variations in conduct were due to an oversolicitous mother and the presence in his mind of sex conflict. Successful treatment of the former cause brought successful changes in behavior at home and at school. As soon as Mrs. Palmer removed her drive from Paul he was free to study and to play. The physical symptoms, related as they were to the latter cause, were not as fully treated or as successfully removed.

This case is typical of child guidance methodology. The facts are first used to arrive at a theory, the theory is then applied to and tested by these facts. This approach, essentially the same as used in physical science, suffers in social science because the instruments of measurement, clinical methods, are less precise than calipers. It suffers, too, from a wider margin of error due to the introduction into the study of a necessary amount of personality.

Existing side by side with this approach, and closely related to it, is the underlying philosophy of child guidance work. The mental hygiene study of personality uses a many-sided approach—history, physical, psychological, and psychiatric examinations—both in its initial survey and its treatment program because workers in this field believe that children's behavior and personality are the reflection of innumerable and varied factors operating within the child's environment and its inner mental life. Not all factors can be isolated, studied, and checked. Some are too minute, others too subtle and intangible. As clinical instruments and methods become more precise and objective, and the larger margin of error in this type of approach is reduced and as the influence upon children's behavior of more obscure variables becomes better known, it will be possible to approximate in exactitude the results of study of physical phenomena. In the meantime it is possible to put into the test tube of this type of social scientist only the

more common elements. The study of the effects of oxygen instead of helium, however, does not preclude the use of a similar scientific approach.

In conclusion one or two points remain to be touched upon briefly. This many-sided approach to the study of children's behavior should not be confused, as it so frequently is, with a middle course eclecticism. This approach does not pick out, as it needs them,\* theories from associated disciplines. It has its own discipline and is building up its own theories of behavior based on the philosophy already mentioned: that behavior is the reaction between the individual and his social setting, and is determined by all the influences that have entered into the past experience of both. The study of any individual child is the study of all of those influences that can be isolated. To be sure one does frequently find creeping into child guidance interpretations theories current in other fields. From what has been said of the history of the child guidance movement it will be seen that this infiltration is difficult to avoid. Moreover the training of personnel has heretofore been of the nature of shopping around in these allied fields. As the mental hygiene† movement builds up its own traditions and material, unifies and stabilizes its own methods, organizes the training of its personnel—and all these things are rapidly progressing—the independence of its contribution becomes more clearly recognized. This contribution of the child guidance movement to the study of personality is not limited to, nor is it primarily concerned with, abnormality. Its chief interest is individual differences in behavior. Since all children deviate in varying degrees from the “norm” in some respect, child guidance examiners are interested in studying the behavior of all children.

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\* Cf. p. 309 where a psychoanalytical explanation in this case was repudiated.

† In the above account “mental hygiene” and “child guidance” have been used interchangeably. This procedure is not strictly correct. Mental hygiene has a larger connotation including work with adults; and, with both children and adults, in connection with the prevention of mental illness.

## INSTRUCTIONS RE USE OF HISTORY GUIDE

1. This guide assumes acquaintance with general principles and content of social history. It attempts to get at underlying psychiatric issues assuming factual material will be obtained *pari passu*.

2. Follow through with thoroughness all suggestive leads obtained. Do not be afraid of taking up one point from different angles.

3. Always try to get much specific data to illustrate a point of general importance unless you are meeting with resistance. Do not be satisfied with informant's vague statements. Try to obtain exact details; e.g., if informant says she is nervous, ask what are the signs of her nervousness.

4. Put the source (mother, maternal grandmother, etc.) before or after any significant piece of information which might have been given from a prejudiced point of view.

PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL HISTORY FOR CHILD  
GUIDANCE CLINIC  
(For full study cases)

## I. Identifying Information:

Name:	Address:	Date:
Age: (exactly)	Color:	School and grade:
Sex:	Nationality of child:	Occupation, if any:
Place of birth:	Religion:	Ordinal position in family.

## II. Behavior for which child is being studied:

a. Complaints. First enumerate specifically existing complaints and their duration.

- b.* History of Complaints. Take up each complaint separately and develop its progress thoroughly up to present status. What is the detailed nature of the complaint. When did it first appear. Under what circumstances. What factors mitigate or aggravate severity of complaint. Under what circumstances has the discordant behavior disappeared. To what factors in child's background is complaint related; playmates, family, relatives, siblings, teacher, doctor, school, neighborhood, sickness, etc. Does behavior have a special time or place factor. Did it develop suddenly or insidiously. What have been the methods used in handling each specific problem; by whom, what result. What is informant's explanation for the problem; what is her opinion as to its present severity. What does she think should be done to handle it.

### III. Developmental History of Child:

- a.* Gestation Period and Delivery. Learn whether mother had a thoroughly normal pregnancy or whether it was disturbed by emotional or physical upset. What was her attitude towards pregnancy, what was that of her husband. Did this attitude change subsequently. Did attitude vary in other pregnancies. What was nature of delivery. Does she feel it was traumatic for her or child *in any way*, physically or mentally.
- b.* Medical History from Birth to Date. What was the physical condition of child at birth with respect to general health, developmental anomalies, nutrition, weight. (Parent's attitude toward these things is important.) Proceed chronologically, learning more about general health of child and specific sicknesses. Learn influence of any medical deviation upon parent's attitude and child's behavior. Pay special atten-

tion to convulsions, influenza, infantile paralysis, encephalitis, chorea and trauma. Do not be satisfied to have informant tell you about childhood sicknesses. Ask about them specifically. In case of any definite sickness obtain detailed information as to time of occurrence, severity, treatment. From informant learn both present status of child's health and child's estimate of its own status. In this connection pay attention to vague and indefinite pains, fatiguability, underweight (real or imaginary), underdevelopment, oversize, reaction to physical appearance, overactivity or lethargy.

- c. Early Development. Try to learn about nature of child's early gross movements; was child overactive as baby, restless and always on the go, or lethargic. Try to trace age at which various forms of locomotion appeared: crawling, assisted walking, independent walking. Did child cover a great deal of ground. When could child hold head up, sit up, stand up. Learn about handedness of child, also manipulatory skill and strength of musculature. When did child first scribble. When did child first use a word. About how many words could it use at 18 months, 24 months. Can they remember when child first used a sentence. When did child get first tooth. How many teeth by two years.

- d. Early Habit Formation. Discuss early feeding methods and diet. Was child hard to please in food matters. Was child delayed in weaning. Was parent worried about quality and amount of food child ate.

What means were used to get child to eat; with what results.

About how many hours did child sleep during first six months of life. When was afternoon nap discontinued. How was retiring period enforced. With

what results. What has been nature of sleep: disturbed by dreams, by demand for attention, etc. With whom did and does child sleep. How far does parent appear involved in child's sleeping habits.

At what age were toilet habits learned. What methods were used. Get specific and detailed data re enuresis.

Does child or home appear to have been much under emotional tension in connection with learning of various habits.

Were there any early sexual manifestations and of what nature. Did child show any interest in parents' bodies. Was there any chance for early sex trauma. What was child's early masturbatory experience. Did child show any of the so-called early sex manifestations; thumb sucking, nail biting, nose boring. What was done about it. Has child shown any sex preferences, at what age. Did child show any unusual interests: excreta, looking, handling, questioning mother's pregnancy, etc.

- e. Early Personality Development. Was child as a baby good natured, jolly, happy or fretful, changeable, irritable, cranky. Was child fearful, easily disturbed, easily annoyed, etc. (Get evidence for any of these by means of specific details—especially with regard to fears.) Investigate child's earliest relationship to other children; desire for and ability to make and keep friends, its relative enjoyment alone and with others (older, younger). What was its attitude toward its own and other children's toys. What were its reactions to advances. Did it make advances; to whom. Was child submissive, aggressive. Was child talkative, quiet, sensitive. Learn about child's early family preferences and apparent cause for them. Were

there early jealousies between child and siblings. How handled. Was there any special reaction to other relatives. Was child affectionate, responsive, antagonistic to anybody. Was child influenced by anybody's death, or departure from home.

#### IV. Child's Present Background and Make-up:

- a.* Later Personality Development. Continue as in III, *e*, looking for variations in personality or further evidence of personality trends previously established. Try to find out causes for any change or intensification of traits. Pay special attention to accidents, sickness (keep in mind infantile paralysis, encephalitis, epilepsy), deaths, births, removal from home of patient or others, intervening miscarriages, separation of parents, economic stresses, school adjustment, physical ineptitude, companions, vocation, as likely influences on personality development.

With older children go into child's moral standards and loyalties, its relationship to groups. Also learn about older children's relationship to reality. Does it show good judgment, carry through plans, act practically.

- b.* School adjustment. Obtain the chronology of school progress. Learn about various schools child has attended and reasons for change. Have school authorities intervened in child's school work. Has child any special abilities or disabilities in school subjects. Has child received special coaching from parents or others on any subject. Has child any special interests in any subjects and how does it show this interest. How much time does child spend on homework. What facilities has child for quiet study. Have teachers commented on child's scholastic status. What are parents'

plans for future education. What is child's plan re future education.

What is child's attitude toward school, toward any special subject. What has been its relationship to teachers. Have they commented on its behavior. Has child ever gotten into any special difficulties at school. (Obtain details.) What does child think of its own scholastic status, what do parents think. Under what conditions does child do good school or bad school work. What is child's attitude toward home work. What are parents' methods of handling child's attitudes toward school or home work or teacher. Did parents themselves have similar difficulties. Has child ever shown signs of malingering to avoid school. What is regularity and promptness of child's attendance.

What do parents do to overcome any irregularity. Does child day dream in school, act restlessly and is he inattentive.

What is child's relationship to other children in class; friendly, leader, asocial. How does child feel about his size, his position in school group.

(Confirm with teacher where possible)

- c. Recreational Interests. How much time does it give to play and recreation. Does child engage in extra curricular activity at school. To what school clubs or other clubs does it belong. What is its status in those clubs. What are its athletic choices. Is it active or passive in these. What skill does it show in games. Has it any special hobbies, such as collecting, printing, science. What are its reading interests. How much is it interested in movies, shows, music. Does it go in for indoor games and dramatics or dancing. Is it interested in outdoor activities, such as hiking, boating,

camping, etc. Is it interested in parties or entertainments. Does it show an interest in games adequate for its years. How sufficient is the play equipment, its opportunities for play and its play resources and outlets. Does its family join in the child's recreation. What is family's attitude toward child's play life.

- d.* Sexual Adjustment and Development. Obtain outline of girl's menstrual history. How did she obtain and react to information re menstruation. What is girl's present attitude toward menstruation. Does boy show signs of puberty development. When did these signs appear.

Is there any evidence of masturbation now. Has child been caught in any frank sex experiences. Have there been rumors of such happenings. Has child witnessed sexual activity. How have parents handled these problems.

Does child like to display its body. Is it interested in the bodies of others. Is child interested in elimination.

How much sex information does child seem to have. Where did it obtain this information. Does child ask questions re sex, birth. How are such questions handled.

What is child's attitude and relationship to opposite sex. Is it overcurious, overmodest, dominating, overpassive. Has child very close companion, of what sex. Is child over interested in its appearance.

- e.* Vocational Adjustment. Does child work after school; hours, wage, type of job. What does child do with money. What is child's attitude toward this work. Do parents want child to work.

What are child's ideas about its future work. What would parents like child to do. Why.

In case of adolescents, what job does it now hold. How successful is it on this job. How many jobs has it held since leaving school. How does it get along with its bosses, its colleagues. What wage does it earn, what does it do with money.

#### V. Family History:

- a. Parents' relationship to grandparents. (Carry out separately for each parent.)

Obtain usual statistical information on grandparents; age at death, cause of death, nationality, vocation, education, number of children, length of time in this country, etc.

What was grandparents' family relationship. Was their married life successful. Why not. What is parents' attitude to the married life of their parents. What was parents' status in their own home. Were they cowed, free, dependent or equal. Trace the relationship of this status to the personality of the grandparents. Were grandparents domineering, weak, unfair, religious, discriminating, unwell, etc. What was the nature of grandparents' sickness and what was parents' relationship to it. Did the grandparents suffer from mental disease, mental deficiency, nervous disease or physical defects of social or psychiatric significance. What was economic status of grandparents' home and what was its influence on parents. Was grandparents' home dominated by any special set of traditions. Are parents carrying on or rebelling against such tradition. What are the parents' attitudes toward their own early home life. Do they

show signs of strong emotional reactions toward it. What do they think about the educational, religious or racial status of their parents. Is there any feeling of inferiority or superiority because of this. Were there undesirable social conditions in their parents' home, such as alcoholism, delinquency. How have these conditions affected their own lives. Was their early home life broken up by death, desertion, etc.; with what effect. Was there a step-parent in their life. What was their relationship to it. What was their relationship to their own brothers and sisters. Were they discriminated against in favor of the latter. Are any of parents' aunts or uncles, grandparents, still in the home and what is their relationship to parents. Did any of the patient's aunts or uncles have any unusual sickness or social experience in which parents were involved.

Especially if parents are immigrants learn about routine life in the old country and parents' reaction to it. Also learn their reaction (and patient's) to immigrating to this country. Learn about change of social and economic status in this country on part of patient's parents.

- b. Parents' Personal History. Take up each parent separately unless otherwise indicated. Where another person, *e.g.*, stepmother, is acting as mother treat her like a parent.

Obtain usual statistical information about age, nationality, place of birth, religion, occupation, educational level, marital status, ordinal position of each parent.

Trace through each parent's history in terms of health, intellectual status, vocational adjustment; personal, social and sex adjustments.

Medical. Learn about any untoward experiences during early developmental period. Such data would include birth trauma, developmental defects, feeding difficulties, early sicknesses. Try to establish whether parent thinks patient is repeating parent's own developmental history in any way.

Obtain a full account of parents' own illnesses with special reference to venereal disease, nervous breakdowns, migraine, endocrinological disturbances, arteriosclerosis, gastric disturbances, accidents and operations. What is parents' mental attitude toward such sicknesses; toward own health in general. What is the other partner's attitude toward wife's or husband's health. What is each partner's attitude toward their children's health.

Obtain woman's menstrual history. Keep in mind relationship of her difficulties to menopause.

Intellectual and educational status. Was each parent backward or precocious as a child. How well educated are they. How successfully did they compete with other children at school. What is their own estimate of their education, of their intellectual calibre. What does each think about the other in these respects. Does either feel inferior or superior in any way.

Vocational Adjustment. When did each parent first start work. What were their reasons for working. Why has the woman had to work since marriage. How long have they held different jobs. What is their earning capacity. What were the parents' reasons for leaving their jobs. What is their employers' estimate of their work. What is their own estimate of it. How well did they get along with fellow employees. What is the parents' present attitude toward

## APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY

their work. Have they had any other special vocational training which is not being used.

Personal and Social Adjustments. *As children* were parents energetic and active. Did they play usual games. Did they belong to clubs. Did they have many friends. Were they leaders or followers. Were they restless and irritable. Were they ill-tempered. Were they enthusiastic, cheerful or worrisome. Were they indolent, careless, suggestible. Were they quarrelsome. Did they submit to authority. Were they conceited, impatient, aggressive. Did they have any special fears. Were they timid and apprehensive. Were they dependent on adults; siblings, parents. Did they have any special interests, hobbies or capacities. (Keep in mind such things as mechanical skill, athletics, art, music, reading, etc.) Did parents ever demonstrate behavior for which child is being referred. Is there any history of childhood delinquency; truancy, stealing, waywardness, gang activity, early sexual irregularities. What are parents' present attitudes toward their own childhood deviations.

What are parents' *adult* interests, activities and recreational outlets; sports, athletics, clubs, art, music, theatre, friends, family, politics, etc. Have parents any special hobby, recreational skill or spare time activity.

Have parents few or many friends. What is their attitude toward them. Do they mix easily. Are they interested in people. Are they cynical and suspicious of people. Do they visit much. Is their home social. Do they think "the world is all right." Are they shy with outsiders. Are they selfish, or kind. Are they tactless or stubborn. Are they sensitive. Do they hold grudges. Are they appreciative. Submissive or leaders. Honest or deceitful. In what are they en-

ergetic. Are they aimless and restless. Are they persistent and persevering. Are they under tension. Are they erratic in their activity. Are they garrulous. Are they impulsive or deliberate. Are they too outspoken. Are they overscrupulous.

Are they cheerful or pessimistic. Are they even-tempered. Are they irritable or placid. Do they brood. Are they over-enthusiastic. Do their moods change easily. Are they sullen, grumbling. Do they bear grudges. How do they react to disappointments, to good news. Do they crave sympathy.

Have parents any bad habits; excessive smoking, drinking, drugs of other kinds, unusual appetites. Have parents been subject to other poisons: lead, arsenic, gas. Are parents regular in matters of eating, sleeping, elimination, recreation. Do parents think any of their children have any of their own personality traits. What is the parents' explanation for such resemblance.

**Marital and Sex Adjustments.** Trace the course of parents' own interrelationship; circumstances of meeting, courtship, circumstances of marriage, separations, infidelities and present status. In connection with present marital status learn on what things parents come together; on what things they disagree. What are the "inferiorities" and "superiorities" of each. What personality differences or agreements play a part in their relationship. How do the children fit into the dynamics of their personalities. Do financial and vocational differences enter into the disharmony of their relationship. Do recreational outlets, health or habits bring them together or keep them apart.

What is the history of their sex life before and since marriage. Is there any question of impotence, frigidity.

ity, promiscuity, free love. Does either partner make excessive demands. Is either partner unresponsive. Is there any question of perverseness, brutality, suspiciousness. Is either partner prudish, over-conventional, intolerant or moralistic about sex matters.

#### VI. History of Siblings of Patient. (Treat each sibling separately.)

Obtain usual statistical information re age, sex, place of birth, legitimacy, educational and vocational status of siblings. Include children now dead, miscarriages, etc.

How does sibling differ from problem child in personality, intelligence, education, health, strength, choice of companions, interests and activities. (Get specific examples of these differences.) What is sibling's present status with respect to behavior, responsibility, dependence, health. What is sibling's relationship to each parent. What are parents' relationships to each sibling. Is there any demonstrated evidence of this relationship; favoritism, emotional tension. What reasons do parents give for any difference in relationship; *e.g.*, age, health, child's own emotional make-up, stepchild, previous deaths, illegitimacy, prematurity.

What is sibling's attitude toward patient. Did sibling know about patient's presence during gestation period. What was his reaction to it; to the birth of the patient. How did sibling act toward patient subsequently. What was patient's attitude toward birth of sibling. Look for signs of jealousy, dependence, companionship, protection, respect, between patient and sibling. Learn how they played together, worked together, slept together. Learn how they react when

parents differentiate between them. How do they react to other's absence, sickness, success, failure. Did patient's personality change after birth of sibling.

#### VII. Parents' Methods of Discipline:

What are each parent's ideas as to the way children should be brought up. How tenaciously are these ideas held and consistently carried out. What disciplinary measures are actually carried out; deprivation, threats, cajolery, etc. When parents disagree regarding discipline what happens. What does each parent do about handling patient's problem. What do they think should be done. What is origin of parent's ideas on child training; *e.g.*, home (or by contrast), reading, own emotions, antagonism toward other parent, influence of relatives, neighbors, definite professional instruction, individuality. What discipline is attempted by others: by relative, nurse, boarder. What difference is there in results. Do parents change methods of discipline for different siblings.

#### VIII. General Background:

- a.* Neighborhood. Pay attention to sociological factors in neighborhood; variety of races, group traditions, respect for order, gang activity, social standards, permanence of residence.

What is physical make-up of neighborhood with special reference to social and economic status, physical hygiene, opportunities for recreation, undesirable influences (speakeasies, police stations, movie houses) local nuisances, crowdedness.

- b.* Home. Pay special attention to sleeping conditions and arrangements, opportunities and equipment for play, orderliness and cleanliness, social levels, under-

standing of physical needs of children and violation of health precepts, housekeeping standards, regularity of meals, roomers, etc. What is the emotional nature of the home atmosphere. Who is dominant person in home. What techniques are used to maintain dominance; reactions to this dominance by those in inferior rôle. What tensions are in the home — gross and subtle. What are the apparent causes of stress; the underlying causes. What is problem child's status in home with respect to such tensions. What evidence do you obtain that problem child's behavior is related to home factors. Compare child's status in home with status outside home; e.g., in the group. How are other people in the home complicating home relationships; relative, boarder, servant. Estimate the amount of intelligence displayed in handling home situations and by whom. Describe any other solidarities, harmonies, jealousies, bickerings, rivalries, alignments you can discover. Relate them to the children where possible. Can you discover the causes of these interrelationships. How constant or frequent is the atmosphere you describe. What appears to precipitate or relieve it. What is family's relationship to neighborhood. Do they accept the general group standards.

#### IX. Information re Informant:

Enumerate all sources of information, the intelligence of informants and their relationship to problem. Estimate their reliability and insight into patient's problem. Estimate the amount of co-operation likely to be obtained from each one and the best means of approaching them. In what ways are they likely to be co-operative in treatment.

## X. Summary:

- a.* Enumerate categorically what outstanding findings this history has brought out.
- b.* Outline your ideas as to the motivation of patient's difficulties.
- c.* What are your treatment recommendations.

OUTLINE FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF CHILD  
(INITIAL INTERVIEW)

(This outline is only a rough unfinished guide to be used for stirring up and recording material only)

## A. Aim of initial interview:—

1. Establish contact with patient, and initiate psychotherapy.
2. Learn motivation for behavior.
3. Survey personality and range of activities.
4. Establish child's deviation from group norm.
5. Outline plans for treatment.

## B. Methods of obtaining information:—

1. Observation of child's spontaneous behavior and in reaction to questions.
2. Estimation of answers to direct questions.
3. Evaluation of spontaneous remarks.
4. Following all leads child gives by his remarks.
5. Following leads already obtained from careful reading of social history.

## C. Synopsis of outline.

1. Observation of child's behavior:—
  - a.* Appearance.
  - b.* Relationship established with examiner.

- c.* Nature and direction of child's physical and mental drive.
  - d.* Emotional make-up.
2. Data on specific problems: —
3. Background and child's reaction to it: —
  - a.* Recreation.
  - b.* Friendships.
  - c.* Family.
  - d.* School.
4. Thought life: —
  - a.* Type of thinking.
  - b.* Phantasies and day dreams.
  - c.* Wishes and ambitions.
  - d.* Night dreams.
  - e.* Earliest memories.
  - f.* Worries, fears, etc.
  - g.* Identifications.
  - h.* Vocational plans.
  - i.* Reaction to own body and sexualizations.
  - j.* Child's solution for difficulties.
5. Summary of findings.
6. Outlook for future.
7. Treatment.
 

<i>a.</i> Medical.	<i>c.</i> Educational.	<i>e.</i> Vocational.
<i>b.</i> Psychiatric.	<i>d.</i> Recreational.	<i>f.</i> Social.

#### I. OBSERVATION OF CHILD'S BEHAVIOR.

(Always give specific examples of behavior or language used where possible.)

*a. Appearance:—*

Pay special attention to way child is dressed. Are clothes older or younger than his years. Does he look as though his parent had dressed him. Is there any special eccentricity. Has he any special badges or pins. Is he untidy. Is he over neat. Is his appearance swagger. Is he unkempt. Is he afraid to get himself dirty. Is he proud of any aspect of his appearance. Does he try to hide some aspect of his make-up. Look for noticeable physical defects and signs of bad habits such as nail biting, thumb sucking, etc. Also observe constitutional irregularities. (Combine with *4i*.)

*b. Relationship established with examiner:—*

Is contact difficult, over-easy. Does child respond to everybody, to nobody, to male, to female. Does contact change during interview, at what point. What is relationship at end of interview. Is contact immediate, slow, shifting. Does contact change with varying nature of material discussed. Does child treat examiner as equal, superior. Is child cowed, oversolicitous, bumptious, friendly, co-operative, oversure.

(Evidence as to contact is obtained by noticing such things as way child enters and leaves room, sits down, addresses examiner, speaks up, modulates voice, handles cap, looks at examiner, looks around during interview, responds to different questions, and the remarks spontaneously made, facial expressions, etc. etc.)

*c. Nature and direction of child's physical and mental drive:—*

Is child all over the place, restless, overactive. Are interests very changeable. Is child blocked, repressed, inhibited, lethargic, spontaneous, shifting, rigid or stiff, uneasy. Is energy well taken care of. Is child slowed up. Does child tire during interview, at what point.

(Evidence for amount and nature of drive is seen in child's

behavior in room, manner of answering questions, urging required, postural changes, facial expression, reactions to requests, interests in objects in room, spontaneous requests and actions, etc.) (Compare with information on 3*a*.)

*d.* Emotional make-up:—

Observe evidence of tears, laughter, catch in voice, change in voice pitch, changeability of mood.

(Try to connect with specific social or personal material.)

Is child shy, sullen, stubborn, lacking in self control, excitable, irritable, immature, oversensitive, depressed.

Ask: when are you happy, unhappy, when do you get angry, etc. etc.

(Use child's reaction to questions and nature of past experience as obtained from his productions for evidence of emotional make-up as well as child's definite emotional disturbances during interview.)

## II. DATA ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

Try to get child's own story on specific difficulties. Try to get child to trace their development from their genesis to their present status. Try to get from child's story some idea of their motivation and influences which attenuate or exaggerate them. Try to learn influence other children have on child's problem conduct.

(This plan is much easier for social and sexual difficulties than for personality and emotional difficulties. This account should be in child's own language as much as possible. Avoid suggestive and leading questions when child is producing adequate material. Avoid interpreting child's story at this point until all material is in. Try to obtain as many details of child's story as possible. Observe closely child's reactions as story is being told. Evaluate reliability of story. Where necessary, use leads obtained from social history to obtain more material from child.)

## III. CHILD'S BACKGROUND AND HIS REACTIONS TO IT

*a. Recreation:—*

What are child's play interests and activities. What opportunity has he for indulging them. How do child's ability and interest in play compare with standards for group. Is child's play life overdeveloped; underdeveloped.

*b. Friendships:— (Very important chapter)*

What is child's position in groups. Has he friends; own age, older, younger. What is his attitude toward them; superior, inferior. What is their attitude toward him. Is he a leader, follower, why. Does he feel inferior to them in games, in physique, in intellect. Is there any objective reason for this inferiority. What nicknames has boy. How does he react to them. Does he protect himself against playmates' attacks directly or by compensation. Is any lack of friends due to his own personality (infantilism, egocentricity, etc.) or to parental attitude, or to his fixations within family. What are his substitutes for friends. Does he accept the group standards, or does he protest against them, why. Does he differentiate in his behavior toward girls. How. Is he a member of gangs, clubs. What is his status within them. Is he under the influence of other children or another child (*e.g.*, older boy friends who are working). How. (Be sure to follow any leads child gives you in connection with his personal relationships.)

*c. Relationship to family:— (Another very important chapter).*

Is there evidence of any family fixation. (This evidence is best obtained indirectly. Ask such questions as: Does your mother undress you, feed you, sleep with you, etc. etc.)

Explore relationship to siblings for evidence of jealousy or over attachment. Is any sibling influencing child directly or

indirectly. Is there a younger child recently arrived in home. What is patient's attitude toward newcomer. (Relationship in games, attitude toward possessions and accomplishments of siblings, child's interpretation of parents' attitude toward siblings; and child's favorite in family are good leads for such exploration.) Is there an older sibling whom subject is imitating.

Look for evidence of child imitating parents' conduct: *e.g.*, hypochondriasis in parents and escapades of father may be lively topics of home conversation. Find out child's story of parental handling. Learn influence of broken home. Does child feel insecure in home for any reason. Are there other relatives influencing the child — grandmother, aunt. Estimate degree child has evolved beyond family group. Is he patterning himself after either parent. (Remember to check up on influence of nurse in well-to-do families.) (For younger children a disjointable doll is sometimes used to obtain child's reactions to siblings or other intimates.)

*a.* School adjustment: —

What is child's attitude toward authority. What in general is child's attitude toward school, toward special teachers. Try to establish reasons for likes or dislikes towards teachers. Is the teacher a parent substitute or imago. Is she a primary source of identification. What are the difficult and easy subjects. Is this strength or weakness linked up with parental attitude toward education. Is lack of interest or inattentiveness related to day dreaming. Try to learn whether child's poor school work is intellectual in origin (*cf.* with intelligence and achievement tests) or is it a secondary problem due to personal conflict or environmental influences. (In question of truancy investigate influence of companions and use made of time away from school.)

Form your own opinion of child's intelligence and ability to learn. Is there any evidence of an attitude of inferiority to-

ward school. Is misbehavior at school compensation for poor school work. What are child's relationships to other children in school. (Combine with 3*b*, Friendships.) What is child's plan and attitude toward future education. What is child's solution for scholastic difficulties. Try to get child to compare any previous school experience of a more satisfactory nature with present unsatisfactory school adjustments. Do parents interfere with school relationships. How. Do child's brothers and sisters go to the same school. What was their record. Does it interfere with patient. What activities has child at school outside of studies. (Link up with 3*a*, Recreation.)

#### IV. CHILD'S THOUGHT LIFE.

##### *a.* Type of thinking: —

From way child answers and produces material, decide whether child's thinking is reflective and clear. Is he confused or hurried. Is material well organized. Is he over-productive, blocked. Are associations loose. Is material meagre. Are there memory defects; significant or general gaps. Is child over exact; uncertain, full, concrete, abstract in his productions.

##### *b.* Phantasies and day dreams: —

Proceed both directly and indirectly. Get child to "make believe" with you. Try to discover identification tendency here. Discuss what he thinks about, lying in bed at night, when not interested in class work, when walking along street, etc. Estimate amount and function of phantasies. If productions are inadequate ask child to make up a story for you. If results poor use leads already obtained re home and school, visits to movies, reading. Other ways of stimulating phantasy production are letting child imagine he is all powerful, what would he do. If he had a million dollars, what would he do. If he could change anything he desired what would he change. If he didn't have to go to school what would he do. How he

sees himself when a man. What are his best thoughts or memories. Decide relationship of phantasies to compensation.

*c.* Wishes or ambitions:—

(Technique is much the same as 4*b*.)

Proceed directly and indirectly. If child could do anything, what would he do. What does he want to do when graduated. Try to learn origin and influence of these desires. In older children autobiographies are helpful. (This technique can best be used in following visits.)

(Child's drawings, when interpreted, serve a similar function. Ask child his three best wishes.)

*d.* Night dreams:— (Best reserved for older children.)

It is safer to use these as illustrations of previously established points. (Proceed cautiously with interpretation—especially in initial interview.) Does child have recurring dream. Does he think it a good or bad dream. Has he any interpretation of dream. What other things does he think about in connection with dream. If child claims he does not dream, have him make up one on the spot. Are dreams well organized, close to the surface, easily recalled, significant, etc.

*e.* Earliest memories:—

What are the earliest experiences child can remember. Are they pleasurable. What is child's reaction to them now. If memories are difficult to recall, help by linking up with some family situation. What does he first remember about mother, father, sibling, etc. What are his memories of deceased parents, earlier environment, first school experiences, first exciting visit, etc.

*f.* Worries, fears, etc.:—

Is he afraid of dark. Does his mother have to accompany him to bathroom, bedroom. Is he afraid of dogs, other ani-

mals. Has parent similar fears or somebody else he knows. Is he afraid of any specific person; father, teacher, colored person. What is the source of fear. Is he afraid of being alone, of passing along certain alleys and corners. (Be sure to follow up any lead yielded.) When is he happiest, saddest. When is he having best time, worst time. What things do his parents worry about. Does he worry about them, about school work, about sickness, about his appearance, his ability to play games, etc.

*g. Identifications:—*

Discover choice of movie actor, hero, teacher, football or baseball star, older boy. If he could be like anybody, whom would he choose. Why. What is his favorite comic. Has he collected any pictures of heroes. What is basis of choice—group ideal, compensation, identification, substitution. If no hero, is it related to negativism, over self-evaluation.

*h. Vocational plans:—*

Discuss directly with older children. (It is helpful to them and revealing to the examiner.) Try to trace origin of these plans—teacher, parent, older child. Why is child choosing a particular line. Does he seem fitted for it. Is it likely to fit in with his psychiatric needs. Is it an effort to escape from difficulties.

*i. Reaction to own body, including sexualization:—*

Does child have any pains. When does he get them. What helps them. Does anybody he knows have similar pains; parents, siblings. What does he say parents do about his pains. What does he think about them. (Try to establish what function, if any, pains serve.)

Is he as strong as other boys. What can he do or not do that they can do; run as fast, etc. Is he sensitive about any part

of his body. What does he or she think of size, weight, muscles, face, mouth, nose, heart, chest, belly, genitals, breasts. (This is a good time to lead up to questions of sex.) Does he think his organs are different from other boys'; smaller, larger. Does he ruminate about birth. How does he think babies are born. What does he think his organs are for. What does he think about when he plays with them. Has he seen other organs; parents', girls', boys'. Has he played with other genitals. Was he the aggressor or led by others. Would he like to play with anybody that way — mother, father, sister, etc. Is he going to marry when he grows up; whom. What has he been told happens to boys who play with themselves. What is his attitude toward girls; overprotecting, too much indifference, etc. What is girl's attitude toward menstruation. (If any frank leads obtained, follow through to obtain source of information or practice and its significance to child. Does child peep or write obscenities. Has he sex phantasies. Remember much sex play is innocent.)

*j.* Child's solution for own problems and attitude toward them:—

Try to find out what child would like to do if he could do anything he wished about his problems. (This may reveal more of child's personality and point to some stress in his environment not necessarily previously discovered.) What does he think should be done about them. What would he like you to do. Whom does he hold responsible. Does he feel guilty, act ashamed. Does he show a spirit of bravado about them. Does he cover up his feelings. Will he co-operate in treatment. Is he a good risk. How does he react to suggestions you make as to what should be done. How is he affected by visit to clinic.

## V. SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS AND IMPRESSIONS OF CHILD.

Give evidence from material obtained for your points of view. Try to relate each finding to the complete picture so as to present a well rounded out understanding of child's behavior.

## VI. OUTLINE YOUR IDEA AS TO WHAT YOU THINK IS LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

Base this upon past history, nature of behavior, your findings, results of previous treatment and present or possible environment.

## VII. DISCUSS TREATMENT IN TERMS OF YOUR SUMMARY.

THEN ENUMERATE TREATMENT PROPOSALS UNDER FOLLOWING HEADINGS WHERE NECESSARY.

*a.* Medical. This will include diet, drugs, rest, exercise, further examinations. It will also include treatment of other members of family where necessary.

*b.* Psychiatric. Outline type of therapy recommended, and for whom.

*c.* Educational. This will include recommendations for change of grade or of school, special tutoring, special curricula. It will also include recommendations for educational tests.

*d.* Recreational. This takes in type of play life needed, kind of toys, friends and group activity.

*e.* Vocational. Outline what type of work is indicated for child. This might include "after school" employment where indicated.

*f.* Social. Recommendations as to parents, home, teacher, siblings, from the viewpoint of methods of handling child, come in here. This handling also includes economic matters. (Of special interest to agencies.)



*PART FOUR:*  
ECLECTICISM AND GENETIC METHOD



## CHAPTER VIII

### *ECLECTICISM AND GENETIC METHOD\**

PERSONALITY, as we have seen it through these varying vistas, is either a synthesis of individual fragments of mind or behavior, or an integration, the organization of which must be directly stated; it is either a system of impulses held in cohesion, or a blind striving that shapes a form for itself within the limits which society allows. All these views may in part be experimentally tested, or even subjected to mathematical verification; yet such testing will be the labor of a century.

In the meantime how is a choice to be made between these varying conceptions; how may one evaluate the truth and usefulness which each conception contains? In many cases the choice seems rather arbitrary, a matter to be settled by personal predilection. For example, one whose life is a succession of inner pictures, one to whom even the conjunctions "but" and "and" are fleeting yet vivid elements of sensory consciousness, is at a loss to understand why any one should descend into the Avernus of a "muscle-twitch" psychology. Those whose minds are blank of images, those to whom expression is a succession of muscular adjustments, are equally at a loss to understand psychology of the "image-mongering" type. Those whose style of life is that of the dissector feel at home only when the tissues of the mind are laid bare, each

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\* For a large part of the material in this chapter bearing on genetic method, I am indebted to Lois Barclay Murphy—G.M.

severed from the others and laid in its appropriate box. Those to whom inspection is more than analysis, and unity more than synthesis, are restless in the dissecting room. To them, despite the successes of analytic science, the living whole, with all its enigmas, is more real. Those to whom life is a conflict with dark forces which they can never squarely face, find in the language of Freud a note which they had elsewhere vainly sought; those to whom a sense of futility and worthlessness has since childhood offered its distressing challenge, find in the Adlerian struggle for superiority the true message of psychology.

This explanation of the viewpoints of psychologists through mention of their personal preferences and needs may easily be overdone; for example, any one of the various psychological schools could easily show how all the other schools have arisen through the oddities of those who have espoused alien psychological systems. A psychoanalyst can easily prove an exaggerated "father antagonism" in the "individual psychologist," while the behaviorist can easily show the childhood conditionings which lie at the root of a belief in the reality of mind. In this way all the "isms" may be reduced to the vagaries of individual constitution or habit. All views then would be, from the point of view of the spectator, partial glimpses of the truth, and all would of necessity be doomed to the errors imposed by human nature.

The fact that there is a germ of truth in this way of looking at the various theories of personality has led to a widespread tendency toward eclecticism. We borrow not only the catch phrases about inferiority feelings, rationalization, and conditioned responses, but the very foundation stones from many a psychological system; we often construct a building of singular dimensions and still more singular internal arrangements. Images and reflexes, complexes and goals are plastered together in a patchwork, which though it may appear to indicate broadmindedness, is like the most sterile of hybrids.

A system made up of such heterogeneous ingredients is no system at all.

The more systematic psychologist finds in such eclecticism not only an artificial patchwork so loosely fitted together that no one can tell at what minute it will tear apart; he tells us that the patch which has been torn from his own psychological system is imperfectly understood and imperfectly used, because in eclectic hands it lacks the definition, the place in a system, which any scientific fact has to have. He points out that there are warring schools even in contemporary physics and chemistry; there are radically different ways of conceiving basic laws. The more progress is made in mathematical analysis of the data of physics, the more imperative it becomes to embark upon systems of metaphysics. It is no accident that Einstein's relativity is but one of several ways of fitting together complicated data which put a strain upon any mind which had adjusted itself to the orderly doctrines of Newtonian mechanics. Some physical scientists tell us, in fact, that we do not even know what their data are until we see them as part of a system; that an experiment is trivial or even fantastic if it sets itself up as a contribution of "facts" having no place in an organized scientific frame-work. Similarly the psychologist who borrows this from one doctrine and that from another is almost certain to find his laboratory a junkpile, the instruments and record sheets of which are as meaningless to him as the broken wheels and scattered ball bearings surviving from the time of a long deceased student of mechanics.

To those who have made an effort to follow sympathetically the contributions of a dozen or more groups of psychologists, priding themselves on their alertness to the legitimate claims of each, this analogy from physical science is apt to be disturbing. For this much truth must be granted to the lover of system: the eclectic is an excellent borrower, but almost never in a position to lend. The only meaning which his findings have is the meaning given by the founder of the system. The

appeal which the psychologist finds in the discoveries of a psychological school is really the appeal not of the detached fact, but of the whole way of looking at things which is reflected by an incidental detail.

In self-defense at the charge that our patch-work method fails to symbolize the dynamics of a personality, we retort that dogmatism has no place in an unfinished science and that we must borrow wherever a useful hypothesis can be found. Do we not in fact exhibit ideas, conditioned responses, compensations and repressions? Are not the facts described real, and are we not bound to pay sober tribute to the various contributions of all the systems? Is not the eclectic as well oriented as any of the protagonists of schools; and is he not in a better position than a defender of a special "ism" to welcome what is of value as it appears in the writings of any and all schools?

All these systems, moreover, can scarcely be considered as equally true or valid in themselves. They not only ignore one another most of the time; when they do pay attention to one another it is usually not to borrow but to revile and rebuke. The schools can not all be accepted as they stand, any more than they can be broken up, and a mosaic made of the fragments. To follow any one school is a stultification of one's capacity for original judgment, for all the ways of approaching personality which have been described here, as well as a number of others not described, have facts to which they may point with pride and systematic interpretations which may not easily be brushed aside. To stand on the solid ground of one, and call the others names, is no more satisfying to the serious scientist than is the blind acceptance of a fact here and a fact there, with no regard to the deeper realities which such facts reflect.

Yet somehow or other we do not believe the situation is as hopeless as it seems. There have been indications of a new sort of eclecticism in the last few years; an eclecticism which can be both critical and tolerant, both factually minded and

aware of the relativity of facts. Such an approach to personality is not merely a theoretical point at which all roads must meet, but a recent event in modern psychology, or, to speak more strictly, an event in the process of becoming. To see the process clearly it will be worth while to glance at the actual process of rapprochement which has been going on in the last seventy-five years; to see how the medical psychologies have interacted with the laboratory psychologies and how all of these have colored one another in a series of research approaches. Our historical sketch will lead to a study of modern research work on the growing personality of the child; for it is in this absorbing task that the new eclecticism has most adequately defined itself.

#### THE ORIGINS OF PRESENT-DAY ECLECTICISM

FIRST we must consider the medical psychologies of the nineteenth century, for the progress of medicine during the last hundred years has had an immense influence on psychology. Many magical theories which still survived began to die out, and the scientific spirit opened the gate to the physician. The physician, however, did not know quite what to do. Hospitals for the insane existed — in fact, had existed from ancient times. But the relations existing between a sick body and a sick mind were by no means clear, and even the collecting of basic facts and the classification of these facts into meaningful patterns was no avocation for the general practitioner. Specialists in mental diseases appeared in increasing numbers.

Psychologists began now to awaken to the significance of a medical approach to mental disease, to see that mental abnormalities are a part of the subject-matter of mental science, that treatises on medical psychology are in order. It is no accident that the very decade (1840-50) which saw the beginning of large-scale recognition of the responsibility of the community for the care of mental defectives and the insane

witnessed likewise some of the first great treatises on medical psychology.

Psychology soon found itself yielding more than it had intended, or perhaps we should say, borrowing more than it was in a position to return. The clinicians of the third quarter of the nineteenth century showed clearly that the study of mental disorder, particularly hysteria, threw an immense amount of light upon every-day psychology, especially upon the phenomena of forgetting, of absent-mindedness, and of suggestion. French physicians, such as Azam, Richet, and Charcot, held the attention not only of the medical world but of those psychologists who were awakening to the conception of a psychology which should be broad enough to include all the facts of mental life. When Wundt published his great treatise on *Physiological Psychology* in 1873-4, Richet was already experimenting upon the physiology and psychology of suggestion and double personality. And only a few years later Charcot opened that most famous of all clinics for nervous disease which made Paris the center of the world's neurological science. The nineteenth century presented, then, as it drew toward its close, a sort of interaction between medicine and psychology which was fore-ordained to result in psychological schools.

In the same decade, however, another development in medical science commenced to delineate medical psychology of a profoundly different cast. German medical psychology came under the leadership of Kraepelin. Kraepelin had studied with Wundt. He saw clearly that the methods of the laboratory could be applied to the study of mental abnormalities as they were applied to the every-day thinkings and doings of the normal. From his laboratory came a series of studies on the psychological effects of drugs, hunger, loss of sleep and other depleting or disturbing physical agencies.<sup>159</sup> Kraepelin was not, however, content to remain a mere collector of incidental facts, any more than Wundt had been. Just as Wundt built

up a systematic psychology, so Kraepelin envisaged a comprehensive "clinical psychiatry" in which mental disorders were to be seen in systematic relation with one another.<sup>160</sup> In the last decade of the century he succeeded, by means of laborious research, in achieving a new and important classification of mental diseases. An illustration of his genius for systematization may be given.

There were already, of course, many classifications; in fact, all sorts of classifications. Kraepelin set to work collecting descriptions of mental disorders not merely as they existed at the time of any single examination, but in terms of the entire span or *course* of the disease. He looked upon mania, for example, not as the mere manifestation of a momentary loss of mental equilibrium, but as an aspect of the course of a life, all of which must be charted, plumbed, and set in order. Now the curious fact kept recurring, among the hundreds of cases studied by Kraepelin, that mania is no mere episode in an otherwise normal life, that it tends to recur in those who have had it once; depressive insanity, too, is no mere momentary affliction. Certain persons are predisposed, and the particular disposition may in some cases repeatedly manifest itself. Now, many individuals who were predisposed to mania seemed also in a way predisposed to depression; a person suffering from a manic attack now is likely to suffer some years hence from an attack of depression; a person may, in fact, show at the same time the mingled characteristics of the two disorders. Despite the superficial contrast between a flighty or manic mentality and a morose or melancholic one, there is nevertheless, underneath, a fundamental emotional disturbance which may show itself now in mania, now in depression, now in a mixture of the two. Kraepelin had, then, by means of a study of the *life-span*, shown a fundamental identity even where superficial observation would have led one to suspect the most diverse dispositions. Kraepelin's clinical psychiatry was an epoch-making advance beyond all psychiatric classifications

which based themselves, so to speak, upon snap-shots of the individual. A consideration of life histories is perhaps the essence of the modern psychiatric outlook.

We have dwelt thus at length upon Kraepelin because it has been important to show that the psychological significance of medical discovery was becoming apparent everywhere, that Kraepelin himself was profoundly influenced by experimental psychology, and in turn profoundly influenced it.

The French school of Charcot and Janet had, as we saw, begun to draw the outlines of a dynamic psychology, a "psychology of personality" as contrasted with the psychology of sensory fragments, of attention, of perception, of association. As we have seen, Freud had, too, in the manner of the day, studied the hypnotic treatment of hysteria. He had, to be sure, known of the more orthodox methods of electrotherapy and hydrotherapy. There was, however, some talk of "suggestion," and he would, he tells us, have been quite content to attribute the cures of the electro-therapist to the influence of suggestion, if in fact he had seen any cures. Charcot seemed to open a new line of attack, for Charcot had two suggestions to offer Freud, the one general, the other specific; the one as wide as the skies, the other as particular as a thunderbolt. The general (or generic) thought was that hysterical symptoms could be traced to the patient's storehouse of *ideas*, that there were ideas which made normal behavior impossible. That a physical disease could result from an idea was of course, from the point of view of the organic neurologist, preposterous; yet Charcot was somehow convincing. Charcot's other contribution to Freud was a reference to sexual causes for mental trouble. It must be remembered that this was the era of Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis*, and that the words of Charcot were the final stroke in hammering in a conviction to which other clinical material had probably already made its contribution.

But Charcot's approach was incomplete, his doctrines not rounded out in a fashion satisfying to the builder of a psycho-

logical system. Now Freud was apparently from the beginning a system-builder, a man who saw the possibilities of a new edifice, a man to whom architectonics was more important than, let us say, entry by the correct door or the proper designation of drawing-room or lounge. A new psychological system had sprung up at Nancy where the great student of suggestion, Bernheim, conducted his school. Here Freud also studied. Freud was enough impressed by Bernheim's work to translate his book on suggestion into German. Again he returned to Vienna, and went on practicing, thinking, and system-building. The story of early psychoanalysis, and of the revolutions which led to analytical psychology and individual psychology, has already been told in Part II.

There are, then, five major systems of psychiatry which have been sufficiently interested in systematic psychology to be called medical psychologies; and to every one of these systems psychology as a science has had to give some attention and make some sort of working adjustment. These we may for convenience designate in terms of their leaders or most able spokesmen: Kraepelin, Janet, Freud, Jung, Adler.

One of these five, the school of Janet had (as we saw in Chapter II), forced recognition from psychologists. Now Kraepelin's clinical psychiatry had no enthusiastic body of psychological supporters, but neither had it violent opposition to meet. Abnormal psychology began to be recognized in universities, and the contributions of Kraepelin fitted in. There was no doubt whatever that his material was *psychological*.

The other three schools had to wait for special opportunities. Such an opportunity was afforded to Freud and Jung by Stanley Hall, one of the most eminent of American psychologists, who in 1909 invited both men to address audiences at Clark University. The lectures were published in the *American Journal of Psychology* in the following year, and constituted the real introduction of the new modes of thought into the American academic world. The new doctrines had much to recommend them; in particular, Freud's idea of studying and analyzing

ing dreams, and Jung's bold program of experimental dissection of the associative processes, were welcome enough.

The doctrines, however, did not fit easily into the psychologies of the day. Their data seemed raw, indigestible masses, descriptions of gross totals of human action or thought, not analyzed into the elementary constituents or elementary processes which a science must of course demand. Except for Jung's study of word-association, moreover, it was clear that most of the new psychology was not experimental psychology at all; it was a new manner of looking at personality, the data being collected in clinics or consultation rooms rather than laboratories, with interest centering in total readjustments of selves rather than in detailed analyses of specific sensations and images and in explicit formulation of basic psychological laws. The picturesque terminology imported by Freud was not so much to be scorned as simply to be ignored by men who, like Titchener, were interested in the "severely technical" description of exactly what each kind of consciousness is.

The resistance shown by American psychology in 1909-10 was, of course, stiffened as the impact of the new literature upon the general reading public began to make itself felt. Teachers of psychology discovered that students came to them with the idea that psychoanalysis was psychology, and that Freudian dream-interpretations were to be taken at face-value; some students preferred the mass totalities of the Freudian system to the precise descriptions and explanations given in the psychology classroom. Psychologists, moreover, despite their many differences, had come pretty consistently to value experimentation; and the new doctrines did not seem amenable to experimental test.

Despite these difficulties, psychoanalysis and the schools historically connected with it dealt with a kind of subject matter in which interest has steadily been growing: despite the unacceptability of hundreds of specific doctrines, these schools have been concerned with a sort of problem to which the psychologist earnestly wants to find a solution. Even when he is sure

that he cannot accept a doctrine as it stands, he finds himself settling down to see what the problem is to which a medical psychologist has found it worth while to devote a chapter, or a book; and to try to follow the paths which have seemed to practicing physicians to be worth treading. The very nature of experimentation had forced the attention of academic psychologists to detailed, relatively easily controlled items of consciousness or behavior, away from a view of the total personality; the very nature of the work of physicians forced their attention from details, in their case, symptoms, toward the total personality. Experimentation in and of itself might never have led to an integrated eclecticism. The demands of a therapeutic approach concerned with the whole personality, however, compelled this synthesis. The result is that the position of the medical psychologists has slowly changed; their claims are listened to, their work is systematically examined. The characteristic attitude of most psychologists today is that of detailed and critical questioning. Some of Freud's hypotheses, for example those concerned with suppression and the tendency to forget the unpleasant, have been subjected to experimental study. Much of Jung's material is frankly outside the pale of the experimental field, yet the study of emotional disturbances which directly affect the process of association is one instance in which Jung's work has been copied and elaborated by a great many experimentalists.

Adler's theory came later into the field, seemed to have more "common sense" in it, and has seemed to incur much less violent opposition. The basic notion of inferiority feelings and compensation for them seems to have gotten abroad very generally. Some experimentation, too, has been done on inferiority feelings, and even on the process of compensation.<sup>161</sup>

WE MAY gain a view of the modern fusion of psychological schools first by considering the *application* of an eclectic doctrine, secondly by looking at the matter more broadly and regarding eclectic psychology from the "pure-science" point

of view. One real point of convergence of psychological systems is the *psychological clinic*, that noisy but important chamber in which all the psychologies that can throw light upon a disordered personality are eagerly cross-examined for their contribution. We do not, of course, mean to suggest that the value of any scientific system is to be judged by any single application, or even by the sum of all its applications. The psychological clinic, however, is usually free to be as eclectic as it likes without serious danger of incurring disrepute. It makes use, then, of the intelligence tests of Binet, it makes use at times of techniques for the study of imagery and association, much as these would be used in ordinary introspective work; it studies conditioned responses very much in the spirit of the behaviorist; and it studies the emotional maladjustments of individual children or adults with all the insight that it can get from clinical psychiatry, the psychoanalysis of Freud, the analytical psychology of Jung, or the individual psychology of Adler. The psychological clinic is, of course, not always eclectic. It is, however, *free to be eclectic*; and it is interesting to note that it is where freedom for eclecticism is permitted (simply because all possible contributions *must* be put to work) that the least "conflict" between schools appears. When an individual mind is sick, everyone who has a helpful idea will be recognized to be "in order" when he speaks. And curiously enough, the contributions from the schools, when actually put to use in the study of a child, seem to sift themselves into a meaningful pattern; much dross is thrown out, but what is left is strangely integrated; it is not so much of a patchwork as we feared. The "child guidance clinic," as has been seen, also uses many psychological approaches.

Eclecticism, however, shows itself in other situations besides that of the clinic. All the *social sciences* which have to do with the adjustments of persons seem busy today in the task of making psychology useful. One might say that the pressing problems of "social pathology" have offered an opportunity for a sort of clinic in which the social order is the patient. But

it is not enough for economists to talk, for example, about the "behavior of prices." They realize more and more explicitly that their economic systems have been founded upon a meager or even fallacious psychology. Sociologists likewise, frequently led astray by a formalism almost as arid as that of classical economics, are vigorously groping for bits of psychological science which will make the interaction of persons somehow more intelligible. Students of political science realize, as keenly as any one, the bankruptcy of theories of the State and of sovereignty, theories of internationalism and world peace, unless all such theories are grounded in genuine factual knowledge and genuine wisdom regarding the intrinsic human nature of individuals and the basic laws governing the responses of human beings one to another.

It is, then, perfectly natural that the more alert of contemporary economists and sociologists draw greatly upon behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, and the rest, wherever a useful hypothesis is to be found, and do their best to work out their own coherent systems. The hypotheses are, of course, frequently bad ones. The fact remains that in a world as confused as ours, in a world in which millions of people go without the necessities of life while other millions seek in vain for employment which might help to fulfill those needs, in an age in which overproduction exists though goods are actually too few to meet the needs of life, people should desperately grasp at hypotheses which may serve for logical clarification of social processes. Now the working hypotheses of all these psychological approaches have the great — one might say almost literally, the *infinite* — merit of being for the most part directly testable hypotheses. They cannot all be correct, but they can almost all be subjected to logical and factual verification or refutation. Truth, as Titchener brilliantly said, emerges more quickly from error than from confusion. And when the elemental distinction is made between those confused and confusing hypotheses which can never be tested and those clear hypotheses which call aloud for

a testing, it is easy to see why rigid adherence to scholastic shibboleths is so rapidly being displaced by a generous and inquiring eclecticism.

But such an eclecticism must meet a two-fold test. It must prove that it is actually able, in practice, to grasp and to use the contributions of schools, and that it need not rob these contributions of their vitality in so doing. Second, it must prove that it need not stifle the tendency to formulate wide and bold hypotheses; that it can, in fact, construct its own original hypotheses. If it meets both tests, it will pay a debt to all schools and still remain solvent.

#### THE ECLECTICISM WHICH GENETIC METHOD FORCES UPON US

THE SORT of eclecticism discussed thus far, however, still bears here and there a little of the imprint of the older agglutinative sort of synthesis. It is in the *experimental study of personality in childhood* that the most adequate efforts of the newer approach appear. It will be worth while to consider this closely, both because of the intrinsic interest of the problem of the *growth* of personality, and because such a procedure will help to make clear what can, and what cannot, be expected from a synthesis of various approaches. Though practical needs have played an immense part in shaping the research work, the fact remains that *immediate* problems call for an understanding of remote and "formal" principles; and (as in the case of chemistry) the attempt to apply our knowledge has forced us again and again to work towards a pure science. It is interesting to see how psychiatric and educational demands have pushed us, willy-nilly, into something very much like a science of child development.

In general the academic psychologist is primarily interested in the *process* of personality formation, while the psychoanalyst and individual psychologist are primarily interested in their *effect*, especially as they appear in civilized society. But whether one is concerned with the process or with the

effects, attention is ultimately turned to the *beginnings* of the emotional reaction, both because these are apt to be relatively simple and because they are in a sense the foundation for later responses.

In fact, it seems that in all probability, more and more use will be made of child subjects for the study of basic problems in personality. Adults are too difficult to study; they are too self-conscious; they have too many defenses accessible; their responses are too confused by the presence of layer upon layer of habit which prevents a clear discernment of the process of response; their motives are too mixed. One reason why laboratory psychology has been so slow in throwing light on basic and crucial problems of personality is doubtless the fact that too many obstacles have presented themselves to any experimenter who uses adult subjects in the attack on these complex problems. On the other hand, as the work on the "simpler species" — the child — progresses, methods will be developed which may be expanded and applied to adults.

The various methods used in these studies of children are of the most widely differing sorts: there are elaborate techniques which may prove immensely fruitful for the future, but as yet have given meager results; and on the other hand relatively casual methods offer data of the greatest moment if valid, but the validity may be questionable. Perhaps the one feature these techniques have in common, in contrast with the analytic schools, is their interest in collecting as precise and objective data as possible; in being able, for example, not to say simply that "only children are apt to be problems," but that "in *X* social group under conditions *abcd*, *n* percent of only children will be problems"; or, more precisely, "*n* percent of only children will have problems of type *A*; *m* percent, of type *B*, etc." In short, their purpose is not merely to provide a system of illuminating concepts to be used by a given teacher or social worker, but to show as exactly as possible just what the range of applicability of these concepts is, under what conditions the effect which they label appears, and under what conditions it

will not appear. They would limit their conclusions so as to apply only to groups similar to those from whom the data were collected, and would constantly warn the student that "although upper-class 'only children' may tend to be problems in Middletown, 'only children' among the Tennessee mountain whites may not be problems for their communities at all." In addition to this quality of precision, the data collected by these techniques aim to be objective and reliable. That is, any one using the same technique on the same group under the same conditions ought to get the same results. The results themselves do not depend upon the inspiration of the moment.

If on the other hand we compare this approach to personality with that of the laboratory we find that many of the techniques are similar. The criteria for good experimental work are much the same whatever school offers the hypothesis for substantiation. It is rather in the general purpose and motive that they differ. In laboratory studies of adults we are most often interested in a cross-section of personality, in the process of perception at a given moment, the pattern of an emotion at a given time, and so on. But the trend in the various studies of child development is toward interest in the long view of personality. One inquires what the personality is when we first have a chance to inspect it, to be sure, but always the interest is in what happens next and why, or how this pattern of behavior or feeling came to be. This interest is of course very close to, as it is in considerable part due to, that of the analytic schools; it is, however, broader. For it is concerned with the total array of physiological, economic, educational, and other social factors that affect the personality from the time of birth.

The genetic approach is, then, highly indebted to analytic groups for its concern with the beginnings and development of personality, and also for many particular hypotheses regarding the organization of personality. It is equally indebted to laboratory "schools" for its experimental, test, rating, and observational methods, together with a large variety of specific

techniques, and above all, their standards of scientific work. The intertwining of these various motives and methods of work in the study of individuality and the genesis of personality will be apparent as we proceed.

Though the problem of personality is not identical with the problem of individuality, it is intimately associated with it. Dictionary definitions suggest that individuality is that which makes any given thing distinct or distinguishable from any other thing in the universe. Personality also rests in part upon distinctiveness or uniqueness. Now, concepts like similarity and difference are often dependent on number; similarity often means simply a relatively small *quantitative difference*, and this holds true even in relation to some of those subtle differences which we are sure make for a unique qualitative distinction. Individuality, then, consists partly in being measurably different. Those who undertake to measure personality are therefore not imposing upon the structure of personality a system of quantitative conceptions which are irrelevant to its qualitative essence. On the contrary, they are among the few who have thought out the problems of the nature of individuality, and have seen that personalities can, from one point of view, be described in terms of measurement of individual differences.

THE VARIETY of quantitative methods of attack upon genetic problems may be illustrated by a typical group of studies dealing with one central question. An experimental approach invariably attempts to reduce a problem to clear-cut and definable form. Now one aspect of the social expression of personality which lends itself to such definition and objective study is the act of smiling. Several obvious ways of studying a simple trait like this suggest themselves immediately. One might keep a diary of a child from birth to two years, recording every smile in relation to its setting or stimulus.<sup>162</sup> By analyzing such material at the end of the period we should then know how early a child had smiled, what situations had first

produced the smiles, and what relation smiling, as an expression of this child's personality, had to other expressions of his personality; or if we had the facilities we might make a study of several children growing up together. This would give us much richer data regarding the stimulus situations for smiling, and might throw some light on the effect of adult personalities upon immature personality as such a form of expression was developing. Or we might study a great many children by observing them in characteristic situations at intervals, hoping that those situations would be sufficiently representative to give us the main landmarks of the development without the enormous amount of work involved in a complete consecutive diary.<sup>163</sup> This obviously would probably miss important individual situations which had helped to shape the development of a particular child's personality. (It is possible, however, that this omission would not affect smiling as much as it might affect fears, for instance; since from our present evidence it seems reasonable to suppose that fear responses can be more easily conditioned by one experience than can pleasure responses, or whatever is being expressed in smiling.) Or by still further abbreviating our procedure, we might systematically subject a number of children to a variety of situations, some of which would be expected to call out smiling while others would not. Any one of these procedures might throw light on processes involved in the development of expressive behavior, and individual differences in their working and results. As a matter of fact, all of these procedures have actually been applied in different investigations. In one case, twenty-four-hour observations were made upon a number of children at each month level from birth to one year. In another case consecutive diary records were made of the behavior of a small group of four children brought up together by the experimenter who was making the investigation, together with her staff. The general procedure involving close observation of not merely one child but of a group of children living together over a period of time is one which ought to throw a good deal of

light upon the processes of early personality development. It is, of course, such a comprehensive and expensive procedure that it is a hard one to undertake.

The method of systematic observation for short periods of time at intervals has been applied to the study of children of nursery school age. Data on nursery school children show interesting possibilities of connection between amount of laughter and amount of physical activity, or between both of these and sociability in very young children. And further data of this sort should eventually give us more adequate evidence regarding the relation of physiological characteristics, bodily activity, etc., to personality traits of even rather obscure sorts. The method of repeated experiment over a period of a year or more has been carried out with a group of infants from the age of eight weeks to forty-four or more.<sup>164</sup> This method was particularly interesting because it showed, more dramatically than a consecutive diary method would show, the tendency under comparable conditions for some children to be consistently jolly and others consistently sober, and for some to have a consistent tendency to smile or cry with almost equal readiness. The fact that such dependable tendencies show themselves so early again suggests the possibility of finding physiological or other innate factors related to this matter of expressiveness.

Here again, however, we should not suggest that environmental factors are unimportant. They would be watched with equal vigor, but the variations in appearance of laughter and amount of laughter in the very early weeks suggest that some factors are at work at a time earlier than we should normally expect environmental influences to have much effect. Furthermore if such innate differences in tendency to laugh, to cry, to waver between the two, do exist from the beginning, they must be of tremendous importance in determining the extent of the influence which may be exerted by different environmental influences and specific early experiences. What is traumatic for one child need not be traumatic for another; what would be excessive emotional stimulus for one child might be a needed

emotional stimulus for another. What relation there is between overt expressiveness and internal emotional disturbance, is, of course, not indicated by such a study as this, and a prognosis regarding the ultimate consequences for personality of any emotional experience would depend on other measures of inner disturbance as well as the measures of external manifestations. With all its limitations, even a small amount of data of this sort may serve as a corrective for an overenthusiastic environmentalist point of view; while specific experiences undoubtedly determine in large part the content of an individual personality, innate factors probably determine the scope of influence of any given emotional experience or set of environmental elements.

In other words, even such a simple starting-point as the observation of smiling and crying leads us into wide and important areas; different methods open up different aspects of the problem. Some suggest the need for further analysis of psychiatric concepts such as the trauma, the all-important influence of specific experiences, or differing responses to different individuals in the family. Others suggest the need for further definition of the range in which "conditioning" operates, or the degree to which the organism does actually behave as a totality. Experimental genetic psychology offers material which may be of real value to each school, just as truly as it depends on all the schools for concepts which may illumine the data, or suggest further avenues of research.

We may next consider the light which considerable quantities of experimental data from the genetic approach throw on basic questions of importance to many schools: "To what extent are we at birth what we are going to be years later?" "What general characteristics of our personality are consistent from the earliest months to later years?" "What particular 'traits' show real continuity?" "How much 'personality' or real organization of behavior tendencies do we have at birth?" "What is the nature of the raw material from which a personality is ultimately woven?" We might have fairly well co-

ordinated behavior tendencies which changed markedly from month to month; or we might have relatively little organized behavior, but such consistency as appeared might prove to be basic and enduring.

The laboratory studies offer a rather haphazard lot of pieces to fit into this puzzle: there is fairly good evidence that those aspects of "personality" which are more or less common to all of us develop early:— the tendency to be "afraid" of certain things such as very loud sounds, to be "angry" at certain things such as serious interference with movement, and to "enjoy" certain ways of being handled, or certain attitudes of other persons such as caressing and fondling. However, even these "primary colors" of personality, — whose modifications and combinations are often said to form the real basis of the finished picture, — appear to be chaotic and indistinct at birth. Other evidence obtained from the study of babies in the first ten days of life<sup>165</sup> shows that even if there is a certain nucleus of pattern and definite organized tendency to response in a young baby, there is much overlapping in the different major types of response, and whatever pattern behavior exists is blurred and confused by behavior common to all these different kinds of response.

In other words, our conception of personality as built up by compound reflexes (or emotions) is a little too simple. We shall have to look for a different conception and think of personality as first gradually forming these definite tendencies out of indefinite confused activities. And this process is undoubtedly influenced both by inner physiological factors (some of them inherited, some of them the result of diet and physical conditions) and by outer environmental, social factors or experiences. After specific tendencies have emerged from the earlier confused state, these tendencies can be modified in the ways the behaviorists have suggested, but perhaps not *before* this. This process of modification itself needs further analysis and qualification.

The expositors of the conditioned response have shown how

specific strong stimuli, as the loud sound made by striking a metal bar, or the blowing of a steam whistle, may influence a child's emotional development. But specific modifications and their subsequent effect depend on the total situation-pattern and not merely the dominant stimulus with which the experimenter is concerned. M. C. Jones<sup>166</sup> has pointed out that an emotional reaction to a particular situation will depend on the inner threshold plus the outer situation; the inner threshold will depend on innate tendencies bound up with neurological and glandular constitution, as well as on previous learning or modification of these innate tendencies, together with special factors of fatigue, hunger, illness or recent emotion; while the outer situation must be analyzed in terms of the immediate dominant stimulus, accessory stimuli, the newness or familiarity of the setting, and so on. A steam whistle may cause a shock on one occasion in a child who is tired and is being carried by an unfamiliar relative in a strange place, when it would be merely amusing when the child was in good spirits, with her mother, near home. But whatever the total inner and outer situation that determined whether the steam whistle brought a spasm of terror or one of joy, the experience *as experienced* becomes part of the child's personality. If it brought a spasm of terror the chances are that thresholds for fear responses not only to steam whistles but to the unfamiliar relative and the strange place, and perhaps strange people and places in general, will be lowered for some time to come, and perhaps permanently. If the steam whistle was experienced as fun, the net result would probably be on the side of added zest for new sounds and people and places. It is extremely important to note that it is this factor of total inner and outer situation-thresholds plus external stimulus-pattern that determines the *effective intensity* of the stimulus; and the effective intensity is more important for the personality than the objective intensity, in all probability. Nearly all stimuli that bring anger or fear responses may bring play responses when they are less intense. A baby tossed lightly into the air laughs

while a baby thrown too far cries; a softly singing voice over the radio arouses interest while the same voice louder becomes disturbing.

This conception is one of the most fruitful that has yet been offered for interpretation of the varying effects of given experiences for different personalities. As yet there has been no large-scale attempt to formulate quantitatively these factors of "threshold," because, quite obviously, they are extremely complex matters to measure. We have made almost no attempt at all to measure individual differences in the tendency to "re-integrate" emotional experiences in reaction to a stimulus *related* to the original stimulus, or the tendency for conditioned responses to be "transferred" to remotely related stimuli. Such differences, when they come to be measured, may make possible at an early age a "neurotic prognosis" as reliable as present intelligence tests. Embryonic as it is, the conception of threshold for response to an emotional stimulus brings the psychiatric hypothesis of the importance of early *trauma* out of the realm of dogma into the realm of analyzable and measurable phenomena.

So FAR, our eclectic approach has assumed with the psychoanalysts the importance of early years both because of special emotional experiences and because of the cumulative effect of all emotional experiences. The eclectic approach has not been dogmatic, however, with respect either to heredity or environment; recognizing the importance of the early years, it has set about to find out what happens in them. So far it has found that the earliest behavior is relatively unpatterned; that vague and not mutually exclusive patterns of response conveniently labeled fear, anger, and love, emerge early; that tendencies toward *different degrees* of overt responsiveness and expressiveness or toward laughing and crying also appear early; and that even before the child is a year old, complicated differences in behavior toward other children, such as those roughly described as dominating or submissive tendencies,

appear. It has further been found that certain intensely emotional experiences (illustrated especially by fears) have far-reaching effects upon a young personality. It has been shown that by various methods undesirable results of such experiences may be eliminated by re-education. And the whole question of *what* stimuli are likely to produce serious fear-reactions is seen to be a complicated problem involving analysis of factors both within and external to the child at the time of the experience. The eclectic approach has been primarily concerned to analyze why certain experiences come to be responded to emotionally while others do not, and to find the causal backgrounds of individual variations in emotional response. We immediately raise questions as to how these different tendencies, modified by experience, *become a personality*. In other words, we wish to know how specific personality "traits" or emotional tendencies become organized. Various possibilities exist here; perhaps certain independent behavior tendencies always develop hand in hand, and the problem of organization is primarily genetic or a problem of maturation; perhaps there is a certain degree of innate hanging-together upon which is superimposed a further degree of relatedness resulting from social patterns; or the interrelations may be socially conditioned altogether; or they may be merely apparent and not real at all.

Now THIS problem of the organization of personality or of the interrelation between traits has repeatedly called for an answer throughout the preceding chapters. The Gestalt psychology, and even more explicitly the individual psychology of Adler, makes this the central problem in personality study, and affirms the reality of modes of organization not only vast enough to comprise many patterns of traits but to comprise the whole personality at once. Our experimental and statistical evidence is entirely inadequate at present to render a verdict regarding this last claim (in fact, as we have already observed, our present mathematical methods are inadequate for such a

task) yet we are able to answer some of the problems regarding the interrelation of traits. One of the most significant, and one of the most adequately studied, has to do with the *generality* or *specificity* of character: to what extent is character made up of certain general traits such as courage, loyalty, ambition, and bashfulness, and to what extent are the courage, loyalty, and the rest, specific to *certain situations*? How much light does a man's heroism or cowardice in one situation throw upon what he will do in other situations? Is character an assemblage of particular habits conditioned to particular situations, or a pattern built of a few large and dependable general dispositions, — or, if it is both, how much is it the one and how much is it the other? <sup>187</sup>

The problem is very similar to the problem regarding the nature of *general intelligence*, and the mathematical methods for its solution are based upon the same logic. There are, in fact, several respects in which a clear understanding of the problem of intelligence will help toward grasping the significance of the research upon the nature of character. It will be worth while to pause for a few moments to consider the methods and results in the study of individual differences in intelligence, in the hope that such an analysis will make the approach to the problem of the organization of character intelligible.

From the first beginnings of mental tests, to the first *standardized* scale of tests was about fifteen years, and twenty-seven more have already passed since the Binet scale of 1905; yet with all the hundreds of studies carried through by the constantly improving methods of intelligence measurement, we are still greatly at a loss to say what we mean by intelligence, or what its essential earmarks may be. Many definitions emphasize a general ability to learn; yet the most exact work indicates that the ability to learn varies enormously with the thing learned. There is no clearly measurable ability to learn which can be defined without reference to particular subject matter. Definitions as broad and general as this nearly always

go on the rocks. But there seem to be two ways of approaching the problem of intelligence which are free from these objections. One is to define it in terms of *all* the individual's *capacities* to make adjustments to a changing environment and suspend judgment as to whether all these separate capacities have some common factors or not; the second is to find those forms of *subject matter* which are manipulated well by those whom we ordinarily call intelligent and poorly by those whom we call unintelligent, and simply define intelligence in terms of skill in handling those subject-matters which we find our tests have emphasized. These may be described as definitions in terms of *process* and *content*, respectively.

Definitions in terms of process are illustrated by the definition of intelligence in terms of the capacity for relational thinking; for example, to determine in what relation the words *sad* and *glad* stand, or to educe missing terms so as to tell what it is that stands in *opposition* to *sad*. General intelligence would then be a general capacity to do this relational sort of thinking. The test of such conceptions lies in the application of correlation methods. Is there in general a tendency for those who excel in one sort of relational thinking to excel in another? The true answer is hard to establish. It is easy to be misled by the fact that persons of high ability in one field are often distinctly competent in some other field. We should not expect an exceedingly able financier to be unable to understand the newspaper, or even to have great difficulty in learning mechanical engineering or European history. But cases of this sort throw no real light on our problem, because all of these tasks are so complicated. What we need to know is not whether two exceedingly complicated sets of functions have any points of overlapping (for the more complicated they are, the more likely they are to overlap with many other things), but to find out whether excellence or failure in some of the simplest processes is correlated with excellence or failure in other simple processes where different subject matter is involved.

Now such data as we have seem to indicate that sometimes very *different processes* relating to *similar subject matter* give results which are significantly correlated.<sup>168</sup> The ability to manipulate words seems, for example, to be a rather general characteristic of the very adaptable brain tissue of man: those who excel in one such form of manipulation are in the long run good in others. The ability to pick up a vocabulary, the ability to form and retain connections between pairs of known words, the ability to find a word meaning the opposite of a given word, the ability to take in the meaning of what one reads, all these seem to be interwoven. As far as we know, this is because words are a sort of thing for which there is a kind of gift, a gift varying enormously from one person to another. Here, then, is ability defined in terms of its content.

But there are also abilities which must be defined in terms of *process*. Such cases are already at hand, *e.g.*, the discovery that some visual memory functions appear to be highly correlated with other visual memory functions, even when different subject matter is used; a general "speed factor" also seems to exist.<sup>169</sup> We shall probably end up by discovering a great variety of interrelationships between mental capacities, some of which will be defined in terms of subject matter (verbal ability, number ability, even color ability or taste ability), and others having to do with process abilities, analogous to the relational thinking of Spearman,<sup>170</sup> or the immediate memory factor just mentioned.

There is no clear proof of "general intelligence" apart from these various "group factors" which we have undertaken to describe. The concept of general intelligence has very considerable value for rough diagnostic purposes in relation to school work or vocational adjustment, but no psychologist who turns over to the physician or teacher a sheer I.Q. thinks that he is describing a child. If the mental tester is not too hurried, he can probably obtain a figure somewhat more accurate for its purpose than the teacher's estimate; but its purpose must be kept in mind. In describing a human being, the I.Q.

has the same kind of significance as a figure describing the value of all the merchandise in a department store. For the purpose of the retailer who has to move or sell out, or put his information to some other immediate practical use, this is well worth while. From the point of view of the purchaser who wants to find exactly what there is in the store, what goods are of high quality and what goods are inferior, the total figure will serve little purpose.

Now this view of general intelligence as a composite of many specific capacities suggests that there may be, beneath the broad and general terms which we use to describe personalities, clusters of specific traits and habits; we may even be able to go far enough in our analysis to get completely *independent* bits of behavior. We may even find some personality traits based on *process* and others on *content*, exactly as was noted in relation to intellectual gifts. On the other hand, if we find by correlation studies that different habits or traits are inter-related, we shall need to inquire what *common elements* there are and what the *different elements* are.

The other great value served by intelligence tests, in helping to make clear the organization of personality, results from the emphasis on the heredity-environment problem. The problem is nearly always misstated in some such form as the following: "To what degree is intelligence hereditary?" This is like asking to what extent a man can live on air. Without air life is soon reduced to *nil*; and without the chromosomes which engender a good brain intelligence is practically nil. The problem is only soluble when one asks to what extent the intellectual *differences* between people are governed by *differences* in environment, and to what extent these are traceable to *differences* in their heredity.

Since intelligence depends not upon heredity plus environment, but upon a certain *interaction* between heredity and environment, the question as to the relative importance of each in determining talents reduces itself to this: in any given social environment and with stock varying within such and such

limits, what is the relative importance of the two factors in causing the observed intellectual differences?

In contemporary America, heredity is perhaps twice as important as environment in producing the variations in the capacities which our intelligence tests measure.<sup>171</sup> The meaning of this finding is, however, entirely relative to the social situation mentioned. If there were greater range in social opportunity than there now is, there would not only be wider variations in measured intelligence, but the *relative importance of heredity and environment would be different*. If through eugenic elimination of the feeble-minded, or if through war or other means there is a disproportionate elimination of the intellectually superior, there will not only be a narrower range of intellectual differences, but the relative importance of heredity and environment will have to be restated and environment assigned a much greater rôle; and if the extremes on the distribution curve increase rapidly enough to flatten out the curve into a new form, the relative importance of heredity in determining the product which we call intelligence will automatically become greater. The heredity-environment controversy, then, relates only to the relative importance of two factors existing *in our present society and with our present biological and social variability*. It is entirely possible that through wise or unwise social control, or through unforeseen scientific and industrial events, the relative importance of the two factors may become in almost any decade widely different from that which now prevails.

The techniques of intelligence-testing have, then, thrown light on two problems as to the nature and organization of intellect; they have studied the generality and the specificity of mental abilities, and they have helped to show to what extent intellectual differences are innate. These are also the two problems which one has to answer first in an attempt to get a quantitative conception as to the structure of personality.

Were this a manual of techniques and results in the measurement of personality, it would be advisable to trace out the

identities and differences between the many experimental approaches towards an answer to these two problems. For the present purpose we are more interested in showing certain general results and implications which have become evident from almost every careful study of the personality-testing variety. We shall illustrate from that investigation which is the most extensive and statistically complete, namely, the Character Education Inquiry conducted by May and Hartshorne;<sup>172</sup> but the interested reader will find in the notes a series of references from which he can easily test the validity of our statements by comparing them with research of various other sorts. The following discussion is centered in May and Hartshorne's work, especially their study of *honesty*. For honesty has been more elaborately studied by experimental method than any other single human character trait or habit, and it will be worth while to show what can and cannot be done in working out a theory of personality by means of such experimental and mathematical devices.

In general, there is a *low but consistent* tendency for each form of honesty in children to be associated with other forms of honesty. A child who cheats excessively at a party game or in athletic sports is not very apt to be a child who is very honest in school work. In general, all these tests of honesty seem to get at some common factor; for if it were not so, the inter-correlations between all these measurements would be zero. On the other hand, the correlations though positive are low. Our prediction that a given child will be honest in one situation because he was honest in another is slightly more apt to be right than wrong, but *only slightly*. If we regard a child's behavior as a result of two variables, one of which is his character at the time and the other of which is the situation confronting him, we shall find that on the whole the variations from situation to situation in these experiments are so great that predictions on the basis of past behavior are not much better than guesses.

The results are cogent; in fact, for the kinds of honesty and

cheating studied, and for the particular group of over a thousand children intensively examined, they are definitive. What these results mean, however, is usually not clear either to the psychologist or to the educator who wishes to put the results to use in some theory of character education.

They are, in fact, so far from clear that psychologists have stopped to cudgel each other with some spirit regarding the question of the "generality" or "specificity" of character. The specificists will have it that character is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements; usually they go further and insist that these elements are simply independent habits, that personality has been built up piecemeal by the process of habit formation emphasized by behaviorism, or by some closely similar process. The generalists, on the other hand, of whom the Adlerians with their style of life are able spokesmen, see in character a unity so fundamental that all life's attitudes reflect some common purpose or orientation.

Now both schools derive much comfort from such data as those of May and Hartshorne quoted above. The specificists point with pride to low intercorrelations between different kinds of honesty, proceeding in fact to show that the same low intercorrelations are found between different forms of generosity, self-control, and persistence. There is no "character in general." May and Hartshorne themselves, though on some pages exceedingly cautious, express on other pages of their work a definite affiliation with this situational interpretation of their data.<sup>178</sup> It must, of course, be borne in mind that one might be a specificist without committing oneself to the behaviorist theory of habit formation. In general, however, what the specificity doctrine means is that one cannot predict much from one specific activity, in one situation, to another activity in another situation. The generalists, or believers in character in general, argue as follows. Each specific act of honesty or dishonesty is, to be sure, a fragment of the individuality, colored in part by the situation. But the situations to which the individual may be exposed are obviously not the *character* of the person,

any more than dyes in which a bit of cloth might be soaked are a part of the cloth. The cloth may, as a matter of fact, be subjected at different times to different dyes, and may seem from moment to moment different cloth. We may, however, wind up ultimately, if the sequence of the dyes is rightly chosen, with cloth similar in most respects to that with which we started. Now if what we wish to know is what the cloth is made of, it will of course be useful to know how various dyes will "take," but at the end of the story it is still the cloth that we are interested in. We have chosen a simile in which there is a rather intimate interaction between the substance and the thing which acts upon it. From a strictly situational point of view, we should in some cases be justified in taking a more extreme illustration, that of porcelain painted now with one color, now after thorough washing with a second color, giving in the course of many days almost as many different appearances as we like. In this case the color is not individually combined with the porcelain. Whether the dish is blue or green to the eye is of no significance from the point of view of him who wishes after the final washing to ascertain the quality of the material used.

Now from this point of view, the situations are not the character any more than the colors were the porcelain. We are, in fact, but little interested in the measurement of the extent of possible vicissitudes of behavior through a wide gamut of possible situations; that is an arbitrary matter depending entirely upon the *range* through which the situations have varied. If May and Hartshorne's nine honesty situations had varied even more than they actually did, the "general" factor of honesty would have been even smaller. If the situations had varied a little less widely, the "general factor" in character would have appeared greater (because different character elements are involved in reaction to different situations). While one person might show different *aspects* of character in different situations — e.g., be generous toward the poor, but

self-defensive and ungenerous toward his brother with whom he is in overt competition, might not another person be more consistent in generosity because he had never had the kind of experience that would make one defensive? The degree of generality depends on the variety of situations studied, of course, but *also* upon the personality organization of the individual. It takes a variety of situations to *show* the variety of character-traits of one person; but also the same variety of situations will bring differing degrees of variation in response from different people.

The degree of generality or specificity is almost entirely a result of the method used, just as the relative importance of general and special factors in putting any utensil or instrument to use will depend upon how inventive and ingenious we are in thinking up possible uses. A rope is, as Chesterton has told us, more general than a telephone; you can do more things with it. But just how specific is a rope? The degree of its specificity depends on whether you are a cowboy, a salesman, or a sailor. Honesty is either a general characteristic or a set of specific habits, depending upon your interest and your emphasis.

So, in fact, with practically all the human character traits which have been measured either in children or adults. Both generalists and specificists admit that if we take a large sampling of concrete details regarding honesty, generosity, self-control, or for that matter, confidence, speed of decision, submissiveness, introversion, or almost anything else used to define character, we can predict something about what the individual will do in future situations; our predictions will be better than shots in the dark. If the theory of specificity were *completely* sound, it is hard to see how this could be done. If the generalists were entirely right, it is hard to see why one should need such a *very* large sampling of specific evidence in order to make a respectable prediction in the future. They ought, in fact, if completely logical, to admit that an individual

having had full opportunity to manifest his honesty in a certain situation could be depended upon to show the same degree of honesty in some new situation.

We have seen that the relative importance of heredity and environment in relation to intellectual differences must depend on the range of variation in each. The same principle is relevant in the discussion of the generality or specificity of character. As a character (already partially or "completely" formed) confronts a range of a dozen different situations, the degrees to which behavior will vary are inevitably dependent upon the range of the situations — the amount of difference from one to another. If a test is so constructed that the situations are more or less similar, the person will be found to show high consistency, so that the general factor in character is large and the specific factor small. If on the other hand the range of situations confronted is very great, so that there is almost no similarity from one to another, the general factor will be exceedingly small and the specific factors enormous. The task of the experimenter, then, if his results are to have any general value in studying personality in our own society, is to allow his experimental situations to vary in a way which is characteristic of the society in which the individual lives. The value of the data obtained by the Character Education Inquiry lies largely in the fact that the range of situations in which honesty, generosity and self-control were tested appears in general to have been a range similar to that which the child actually confronts in the communities and at the ages considered.

The fact that the general factor of character is rather small does not mean that the organism in itself is "inconsistent." It only means that there are habits which are partly dependent on one another and partly independent. The degree of interdependence shows itself entirely through responses to varied situations; if the situations vary enormously the character appears grossly inconsistent. The very concepts of consistency and inconsistency are meaningless when the organism is taken as a detached entity; the only possible meaning of character

measurement is in terms of character in relation to its milieu, and the *norms for different conduct situations* imposed by the milieu. On this basis, then, children's character appears to be rather "inconsistent" within the social group studied.

We saw above (pages 83-85) that the "situational" view assumes that the different behavior of different persons is simply a result of the differences actually inherent in the situations which they confront. On this basis there would be no "character" at all. Most of the situationists, however, do not really mean this; what they mean is that instead of acting upon some general abstract principle the individual carries over into each new situation a response which has been successful in some similar situation in the past (the "transferred conditioned response" as discussed on page 76). Thus, in general, they would say that persons are no more honest, or generous, in any situation than it is "wise" to be in that situation; and they would point to the small boys who bully their inferiors behind the school fence half an hour after they have cleaned the teacher's blackboard in all magnanimity. Great "inconsistency" of overt behavior may be resolved to relative "consistency" when seen from the point of view of motive. Personality, then, from this point of view, is the product of a widened range of stimuli which provokes response tendencies present in their simplest form in all persons.

Even in these terms the child has some "character," for even though the whole repertoire was originally an agglomeration of independent reflexes, he has a fairly predictable behavior system. It is hard to see how a child's conduct can be a pure "product of the situation" even if the situation is *absolutely* unlike previous situations confronted. The individual in a social situation seldom shows the complete plasticity which the rigid situationists assume, and which might be quite to his advantage to show.

On the other hand, there are abundant data indicating that nearly all *generalized traits* among children, adolescents, and young adults suffer the same fate as *general honesty*. "Confi-

dence" in one situation allows, for example, no useful prediction as to how much confidence there may be in another.<sup>174</sup> The fact is that the experimental studies show very little interrelation between the habits functioning in the many different groups of situations.

The question then is whether there really *is* any such character trait as honesty or confidence. To this it may be replied that if the correlations were in fact *zero*, each form of confidence would be independent of all the others, and so on; but if the correlations are positive at all, it shows that there is a general factor of confidence. Even if this correlation be but ten (out of a possible one hundred), we have detected a general confidence factor; the trouble is that we have mixed in with it a great many things *besides* this general factor. This, then, is a function of the way in which the tests are constructed, and is not in any sense an argument against the existence of the generalized trait. The fact that the correlation is low raises the question as to how *important* this general factor is in relation to other factors affecting the children's behavior. A general tendency toward being honest, and a general tendency to avoid arguments or conflict, and a general tendency to make a good impression, and a general tendency to "get all that is coming" to one, might all be operating in any one situation, or series of situations, and to quite different effect as a result of slight differences in the situations. In other words the concept of inter-play between the situation and the personality would probably be quite as useful here as it was in the case of emotional behavior at the age of two years. We may even conceive the problem in terms of a "threshold for honesty" which would be raised or lowered by the probable severity of the teacher if one told the truth, the likelihood of being found out if one didn't tell the truth, the disapproval of one's friends if one did tell, the added trust of the teacher if one did tell, and so on. Presumably here also, the results of any given experience would affect the threshold for subsequent responses.

To return to our discussion of the tests, then, where we are concerned with a comprehensive picture of the honesty of a given person at a given time. The reliability of the tests is increased by taking a larger and larger number of them, so that in time one may say that one has covered all the ground which the trait covers. *If in fact tests of honesty, confidence and so on are tests of the thing they purport to test, they assume at the start that there is a general factor; and if they come out with any reliable positive correlation at all they prove the assumption to have been correct.* The task of raising the correlation is simply a task of taking a wider array of situations and grouping the tests into teams. How important the general trait will be in a concrete case, however, can not possibly be guessed in advance. The expression of the general trait may in fact be very easy or very hard to see, depending on the specific *details* mixed up with it in any concrete situation.

WE COME next to the question of the *inheritance* of personality traits. We have seen that children of primary school age (from about six to the onset of puberty) show a certain general factor of character. They even show an interrelation between general honesty, general self-control, and general unselfishness, so that we not only have a right to go beyond the habit factor in its simplest form, but to invoke some sort of hypothesis regarding the reasons for interconnection between these apparently distinct activities. Why, after all, should there be any connection whatever between refusal to cheat and willingness to give up part of school kit? Why should there be any connection between refusal to falsify an examination paper and the capacity to keep going at a rather dull task despite enticing distractions? All the "desirable" traits studied by May and Hartshorne, that is, those which our own civilization calls good, appear to be somewhat associated. What shall we say of this? Are some children born good and others bad? Have some children really "learned to be good," and others,

failing to receive moral instruction, simply displayed the innate perversity of human nature? The final answer cannot be given, but some illuminating data have been presented.

In the first place, it appears that the general factor of honesty increases by leaps and bounds in one group of 150 children, whereas in another group during the same years it fails to do so. The first group is growing up in a favored community; the children are "learning to be good." In particular, they are learning to tell the truth and to do those things which in their community are called honest. The other group of children which, at the fifth grade level had already shown somewhat less general honesty, became less and less honest. The forms of social pressure which make for the generalized factor of honesty — *e.g.*, admonitions and vivid examples of integrity — are not doing their work.

Are we then to conclude that such general factors as do exist are environmental products? In the case of honesty, the answer is almost certainly in the affirmative. One might hazard the conjecture, from such data as we have on generosity and self-control, that the same is true also of them. All this applies, however, to character traits in the *ethical* sense. It does not follow that this environmental explanation of the general factor has any applicability to deep-seated personal and temperamental qualities. It is, of course, possible that a child can be taught to be calm or that a nerve-racking environment might make of him a "consistently" or "incurably" nervous person. There *might* be an environment, in fact, which could produce in a given person almost any temperament. This, however, is a case of "might" rather than "can," for the probabilities seem in the opposite direction. Nervousness can certainly be created by a harrowing environment, and cheerfulness can probably to some extent be engendered by cheerful comrades; but we are almost certainly not dealing with the same sort of plasticity here which we have in the case of honesty. We have already shown that something like "temperament" certainly appears in even tiny children.

It would seem, for example, from R. W. Washburn's work, that even at a few weeks of age there are the smilers and the weepers, the jolly and the glum, and that these ways of facing life are fairly constant during the first two years of life. Not that the jolly would be unaffected by a dismal habitat, nor that the glum would prove at such a tender age refractory to all the world's sources of smiles. We are again speaking simply of a balance between co-working factors and just as we have had to give environment its due in relation to behavior according to the moral code, so we shall probably have to give heredity much of the credit for this generalized emotional disposition to which we ordinarily assign the term temperament. As we saw in the case of the previous discussion of heredity and environment, the relative importance of the two factors depends upon the range within which each is allowed to vary. If we took children of an extremely wide range of temperaments and put them in a similar environment, we should expect to find them, after a year or two, owing their differences in temperament far more to their *original* differences than to such slight differences as existed in the new environment. If on the other hand, we took children temperamentally much alike and put them in environments ranging all the way from those of the prince to those of the pauper, with all the nobility, gentry, tradesmen and laborers in between, the net result would probably reveal differences far more dependent upon situational variations than upon the original constitutional differences. Our hypothesis about constitutional factors and temperament, and the relative importance of heredity, is pertinent, if at all, only to our existing human nature and our existing social world. We suggested that if the world moves in the direction of greater equality of opportunity, there will still be differences in capacity, but differences probably less pronounced than those existing today; in the same way, if the world works towards more homogeneous emotional surroundings for children, the extremes of temperament found among them will probably not be so

far apart. Some differences in temperament, however, would probably remain even if an absolute uniformity of emotional surroundings were imposed.

Emotional habits are of course formed very early; but these habits seem to be easily formed and deep-seated in some persons, slowly formed and lightly worn in the case of others. "Myself and fear were born twins," said Hobbes. Perhaps he had a birth trauma; perhaps someone struck a metal bar behind his head when he was very young; but perhaps too, he was born with an easily upset nervous system.

Having made our point here and begged indulgence for hospitable consideration of constitutional factors in temperament, we shall not press the point further.

WE SHOULD expect that most of the constitutional factors in personality would turn out to be fairly simple; at least, that the social environment would enormously complicate the picture by interweaving various characteristics with one another into complicated *patterns*. Our analysis of honesty and other ethical traits suggests that the degree of consistency in the individual is likely to be related to the degree of consistency with which these ethical sanctions are accepted and imposed by the social groups of which he is a member. The child is in truth a microcosm which reflects the colors of his social macrocosm.

In the case of emotional trends less explicitly verbalized, and not involving such clearcut ethical sanctions, the basis for organization is more complicated. Honesty may be a result of consistently being approved when honest, together with the discovery that other people are honest, and that those who are dishonest are disapproved. Shyness, however, could not be laid so lightly at the door of social sanction, nor could a variety of other traits which in combination make the personality of any individual unique. What makes these intricate, complicated personality differences which we find among children? The general tendencies toward expressiveness or non-expressiveness, submissiveness or dominance, agitation or serenity, even

if they actually exist in babies, could hardly lead, in and of themselves, to the intricate fabric of responses that appear in children. Heredity provides variety undoubtedly; yet, as we have seen, it seldom predetermines a specific social characteristic or pattern of traits, — what heredity provides is shaped in a social mold and a mold of intricate design.

The ways in which the complexities of the process make themselves apparent may be seen in relation to the child's position in his family. Common knowledge has it that the "only child" is spoiled and undisciplined, the youngest child is forever a baby, the oldest daughter is a "little mother" and the oldest son also frequently shares parental responsibilities in a way that fundamentally determines his character. The Adlerians also have found family relationships of this sort important in creating feelings of inferiority or power, needs for compensation or for a continuation of early experience which give certain emotional satisfactions.

Psychologists, acting upon these cues from other groups, have been interested to discover what actual patterns of behavior characterize children of different positions in the family. They came to the rescue of the only child first and showed that whether in kindergarten or college, the "only child" was no more of a "problem" than children from more sizable families.<sup>175</sup> Attempts were then made to find out the truth about the oldest child,<sup>176</sup> but these also have suggested that there is very little if any difference in the *proportion* of oldest children who became problems for clinics as compared with children who came later. The mere question of whether oldest, youngest, or only, children are more apt to be problems is of course an elementary and superficial one. It was soon suggested that the really interesting question was not "are oldest children problems more often than others," but "what kinds of problems do children of different positions in the family tend to have?"<sup>177</sup> This proved to be a more fruitful point of departure; there seemed to be real evidence that certain positions in the family tended to provide certain char-

acteristic problems. But even here, results differed in relation to other major factors; in a small rich community, homes with "only" children produced problem boys more frequently, although girls were no more frequently problems when they were only children than when they were members of a larger family in this same community. School troubles and delinquent behavior (involving real conflicts with society) were more frequent among only children in the clinic than they were among children who had a brother or sister; but these only children did not show as many *inner* conflicts and emotional difficulties as the children who did have a brother or sister.

The degree and kind of problem also depended on whether there were two boys, two girls, or a boy and a girl; a problem boy was more likely to have a brother immediately below or above him than a sister. Still other investigators point out that the presence of relatives in the home, difficulties between the parents, and other factors present to a greater or less degree in all families, weigh more heavily upon the only child than upon the child whose brothers and sisters relieve him of complete dependence on the adults.<sup>178</sup> Differences in aggressiveness, leadership and self-confidence are also claimed to be related to position in the family; only children are apt to be more self-confident, oldest children less aggressive. That position in the family does have important results for personality, we can agree with the Adlerians. But an experimental eclectic must insist that *what effect position has* depends upon a large handful of other factors,—the sex of the nearest children, economic status of the family, other stresses and strains in the family relationship, attitude of the parents and other features as yet unstudied.

The study of "problem children" has also furnished a large amount of material for the study of interrelationships between personality traits *in the process of their development*, derived from analyses of emotional factors in the immediate environment of children. Among the causes comes first of all the

behavior of the parents.<sup>179</sup> The most frequent undesirable attitudes and practices on the part of the parents of the children include such features as: disagreement of the parents on discipline, friction between the parents, nagging the child and comparing him unfavorably with other children, lax and inconsistent discipline, lack of sense of responsibility for training the child, tension between the mother and child, waiting on the child too much, bribing and deceiving the child, spanking the child, friction between the child and the grandparent.

Now these various items in and of themselves, interesting and significant though they are, are not as important as their *inter-relations*. The interesting thing is that these problems do not "just happen." They seem to come in clusters and groups and where we find one kind of problem, we are apt to find another kind. We shall expect to find that when there is poor nutrition there is need of medical care, but there is significance in the following relationships. There is a marked tendency for restlessness and negativism, for negativism and emotional dependence, for emotional dependence and too much attention to occur together. In other words, it is possible that the negativism or resistance of the child may in some cases be connected with a general restlessness which is not having sufficient outlet, or on the other hand it may be that the negativism is simply one symptom of an underlying condition of which the restlessness is also a symptom. This also suggests that negativism may in other cases be a kind of reaction to or expression of undue emotional dependence, or the negativism and the emotional dependence may be due to too much restriction and too much attention from adults, in this case the negativism and the emotional dependence simply showing the front and back sides of the same pattern.

Other interesting interrelations occur between emotional dependence and temper tantrums, too much attention, too little opportunity to play with children, and fear. In every case there is the question "which is cause and which is effect?", or "may both be due to an underlying cause which none of the

data suggests?" At any rate where an approach that simply studied one child at a time might consider these simultaneous problems as merely coincidence, this kind of statistical approach suggests real interrelations between the behavior tendencies in this problem group. This illustration is given here not because we are primarily interested in problem children but simply because it suggests the interlockings of influences upon personality. Situation *abc*, which might include, for instance, (a) disagreement between parents about discipline, (b) friction with the grandmother, and (c) too much bossing, could perhaps result in emotional dependence of the child, who might be constantly seeking for a satisfactory response from each of the three adults, and in negativism as a reaction partly due to the excessive bossing and partly tied up with the emotional dependence which had also resulted from the whole situation. At the same time temper tantrums may grow out of the general emotional instability of the child in this difficult situation, together with the particularly difficult factor of disagreement between the parents about discipline. If these various causes and results can work together in this fashion in the child who comes to the attention of a clinic, it seems not unreasonable to think of the whole process of the development of personality as such an interplay of forces. Personality tendencies may be conceived as gradually emerging from chaotic behavior, with individual differences in fear, rage, and love, or dominating and submissive, crying or laughing tendencies; these individual differences accentuated or diminished by the cumulative effect of experience and transferred conditioned responses; the resulting thresholds, determined by the innate differences and subsequent learning, shown in varying reactions to different situations; and finally the complex interweaving of different long-time situation elements to affect thresholds for groups of behavior tendencies. The same environmental influences which combine to produce interrelations between traits may of course work to produce *disintegration* and unrelatedness.

This sort of analysis, it is plain to see, is simply of the nature of groundwork. It would not go far in helping us to diagnose any particular case of jealousy or negativism. But it offers substantial dependable cues for diagnosis as well as certain implications for training and education. If this evidence is valid we should not be justified in saying of a given negativistic child, merely, "He is in the stubborn stage; he will get over it soon." We should attempt to find out whether the amount of supervision and domination he had was being adjusted adequately to his growing abilities and activity, whether parents were cultivating a dependent attitude in him and what the specific emotional relations between this child and members of the family were. The problem of handling the child's negativism would of course be in large part a problem of handling the rest of the family. Similarly, in the case of the jealousy we would take into consideration the age-relations between a given child and his brothers or sisters, relative abilities, emotional relations of the various children with their parents and with each other. We should undoubtedly use concepts of "security", "compensation", "fixation", and others from the analytic schools; but should also think in terms of hereditary individual differences, past experiences modifying these differences, and the particular details of the situation in which we found a given child which might be related to his characteristic behavior.

If we now return to the question to what extent personality traits are innately interrelated, our answer is not very clear. We have already seen that emotional difficulties of various sorts do seem to come in groups rather than as single bolts out of the blue; but we have not enough evidence regarding every-day traits to be very conclusive. Sociability, laughter, and activity seem to be related in little children, and other studies suggest that various sorts of "extroverted" traits such as talkativeness, sociality and leadership are interrelated in older children. We cannot say anything very decisive however — certainly we have not a case of "where *a* is, there *b* is also," but only "where

*a* is, there *b* may be also." Even if a group of traits can be reduced to a necessary *antecedent*, it is still possible that these consequences follow only within a particular social environment. We shall do well to avoid assumptions regarding innate *patterns* (compare page 383). Often what we call a pattern is simply the same trait under various guises — a threat will serve for a blow, or a pleading look for an entreaty.

There is, moreover, no known psychological reason why personality traits should innately cluster in any extensive way. The urge toward monism of personality is largely a logical and a normative, or a moral and a practical urge. A person may talk a great deal and be either emotional or unemotional; his emotionality may be largely determined by his autonomic stability\* and his experience with people, together with the amount of specific emotional pressure he is under in a given situation; while his talkativeness may be largely determined by his larynx and his brain! We *want* people to be consistent so that we can predict what they will do but the actual amount of consistency in personality will depend largely on the consistency of the central and autonomic nervous systems together with the consistency of the experience or of life itself. In a limited, unified "culture area" we might expect to find personalities which were also consistent, limited and unified; in our own heterogeneous, confused civilization, it is unreasonable to expect unity or consistency in any great proportion of the population. The criterion of consistency is itself a culture-pattern; only when a unified cultural standard can be directly compared with an empirical behavior pattern can consistency be found.

ON THE whole, then, although we have seemed to find some evidence for general factors in character (comparable to the group factors in mental capacity), we have as yet found but few clues to patterns existing *among* these group factors. Some

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\*The "autonomic" nervous system, which controls many internal changes, is to some degree independent of the "central" nervous system which includes the brain.

patterning of group factors might be said to exist where a factor correlates significantly with another, so that those who are richly endowed in the one are richly endowed in the other, but as we have seen (page 20), mere correlation points only to *common elements* which need to be traced out; it shows nothing about true patterning. On the other hand, *some* of the type theories which we discussed above (pages 28-36) seem to be confirmed by experimental data of the sort cited in this chapter (pages 371, 389). We saw that one very fruitful concept of patterning in personality has to do with systems of interrelationship derived originally *from one single trait*; this trait, through sheer priority or through dominance, came to play a central part in the organization of character. Yet after the organization of character has once been achieved, a fairly stable structure continues, the originally dominant trait now being no longer an independent prime mover but an inseparable aspect of an organized whole.

For all the variety and even the inconsistency appearing in social responses, personality remains a *biological* unity, a system of tendencies requiring both analysis and the recognition of uniqueness. The method of analysis is necessary when our approach is genetic; we see the component parts interacting and establishing a balance. Yet the balance is always more than a balance, because in living things what was once a component or ingredient in the total has become an aspect, a reflection, of the whole. What was once dominant may under certain conditions of equilibrium become more dominant still, while under other conditions it may become subordinate. But whatever its status, it cannot remain, as an aspect of a living organism, an isolated unit.

The implications of such a view are strangely like that which has been taught, in slightly different aspects, by all of the major psychological systems whose approaches to personality have been considered here. The view is, as we have seen, an almost necessary corollary of Gestalt psychology; it is the view towards which Janet, Binet, Sidis, and Prince worked in their

attempt to understand what made for association and dissociation of personality; it is the seasoned wisdom of the wisest "organismic" type of behaviorism. It is the heart of the Freudian doctrine that symptoms require more than a description of their natural history, and lead perforce to some conception of the way in which the symptom arose from the entire personality. For Jung one needs to place the symptom not only in its context in the immediate past but also in the remote (ancestral) past and in the future. Probably the Adlerian "style of life" is the most explicit concept achieved by the psychiatrists in the attempt to make the symptom merely an aspect reflecting the whole mode of organization of the personality, to make even the personality, as it exists at a given moment, but an aspect of a totality no smaller than that of the whole life span.

Viewed in this way, it is to be doubted whether the major differences expressed by these schools regarding the form or structure of personality are anything more than differences in dialect. They differ strikingly as to the *contents* of personality — ideas, muscular responses, complexes, etc., — and there is nothing gained by trying to minimize the differences; they also differ quite fundamentally as to the metaphysics of personality. Yet as to the broad outlines of what the *form* of personality is, their differences seem secondary. This does not of course mean that they are right, or even that they are on the right road. Yet, as we have seen, the experimental and quantitative methods, especially in the study of the growing personality of the child, seem to confirm this view. Even if no hereditary patterns of personality are provided, it seems to be of the very nature of the growing organism to shape itself and to be shaped into the sort of unity which we have defined. The integration which occurs in the social process of shaping a personality is apparently in large part a process of finding ways in which habits may effectually combine (page 78). The organism has always, — almost by virtue of the definition, — had some organization, and the process of growth is in large part a

process of differentiation from the almost primeval chaos of the newborn infant's life (page 373). Yet as the process of *differentiation* occurs, new modes of *integration* are found. We need more such experimental and clinical studies, and greatly improved mathematical methods; yet even what we now have seems to suggest that the toil has been worth while.

THOUGH in the respects described here the approaches of all the schools seem profoundly alike, this is nevertheless no final *solution* of our problem as to what to do with eclecticism. In the first place, what the schools have in common, though it seems important as stated here, may seem to others to be trivial; and since this is a judgment of value rather than a simple matter of fact, it would be idle to maintain that the existence of this common ground *ought* to dissipate scholastic differences. In the second place we must recall the lack of a definitive plan for making a choice as among the various approaches when they present us with radically different *sorts of material*.

But, as we have seen, we might as well determine a child's physical condition by adding together pounds, inches, degrees, ergs and amperes as to throw conditioned responses, Oedipus complexes, and inferiority feelings into the scale pan of personality. Eclecticism of this sort provides at its best a series of portraits, one sharply drawn in pen and ink with no color; another in soft pastel colors with no outline; a third with all the realism of a colored photograph but with the same distortion of perspective. We may in "imaginative reconstruction" guess what the total would be; but if we have proceeded merely by the method of synthesis the construction will be artificial. One may not interpolate a conditioned response between a Freudian symbol and the thing symbolized, for this would be like Woodworth's "train of cars which was held together by the feeling of amity between the conductor and the engineer"; and we may not postulate Adlerian compensation between childish Oedipus complexes and the traits of an adult despot.

One may not interject images between the muscular contractions which are the behaviorist's thoughts, nor may *imagos* even be substituted at will for images.

The only sort of eclecticism which a serious scientist can respect is the integration of disparate methods into *one* method, a method which uses not merely many conceptions but many *systems of conceptions* at once. The psychologist who is intent upon grasping personality as a whole, can not possibly be content with a single system, even if he is morally certain that this system is entirely true. Suppose, for example, that one accepts psychoanalysis as the absolute truth; it is still manifest that its treatment of the problems of learning, or association, is too schematic to be of service; or suppose one is a complete behaviorist, it is manifest that to label eidetic phenomena simply "verbal behavior" is like making a red flag *identical with* a train on the track ahead. The association psychology is far indeed from having systematized the data of motivation; and Gestalt, though pointing to discontinuity, has, as we have seen, but slowly found the way to continuity.

It is, for example, very doubtful whether the *dynamics* of the "early conditionings," to which Watson refers in discussing conscience, differ very profoundly from the dynamics of those early changes in the Freudian Ego from which the Super-Ego arises. It is very doubtful whether the inferiority feelings so emphasized by Adler differ in any fundamental respect from the "narcissistic wound" which Freud describes as the basis of humiliation and self-depreciation. Moreover, the willingness of all the psychiatric schools to consider the legitimacy of explaining special symptoms in terms of the dynamic organization of the whole personality is no mere reflection of the influence of the Gestalt psychology; it is, rather, the formulation of the same conception in somewhat different language. Science, at any given stage, must consist of a *systematic verbalization*, often but not necessarily accompanied by quantitative symbols; the whole history of science, particularly of physical science in the last thirty years, has repeatedly shown that the

actual *content* to which this verbalization refers has to be redefined, though the forms, the mode of organization of the facts, may remain sound. Whether it is wiser to speak of the "libido" as *sexual*, and then broaden the term "sexual" to include the whole system of cravings, or whether it is wiser to use the term "libido" for cravings in general and then find narrower terms for more specific wants, is largely a question of interest and taste. Whether the self-assertive motive is rightly to be considered the origin of everything else will of course depend in large measure upon the way in which it is defined. If it be defined as practically equivalent to the will-to-live, it is hard to see how it differs any more from Jung's libido than it does from Freud's. And whether the mechanics of "association," as described by neo-associationists like Binet, Sidis and Prince, differs from the mechanics of "conditioning" as described by Bekhterev and Watson, is an open question.

All this is not tantamount to the declaration that the schools are all saying the same thing. They differ in at least two respects. They tend to become interested in different things, and to describe things which the other schools have not yet noticed and which they consequently find hard to incorporate until they have meditated and experimented a while. Secondly, the schools tend to insist upon certain general philosophical conceptions, for example those relating to the nature of time and the whole matter of orientation towards the future. Until the physicists can do better by us in telling what we are to think about time, it is doubtful whether any reconciliation between the "deterministic" and "finalistic" methods can be made. But by the same token, we may reasonably doubt whether these philosophical distinctions are, in their present form, fruitful in the study of personality.

Personality is as complicated as the thing to which all these approaches point; it needs all these approaches and probably many more as well. It is a struggling, partly integrated, partly conscious system of innate and learned responses, a system to which neither summation nor integration, neither conscious

nor unconscious, neither pleasure principle nor visceral tension gives the final key. Our problem is like that of a man who, should he be asked which view of the Winged Victory is the "true" one, would reply that it is only when he has studied it for hours and can in a sense see all the views at once, that he can even begin to grasp what the thing means. Or one might say that each of the existing schools is like a plane passed through a solid; the solid can not be grasped by such methods. Even so, the simile is far too simple. Simplification in exposition is sometimes useful, but in taking stock of the sort of views that might be most fruitful, we would suggest that the wisest man is he who can see the utility of all these intricate systems at once, not as a sum but as a fused or integrated total. There will, to be sure, be points in one system which will be irrelevant or in contradiction to those in another, but by and large *the systems grow both by eliminating errors and by taking account of problems which other systems have attacked in their own way.* The next great step in the study of personality will probably be made by some one who can not only conceive systems to symbolize the complexities of personality, but can clearly see that polydimensional totality to which his new system, as well as the old, must point. Although it is easy to predict that such a one will eventually arise, it will be the task of decades to shape, to clarify, and to test such a conception.

## EPILOGUE

### A FRAGMENT OF SCHOLASTIC BIOGRAPHY

COLD. A dull pressure, gradually more and more of it; a tickle spreading every which way; now a bright pain, one might almost say a brilliant pain; strains everywhere, strains and pressures, sometimes fusing, sometimes disentangling themselves for a moment; now all is a nameless blend. A shrill, strident clang, crescendo; dull pressure again. The clang fades out. Warm, glowing warm; the gray fades and twinkling yellows appear. Darker and darker gray. The yellow spots are gone. Now black, warm, pressury; an even pleasantness with almost nothing else. Background and foreground are all confused, a whirling, a nausea; a rhythmic pressure, endlessly recurring; yellow spots again; they go, and blue spots appear. A hissing, a spitting noise and a popping and rumbling, each with a strain and a sudden relaxation. A pressure on the cheek, strains in neck, now pressure on both lips near the middle and a low monotonous rhythmic tone. A fragrant odor, sweetness too, much sweetness, together with the warm, pressure in the throat, and it goes spreading downwards; more pressure on the lips; puffing again, mingled with low, monotonous tones. Now there is only warmth in and out; the strains disappear; the pressures even themselves out, the gray matrix reappears; even that fades too now and blackness spreads over it all.

TIM BABBLED of course endlessly; stresses and strains too slight to excite a cry kept the larynx continually in agitation, and sounds of "dah", "nah", "lu", "la" and the rest kept pouring forth. Every now and again throat and lips would maintain their position for a few seconds and the same sound would come out over and over again. The sounds beat endlessly on Tim's ear-drums—"la, la, la" again and again; somehow he couldn't stop. Joe came into the room, grinned broadly, stopped suddenly and was about to poke Tim's eye, but the "la, la" was too fascinating.

For a minute Tim stopped, and wide-eyed amusement reflected itself back and forth a thousand times as in two mirrors facing one another. "La, la," said Joe. "La, la, la," said Tim. Those auditory centers already so over-worked from the constant recording of his own sounds caught the sound from his big brother and shot the impulse through to the over-mobile larynx along the line already so many times traversed. In came Father. "Well, well," he said, "what's going on here? Oh, I know about you, Joe—what I mean is this, what's going on here? Imitation—he is imitating you, Joe. See here"—Tim innocently echoed "here." "Ah, ha!" said Father, seizing Tim under the arm-pits and lifting him to the level of his own eyes, a radiant smile spreading across his face. Tim's own smile presented a very pretty reflection.

Over and over again that day, that week, that month, Father came rushing in to prove to himself that the world about the youngster was really stamping itself into him according to the pattern of an endlessly varied imitation—sounds, looks, movements; the world was making a most perfect carbon copy of itself in the attitude, the gestures, the social reactions of the little son. Day by day each new venture of Tim's in the direction of social conformity brought an enthusiastic acclamation; a moment of being played with, a moment of presentation of just those stimuli which could be most infallibly counted upon to make for radiant smiles; strokings and pattings, rockings and rollings, all that was fun and exciting. But always it was

Father or Mother who administered these delights. Joe was too small, and anyhow occasional poking of eyes or pulling of hair produced more visible and more satisfactory results. Tim in the course of time smiles as Father or Mother comes into the room; frowns, wheels away or bursts into tears as Joe's shadow darkens the door.

A new nurse comes to take care of Tim. She is red-haired and stalwart, and, what is more to the point, she has a great deal more time for Tim than have Father or Mother. All sorts of new experiences, journeys down the long steps across the lawn in the sunshine, through the garden and even into the dim exciting attic, make eagerness, open-eyed expectation the symbol of her part in the world; the mere sight of her red hair and broad shoulders at the door is enough to arouse a wide-eyed and wide-mouthed gaze, a posture, a muscular adjustment, change in blood pressure and secretory changes which reflect themselves in brightness of eye and the trembling of fingers. Different sounds, too, come from Mary's lips; they are deeper and fuller than Mother's, and somehow Tim, who seemed to have infallibly inherited the inflection of the maternal voice, is found talking in the curt and almost blunt accent of a community of which he never heard. Tim at two years of age is a little bundle of habits, habits dominated for the most part by four fundamental stimuli, making Tim almost four different personalities as Father, Mother, Joe and Mary come and go in the round of the day's experience.

THE WORLD was an enigma for Tim, an incomprehensible background of which he was himself the equally incomprehensible foreground; incomprehensible, yes, but by no means indefinite. In fact, definiteness and indefiniteness could scarcely be defined for him, for everything was clear and simple except for a few moving shapes which at times lost themselves in the background and at other times lost themselves in the very foreground of himself. The world, why, yes, the world was of course the wooden horse and the string which pulled it, the

clockwork train that ran on its rails on the nursery floor, mornings of sunlight and afternoons of shadow in that nursery and the long piazza beside it, trees with more shade and lawns with more, ever so much more, of sun. The world was a background for his own ever-present and infinitely important doings. But when he liked he could shut out parts of it. By the simple process of "Let's play engine" it was possible to shut out from the world all those big and uncomfortable things which made life complicated and confused. Daddy's cane in the corner was a gun, the wooden horse was a wild mustang, chairs were outposts and barricades, and all those things which he didn't wish to recognize simply ceased to exist. The world was made by the simple *fiat* of "Let's play" — totals exchanged themselves for other totals, masses for other masses; his world knew nothing as yet of composition or elements.

But the most absorbing of games, at least in one ever-recurring mood, was the game of drawing pictures, and when a few brisk strokes had been made and the result definitely pronounced to be a likeness of Reo, the wooden horse, not only Father and Mother but even Mary would look puzzled and seem to expect it to be drawn again. One day Mary said, "Why, that's not a horse, Tim, that looks more like a tree." Yes, he could see in a sense that it was a tree; something was wrong. A second time, and suddenly the horse fell, so to speak, in two; its head, so to speak, came off as he looked at it. Head, yes, and trunk — something different, almost automatically a mark, then a pause and then another mark. In a moment there was Mary again. "Yes," she called out, "that's a horse; that's a nice horse; it looks like Reo, doesn't it?" A smile, the fundamental pattern of all the world of social life that Tim at first understood and learned to control, was there. The way was paved for a new onslaught on the horse. A grasp of legs and of tail.

Thus step by step the world was broken up. That which was one became a pattern of parts; parts were themselves grasped and drawn and within them still further sub-divisions

of parts recognized. "Tim is getting to be quite a little artist," Father said one day.

DRAWING became more and more of a hobby with Tim; straight lines, curvy lines, parrots and realistically trumpeting elephants. Teacher said that in reading and number work he was rather slow; music had no charms; and though he could beat everybody of his age at making rabbit-faces, he never showed off (except when there was company). Less and less hop, skip, and jump during that year of kindergarten; more and more sitting or lying in the corner in sober absorption in the mysteries of line and color. "That's his Grandfather Johnson," said Mother; "he used to have such an eye for color." Flat on his tummy he lay by the hour, his head turned at an angle of forty-five degrees. A curious squint one day caught Mother's attention. "Tim, son," she called, "do let me look at you!" "All right, Mother, soon as I finish this cowboy." When he went into the living room there was no question about it. An appointment with Dr. Gregg, and much reading of big letters and little letters and looking at steady lights and wavering lights. "Well, it isn't serious," the Doctor said; "we can correct most of it. It is not very often we have to correct for both astigmatism and muscular trouble in a youngster of his age."

It would not be true to say that Tim did not like books. He liked them in the same way that he liked aeroplanes and see-saws; they were fun, but they were just *things*. Some boys liked to put aeroplanes together, others to take clocks apart. When Sam Cummings founded the "Radio and Aeroplane Society of West Leander Heights" and all the younger fry tried to join it, Tim did not even ask to be taken in. In the same way books were but paper, and pages were but strings of words, about what some boy did with a shot-gun. One day, however, Mary read him a story about a Norse King with snow white hair, whose eyes sent forth such piercing rays that

the ice and snow melted in rivulets about him; their fiery gleam softened the frozen earth and started the sap running in the trees; a glance at the storm clouds turned them into the lightest of fleecy wisps, breathing the gentleness of spring. The picture was fascinating, absorbing, overwhelming; Tim had to draw and redraw it. The King became daily more real. Tim had to have a sword and crown and to stare the grocery man out of countenance. Even the good-natured Tony, who brought the ice, thought it strange that Tim should pout and glare so at his morning burden on its way into the refrigerator. It actually melted a little faster too; anyhow Tim thought so. Tim, the King, gradually drove out Tim the little boy. He built himself daily a royal world of thoughts, thoughts that re-echoed the days when Johnsons were Jansens, the day when that which was the germ of Tim's unfolding mind was Jan, son of Jan, Herald to the great King Skiold of Righolm. The drawing went on, but in place of houses, the great hall Valhalla; in place of maples and elms, the great tree Ygdrasil.

SURELY he had found within himself what met his deepest needs. He did not seem to need "the gang" which was comprised of many of his contemporaries. But one who saw a bit beneath the surface would note that though he cared nothing for baseball he struggled to make the school nine; made it despite the vast burden of glass that his eyes had to carry, and was actually chosen top-string pitcher. One would have thought the furious effort he threw into the struggle strange and unaccountable in view of the aloofness of the same boy a few years before. Strangely enough, games played away from the home diamond were solemnly planned and coolly and infallibly pitched through; and nearly all of them were won. The games on the home field were erratic, confused, and unpredictable. Once in the eighth inning he stared into the grandstand for nearly a minute before he pitched the first ball. He looked and found something. Then he turned, and threw a wild pitch five feet over the catcher's head; and he turned red.

"Who is she, Tim?" called a mocking voice from the enemy's grandstand, and a gale of laughter rang out.

The rest of the season was a frantic struggle against detection, detection of the sin of being in love. Once after he had seemed to throw away a game and the sullen team was leaving the shower room, Tim did not say a word. He did not even look at his team mates. Two faces were struggling in his imagination, one framed with graying hair, the other with deep auburn, but they were strangely alike. "Snap out of it," he kept saying to himself, and began to whistle. "What's that you're whistling?" said his friend Bob. "Oh, nothing," said Tim, "I don't know, I can't remember the names of tunes." "Well, I do," said Bob, "it's 'I Want a Girl Just Like the Girl that Married Dear Old Dad.'"



## NOTES

Books in foreign languages are referred to by  
English title only if they have been translated.

- <sup>1</sup> Locke, J. *An essay concerning human understanding*, 1690, Book II, Chap. XII, 6.
- <sup>2</sup> Bekhterev, V. (Bechterew, W.) *La psychologie objective*, 1913 (Russian original, 1907).
- <sup>3</sup> Watson, J. B. Psychology as the behaviorist views it, *Psychol. Rev.*, 1913, vol. 20, 158-177.
- <sup>4</sup> Wertheimer, M., Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von Bewegung, *Zsch. f. Psychol.*, 1912, vol. 61, 161-265.
- <sup>5</sup> See especially the survey given by Koffka, K. Perception: an introduction to the *Gestalt-theorie*, *Psychol. Bull.*, 1922, vol. 19, 531-585.
- <sup>6</sup> Fechner, G. T. *Elemente der Psychophysik*, 1860.
- <sup>7</sup> Ebbinghaus, H. *On memory*, 1885.
- <sup>8</sup> Compare, however, Köhler, W. *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*, 1924.
- <sup>9</sup> Volkelt, H. Fortschritte der experimentellen Kinderpsychologie, *Ber. ü. d. IX. Kong. f. exper. Psychol.*, 1925 (publ. 1926), 80-135.
- <sup>10</sup> See, for example, Cramauvel, E. Expériences au jardin d'enfants, *J. de Psychol.*, 1927, vol. 24, 701-718.
- <sup>11</sup> If, of course, only a cross section at a given point in time is considered, the expression that "the whole determines its parts" is meaningless, since parts and wholes are merely different aspects of experience. In changing or dynamic situations, however, it is legitimate to point out that the part is regulated by the trend of the whole, in the sense that an entity existing outside the pattern would have to be changed to be acceptable in the pattern at all; thus, a given blotch of color moved from a point of isolation into the midst of a landscape seems to undergo transformations. We should, of course, willingly concede that if the thing changes, it is no longer the *same thing*, and that it is only in a loose sense that an aspect of a whole "remains" the same as the previously existing part. For most purposes, however, the fact that a phenomenon seems to change as its context changes justifies the present form of expression, as long as it is not made to do too much metaphysical work.
- <sup>12</sup> The question of the "reality" of discontinuities in the mathematician's world is, of course, a rather silly one, since one can invent an infinite number of different realms of logical and mathematical discourse. The reader who does not wish to be disturbed by problems in mathematical or logical theory will do well to consider this presentation simply in the light of Euclidean space of *finite* dimensions. It may quickly be granted that in modern geometry the parabola merges into the ellipse, since the parabola is merely an ellipse having its foci at an infinite distance; in this way discontinuity is avoided. The astronomer who is actually trying to decide whether a comet *will* come back or *will never* come

- back must for his own purposes regard the distinction between parabolas and ellipses as absolute. Compare Russell, H. N., Dugan, R. S., and Stewart, J. Q., *Astronomy*, 1926, 411.
- <sup>13</sup> See Merz, J. T. *History of European thought in the nineteenth century*, 1896, I, 116.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 403.
- <sup>15</sup> Krueger, F. *Über Entwicklungspsychologie*, 1915.
- <sup>16</sup> See Roback, A. A. *The psychology of character*, 1927, 320-337.
- <sup>17</sup> Reference is to Husserl's phenomenology, as described, for example, in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900.
- <sup>18</sup> Giese, F. Das Ich als Komplex in der Psychologie, *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1914, vol. 32, 120-165.
- <sup>19</sup> There is, of course, a "most probable" degree of endowment in traits *b*, *c*, *d*, for any given value of *a*, but any amount of each trait can appear along with any amount of each other trait.
- <sup>20</sup> Titchener, E. B. *Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought-processes*, 1909, 27.
- <sup>21</sup> Köhler, W. *The mentality of apes*, 1925.
- <sup>22</sup> Adams, D. K. Experimental studies of adaptive behavior in cats, *Comp. Psychol. Monog.*, 1929, vol. 6, No. 1.
- <sup>23</sup> James, W. *A pluralistic universe*, 1907.
- <sup>24</sup> Hartshorne, H., May, M. A., and Maller, J. B. *Studies in service and self-control*, 1929.
- <sup>25</sup> Hartshorne, H., May, M. A., and Shuttleworth, F. K. *Studies in the organization of character*, 1930.
- <sup>26</sup> See, for example, McFarland, R. A. The rôle of speed in mental ability, *Psychol. Bull.*, 1928, vol. 25, 595-612.
- <sup>27</sup> Washburn, R. W. A study of the laughing and smiling of infants in the first year of life, *Genet. Psychol. Monog.*, 1929, vol. 6, nos. 5 and 6.
- <sup>28</sup> That this is more than a general conjecture seems reasonably well established by case studies of delinquents and others, e.g., *Judge Baker Foundation case studies*, series No. 1, 1922.
- <sup>29</sup> Allport, G. W. The study of the undivided personality, *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1924, vol. 19, 132-141.
- <sup>30</sup> See, for example, Sharpey-Schafer, E., *The endocrine organs*, 2nd ed. 1924-1926.
- <sup>31</sup> Bleuler, E., *Theory of schizophrenic negativism*, 1912.
- <sup>32</sup> Jung, C. G. *Psychological types*, 1920.
- <sup>33</sup> See, for example, Heidbreder, E., Measuring introversion and extroversion, *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1926, vol. 21, 120-134.
- <sup>34</sup> Kretschmer, E. *Physique and character*, 1925.
- <sup>35</sup> Thus Francis Galton was content to speak of persons with vivid visual imagery as "visionaries" without inquiring into their auditory imagery (*Inquiries into human faculty*, 1883).
- <sup>36</sup> Jaensch, E. R. *Eidetic imagery and typological methods of investigation*, 1930; Klüver, H. The eidetic child, in C. Murchison's *Handbook of child psychology*, 1930.
- <sup>37</sup> Klüver, H. Fragmentary eidetic imagery, *Psychol. Rev.*, 1930, vol. 37, 441-458.
- <sup>38</sup> Klüver, H. Studies on the eidetic type and on eidetic imagery, *Psychol. Bull.*, 1928, vol. 25, 69-104.
- <sup>39</sup> A volume like this is not a suitable place for the presentation of type theories which are concerned more with logic and with the tools necessary in the analysis of cultural phenomena than they are with types of personality. The "ideal types" which are used in contemporary German philosophy in an attempt to understand the attitudes and character of the religious man, the economic man, the aesthetic man, and so on, appear to be primarily instruments for the exploration of human history. Though the value of such instruments is not to be judged on the basis of empirical findings in psychology (because several types coexist in one person and defy quantitative separation) it is of great interest to note that G. W. Allport

has recently attempted to see what can be done towards measuring the tendencies towards such types.

<sup>40</sup> See Conklin, *Heredity and environment in the development of man*, 1918 and subsequent editions.

<sup>41</sup> The theory does not of course assume a one-to-one relation between a measured trait and a gene. Some measured traits might be products of dozens of genes, while a single gene might help to determine dozens of traits. This complicates, but does not seem to alter, the concept of patterning through "linkage."

Klüver (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1931, vol. 10. 781-788) has urged that the term "type" be discarded wherever static systems of relationships are involved. The term should be used, he believes, to define dynamic systems of interaction between personal characteristics. Since it is hard nowadays to say anything worse of a thing than that it is static, or anything better than that it is dynamic, we hesitate to play the rôle of *advocatus diaboli*. Yet with the disappearance of "force," in the sense of pushes and pulls, from physical science, the term "dynamic" often means simply the temporal priority of one characteristic over another. This seems to define one real kind of type (p. 29) but only one. If the *interaction* between characteristics is implied, it seems worth while to note that most such interactions are inaccessible to present physiological techniques. It is hard enough to ascertain the definite patterning of traits; in the meantime it seems worth while to use and to emphasize such patterns as we do find, even though it will be a long time before the biological reasons for the patterning become thoroughly intelligible. Most of our best existing methods seem to involve only such "dynamics" as are involved in geometry.

<sup>42</sup> Titchener, E. B. *A textbook of psychology*, 1909-1910.

<sup>43</sup> Dalton, J. Extraordinary facts relating to the vision of colours, a paper read at Manchester in 1794.

<sup>44</sup> Titchener, E. B. *A textbook of psychology*, 1909-1910, 197-199.

<sup>45</sup> See the references given in Note 36.

<sup>46</sup> Titchener, E. B. *Lectures on the elementary psychology of feeling and attention*, 1907.

<sup>47</sup> James, W. *Principles of psychology*, 1890, II, 442-485.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Titchener, E. B. *A textbook of psychology*, 1909-1910, 202 ff.

<sup>49</sup> Klüver, H. Visual disturbances after cerebral lesions, *Psychol. Bull.*, 1927, vol. 24, 316-358.

<sup>50</sup> See, for example, Jersild, A. T. Mental set and shift, *Arch. Psychol.*, 1927, No. 89.

<sup>51</sup> As in the preceding chapter, we are endeavoring to show where the existing psychological concepts lead, and not to speak for others. We doubt, for example, whether Titchener would have been interested in the present description of an "existential" psychology of personality.

<sup>52</sup> Probably few will challenge the statement that the greatest mediator between psychology and psychiatry was Théodule Ribot: cf. his *Diseases of memory and Diseases of personality*.

<sup>53</sup> Carpenter, W. B. *Mental physiology*, 1874, 515-517.

<sup>54</sup> Dieffenbach, J. F. *Die Heilung des Stotterns durch eine chirurgische Operation*, 1841.

<sup>55</sup> Liébeault, A. A. *Le sommeil provoqué et les états analogues*, 1889; *Thérapeutique suggestive, son mécanisme, propriétés diverses du sommeil provoqué et des états analogues*, 1891.

<sup>56</sup> Bernheim, H. *De la suggestion dans l'état hypnotique et dans l'état de veille*, 1884, *Automatisme et suggestion*, 1917.

<sup>57</sup> Charcot, J. M. *Oeuvres complètes*, 1891.

<sup>58</sup> See Wittels, F. *Sigmund Freud*, 1924, chap. 4.

<sup>59</sup> Janet, P. M. F. *The mental state of hystericals*, 1892; *The major symptoms of hysteria*, 1907, 2nd ed., 1920.

<sup>60</sup> Thus Janet's celebrated case, Irène, passed into a "monoideic" state in which she remembered absolutely nothing but her mother's illness; in all other states the mother's illness was forgotten.

- <sup>61</sup> Janet, P. M. F. *The major symptoms of hysteria*, 61-63.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 68-69.
- <sup>63</sup> Binet, A. *On double consciousness*, 1890, 2nd ed., 1896; *Alterations of personality*, 1892.
- <sup>64</sup> Richet, C. *Essai de psychologie générale*, 1891.
- <sup>65</sup> Azam, M. Le dédoublement de la personnalité et le somnambulisme, *Rev. Scient.*, 1890, vol. 46; *Hypnotisme et double conscience, origine de leur étude et divers travaux sur des sujets analogues*, 1893.
- <sup>66</sup> Binet, A. *On double consciousness*, 39.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 409-419.
- <sup>68</sup> Sidis, B., and Goodhart, S. A. *Multiple personality*, 1905.
- <sup>69</sup> Numerous references will be found in Taylor, W. S. *Readings in abnormal psychology and mental hygiene*, 1926, 435-545.
- <sup>70</sup> Prince, M. *The unconscious*, 1914, 147-187.
- <sup>71</sup> Prince, M. *Clinical and experimental studies in personality*, 1929.
- <sup>72</sup> Prince, M. *The unconscious*, 33-34.
- <sup>73</sup> Prince, M. *The dissociation of a personality*, 1905, 313.
- <sup>74</sup> This dependence of psychiatry upon association theory has been repeatedly emphasized by the Zurich school, notably Riklin.
- <sup>75</sup> Janet, P. M. F. L'analyse psychologique, in Murchison, C. *The psychologies of 1930*.
- <sup>76</sup> Burnett, C. T. Splitting the mind: an experimental study of normal men, *Psychol. Monog.*, vol. 34, no. 2 (Whole no. 155), 1925.
- <sup>77</sup> Messerschmidt, R. A quantitative investigation of the alleged independent operation of conscious and subconscious processes, *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1927-1928, vol. 22, 325-340.
- <sup>78</sup> Experiences of this sort have been described frequently by artists and literary men; they were, for example, intensely real to Robert Louis Stevenson.
- <sup>79</sup> This view, vigorously expressed, for example, by E. B. Titchener and Hugo Münsterberg, was in part a direct reaction against the terminology of Sidis.
- <sup>80</sup> For an interesting conjecture as to the nature of dissociated brain functions see Pressey, H. E. in Taylor, W. S. *op. cit.*, 484-490.
- <sup>81</sup> Stratton, G. M. An experience during danger, in *Problems of personality, studies presented to Dr. Morton Prince, pioneer in American psychopathology*, 1925, 48-51.
- <sup>82</sup> Head, H. *Aphasia and kindred disorders of speech*, 2 vols., 1923.
- <sup>83</sup> Witness the large number of problems of this type in the psychological journals, especially in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*.
- <sup>84</sup> Special importance attaches to the technique of W. R. Wells, who has made use of direct suggestion in wide-awake subjects, producing the hypnotic phenomena which have often been alleged to depend upon sleep. Wells believes that the term "suggestion" is in itself confusing, since in using suggestion with waking persons we ordinarily resort to indirection of various sorts — the suggestion is effective only if concealed. Wells's method, as he himself points out, is simply a methodical development of procedures outlined as far back as the time of Braid and abundantly utilized by Bernheim.
- <sup>85</sup> Pavlov, I. P. The scientific investigation of the psychical faculties or processes in the higher animals, *Lancet*, 1906, vol. 171, 911-915.
- <sup>86</sup> Bekhterev, V. M. [On the method of associated motor reflexes, *Proc. Soc. Clin. Nerv. and Ment. Dis., Milit. Med. Acad. St. Petersburg*], 1907.
- <sup>87</sup> Bekhterev, V. (Bechterew, W.) *La psychologie objective*, 1907 (both French and German translations, 1913).
- <sup>88</sup> Watson's recognition of the importance of Bekhterev's work and of the conditioned-response principle in objective psychology is clearly stated in his article, Behavior and the concept of mental disease, *J. Philos.*, 1916, vol. 13, 589-596. In the following year, he and J. J. B. Morgan further outlined the doctrine of conditioning (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1917, vol. 28, 163-174). The point is worth emphasis now since it has sometimes been said that Watson's utilization of the conditioned-response formula belonged to a later period in the history of behaviorism.

- <sup>80</sup> Boring, E. G. The psychology of controversy, *Psychol. Rev.*, 1929, vol. 36, 97-121.
- <sup>80</sup> Watson, J. B. Psychology as the behaviorist views it, *Psychol. Rev.*, 1913, vol. 20, 158-177.
- <sup>81</sup> Watson's retrospective account of his reaction to parallelism will be found in the preface to the second edition of his *Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist*, 1924.
- <sup>82</sup> A fundamental objection to all "double-aspect" theories of the mind-body relation is quite clear in a long and most illuminating footnote in *Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist*, 2nd ed., 352. Watson argues that there are probably centrifugal fibres from the brain to the retina, and that genuine effector processes occur in the case of vision (and hence of visual imagery). The trouble with images had been that they were *parallel* to brain activities, a sort of phosphorescence like that described by the epiphenomenalists. Balking at all such doctrines, Watson preferred to say that the visual image is not parallel to, but simply *is*, a physical event, and furthermore that the physical event is no mere chemical change in the *brain*, but a muscular, glandular, or other effector process. It is, of course, to be seriously doubted whether this view is any more "materialistic" than the double-aspect theories of many other psychologists; but in order to grasp behaviorism it is essential to recognize that Watson felt all parallelist and epiphenomenalist theories to contain a vestige of soul theory.
- <sup>83</sup> The official position in the U.S.S.R. will be found in Kornilov, K., *Psychology in the light of dialectic materialism*, in C. Murchison's *Psychologies of 1930*, 243-278. Bekhterev's position is well stated by Schniermann in the same volume, but the contemporary journals make it quite clear that Kornilov's school has already gained the ascendancy.
- <sup>84</sup> Watson is so insistent upon this point that in his *Behaviorism*, 2nd ed., 1930, we have not only a heavy emphasis upon the details of physical structure, but a vigorous assault upon the notion of the inheritance of mental traits. See, for example, his criticism (p. 105 ff) of Gesell's evidence for the striking similarity of identical twins. Behaviorism in this case has almost come to mean an emphasis upon the all-importance of learning as against heredity.
- <sup>85</sup> Titchener, E. B. *Experimental psychology*, 4 vols., 1901-05.
- <sup>86</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus*, § 190 (Jowett trans.).
- <sup>87</sup> Lorimer, F. *The growth of reason*, 1929, 69-70.
- <sup>88</sup> Bain, A. *The senses and the intellect*, 1855, 345.
- <sup>89</sup> Thorndike, E. L., and others. *The measurement of intelligence*, 1926, 426.
- <sup>100</sup> See, for example, Peatman, J. G. A study of factors measured by the Thorndike Intelligence Examination for High School Graduates, *Arch. Psychol.*, 1931, No. 128.
- <sup>101</sup> See various studies in the *Twenty-seventh yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, 1928.
- <sup>102</sup> Gesell, A., and Thompson, H. Learning and growth in identical infant twins: an experimental study by the method of co-twin control, *Genet. Psychol. Monog.*, 1929, vol. 6, no. 1.
- <sup>103</sup> A brief summary is given by Newman, H. H., *Scient. Mo.*, 1932, vol. 34, 169-171.
- <sup>104</sup> Terman, L. M. *The measurement of intelligence*, 1916, 290-301, 302-306.
- <sup>105</sup> Rivers, W. H. R. A case of claustrophobia, *Lancet*, 1917, vol. 193, 237-240.
- <sup>106</sup> Watson, J. B. *Behaviorism*, 2nd ed., especially chaps. 10, 11, 12.
- <sup>107</sup> The issue is very complicated, and the word "seems" is all that may well be used. The statement in the text is based on the analysis by Razran, H. S. Theory of conditioning and related phenomena, *Psychol. Rev.*, 1930, vol. 37, 25-43.
- <sup>108</sup> Jones, M. C. The elimination of the conditioned fear response, *Ped. Sem.*, 1924, vol. 31, 308-315.
- <sup>109</sup> Watson, J. B. *Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist*, 2nd ed., 231-236.
- <sup>110</sup> For a more complex representation of the theory in diagram form, see Watson, J. B. *Behaviorism*, 2nd ed., 253, 257, 258, 266.
- <sup>111</sup> Research now in progress by F. Guanella and B. Biber suggests the importance of such language controls as are mentioned in the text; both studies will appear in the *Arch. Psychol.*

- <sup>112</sup> Watson, J. B. *Behaviorism*, 2nd ed., 264.
- <sup>113</sup> The statement applies to Watson's *Behaviorism* but not to the doctrines worked out by E. B. Holt in *The Freudian wish and its place in ethics*, 1915.
- <sup>114</sup> Among psychological studies, special attention should be drawn to the writings of W. I. Thomas; a large number of cases in which this approach can be seen at work are available in Thomas, W. I., and Thomas, D. S., *The child in America*, 1928.
- <sup>115</sup> Freud, S. *General introduction to psychoanalysis*, 1920, 7-8. Our translation differs somewhat from Hall's.
- <sup>116</sup> Kant, I., *Critique of pure reason*, 1781.
- <sup>117</sup> Nietzsche, F. *Beyond good and evil*, 1886.
- <sup>118</sup> Dilthey, W., *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, 1894. (Zergliedern=dismember.)
- <sup>119</sup> Haeckel, E., *Das Welträthsel*, 1899.
- <sup>120</sup> It may appear strange that the perspective from which the development is seen seems to stress the German researches more than those of other countries. Freud, however, is a product of the German atmosphere, and this was decisive for the conception of his work. It is clear that each country produces schools of thought colored by its unique atmosphere, tradition and history. In presenting the history of psychoanalysis, therefore, we regard the development more through Freud's eyes, that is, subjectively, rather than objectively through the eyes of the observer.
- <sup>121</sup> Freud, S. *The problem of lay analyses*, 1927, contains an Autobiographical Study which will be of great value to the historically minded student.
- <sup>122</sup> Rosanoff, A. J. *Manual of psychiatry*, 6th ed., 1930.
- <sup>123</sup> See the Clark University lectures delivered by Freud in 1909, published in *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1910, vol. 21, 181-218.
- <sup>124</sup> *Studien über Hysterie*, 1895.
- <sup>125</sup> Schultz, I. H. *Seelische Krankenbehandlung*, 1922.
- <sup>126</sup> Bernheim's point of view is expressed in his *Suggestive Therapeutics*, trans. from 2nd French ed., 1880.
- <sup>127</sup> Freud, S. History of the psychoanalytic movement, *Psychoanalytic Rev.*, 1916, vol. 3, 412. Our translation differs slightly.
- <sup>128</sup> Mohr, F. *Psychophysische Behandlungsmethoden*, 1925, 270.
- <sup>129</sup> Jaspers, K. *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, 1923.
- <sup>130</sup> See especially Freud's *Psychopathology of everyday life*, 1904.
- <sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*.
- <sup>132</sup> Nietzsche, F. *Beyond good and evil*, Apothegms.
- <sup>133</sup> See, for example, Klein, D. B., *The experimental production of dreams during hypnosis*, 1930.
- <sup>134</sup> Freud, S. *General introduction to psychoanalysis*, 1920, 292.
- <sup>135</sup> Freud, S. *Collected papers*, 1925, IV, 30-59.
- <sup>136</sup> Freud, S. *General introduction to psychoanalysis*, 1920, 294 ff.
- <sup>137</sup> Freud, S. *The ego and the id*, 1923, chap. 4.
- <sup>138</sup> Freud states that he owes the formulation of the concept partly to G. Groddeck's *Das Buch vom Es*, 1923.
- <sup>139</sup> Freud, S. *Beyond the pleasure principle*, 1920, 76.
- <sup>140</sup> Freud, S. History of the psychoanalytic movement, *Psychoanalytic Rev.*, 1916, vol. 3, 454.
- <sup>141</sup> *Studies in word-association*, edited by Jung in 1910, is a symposium based partly on the joint work published by Jung and Riklin in 1904.
- <sup>142</sup> Kraepelin, E. *Über die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgänge*, 1892.
- <sup>143</sup> See, for example, Sommer, R. *Diagnostik der Geisteskrankheiten*, 1894.
- <sup>144</sup> Jung, C. G. The association method, *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1910, vol. 21, 219-269; quotation is from pages 230-235. Reprinted by courtesy of the editors.
- <sup>145</sup> Jung, C. G. *Psychological types*, 1920, 211. Our translation differs slightly from Baynes'.
- <sup>146</sup> See especially *Psychological types*, 542 and 567.
- <sup>147</sup> Jung, C. G. *Psychology of the unconscious*, 1912, 82.
- <sup>148</sup> Jung, C. G. *The theory of psychoanalysis, Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Monog.*, Series

- No. 19, 1915. (This had been written just before the break with Freud, but Jung's distinctive approach will easily be seen.) We have used passages from pages 12-14 and 73-76; but again there are differences in translation.
- <sup>142</sup> Künkel, F. Die Kritik der Triebe, *Intern. Zsch. f. Individualpsychologie*, 1927, vol. 5.
- <sup>150</sup> Adler, A. Unpublished lecture; cf. *Practise and theory of individual psychology*, 1924, p. 2 ff.
- <sup>151</sup> Wexberg, E., *Individual psychology*, 1929.
- <sup>152</sup> Adler, A. A study of organ inferiority and its psychical compensation, *Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Monog.*, 1917 Series No. 24 (German original 1907).
- <sup>153</sup> Wexberg, E. *Individual psychology*, 1929, chap. 5.
- <sup>154</sup> Laird, D. The influence of likes and dislikes on memory as related to personality, *J. Exper. Psychol.*, 1923, vol. 6, 294-303.
- <sup>155</sup> Beck, O. Ursache und Therapie bei verwahrlosten Jugendlichen, *Intern. Zsch. f. Individualpsychol.*, 1931, vol. 5, 396-402.
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- <sup>157</sup> Adler, A. *Practise and theory of individual psychology*, chap. 6.
- <sup>158</sup> See bibliography for this chapter, on pages 422-423.
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- <sup>160</sup> Kraepelin's *Clinical psychiatry* is available in a slightly modified form in Diefendorf's translation, 1921.
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- <sup>169</sup> Du Bois, P. H. Dissertation to appear in *Arch. Psychol.*
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- <sup>171</sup> See the various studies in the *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, 1928.
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